








POWER, INSTITUTIONS AND MOBILE ACTORS IN 
TRANSNATIONAL SPACE 
Edited by 
Rano Turaeva and Rustamjon Urinboyev 
  
 
Labour, Mobility and Informal Practices
in Russia, Central Asia and Eastern 
Europe 
This book explores daily survival strategies of people within the context of failed 
states, flourishing informal economies, legal uncertainty, increased mobility and 
globalization, where many people, who are forced by the circumstances to be 
innovative and transnational, have found their niches outside formal processes 
and structures. The book provides a thorough theoretical introduction to the link 
between labour mobility and informality and comprises convincing case studies 
from a wide range of post-socialist countries. Overall, it highlights the importance 
of trust, transnational networks and digital technologies in settings where the rules 
governing the economic and social activities of mobile workers are often unclear 
and flexible. 
Rano Turaeva is a senior scholar affiliated with the Institute for Social and 
Cultural Anthropology, Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich and an associ-
ated senior researcher at Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle 
Saale in Germany 
Rustamjon Urinboyev is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology 
of Law at Lund University and Senior Researcher in Russian and Eurasian Studies 
in the Aleksanteri Institute at University of Helsinki 
           






BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European 
Studies 
For a full list of available titles please visit: https://www.routledge.com/BASEES
-Routledge-Series-on-Russian-and-East-European-Studies/book-series/BASEES
Series editors: 
sociology and anthropology: Judith Pallot (President of BASEES and Chair),
University of Oxford 
economics and business: Richard Connolly, University of Birmingham 
media and cultural studies: Birgit Beumers, University of Aberystwyth 
politics and international relations: Andrew Wilson, School of Slavonic and East
European Studies, University College London 
history: Matt Rendle, University of Exeter 
This series is published on behalf of BASEES (the British Association for
Slavonic and East European Studies). The series comprises original, high-qual-
ity, research-level work by both new and established scholars on all aspects of
Russian, Soviet, post-Soviet and East European Studies in humanities and social
science subjects. 
137. Governing the Soviet Union’s National Republics 
The Second Secretaries of the Communist Party 
Saulius Grybkauskas 
138. Putin’s Fascists 
Russkii Obraz and the Politics of Managed Nationalism in Russia 
Robert Horvath 
139. Building Communism and Policing Deviance in the Soviet Union 
Residential Childcare, 1958–1991 
Mirjam Galley 
140. Translating Great Russian Literature 
The Penguin Russian Classics 
Cathy McAteer 
141. Labour, Mobility and Informal Practices in Russia, Central Asia and 
Eastern Europe 
Power, Institutions and Mobile Actors in Transnational Space 







and Eastern Europe 
Power, Institutions and Mobile Actors in 
Transnational Space 
Edited by Rano Turaeva and Rustamjon 
Urinboyev 
First published 2021 
by Routledge 
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 
and by Routledge 
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business 
© 2021 selection and editorial matter, Rano Turaeva and Rustamjon 
Urinboyev; individual chapters, the contributors 
The right of Rano Turaeva and Rustamjon Urinboyev to be identified as 
the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual 
chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or 
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now 
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in 
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing 
from the publishers. 
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or 
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation 
without intent to infringe. 
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data 
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 
A catalog record has been requested for this book 
ISBN: [978-1-032-01013-7] (hbk) 
ISBN: [978-1-032-01014-4] (pbk) 
ISBN: [978-1-003-17676-3] (ebk) 
Typeset in Times New Roman 

























Introduction: Labour, mobilities and informal practices in Russia, 
Central Asia and Eastern Europe 1 
RANO TURAEVA AND RUSTAMJON URINBOYEV 
PART I 
Labour in times of uncertainty 17 
1 The struggle for formal work: The everyday experiences of 
Russia’s Central Asian labour migrants 19 
JOHN ROUND AND IRINA KUZNETSOVA 
2 Driving in the shadows: Rural–urban labour migrants as informal 
taxi drivers in post-socialist Tashkent 36 
NIKOLAOS OLMA 
3 Deportation regimes in the post-Soviet space: Producing 
deportable migrants in the Russian Federation 51 
RANO TURAEVA AND IZZAT AMON 
4 The migration infrastructure of posting: Transnational informality 69 
ALEXANDRA VOIVOZEANU 
PART II 
Mobility as blurring national, transnational and digital 
boundaries 87 
5 Smartphone transnationalism in non-Western migration regimes: 

















    
 
 







6 Central Asian female migrants’ transnational social spaces: 
Straddling illegality and tradition
SHERZOD ERALIEV AND ANNA-LIISA HEUSALA 
114 
7 Spiritual mobility: Alternative healing practices amongst Central 
Asian migrants in Moscow
ANNA CIEŚLEWSKA 
133 





Informality as state practice dealing with mobility 173 
9 Symbolic state imagery, informal state practice
CARESS SCHENK 
175 
10 Informal practices and the rule of law: Russia, migration and the 
‘Arctic route’
JONI VIRKKUNEN AND MINNA PIIPPONEN 
192 
11 ‘Ask us decently and then we will not reject anyone!’: Providing 
informal healthcare in a Kazakh medical space
BAKYT MURATBAYEVA AND BENJAMIN QUASINOWSKI 
214 
12 Dual citizenship and twofold informality: The interstices of state 














Izzat Amon is an independent researcher and practicing human rights activist 
and lawyer based in Moscow in Russia. Amon is a popular representative of 
Central Asian migrants in Russia and participates actively in political and aca-
demic events around the world with speeches addressing current situation of 
Central Asian migration to Russia. 
Anna Cieślewska is a researcher at the Department of Iranian Studies, Institute 
of Oriental Studies at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. In 2019 she got 
her postdoctoral degree in Religious and Cultural Studies at the Faculty of 
History, University of Warsaw (UW). She wrote her doctoral thesis at the 
Institute of Applied Social Sciences (UW). She graduated from the UW’s 
School of Cross-culture Relations with a MA degree, and earned a MSc degree 
in Development Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies at 
the University of London, as well as completing the Academy of Fine Arts in 
Warsaw. On account of her interest in Central Asian socio-economic devel-
opment issues and the geopolitics of Central Asia and Caucasus, as well as 
in Islam and local traditions in the post-Soviet region, she has spent the last 
15 years working on various research and development projects in the CIS 
region and the Middle East. At present, she leads the project, ‘Changes in reli-
gious tradition of migrants from Tajikistan in the Russian Federation’, and is 
preparing a research project related to transmission of Islamic knowledge and 
religious leaders in contemporary Georgia. 
Sherzod Eraliev is a postdoctoral researcher at the Aleksanteri Institute, 
University of Helsinki. He defended his PhD thesis on Russia´s policies vis-
á-vis labour migrants from Central Asia at the University of Tsukuba, Japan, 
in 2018. His research interests include state and migration policies, migration 
regimes, skilled migration, migration and religion, and state and society in 
Central Asia. 
Anna-Liisa Heusala is a political scientist and university lecturer in Russian
and Eurasian Studies at the Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki. Her
research focuses on Russian public administration, migration and legal cul-
ture, migration and human security, and comprehensive security, in which











Irina Kuznetsova is a Research Fellow and a Lecturer in the School of Geography, 
Earth and Environmental Sciences at the University of Birmingham, the UK. 
Irina works on migration from Central Asia in Russia exploring government’s 
policies, everyday experiences of migrants and social policy and the impact 
of migration on rural communities. Her recent projects focus on social conse-
quences of population displacement from Ukraine’s war-torn territories and 
are supported by AHRC, British Academy and Wellcome Trust. 
Bakyt Muratbayeva received a diploma in International Relations from the 
German-Kazakh University (Kazakhstan) and an MA in Sociology from the 
University of Bielefeld (Germany). She is currently writing her dissertation 
for PhD (Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale), in which 
she analyses different uses of ethnic categories in the ordinary language of the 
medical staff of a rural hospital in Kazakhstan. 
Nikolaos Olma is a Research Fellow at the Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient 
in Berlin, Germany. His current research project focuses on how the conse-
quences of chronic exposure to low doses of radiation is negotiated. He pre-
viously worked as a Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Social 
Anthropology in Halle (Saale), Germany and as a PhD Fellow at the University 
of Copenhagen, Denmark, where his dissertation explored the nexus of embod-
ied memory and urban infrastructure in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. 
Minna Piipponen received her doctoral degree in Human Geography at the 
University of Eastern Finland (UEF, previously University of Joensuu) in 2007. 
Dr Piipponen has worked in research and educational positions at the UEF, 
e.g., as Lecturer (2008–2009), Head of Education (2011–2014) of the VERA 
Centre for Russian and Border Studies, Project Researcher (2015–2019) and as 
Research Amanuensis (since 2020). Her research interests include international 
migratory processes especially in Russia, regional and local development pro-
cesses with particular emphasis on Russian resource sectors and border areas, 
as well as cross-border cooperation especially in North-West Russia. 
Benjamin Quasinowski received his diploma in Sociology from Bielefeld 
University, Germany. For his dissertation (University of Konstanz) he inves-
tigated the relationship between local, universal and global micro-structures 
of social interaction in a village hospital of Kazakhstan. Benjamin is currently 
working in the DFG-funded project, ‘Travelling knowledge: the glocalization 
of medical professional knowledge and practice’ (University of Duisburg-
Essen, Germany), which investigates mechanisms that lead to the worldwide 
diffusion of medical treatment standards and practices. 
John Round is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Geography, Earth and 
Environmental Sciences at the University of Birmingham. His main research 
interests revolve around the nature of everyday life in post-socialist spaces 
and the ways in which individuals/households cope with socio-economic mar-








employs the work of de Certeau and Lefebvre to theorise everyday practices 
and Mbeme’s theories of necropolitics to understand state responses to them. 
His current research explores the problems migrants face in Russia and the 
ways in which they cope with it. 
Caress Schenk is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Nazarbayev 
University (Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan) with teaching and research expertise in 
the politics of immigration and national identity in Eurasia. Her book, pub-
lished with the University of Toronto Press in 2018, is called Why Control 
Immigration? Strategic Uses of Migration Management in Russia. Her cur-
rent research is funded by research grants from Nazarbayev University and 
the competitiveness improvement programme of Tomsk State University. Her 
previous research has been funded by the American Councils for International 
Education, Nazarbayev University and the Fulbright Scholar Program and has 
been published in Demokratizatisya, Europe-Asia Studies, and Nationalities 
Papers, and in edited volumes published by Edinburgh University Press 
and Oxford University Press. Dr Schenk is also a Senior Researcher in the 
Laboratory for Social and Anthropological Research at Tomsk State University, 
a member of the Program on New Approaches to Research and Security in 
Eurasia (PONARS Eurasia) and a regional manager of the CoronaNet Research 
Project. 
Agata Stanisz is a Professor at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań at the 
Department of Anthropology and Ethnology. A field researcher and fiel-
drecordist as well as a committed photographer. An author of books. Research 
interests: anthropology of infrastructure, new rural paradigm, road studies, 
multisite and mobile ethnography, de-visualizing research methods (anthro-
pology of sound and audioethnography), cyberanthropology. Research areas: 
Western Europe, Poland. 
Rano Turaeva is a senior scholar at the Ludwig Maximillian University and 
an associated researcher at Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in 
Halle Saale in Germany. She is currently working on the project, ‘The Role 
of Mosques in Integration of Migrants in Russia’, and has been writing on 
the topics of migration, entrepreneurship, informal economies, gender, bor-
der studies, identity and inter-ethnic relations, among many others, which 
have been published in such journals as Central Asian Affairs, Central Asian 
Survey, Inner Asia, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Anthropology 
of Middle East, among other journals. Her book based on her PhD thesis was 
published by Routledge in 2016 under the title, Migration and Identity: The 
Uzbek Experience. 
Rustamjon Urinboyev is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology 
of Law at Lund University and Senior Researcher within the ERC-funded 
‘GulagEchoes’ project in the Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki. 
Rustamjon works at the intersection of sociology of law and ethnography, 









context of Russia and Central Asia. His current research focuses on (a) migra-
tion, shadow economy and informal legal orders in hybrid political regimes, 
(b) corruption, informality and legal pluralism in Uzbekistan and (c) informal 
hierarchies, religious orders and ethnic identities in Russian penal institutions. 
He is the author of Migration and Hybrid Political Regimes: Navigating the 
Legal Landscape in Russia (2020), published by the University of California 
Press. 
Joni Virkkunen works as a Research Manager at VERA Centre for Russian and 
Border Studies, Karelian Institute, University of Eastern Finland (UEF). Since 
receiving his PhD in 2002, his tasks have related to research and research coor-
dination within Russian and border studies and doctoral training at the UEF. His 
research relates to borders, border governance, cross-border cooperation and 
EU–Russian relations and transnational migration in Russian and post-Soviet 
contexts. In his recent research, he has been looking at the 2015–2016 Arctic 
route through Russia to the EU and the related insecurities, migratory strate-
gies and failed integration of Afghan and African immigrants in Russia. Since 
2013, Dr Virkkunen has acted as the Chairman of the Finnish Association for 
Russian and East European Studies and Member of the International Council 
of ICCEES (International Council for Central and East European Studies). 
Alexandra Voivozeanu is a sociologist interested in Romanian labour migra-
tion. Her PhD thesis, entitled ‘Posted Migration of Romanians Working in the 
Construction and Meat Processing Sectors in Germany’, focused on levels of 
precarity experienced by migrants in this non-standard form of employment, 
as well as on recruitment mechanisms and union approaches towards posted 
workers. She is currently a post-doctoral researcher at the Centre for Ethnic 
and Migration Studies (CEDEM) of the University of Liège. 
Jvan Yazdani obtained his PhD in Social Anthropology from Sapienza 
University of Rome, and has worked on diasporic return migration in post-
Soviet Caucasus. He is currently working as an editor and translator of aca-
demic texts and is undertaking fieldwork in North East Scotland on maritime 






This volume emerged from a very collaborative effort among an interdisciplinary 
group of scholars interested in understanding the interconnections between 
labour, mobility and informality in Russia, Eurasia and Eastern Europe. 
Generous funding from the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond enabled us to organize 
two international workshops in Lund, Sweden. The first workshop entitled 
‘Migration and Informality in Central and Eastern Europe’ (MICEE) took place 
at Lund University on 26–27 March 2018. MICEE workshop brought together 
scholars, practitioners and civil society actors (human rights activists, journalists) 
from various countries, disciplinary backgrounds and policy areas. The papers 
presented during the workshop provided fresh empirical evidence and policy 
insights and raised a lively discussion on the role and impact of these new 
migratory patterns and tendencies in reshaping the political, economic, social 
and legal landscape of Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia that is fed by 
already existing informal practices. The second workshop ‘From Economic to 
Political Informality: Exploring the Link between Shadow Practices, Policy 
Making and Development’ was also hosted by the Department of Sociology of 
Law at Lund University on 17–19 September 2019. This workshop allowed us 
to further explore and conceptualize the interlinkages between labour, mobility 
and informality, providing a space for reflecting on how we might develop and 
combine papers from the two workshops in dialogue with one another for eventual 
publication. Hence, many papers included in this volume come from the scholars 
who presented their research in Lund. 
In addition to the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, which provided the two 
workshop grants, we received financial and administrative support from several 
funding agencies and institutions, namely the European Commission (MSCA IF 
Project Migrant Law Russia, No 751911, MSCA RISE Project Central Asian 
Law, No 870647), Swedish Research Council (dnr 2018-01425) and University 
of Helsinki Three-Year Grants Programme (Project Non-Western Migration 
Regimes). We would like to express our gratitude to the Department of Sociology 
of Law at Lund University for hosting the two international workshops and 
providing necessary facilities and resources. We are also grateful to the University 
of Helsinki and Aleksanteri Institute for covering the language check and editing 




at the University of Helsinki, for editing and proofreading all chapters of the 
volume, especially during July and August of 2020, when she worked full-time 
and intensively with us, without taking any break during the summer holidays. 
As editors we have each played an active role in getting funding, organizing 
workshops, working with the contributing authors and producing the volume as a 
whole. We are grateful to Peter Sowden (commissioning editor) and Judith Pallot 
series editors of BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies 
for supporting the project through to publication. We would like to express our 
gratitude to our contributors for their hard work, understanding and patience as we 
developed this project over two years. Finally, we would also like to thank all the 
heroes in the chapters that follow—our interviewees, friends and acquaintances— 
whom we met in our respective fieldsites and who shared their transnational and 
mobile life experiences with us. It is to our heroes that we dedicate this volume. 
Rano Turaeva and Rustamjon Urinboyev 

















Labour, mobilities and informal practices in 
Russia, Central Asia and Eastern Europe 
Rano Turaeva and Rustamjon Urinboyev 
Introduction: mobility and informality 
Mobility and migration increased rapidly following the end of the Cold War
period and the collapse of communist regimes. These developments led to the
emergence of new national, regional and international mobility regimes (e.g.,
the Commonwealth of Independent States, the European Union and the Eurasian
Economic Union). These newly established mobility regimes—encompassing
visa regulations, union regulations, refugee politics, labour market regulations,
migration regulations and capital globalisation—rendered these nation-states
visible in new ways and placed state–society relations at the centre of popular
discussions (Schiller and Salazar 2013). For many travellers, mobile workers,
migrants, refugees and other mobile entrepreneurs moving beyond their home-
town or country, these new mobility experiences and strategies generated new
challenges, hardships and uncertainties. The social and kinship networks, which
served as alternative (to the state’s) welfare structures in their home countries,
were no longer available in their host countries, leaving individuals in more
precarious positions and rather vulnerable (Turaeva 2016). Another key con-
tributing factor was the rapid proliferation of draconian immigration laws and
policies within various migration regimes (Coutin 2003; De Genova 2004), a
global trend that produced millions of undocumented migrant workers for infor-
mal economies. 
However, despite tightening immigration laws and flourishing informal econ-
omies, legal uncertainty, increased mobility and globalisation, mobile people 
became increasingly innovative and transnational, whereas a growing number of 
mobile entrepreneurs have found their niches within and beyond these processes 
and structures. Since mobility does not recognise rigid state legal systems and 
boundaries, mobile actors have found alternative ways of navigating restrictive 
legal landscapes and of organising their economic activities and mobile lives. 
Today mobile people represent the largest category of people navigating their 
daily survival through mobile lives beyond nation-state legal systems, cross-
ing multiple geographic and digital boundaries and dealing with diverse power 
structures, institutions, brokers and gatekeepers. The contributions in this volume 
include original, fieldwork-based examples from Russia, Central Asia, Eastern 
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Europe and beyond, dealing with mobilities and informal practices in transna-
tional and digital spaces. 
Another key tendency explored in this volume focuses on how informal prac-
tices are becoming increasingly transnational due to the explosive growth of com-
munications and transportation technologies. We can no longer confine informal 
practices to the territory of a single nation-state. In arguing so, in this volume, 
individual authors show how informality operates across physical and digital 
boundaries, through varying means and with an identifiable impact on the out-
comes of practices that mobile actors (and other actors) engage within their host 
countries. In other words, the informalisation of societal organisation as well as 
state–society relations extend beyond national boundaries taking on a transna-
tional and global character. 
As the review of informality literature indicates, today we can speak of 
informal economies and/or practices not only in so-called third-world countries or 
the Global South but also in the North (Hart 2005; Cassel and Cichy 1986; Tanzi 
1980; Roitman 2005; Meagher 2009, 2010). There is, by now, a large body of 
literature on informal economies, schematically divided into two camps: namely, 
positive views and optimistic accounts versus negative views with pessimistic 
accounts (Cassel and Cichy 1986; Tanzi 1980; Tokman 1992; Meagher 2010; 
Roitman 2005; MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000). The literature on 
informal economies primarily focuses on examples from Africa, Latin America 
and Europe. However, some works also examine the former Soviet space 
(Ledeneva 1998, 2006, 2013; Mars and Altman 1983; Berliner 1952; Grossman 
1977; Treml and Alexeev 1994; Humphrey 1998; Kotkin 1995; Kaiser 1997). 
The approach to informality taken in this edited volume contributes to the 
novel debates falling under the ‘mobility turn’ (Urry 2012, 2016) within migra-
tion studies, based on the understanding that people, things and ideas are in 
constant and dynamic motion, thereby making the rigid institutional structures, 
boundaries and legal landscapes blurred within mobile transnational and digital 
contexts. Salazar (2017: 6) outlines the ‘new mobilities paradigm’ and states that 
this paradigm ‘incorporates new ways of theorising how people, objects and ideas 
move around by looking at social phenomena through the lens of movement […] 
It can be seen as a critique of both theories of sedentism and deterritorialisation.’ 
Studies of mobility are not a new paradigm but is rather built on a large body of 
literature, where mobility was approached from very different angles and depths 
(Giddens 1986; Appadurai 1991, 1996; Beck 2006; Salazar and Schiller 2014; 
Salazar 2017). Giddens (1986) attempted to capture movements through fluidis-
ing the structure in his structuration theory. Appadurai (1991) drew our attention 
to the processes of deterritorialisation. Beck (2006) emphasised the risks and the 
constructions of risks and power. Thus, fluidity became a central feature defining 
mobilities, structured through networks, spaces and orders (Urry 2016; Salazar 
2017; Levebfre 2004). 
Armed with these perspectives, in this volume, we attempt to shed light on the 
daily navigational and survival strategies within mobile transnational and digital 




structures are not rigid, but rather fluid and changing, where various boundaries 
become blurred and legal systems are no longer able to catch up with the ever-
growing mobilities, calling for more informal means of arranging things, getting 
things done and living mobile lives (Schiller and Salazar 2013). 
In what follows, these insights are explored within the context of post-socialist 
societies in Russia, Central Asia and beyond Eastern Europe. Literature on 
informal economies focusing on the Soviet era is scant, although some studies 
have shown that informal economies function in grey zones, between legal and 
illegal, parallel to the central state-planned economy (Portes and Böröcz 1988; 
Morris and Barclay 2008; Mars and Altman 1983; Round et al. 2008; Berliner 
1952). Some of this literature focuses on shuttle traders (chelnoki/chelnochkovyi 
biznes) in the late Soviet era (Turaeva 2010; Mukhina 2009; Humphrey 1999; 
Pohorila and Korzhov 2001; Markova 2014; Cieślewska 2014). 
Since the end of socialist regimes, the end of the Cold War and accelerated 
globalisation, mobility and transnational flows, informal economic activities 
have increased dramatically, and employment patterns have drastically changed 
(Nazpary 2002). In many countries of the Global South, economic or social incen-
tives no longer remain in state-provided jobs, whilst welfare was often provided 
under the socialist or communist promises of those states (Raeymaekers et al. 
2008; Hansen and Mariken Vaa 2004; Maloney 2004; Chen 2006). 
The empirical examples collected in this volume show that actors living within 
transnational spaces crossing several national boundaries innovatively respond 
to the bureaucratic and institutional constraints and invent various informal 
channels and strategies in order to navigate the repressive legal landscapes which 
often do not accommodate mobile labour. Trust, transnational networks, digital 
technologies and informality play crucial roles in the verbal agreements replacing 
formal contracts (Turaeva 2013, 2014; Urinboyev 2017). Rules governing the 
economic and social activities of mobile workers are ad hoc and flexible. They 
can be renegotiated on the spot and are subject to changing circumstances. There 
are many variables in play across all aspects of the negotiating process, the 
institutionalisation of new rules and relations, status maintenance, transnational 
pressures and networks as well as the formation of trust networks (Turaeva 2013; 
Urinboyev and Polese 2016). These include historical institutional developments 
and the history of state formation in the region; current economic and political 
developments, as well as micro-level aspects of daily life, such as social norms 
and cultural repertoires. These, coupled with the currents of globalisation 
processes shared via communication technologies as well as other traditional 
means of channelling information and knowledge, establish frames of ordering 
or reordering the spaces of transnational economic engagement and living simple 
mobile lives (Turaeva 2014). 
Mobility–deregulation and immigration–reregulation 
Mobility challenges national boundaries and state regulatory systems in both 
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This leads to what has been already observed as deregulation. The economic, 
political and social lives of mobile persons and migrants in the places of their 
engagement leads to additional engaged practices, requiring recognition or dealing 
with locally existing state regulations. The countries where mobile persons or 
migrants live or work, try their best to exert maximum control over all aspects 
of migrant lives and the migration processes taking place within the boundaries 
of the relevant states. This process has been observed by many researchers as 
reregulation experiences of states facing new forms of mobility and migration, 
which otherwise stemmed from the desired control over the population within the 
relevant national boundary. These two processes are unrelated and can only be 
seen as examples of experiences of mobility and the informalisation of economies, 
societal relations, politics and security. 
Regulation and reordering of transnational spaces received considerable 
attention where new perspectives were opened going beyond state-centric 
analysis of rules and rule making (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersen 2006). We suggest 
examining the nation-state legal systems from the opposite side, namely, through 
the eyes of individuals who can choose whether to follow state laws or not 
(Ewick and Silbey 1992, 1998, 2003; Silbey 2005). Rather, taking the opposite 
perspective on the issue and focusing on how ordinary people construct their ‘own 
legal world’ (Marshal and Barclay 2003)—namely, the perspective of mobile 
people themselves—provides more productive thinking about how these laws and 
policies shape the actions of those at whom such laws and policies are directed. 
Mobile actors negotiate their host country’s legal system in their own terms and 
with their own tools, which, in turn, play a part in the process of producing new 
forms of legal order and informal governance. Thus, mobile actors may produce 
various informal norms and practices (i.e., ‘informal legal orders’), providing 
alternative (to state law) means to regulate their working lives and to seek redress 
for their problems. 
Accordingly, these new informal orders and practices serve as frames of 
reference and sources of basic order for transnational mobile actors who negotiate 
their daily economic survival within and outside their home countries. In relation 
to the state or redefining the state and negotiating rules and norms represent 
aspects of these daily survival processes (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006). 
Rule making, now subsumed within the debate on transnational governance, is 
conceptualised more broadly than in its classical definition, which assumed the 
centrality of the state (Baldwin et al. 1998). Critical approaches to the scholarly 
works on deregulation pointed out the ‘new age of legalism’ (Schmidt 2004) 
and importance of the role of the state. Schmidt (2004) for instance points to 
both declining states and increasingly important ‘age of legalism’. Comaroff and 
Comaroff (2006: 33) refer to this age as ‘an Iron Cage of Legality’, in which 
law fetishism is overdetermined and where ‘the distillation of postcolonial 
citizens into legal subjects, and postcolonial politics into lawfare, charts the 
road from the past to the future, albeit less sharply in some places than in others. 
Not only are government and public affairs becoming more legalistic, but so 






Furthermore, transnational regulation was defined as a form of governance which 
‘structures, guides and controls human and social interactions beyond, across and 
within national territories’ (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006: 6). 
The above discussion on regulation, deregulation, reregulation and transnational 
governance recognises that the state is not the only governing agency and authority 
for regulation, such that other actors and sources for authority provide order and 
norms. From this point of view, nation-state law and regulations merely represent 
one among many other normative orders within society. Thus, no single, integrated 
set of rules in any society exists, whether codified into law, sanctified by religion 
or established as the rules of daily social behaviour. Quite simply, there is no 
uncontested universal normative code that guides people’s lives and actions; the 
very nature of the legal order is determined by the outcomes of the struggles and 
the interplay amongst plural normative orders. This conclusion regarding plural 
forms of regulation and normative orders are well supported by examples from 
alternative regulations and legal pluralism (Merry 1988; Griffiths 1992; Keebet 
von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2009; Eckert 2004) as well as the examples offered 
in this volume. 
Uncertainty as a resource: from mobilities to informalities 
Uncertainty is maintained and even fostered for use as a resource for economic 
gain by those in power—be it the middlemen offering services to avoid the state or 
state officials acting in the name of the state. Interethnic relations and nationalistic 
discourse rather strongly shape encounters, particularly when crossing borders 
(Turaeva 2018). Intensified by the additional uncertainty of the travellers, this 
creates favourable conditions for violence and abuse. 
This environment is precarious, as described by Judith Butler (2009, 2016). 
Butler (2009: ii) defines precarity as a ‘politically induced condition of maximised 
vulnerability and exposure for populations exposed to arbitrary state violence and 
to other forms of aggression that are not enacted by states and against which states 
do not offer adequate protection’. Here, it is important to distinguish between 
systemic qualities of risk—as in Beck’s risk society model (Beck 2009)—and 
precarity as a structural condition where knowledge of these qualities (precarity 
and risk) are given. However, in situations of uncertainty, a lack of knowledge 
about security stands as an a priori requirement for feeling insecure and in doubt 
(a state of uncertainty). On the individual level, uncertainty—namely, the lack 
of knowledge about risks—renders one completely dependent upon others and, 
therefore, vulnerable to violence and abuse. Pelkmans (2013) highlights the 
intellectual aspect of doubt, whereas McBrien (2013: 253) draws attention to 
the emotional aspect of doubt. The anthropology of uncertainty (Boholm 2003; 
Samimian-Darash 2012) is an emerging field of study, and scholarly works on 
uncertainty and risks remain dominated by quantitative analysis primarily in the 
fields of medicine, health, business and trade. 
Mobilities imply change and always involve novelty if focused on location, 
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positive outcome and moving up the social and economic ladders. However, 
mobilities as something fluid also denote instability and uncertainty. New 
locations, new rules, new environments and the absence of familial networks and 
family support lead to situations of uncertainty and risk unless people are friendly 
to each other, state officials do not abuse their authority and people are protected 
by their families and networks. In an environment of precarity, those who have 
no power depend on the mercy of those in power, feared as capable of abusing 
their power at any moment. The condition of uncertainty is maintained through, 
for instance, constant questioning of travellers’ belongings, documents and the 
purpose of travel. Uncertainty is not always viewed as negative, depending upon 
the actors and if an actor is in a position to make use of the uncertainties of others. 
Uncertainty represents a significant resource, making it easy to gain profits in 
the form of money, presents, private numbers and the attention of good-looking 
women (Turaeva 2018). 
Uncertainty and informality represent a married couple, where precarity 
and uncertainty are related to informal relations and activities producing 
vulnerabilities. In this volume, we have collected diverse examples of informal 
practices taking place in the contexts of mobility and migration. These examples 
show that individuals who live mobile lives must face the consequences of fluidity 
and the instability of rules, institutions, locations and networks. Flexibility, 
navigation and entrepreneurship are important skills actors should possess in 
order to live mobile lives. Constant efforts aimed at stabilising fluidity and change 
produce temporal orders and spaces as well as effective networks of trust, where 
individuals attempt to deal with the challenges of mobile living and uncertainty. 
Volume overview and chapter outlines 
This volume is organised in three sections, which focus on three interlinked 
themes: (a) labour, (b) mobility and (c) informality. The three sections may 
overlap in terms of their contents; however, our aim is to emphasise the central 
themes which cut across the chapters of this volume. The chapters highlight the 
ways in which mobile actors and entrepreneurs organise and negotiate their daily 
precarious livelihoods, navigating the multiplicity of rules, institutions, locations 
and networks within national, transnational and digital landscapes. 
Part I: Labour in times of uncertainty 
The chapters in this section explore how mobile actors and non-citizens
deal with legal uncertainty, unequal power relations and precarity under the
conditions of uncertainty, undocumentedness, a weak rule of law and a shadow
economy. All four chapters demonstrate that the condition of legal uncertainty
and precarity produces varying outcomes in different social contexts and
arenas. On the one hand, such circumstances may indeed lead to unequal power
relations and arbitrariness in decision-making. On the other hand, however,











structure navigation through the legal restrictions or to gain access to facilities
and resources otherwise difficult to obtain within the official legal framework
of their host country. Flexibility, navigation, street smartness and the ability to
adjust to a weak rule of law environment and corrupt system represent important
traits and skills actors need to possess when dealing with the challenges of
mobile living. 
Nikolaos Olma in his chapter, drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in 
Uzbekistan conducted between 2014 and 2016, examines the informal practices 
and experiences in the (informal) taxi sector in post-socialist Tashkent, which 
serves as a primary income-generating arena for many unemployed internal 
migrants originating from Uzbekistan’s rural areas. Taxiing is a quintessentially 
informal activity in Uzbekistan, given that it is not only a precarious profession 
practised outside the institutional and legal boundaries of the Uzbek state and 
its agencies but is itself also informed by multiple modalities of informality 
permeating the subjectivities and the everyday lives of the drivers involved in it. 
From acquiring a car to finding their way around the city to escaping regulatory 
pressure and paying bribes to traffic police officers and tax agency officials, 
informal taxi drivers continually navigate a wide array of informal processes, 
negotiate power relations, adjust to market forces and manoeuvre around various 
legal frameworks. The involvement of rural labour migrants in taxiing further 
exacerbates this informality given the informal character of most actions and 
activities pertaining to the settlement and employment of these individuals in 
Tashkent. In this sense, Olma examines the informal taxi as an index of how 
and where two seemingly independent mobility paradigms—that is, rural–urban 
labour migration and informal urban transportation—converge. Thus, Olma uses 
the informal taxi sector as a lens through which he explores the various informal 
processes and everyday livelihood strategies rural labour migrants employ in their 
attempts to deal with the uncertainty and precariousness accompanying relocation 
to Tashkent. 
Round and Kuznetsova’s chapter on the labour relations of Russian busi-
nesses and other employers with migrant workers describes the daily struggles 
of migrants who attempt to formalise their work despite continuous barriers 
established by employers more interested in abusing the precarious existence of 
migrants. In doing so, Round and Kuznetsova show that even those migrants who 
possess all of the necessary papers and permits to work legally face difficulties 
securing work based on contracts, which employers avoid. This chapter provides 
a theoretical contribution to discussions regarding uncertainty as a resource and 
power relations within labour markets and the state regulation of labour markets. 
Turaeva and Amon’s contribution on deportation regimes in Russia illustrates 
the consequences of the legal regulation of a deportation regime, namely, the new 
regulation adopted after 2012, which granted the police and courts as well as oth-
ers even more power over the unprotected migrant population in Russia in order 
to abuse the system of deporting migrants. Here, the authors describe contradic-
tory statutes within Russian law used to establish a deportation regime in order to 
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uncertainty is used as a resource by those in power to abuse migrants by rendering 
them easily deportable. 
The last chapter in this section by Voivozeanu explores the informality within 
the transnational labour market revolving around the recruitment process (or 
posting) of Romanians who work in the German construction and meat processing 
sectors. This migration infrastructure of posting involves numerous actors, namely, 
companies that facilitate posting, migration intermediaries, migration networks 
and migrants, who actively make use of grey zones and informal practices, 
creating transnational spaces that often do not fit within legal systems. As this 
chapter shows, in the context of the current European regulatory framework, 
the social fields created by posting are filled with informal norms and structures 
through which the actors involved negotiate across borders. Within recruitment 
for this type of employment, formal actors (typically, companies) rely on informal 
actors and practices to recruit workers and remain on the market. Arrangements 
which involve agents and/or networks might be beneficial for migrants, since they 
may bring (better) employment opportunities. Yet, they might reproduce power 
relations in favour of those actors controlling the recruitment process, thereby 
leading to exploitative contexts for workers. As a result, closely examining the 
entire migration process, where diverse actors develop both formal and informal 
relations and practices, it becomes difficult to differentiate between formal and 
informal arrangements amongst companies, agents and migrants. 
Part II: Mobility as blurring legal, 
physical and digital boundaries 
The four chapters in the second section of this volume all illustrate the ways in 
which mobility blurs all kinds of boundaries such as legal, informal, physical 
or geographic, digital or real world. As a result, rigid institutional structures, 
physical boundaries and legal landscapes become blurred within mobile 
transnational and digital contexts. Mobile actors, drawing upon their premigratory 
cultural legacies, practices and social capital, negotiate and redefine the rules and 
norms and innovatively navigate bureaucratic, institutional and legal constraints 
within national, transnational and digital contexts. These navigational strategies 
serve as an alternative adaptation venue, enabling mobile actors to organise their 
precarious livelihoods in repressive legal environments. 
These processes are vividly illustrated in Urinboyev’s ethnographic study 
of smartphone transnationalism amongst Uzbek migrant workers in Russia—a 
migration context characterised by a weak rule of law, malfunctioning institutions, 
large shadow economies, a poor human rights record, widespread xenophobia 
and a weak civil society. Hence, given the restrictive sociopolitical environment, 
corrupt legal system and widespread xenophobia, Uzbek migrants in Russia can 
hardly engage in collective action or transnational activism and instead attempt 
to minimise their visibility in public places (e.g., parks, streets, shopping malls 
and on public transport). Although Uzbek migrants’ transnational activism and 








communications technologies (e.g., smartphones and social media) have enabled 
Uzbek migrants to remain in touch with their home societies, as well as create 
efficient, smartphone-based translocal communities in Moscow, typically centred 
around migrants who hail from the same neighbourhood community or village in 
Uzbekistan. The existence of this smartphone-based transnational environment 
helps migrants cope with the challenges of musofirchilik (being alien) and 
avoid or manoeuvre around structural constraints such as complicated residence 
registration and work permit rules, social exclusion, racism and the lack of any 
social security. These smartphone-based transnational interactions serve as a ‘legal 
order’, regulating contractual relationships and obligations amongst migrants, 
exerting an identifiable impact on the outcomes of many practices Uzbek migrants 
(and other actors) engage in whilst in Moscow. 
Eraliev and Heusala’s chapter is an important contribution, primarily because 
it extends the scope of this volume to include the transnational experiences of 
Central Asian female migrants in Russia. Because the vast majority of migrants in 
Russia are male, the bulk of the literature on migration and informality in Russia 
has focused primarily on male-dominated transnational social spaces. Whilst the 
reasons prompting labour migration might be similar for both men and women, 
the consequences of migration can be drastically different for more vulnerable 
immigrant groups within migrant communities and, particularly, for women. 
Eraliev and Heusala argue that vulnerable migrant groups such as women often do 
not fit into transnationalism, informality or legal cultural narratives without taking 
into account the specificities of the female experience. To examine the transnational 
social spaces of Central Asian female migrants in Russia, the authors explored the 
life stories of four female migrants originating from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 
all residing in Moscow. In contrast to the previous chapter by Urinboyev, Eraliev 
and Heusala found that transnational social spaces did not include informed or 
equal choice for women. Informality, which includes multiple types of actors 
and reasons, currently sustains a transnational social space where the relatively 
well connected—typically, men—acquire rights and exercise these rights, whilst 
leaving other groups such as women and children in highly dependent positions. 
Female migrants as representatives of vulnerable migrant groups have limited 
opportunities to endure the precarious migrant life. They are not in a position to 
manoeuver around the official state structures using individualistic strategies. The 
revolving door migration between Central Asia and Russia, a lack of social capital 
and financial resources, their dependent position within migrant communities and 
strict family traditions limit the real agency of many female migrants. Instead of 
representing an empowering source of survival for female migrants, the current 
transnational social space in which Central Asian migrant women live recycles 
organisational pathologies of Russian authorities and the inequalities of their 
home countries. Thus, the decisions female migrants take regarding legal matters 
in Russia are often random, unpredictable and depend upon informal networks. 
Mobile transnational actors not only carry their premigratory cultural 
repertoires, traditions and morality to their host country, but they can also 
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of unconventional healing practices from Tajikistan to the Russian Federation is 
at the heart of Cieslewska’s contribution to this volume. Her chapter explores the 
development of the healing practices industry (such as writing amulets, divination, 
cupping therapy, etc.) in Russia. In doing so, she presents three case studies of 
migrant spiritual healers and/or religious leaders from Central Asia who perform 
spiritual services in Moscow. In particular, she examines how migrants create 
informal and formal spaces for expanding spiritual healing, and the ways in which 
those practices function in the local market as alternative medicine. Cieslewska 
argues that the informal nature of healing practices relates to the migrants’ status 
in Moscow. That status also reflects the role and function of these healing methods 
within a particular spiritual tradition. Various healing practices have come to 
Russia with migrants from Central Asia as part of their religiosity, becoming 
services offered on the ‘spiritual market’ to migrants and nonmigrants. Transfer 
takes place primarily informally through trust networks and is embedded within 
social relations. Some migrants use the informal healing services as a coping 
strategy due to their limited access to medical care in Russia. They also view 
certain practices as part of their identity, which helps them in their experience as 
migrants by connecting them to their country of origin. In Moscow, the spiritual/ 
healing practices serve as a source of support for individuals, but also become a 
means to improving one’s social position and increasing their income. Migrants 
find a niche amongst various alternative forms of healing, gradually changing the 
spiritual market in Russia. Their social and geographical dislocation also triggers 
their transformation, since they adapt to the local conditions and reformulate the 
meanings of their practices. Some of these meanings are transferred back to the 
countries of origin, influencing the local market for alternative healing practices. 
Finally, Stanisz’s chapter focuses on road regimes, where mobility created 
economic niches for a variety of actors in suburban Western Poland. Here, Stanisz 
draws upon an ‘ethnographic study of roadside villages and towns located along 
Poland’s national road no. 92, exploring how local and mobile people—that is, 
ordinary citizens, representatives of local governments, entrepreneurs, passing 
immigrants, road workers and truck drivers—adapt, change and maintain informal 
and/or semi-legal economic strategies’. 
Part III: Informality as state practice dealing with mobility 
The themes developed in the final section of this volume revolve around questions 
of bureacratising informality—in other words, formal machines with informal 
wheels. This section includes contributions that illustrate (a) how the state 
implements immigration control through various informal practices, a tactic that 
is essential for reconciling conflicting state priorities and practices, (b) informal 
practices surrounding border control and smuggling of migrants, (c) state services 
of health care or other services to provide citizens and migrants is obviously an 
ideal image of the state but not always a practice and (d) how the absence of viable 
formal legal channels incited minority groups to invent various informal practices 













Schenk’s chapter on symbolic and informal state practices ‘demonstrates how 
formal and informal practices are not only a normal part of the state function, but 
they can be essential for reconciling conflicting state priorities and practices’. 
Here, she skilfully provides an insightful analysis of two policy mechanisms— 
migration quotas and deportation—within a surrounding package of policy and 
implementation practices. In doing so, Schenk shows that ‘by selecting one key 
practice to elevate to the level of symbolic immigration control, state actors can 
absorb attention away from contradictions in the policy sphere that serve as 
evidence of ineffectiveness within the system’. 
Virkkunen and Piipponen investigate an episode, the so-called ‘Arctic route’, 
through Moscow and Northern Russia, which became a major transit channel 
to the European Union (via Finland and Norway) during the ‘migration crisis’ 
of 2015 and 2016. Migrants from various Asian, African and Middle Eastern 
countries chose the Arctic route given its cheaper price and, significantly, because 
it was considered safer than the overcrowded route through the Mediterranean 
Sea to Greece, Italy and Spain. These new migratory flows were partly driven 
by extensive coverage in social and online media reports that spread rumours 
amongst migrant communities and smugglers in Russia and globally. Another 
key factor contributing to the emergence of the Arctic route was the informal 
practices of Russian state officials (e.g., corruption, the ambivalent behaviour of 
state authorities and ambiguous deportation orders) that served both as push and 
pull factors for migration. On the one hand, these informal practices created severe 
insecurities, pushing migrants to negotiate their daily survival by circumventing 
and exploiting state legal systems. On the other hand, a weak rule of law and a 
corrupt political system served as an opportunity structure and allowed smugglers, 
local businesses and migrants to establish the Arctic route. Russian state officials 
were indirectly involved in the operation of the Arctic route by allowing asylum-
seeking migrants with deportation orders to enter the usually well-guarded border 
zone in the North and to approach the Finnish and Norwegian borders. Migrants 
had their own agency, and, with help from intermediaries situated between 
migrants and the state, they were able to manage their trip to Finland and the 
European Union. In other words, because the informal practices functioned as 
the contextual foundation for migration in Russia and along the Arctic route, 
transnational and local intermediaries along with their contacts operated in order 
to negotiate concrete solutions and practices for migrants and the state bureaucracy 
alike. Without these, neither transnational migration nor the Arctic route would 
have been possible. 
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, a different mode of
mobility emerged. This mode is translocal, much more dynamic than the typical
Soviet mode of mobility and characterised by its recurrence over individual
lifespans. Kazakhstan’s Oralmandar are a social category particularly affected by
this post-Soviet form of mobility. As a people whose family networks and mobile
lifestyles are often spread across several countries, healthcare systems, labour
markets and jurisdictions, they are also especially affected by the respective
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and Quasinowski describes the new practices related to informal healthcare
services in rural Kazakhstan, which emerged in response to the new mobility
of ‘paperless’ Oralmandar—that is, ethnic Kazakhs who immigrated from
China and Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan in the post-Soviet period. Whilst from a
strictly juridical point of view, ‘paperless Oralmandar’ are not legally entitled
to treatment, in reality they have been provided with free primary healthcare
services. These practices of informality tend to take on a complementary role to
the formal healthcare provision, particularly in rural contexts, where regulatory
frameworks are often inconsistent or entirely absent. However, these informal
practices have been significantly affected by initiatives aimed at reforming and
digitising Kazakhstan’s healthcare system, requiring medical professionals to
formally register and report each medical treatment they provide. Digitalisation
no longer allows doctors to transgress regulatory frameworks and prevents
them from providing free health care to the Oralmandar. As a result, rather
than optimising and improving healthcare delivery, the digitalisation reforms
introduced an element of arbitrariness into medical practitioners’ decision-
making, thereby leading to more informality and corruption within the healthcare
sector. This example suggests that informality may usurp a complementary
function alongside formal practices in spaces where the formal state policies and
institutions are ineffective. 
In the final chapter of this section, Yazdani investigates the informal practices 
of ‘dual citizenship’ amongst Meskhetian diasporic communities/return migrants 
in Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Meskhetian are an ethnic group that lived in 
villages along the Georgian–Turkish border until November 1944, when the 
Soviet army deported them en masse to Central Asia. Meskhetian Turks and 
their return to their historical homeland resulted from one of the main conditions 
Georgia needed to fulfil when negotiating its accession to the Council of Europe. 
Subsequently, when Georgia became a member of the Council in April 1999, the 
country accepted an official obligation and commitment to adopt legal measures 
to facilitate Meskhetian Turks’ return to Georgia. Accordingly, in 2007, Georgia 
adopted the ‘Law on the Repatriation of Persons Forcefully Resettled from 
Georgia by the Former Soviet Union in the 1940s’, a legislative act specifically 
aimed at facilitating the return of Meskhetian Turks. However, this law provided 
insufficient time for submitting applications, imposed cumbersome requirements, 
left too much room for interpretation by government officials and contained many 
other legal requirements economically unfeasible barring their fulfilment. These 
legal barriers were further exacerbated by Georgia’s new citizenship regime, 
which emphasised Orthodox Christianity and the Georgian language as primary 
markers of Georgian national identity. Meskhetians, a Turkish-speaking and Sunni 
Muslim people, thus became an ‘internalised Orient’ with little or no connection 
to mainstream Georgian society. Due to these hardships and legal uncertainties, 
Meskhetian Turk communities produced a myriad of informal practices and 
transnational lifestyles outside the nation-state’s legal boundaries. Their daily 
lives feature an indisputable transnational quality and are based on family and 






formation processes and in their eccentric relation to canonical, geographically 
sanctioned national identities. 
References 
Appadurai, A. 1991. “Global Ethnoscapes: Notes and Queries for a Transnational 
Anthropology.” In Richard G. Fox (ed.), Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the 
Present. Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 191–210. 
Appadurai, A. 1996. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Baldwin, Robert, Scott Collin and Christopher Hood (eds.) 1998. A Reader on Regulation. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Beck, U. 2006. “Risk Society Revisited.” In F. Cosgrave (ed.), The Sociology of Risk and 
Gambling Reader. London and New York: Routledge, 61–85. 
Berliner, J.S. 1952. “The Informal Organization of the Soviet Firm.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 66(3), 342–365.
Boholm, Å. 2003. “The Cultural Nature of Risk: Can There Be an Anthropology of 
Uncertainty?” Ethnos, 68(2), 159–178. 
Butler, J. 2016. “Rethinking Vulnerability and Resistance.” In Judith Butler, Zeynep 
Gambetti, and Leticia Sabsay (eds.), Vulnerability in Resistance. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 12–27. 
Butler, J. 2006. Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. London and New 
York: Verso. 
Cassel, Dieter and Ulrich Cichy 1986. “Explaining the Growing Shadow Economy in East 
and West: A Comparative System Approach.” Comparative Economic Studies, 28, 
20–41. 
Chen, Martha A. 2006. “Rethinking the Informal Economy: Linkages with the Formal 
Economy and the Formal Regulatory Environment.” In Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis, Ravi 
Kanbur and Elinor Ostrom (eds.), Linking the Formal and Informal Economy: Concept 
and Measures. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 75–92. 
Cieślewska, A. 2014. “From Shuttle Trader to Businesswomen.” In J. Morris and Abel 
Polese (eds.), The Informal Post-Socialist Economy: Embedded Practices and 
Livelihoods. New York: Routledge, 50–121. 
Comaroff, John L. and Jean Comaroff 2006. “Introduction.” In John L. Comaroff and Jean 
Comaroff (eds.), Law and Disorder in the Postcolony. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 33. 
Coutin, S.B. 2003. “Illegality, Borderlands, and the Space of Nonexistence.” In R.W. Perry 
and B. Maurer (eds.), Globalization Under Construction: Governmentality, Law, and 
Identity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 171–202. 
De Genova, N. 2004. “The Legal Production of Mexican/Migrant ‘Illegality’.” Latino 
Studies, 2(2), 160–185. 
Djelic, Marie-Laure and Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson (eds.) 2006. Transnational
Governance: Institutional Dynamics of Regulation. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. 
Eckert, Julia 2004. “Urban Governance and Emergent Forms of Legal Pluralism in 
Mumbai.” Journal of Legal Pluralism, 36(50), 29–60. 
Ewick, P. and S.S. Silbey 1992. “Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance: An 
Account of Legal Consciousness Symposium on Feminist Critical Legal Studies and 
  
 
14 Rano Turaeva and Rustamjon Urinboyev
Postmodernism: Part One: A Diversity of Influence.” New England Law Review, 26, 
731–750. 
Ewick, P. and S.S. Silbey 1998. The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday Life. 
London: University of Chicago Press. 
Ewick, P. and S. Silbey 2003. “Narrating Social Structure: Stories of Resistance to Legal 
Authority.” American Journal of Sociology, 108(6), 1328–1372. 
Giddens, A. 1986. The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. 
Berkley: University of California Press. 
Glick Schiller, N. and N.B. Salazar 2013. “Regimes of Mobility Across the Globe.” 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 39(2), 183–200. 
Griffiths, J. 1992. “Legal Pluralism and the Social Working of Law.” In B. Brouwer et al. 
(eds.), Coherence and Conflict in Law. Deventer/Boston-WEJ Tjeenk Willink Zwolle: 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 151. 
Grossman, Gregory 1977. “The ‘Second Economy’ of the USSR.” Problems of 
Communism, 26(5), 25–40. 
Hansen, Karen T. and Mariken Vaa (eds.) 2004. Reconsidering Informality: Perspectives 
from Urban Africa. Uppsala: North Africa Institute. 
Humphrey, Caroline ed. 1998. Marx Went Away but Karl Stayed Behind. Ann Arbor: 
Michigan University Press. 
Humphrey, Caroline 1999. “Traders, ‘Disorder,’ and Citizenship Regimes in Provincial 
Russia.” In Michael Burawoy and Katherine Verdery (eds.), Uncertain Transition: 
Ethnographies of Change in the Postsocialist World. Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 19–52. 
Hart, Keith 2005. Formal Bureaucracy and the Emergent Forms of the Informal Economy. 
WIDER Research Paper. 
Hart, Keith 2008. Between Bureaucracy and the People: A Political History of Informality
(No. 2008: 27). DIIS Working paper. 
Kaiser, Markus 1997. Die Soziologie in der Republik Usbekistan. Bielefeld University 
Working Paper No. 265, Bielefeld, Germany. 
Kotkin, Stephen 1995. Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Ledeneva, Alena, V. 1998. Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking, and Informal 
Exchange. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Ledeneva, Alena, V. 2006. How Russia Really Works: Informal Practices in the 1990s. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Ledeneva, Alena, V. 2013. Can Russia Modernize? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal 
Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lefebvre, H. 2004. The Production of Space. Balden: Blackwell. 
MacGaffey, J. and R. Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000. Congo-Paris: Transnational Traders on 
the Margins of the Law Transnational Traders on the Margins of the Law. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
Maloney, William F. 2004. “Informality Revisited.” World Bank Economic Review, 32(7), 
1159–178. 
Markova, Mariana 2010. Living Through the Fall of Communism: Life Narratives of the 
Last Soviet Generation. Ph.D. Diss., University of Washington. 
Mars, Gerald and Yochanan Altman 1983. “The Cultural Bases of Soviet Georgia’s Second 
Economy.” Europe–Asia Studies, 35(4), 546–560. 
Marshall, A.-M. and S. Barclay 2003. “In Their Own Words: How Ordinary People 





McBrien, J. 2013. “Afterword: In the Aftermath of Doubt.” In Mathijs Pelkmans (ed.), 
Ethnographies of Doubt: Faith and Uncertainty in Contemporary Societies. London: 
IB Tauris, 251–268. 
Meagher, Kate 2009. Culture Agency and Power: Theoretical Reflections on Informal 
Economic Networks and Political Process DIIS. Danish Institute for International 
Studies, Working Paper No. 2009-27, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
Meagher, Kate 2010. “The Politics of Vulnerability: Exit, Voice, and Capture in Three 
Nigerian Informal Manufacturing Clusters.” In Lindell Ilda (ed.), Africa’s Informal 
Workers: Collective Agency, Alliances and Transnational Organizing in Urban Africa. 
London: Zed Books, 46–64. 
Merry, S. E. 1988. “Legal Pluralism.” Law & Society Review, 22, 869–896. . 
Morris, J. and A. Barclay 2008. The Informal Post-Socialist Economy; Polese, Morris, and 
Kovács, “Introduction”; Round, John, Colin C. Williams and Peter Rodgers, “Everyday 
Tactics and Spaces of Power: The Role of Informal Economies in Post-Soviet Ukraine.” 
Social & Cultural Geography, 9(2), 171–185. 
Mukhina, Irina 2009. “New Losses, New Opportunities: (Soviet) Women in the Shuttle 
Trade, 1987–1998.” Journal of Social History, 43(2), 341–359. 
Nazpary, Joma 2002. Post-Soviet Chaos: Violence and Dispossession in Kazakhstan. 
London: Pluto Press. 
Pelkmans, Mathijs, eds. 2013. Ethnographies of Doubt: Faith and Uncertainty in 
Contemporary Societies. London: IB Tauris. 
Pohorila, N. and G. Korzhov 2001. “Self-Identification in the Society of Crisis: A Case 
of Cross-Border Traders.” Naykovi Zapiski Kievo-Mogilians’koy akademiy, 19, 58–64. 
Portes, Alejandro and József Böröcz 1988. “The Informal Sector under Capitalism and 
State Socialism: A Preliminary Comparison.” Social Justice, 15(3–4), 17–28. 
Raeymaekers, T., K. Menkhaus and K. Vlassenroot 2008. “State and Non-State Regulation 
in African Protracted Crises: Governance Without Government?” Africa Focus, 21(2), 
7–21. 
Roitman, Janet 2005. Fiscal Disobedience: An Anthropology of Economic Regulation 
in Central Africa. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Accessed June 23, 2020. 
doi:10.2307/j.ctv36zp9f. 
Round, John Horace, Colin C. Williams and Peter Rodgers 2008. “Everyday Tactics and 
Spaces of Power: The Role of Informal Economies in Post-Soviet Ukraine.” Social & 
Cultural Geography, 9(2), 171–185. 
Salazar, Noel B. 2017. “Key Figures of Mobility: An Introduction.” Social Anthropology, 
25(1), 5–12. 
Salazar, Noel B. and Nina Glick Schiller (eds.). 2014. Regimes of Mobility: Imaginaries 
and Relationalities of Power. London: Routledge. 
Samimian-Darash, L. 2012. “Governing Future Potential Biothreats: Toward an 
Anthropology of Uncertainty.” Current Anthropology, 54(1), 1–22. 
Schmidt, P. 2004. “Law in the Age of Governance: Regulation, Networks and Lawyers.” In 
Jacint Jordana and David Levi-Faur (eds.), The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and 
Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 273–295. 
Silbey, S.S. 2005. “After Legal Consciousness.” Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 
1(1), 323–368. 
Tanzi, Vito 1980. “Underground Economy and Tax Evasion in the United States: Estimates 
and Implication.” Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, 32, 427–453. 
Tokman, V.E. 1992. Beyond Regulation: The Informal Economy in Latin America. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
  16 Rano Turaeva and Rustamjon Urinboyev
Treml, Vladimir G. and Michael V. Alexeev 1994. “The Growth of the Second Economy 
in the Soviet Union and its Impact on the System.” In Robert W. Campbell (ed.), The 
Postcommunist Economic Transformation. Boulder, CO: Westview, 221–248. 
Turaeva, Muyassar 2010. “Women’s Health in Central Asia: The Case of Female Suitcase 
Traders.” Anthropology of the Middle East, 5(2), 1–15. 
Turaeva, Rano 2013. “Post-Soviet Uncertainties: Micro-orders of Central Asian Migrants 
in Russia.” Inner Asia, 15(2), 273–292. 
Turaeva, Rano 2014. “Mobile Entrepreneurs in Post-Soviet Central Asia.” Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies, 47(1), 105–114. 
Turaeva, Rano 2016. Migration and Identity in Central Asia: The Uzbek Experience. 
Routledge. 
Turaeva, Rano 2018. “Border and Road Regimes in Central Asia: Ordering Disorder at 
Uzbek-Kazakh Checkpoint.” In Routledge Handbook of Asian Borderlands. Routledge, 
434–444. 
Urinboyev, R. 2017. “Establishing an ‘Uzbek Mahalla’ via Smartphones and Social Media: 
Everyday Transnational Lives of Uzbek Labor Migrants in Russia.” In M. Laruelle 
(ed.), Constructing the Uzbek State: Narratives of Post-Soviet Years. Boulder, CO: 
Lexington Books, 119–148. 
Urinboyev, R. and A. Polese 2016. “Informality Currencies: A Tale of Misha, his 
Brigada and Informal Practices among Uzbek Labour Migrants in Russia.” Journal of 
Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 24(3), 191–206. 
Urry, J. 2012. Sociology Beyond Societies: Mobilities for the Twenty-first Century. London 
and New York: Routledge. 
Urry, J. 2016. Mobilities: New Perspectives on Transport and Society. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
von Benda-Beckmann, Franz and Julia Eckert (eds.) 2009. Rules of Law and Laws of 
Ruling: On the Governance of Law. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 1–30. 
von Benda-Beckmann, F., K. von Benda-Beckmann and J. Eckert 2009. Rules of law 
and laws of ruling: law and governance between past and future. Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited. 
Part I 








1 The struggle for formal work 
The everyday experiences of Russia’s Central 
Asian labour migrants 
John Round and Irina Kuznetsova 
Introduction 
Russia receives one of the highest numbers of labour migrants in the world— 
the majority coming from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan—and is the 
source of one of the largest total remittances, worth US$21 billion in 2018 (IOM 
2020: 93). Estimates for the number of migrants working within the country vary 
dramatically, due to the chaotic nature of the country’s migration policy, ranging 
from three to five million. Given the increasing labour migration resulting from 
the global economic crisis, there is a renewed interest in the working experiences 
of migrants (see, for example, Potter and Hamilton 2014; Bloch and McKay 
2016). Yet academic discussions on such issues in Russia are still developing 
(see Reeves 2013; Eastman 2013; Malakhov 2014; Urinboyev and Polese 2016; 
Urinboyev 2017). Through qualitative and participatory research, this chapter’s 
primary role is to reveal the immense difficulties that Central Asian migrants 
face in their working lives in Russia. In both political and media discourses, such 
migrants are commonly portrayed as ‘illegal’—despite the fact that the migrant 
body cannot be illegal—which renders them ostracised from many areas of 
society, and ‘fair game’ for exploitation by employers (Round and Kuznetsova 
2016). As Williams et al. (2013) have shown, many ethnic Russians struggle to 
operate fully in the formal labour market, due to the actions of employers, and, 
as what follows demonstrates, the situation is even worse for labour migrants. 
Even those with genuine work permits or patents struggle to formalise their work 
practices, leaving them open to abuse, such as the withholding of their pay, a 
lack of safety regulations at work, extremely long working hours and/or highly 
unstable work. 
Such discussions add much to global debates on the increasing precarity of 
work in the (post)crisis period (see Standing 2011), but the primary literature 
it engages with stems from the growing interest in the management and work 
literature on informal work (see, for example, Godfrey 2011; Webb et al. 2014; 
Ketchen et al. 2014 for its origins). Despite the truism that the informal economy, 
if taken broadly, rather than following the typical state definition of tax avoidance 
(for a full overview of this debate, see Siqueira et al. 2016), has operated for far 
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informal, with subsequent calls for the setting of ‘research agendas’ (Ketchen 
et al. 2014). As discussed in more depth below, the majority of such literature sees 
informal practices as either a response to an overly bureaucratic state (see Kuehn 
2014 for further discussion) or a stepping stone to formality as people try out new 
ideas without making the commitment of registration (Kus 2014). 
However, there is a significant lacuna in the literature on the actions of employers 
who force their workforce into informality via a series of nefarious practices. 
Addressing this provides insight into the nature of Russia’s socio-economic 
development and suggests a recalibration of research agendas to consider in more 
detail the experiences of those working informally in labour markets across the 
world. After detailing the research methodologies below, this chapter is then 
situated within the literature on labour precarity and informality, noting the lack 
of work on employer-forced informality, before turning to empirical discussions. 
The latter are split into three sections: the first examines the governance of labour 
migration in Russia; the second reveals how this actually works in practice in 
order to erect barriers to formal work; and the third explores the lived realities of 
work for labour migrants. We conclude by arguing that, in the current situation, 
there is no incentive to improve the lives of migrants since the current stasis is 
extremely profitable to those with power. 
This chapter draws upon in-depth interviews conducted in 2013 and 2014 with
300 labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan working in
the Russian cities of Kazan and Moscow. Despite some changes in the labour
migration regulations including the creation of a single labour market within
the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) recently, we argue, the embeddedness
of informality into the migrants’ work experiences still remains highly topical.
Whilst there are some differences in the experiences of the different groups in
the two respective cities (for Moscow, see, for example, Round and Kuznetsova
2018), the space available precludes a full examination of them. Thus, here we
concentrate more on their everyday work experiences. Whilst there are many
younger migrants working in Russia, the experiences of older workers were also
explored, and there was an equal split of interviewees between genders. Our
sample consisted of an entire range of migrant statuses amongst the interviewees,
but here we focus on those who were legally documented to work in Russia
and struggled to formalise their practices. Interviewees were approached through
existing contacts, through nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) working on
migrant issues and, then, through the snowball method. We conducted interviews
in Russian or, if the interviewee was not comfortable, with the assistance of a
translator in the language of their choice. In many cases, the interviews were
recorded and later transcribed, but, given the sensitive nature of the issues under
discussion, some were unwilling to be recorded. In such instances, notes were
made immediately after the interview concluded. ‘Elite’ interviews were also
conducted with government officials, NGO workers and practitioners, upon which
the section on Russia’s migration system is based. Both authors were in Russia
for the duration of the research. The first author was a labour migrant working
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is quantifiably different from that of Central Asian migrants, it provided many
insights into the country’s stifling bureaucracy that surrounds migration and
work. 
Precarity, informality and labour migration 
Around the globe, labour precarity in the workplace is expanding as a result 
of the form of neoliberalism emerging from the current economic crisis. Zero-
hour contracts, successive internships, non-unionisation, a lack of any long-term 
stability and stagnant pay rates are a reality for increasing numbers, with little 
sign of a return of workers’ rights (Gialis and Leontidou 2016). Obviously, within 
this context, there are differing scales and levels of precarity, across differing 
economic forms and average income levels (Geyer et al. 2013; Williams and 
Lansky 2013), with Standing (2011) showing the depths of issues in countries as 
diverse as Japan and Italy, arguing that a new class of worker is forming around 
these uncertainties. Precarity exists in all employment spheres, from cultural 
economies (de Peuter 2014) to gold mining (Hilson et al. 2014); common across 
them is the nature of informal behaviour that exists within sectors. Whilst many 
of the above-noted employment practices (such as zero-hour contracts, which are 
expanding in the formal economy) have always existed in the informal sector 
(such as day labourers being paid cash in hand), given the global rise in precarity, 
there is, nevertheless, a renewed—and, in some disciplines, an emerging—interest 
in informal economic practices, featuring both vague and contested definitions. 
Traditionally, informal work has been infused with negative connotations 
since it is hidden from the gaze of the state and concentrated around issues of 
cash-in-hand work, with no tax paid on the proceeds, regarded as something 
that will decline in scale as formal economic growth occurs (see Williams et al. 
2012). This fails to recognise both the diversity and the persistence of the informal 
sector, with Schneider (2014) arguing that, in fact, globally the informal sector’s 
size is growing, with many countries seeing levels of informality rise above 50% 
of their GDP. Furthermore, as Williams et al. (2013) note, there is also a false 
dichotomy attached to formality/informality: work is often seen as either formal 
or informal, not reflecting the nuances within a sector, the linkages between formal 
and informal work or the breadth of practices and motivations behind them. The 
work of Gibson-Graham (2006) broadened such discussions by demonstrating 
the diversity of informal practice to include volunteering, care-giving and mutual 
exchange in addition to their relationships to the paid sector. Within this more 
nuanced context, informality came to be seen as positive in certain spheres, 
especially in relation to new enterprise formation, accompanying the recognition 
that nascent entrepreneurs often try out their new ideas in an informal manner 
before committing to formality and all the bureaucracy, time and effort this 
involves (Rezaei et al. 2014). Thus, some (see, for example, Webb et al. 2014; 
Ketchen et al. 2014) call for new research agendas on informal entrepreneurship, 
as if it is a new phenomenon rather than a practice predating the formal economy 
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Given the often precarious nature of migration and the problems of entering 
titular labour markets, a rich body of literature has emerged exploring how 
informal work and entrepreneurial behaviour have provided employment to 
migrants (for recent discussions, see Likic-Brboric et al. 2013; Sidzatane and 
Maharaj 2013; Sheehan and Riosmena 2013). Through this literature, there 
is a deep understanding that migrants often face little option but to operate 
informally, either as workers or entrepreneurs, because of restricted access to the 
labour market they have entered or because of a lack of documentation enabling 
access, such as visas and/or work permits. However, there is less understanding 
of the more pernicious practices of employers forcing documented workers, 
both domestic and migrant, into informality in order to increase profits (through 
the avoidance of payroll taxes and social obligations such as holiday pay) and 
time (by avoiding the bureaucracy of formally registering workers), as well as 
the government frameworks enabling these (however, see Williams et al. 2013). 
Using the example of Central Asian labour migrants with working visas in 
Russia, this chapter begins to fill this lacuna by concentrating on the informal 
practices of employers who force their workers into precarity. By taking this 
approach, what follows also expands upon discussions in the entrepreneurship 
literature on informality by highlighting the linkages between the state and the 
economy. Currently, this usually involves exploring the relationship between 
taxation rates (Kuehn 2014) and/or the administrative burden to enterprises on 
levels of informal behaviour. However, there is a growing literature on the more 
general impacts of the forms of political economy existing in a country on the 
formal/informal spheres. For example, Kus (2014) demonstrated the impact of 
Turkey’s neoliberal reforms on the nature and scale of its informal economy and 
De Castro et al. (2014) explored how informal enterprises operate within differing 
scales of governance, as well as how these various layers implement regulations 
differently. One of their key arguments is that if there is a close linkage between 
the state and the economy, as there is in Russia (William et al. 2013), then a 
system will evolve and become codified to enable making a maximum profit at the 
expense of powerless sectors of the labour force. Within this context, there is no 
incentive for the system to change, since it works for those who hold the power, 
carrying serious implications for the long-term economic development of the 
country (for similar discussions on Albania and Kenya, respectively, see Muceku 
and Muça 2014; Meagher 2014). Framing informal economic practices in this 
political economy context allows us to complicate the current tendency to view 
informality in a more positive light (as an enabler of entrepreneurial start-ups and/ 
or as an understandable reaction to burdensome regulations) by demonstrating the 
more hidden activities of employers who force workers into this sphere. 
The governance of labour migration in Russia 
In relation to employment, one of the primary outcomes of the form of politi-
cal economy that has developed in Russia since the Soviet Union’s collapse is 
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As numerous studies have shown (e.g. Williams et al. 2013; Walker 2010), 
many Russian workers struggle with uncertainty in the workplace as a result of 
employer practices, such as the partial payment of salaries in cash and simply 
ignoring contracts. However, nowhere is this more keenly felt than in the labour 
migration sector. Whilst the federal government has long realised that there is a 
need to develop an effective system enabling migrants to contribute more fully 
to economic development, such attempts have been stymied by the sheer scale 
of migration, the competing ministries involved in the process and the practices 
of employers. The situation is further complicated by the visa regimes that exist 
between post-Soviet countries, which, in the majority of cases, allow for Central 
Asians to be in Russia for a 90-day period, travelling on their internal passport 
with no need for a visa. Therefore, people can enter the country (although often 
not without problems, as illustrated below), stay for a while, then leave the coun-
try and return quickly. Also, as Reeves (2013) demonstrates, there is a thriving 
market for fake work permits. In fact, we have observed how these are sold in the 
McDonald’s closest to Moscow’s main mosque. Russia needs labour migration, 
since the country has the third-lowest labour productivity rate in the world and, 
as a resource-rich country and despite the global economic downturn, major cities 
are expanding and mega events such as the Sochi Olympics and the World Cup 
ensure a large demand for labour (Müller 2012). In addition, under Putin’s first 
government, the growth in living standards has meant that more people are unwill-
ing to undertake low-paid menial work, such that there is a high need for cleaners, 
cashiers, janitors and the like. All of this is compounded by the demographic dip 
in people entering the labour market and by outwards migration. Migration to 
Russia is driven by socio-economic marginalisation in Central Asia, which has 
the lowest levels of income in the Northern Hemisphere. For example, GDP in 
Tajikistan in 2018 was US$826.60 per year, compared to Russia’s US$11,288.90 
(The World Bank 2018). As one interviewee said: 
In Moscow we can earn enough to live and support our parents and children 
back in Tajikistan. If we did the same jobs in Dushanbe we would only be 
able to feed ourselves. We cannot work in our professions here and we have 
to work all the time but it is the only choice we have. 
Formal labour migration into Russia is governed through two systems: formal 
work permits and a patent system (Kuznetsova 2017). The citizens of EAEU’s 
member-states (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia), 
established in 2014, now participate in a single labour market, meaning they are 
not required to possess any permits to work in Russia. At the same time, the single 
labour market, as Ryazantsev et al. (2019) show using the example of labour 
migrants from Kyrgyzstan, does not automatically reduce the many issues they 
face. 
For a long time, a general work permit served as the main channel for labour 
migration to Russia, until 2010 when the patent system for foreign workers 
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permits are granted only to foreign citizens who enter Russia with a visa. In 2015, 
more than 140,000 such permits were granted (25% fewer than in 2014), half of 
them granted to citizens of China and Turkey. 
As for the work permits, enterprises apply during the previous year for the 
number of permits they think they will need for the forthcoming period. These 
are then, supposedly, distributed through a quota system. For many enterprises, 
this is inefficient since they are unsure of the amount of labour they will require in 
future. This leads to the hoarding of permits, which can then be used as a means of 
gaining a competitive advantage if a competitor does not receive the permits they 
require. In total, over the time period between 2010 and 2014, about six million 
such permits were issued. Most of them were granted to citizens of Uzbekistan 
(about 42%), Tajikistan (15%) and Ukraine (11%) (Kuznetsova 2017: 140). Upon 
arrival, the work permit must be registered with the migration service. The patent
system aimed to expand the taxation base from workers who had previously 
worked informally. The price of a patent is, however, different in Russian regions; 
in Moscow in 2020, for example, it cost 5350 Russian roubles (approximately 
US$72) per month. As we show below, both systems are open to abuse and are 
staggeringly overly bureaucratic. 
Given the chaotic nature of the migration system and the need for labour 
migration, the current Putin administration introduced the ‘Concept of the 
State Migration Policy until 2025’ (President of Russia 2012), with the idea of 
developing effective migration regulations, increasing cooperation between 
countries and enabling the increased integration of migrants into Russian society. 
The latter is important since, similar to many countries experiencing high levels 
of labour migration, antagonism is directed towards labour migrants, especially 
in Moscow. Migrants are constructed as ‘illegal’ regardless of their actual status, 
deemed criminals and carriers of disease. The Moscow Mayor, Sergei Sobyanin, 
even went as far as to say that, if it were not for migrants, the city would be the 
world’s safest (Nikolaeva 2013).1 To increase the integration potential, migrants 
must now pass Russian-language and culture exams prior to beginning work, 
with the aim of increasing interactions within the city. There is little evidence 
demonstrating that these exams have or will improve relations between migrants 
and the titular population or become anything more than a new site where 
informal payments will be required. Moreover, as Ruget (2018) stresses, these 
exams are laden with Russian nationalism, and many questions are disconnected 
from migrants’ everyday concerns. With regard to the technical development 
of the migration system, the primary aim was to decrease the bureaucracy for 
both employers and employees, reduce the corruption inherent in the system and 
increase the training of migrants and thus their productivity. 
The concept was derailed, however, by events surrounding the Moscow 
Mayoral elections in late 2013, which turned into a race to the bottom of just 
how xenophobic the candidates could be towards Central Asian labour migrants. 
The leading contenders all argued that Moscow’s socio-economic problems were 
the result of migrant behaviour and their participation in the informal economy. 
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migrants should be banned from the metro, since ticket prices are subsidised and 
‘migrants don’t pay tax, so why should they benefit’, or that if they are not paid 
then they simply go and rob a Russian (Navalny 2013). Within this xenophobic 
context, it was no surprise that tensions increased, resulting in riots in Biryulyovo 
after a Russian was killed by an Azerbaijani, prompting the closure of the region’s 
ethnic market and the detention of over 3000 Thai migrants in a makeshift camp 
within the city limits. In relation to our arguments here, this tension greatly 
impacted migration management, since senior politicians realised that they could 
make political capital out of the situation. More restrictions for immigrants 
have been introduced, including, for example, compulsory registration in their 
accommodation beginning in 2014 and a re-entry ban began in 2015 for those 
against whom two administrative law violations have been filed. As Schenk (2018) 
argues, the increasingly restrictive migration policy is politically motivated and 
contributes to the enforcement of centralised control which led to the increasing 
of deportations of labour migrants (see Chapter 9). In 2016, the Federal Migration 
Service (FMS) was closed down, and its functions were transferred to the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, which also demonstrates the securitisation of the migration 
policy. 
Barriers to formality and everyday realities 
As numerous studies have shown, formally entering Russia’s labour market is 
difficult, not only for migrants but also for ethnic Russians (e.g. Round 2004; 
Walker 2010, 2015). This difficulty results from the informal processes inherent 
in the labour market, such as the use of connections to secure employment, the 
prevalence of cash in manual work and the lack of job security. However, such 
issues are magnified for the migrant community, very few of whom have the con-
nections enabling them to secure ‘good’ jobs. The first barrier they must face is 
actually entering the country. Many travel by bus, the cheapest method; but, in 
many cases, they are required to pay bribes, even though they have a free right 
of passage into the country. In the study of border crossings undertaken for this 
research, at every passport control, each bus we rode on featured collections to 
ensure there would be no problems at the crossing. When the bus reached the 
outskirts of Moscow, it was stopped again and another informal payment was 
required, even though no border was crossed at that point. 
Before 2014, Migrants forced into informality must leave the country every
90 days to obtain a new migration card, crossing, in the case of Moscow, the closed
border between Russia and Ukraine. Although they are legally entitled to make
this journey, on average migrants are forced to pay US$70 to leave the country
and US$90 to return. A border guard explained that every day they must pay their
superior US$5000, with anything over that representing a ‘profit’, in order to keep
their positions.2 By air, the situation is a little better. Upon arrival, Central Asian
migrants are often separated from other passengers and herded from room to room.
They are treated with absolutely no respect and shouted at repeatedly, with little
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they are ‘treated like animals’, forced to wait for seemingly no reason for hours at
a time before they can enter the country; often, informal payments are requested. 
The next problem migrants must face is the registration of their work permit, 
both with their employer and FMS. The issues surrounding employers’ practices 
are perhaps the most pernicious in the entire process, since they force labour 
migrants to operate informally, thereby reducing their security and salaries and 
enabling the state to construct them as ‘illegal’. The International Organisation of 
Migration (IOM) argues that the term ‘irregular migrant’ is more appropriate. But, 
within the Russian state and media discourse, such nuances do not exist, and an 
extremely narrow definition of informal work—that the worker is undertaking this 
practice simply to deny the state tax—is almost always applied. Thus, by default, 
labour migrants are ‘illegal’. The reality has much more to do with the neoliberal 
form of economy that has emerged in Russia, which sees more than 50% of GDP 
accumulated informally (Schneider 2014), a system within which the employer is 
all-powerful. Russia has a flat-rate taxation system, whereby the employee pays a 
relatively low 13% tax; however, employers pay a high 30.2% payroll tax based 
on the employees’ salary. This provides a clear incentive for employers to reduce 
their formal salary-based taxation bill and instead make additional cash-in-hand 
payments to reduce their tax burdens. Many Russian workers outside the state 
sector are offered two salaries when they begin work—the low official one and the 
higher cash payment—with little choice but to accept this arrangement. For labour 
migrants, our interviews revealed that, in the majority of cases, they are simply 
offered cash-in-hand payments or extremely low formal salaries. Since they are 
in no position to turn down work, they are forced into such arrangements. This 
obviously invalidates their work permit, and employers simply refuse to register 
them as working there. With no power, there is nothing the migrants can do but 
accept the situation. They also lack any security that the salary will be paid, safety 
regulations can more easily be ignored, and, if the migrant is injured at work, 
then, according to NGOs who try and protect such workers, often they are simply 
taken from the workplace and placed on the street such that the company has no 
obligation to pay for their healthcare. This chapter looks at precarious work and 
employer/state practices; therefore, migrant entrepreneurs are not in its focus.3 
Interviews with elites revealed that employers often make informal payments 
to ensure that they are not raided by the migration and/or tax authorities, enabling 
them to undertake the above practices with impunity (or, conversely, payments 
can be made to ensure that a competitor’s workplace is raided). Another practice 
is to subcontract work through employment agencies. For example, a state insti-
tution claiming that all its workers are employed formally will employ its clean-
ing staff through an agency. By interviewing such workers, the reality of their 
employment was revealed. Firstly, the workers’ documentation is not checked 
by the agency, and thus the migrant is unable to obtain the paperwork needed to 
register their employment. Secondly, their pay is much lower than the official pay-
ment for the post at the agency (and no doubt other participants take a significant 
cut). For example, a cleaner earns around 17,000 roubles per month cash in hand 
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payments for breaks, holidays or sick leave. Any period away from work will lead 
to dismissal, meaning that migrants with young children who remain at home find 
it extremely difficult to visit them. Illness is a great concern, as this interviewee, 
who had a problem with her hip making it extremely difficult to walk, explained: 
I get to work by 7 in the morning and work until 1 pm, and then I make an 
hour’s journey to an informal Kyrgyz clinic [she cannot access formal health 
care since she is concerned they will report her to the migration service and it 
is too expensive]. I pay someone to work for me while I am away, and, after 
my treatment, I return to work around 5 pm and work until 8 pm. If I took 
more than a day off work, then I would simply lose my job. 
To place this salary into context, the above interviewee pays 19,000 roubles in rent 
per month for a room in a shared flat; for food, travel and money to remit home, 
she relies on her husband’s salary of around 24,000 roubles per month (US$322). 
Moscow is an extremely expensive city in which to live, with the cost of food, 
for example, exceeding the average costs in most Western European cities, as 
exemplified by the following. A major Western European-owned supermarket 
chain has had good success in breaking into the Russian market. During its 
emergence, large posters advertised for staff. On every advert, there are pictures 
of smiling ethnic Russians, and the blurb states that only Russian citizens can 
apply and that the working week is 30 hours. It was somewhat puzzling, then, to 
see that on most days almost all of the cashiers were from Central Asia. Interviews 
amongst this group again revealed the use of subcontracting. Labour migrants 
work primarily for cash-in-hand wages, 11-hour shifts, with an unpaid 30-minute 
break, receiving 100 roubles an hour (US$1.3). They receive no holiday pay and 
no healthcare coverage, and again, if they miss more than a couple of shifts they 
are dismissed without notice. Given the high cost of goods within the supermarket, 
they are not even able to buy products from it given their low salaries. 
Even if migrants are able to entice their employer to employ them formally, 
they still face difficulties in formalising their status. After receiving the 
documentation from their workplace, the migrant must then go to the Office of 
Visas and Registration (OVIR) to register the documents. At Moscow’s main 
OVIR, migrants are literally caged in as they wait outside, with waiting times 
to enter the building running into days (migrants put their name on a list and 
return to the same place the next morning if they are unable to enter that day). 
Interviewees explained that, when they are inside, they are, similar to experiences 
in airports, treated like animals, with no respect at all afforded to them. Often they 
are accused of having false documentation, and, given the above, it is no surprise 
that they are regularly asked for informal payments to expedite the process. 
Interviewees discussed how the process often takes months to complete, requiring 
multiple trips to the office. As one interviewee said: 
We spent three days queuing up at the registration office trying to get some-




28 John Round and Irina Kuznetsova
changes all the time. We waited outside office after office and eventually 
someone told us to leave and just look it up on the internet. I really don’t 
know why they make it so hard for us to find the information we need to 
register our work permits. 
Given how difficult it is for migrants to take time off from work, many are 
reluctant to spend days queuing at OVIR, since, at best, they lose income given 
that they are not paid whilst not working and, at worst, they lose their jobs. 
Furthermore, formality offers them little protection from the police nor provides 
greater stability with employers. The lead author spent time around the city’s 
main OVIR, and when walking back to the metro station he saw a police van full 
of Central Asian migrants. From observing the situation and talking to migrants 
in the area, it became clear that the police were waiting for migrants to return 
after depositing their documents at OVIR and then stopping them and asking for 
said documents (see also Round and Kuznetsova 2018). Since the migrants did 
not have their documents to hand, the police then detained the migrants until 
they made an informal payment to secure their release. Given that technically 
the only people allowed to ask for your documentation on the street, unless you 
are suspected of committing a crime, are FMS agents, this is obviously illegal. 
However, such practices are embedded in the practices of the police, many of 
whom view migrants as a source of income. 
The benefits of formality for migrants are negligible. Even if employers 
pay the social tax, migrants remain ineligible for free health care except in 
emergencies, and, in the vast majority of situations, they receive no benefits 
from their employers. Often, factories and markets are raided by FMS, and 
migrants are swept up regardless of their migration status and detained for a few 
days before their release. Those working under the patent system, who pay for 
a stamp in their passport each month enabling them to work, also suffer from 
a lack of understanding of how the system works. In many cases, interviewees 
recounted that, when stopped by the police, those stopping them stated that the 
documentation was incorrect and fined them unofficially. Unable to take holidays, 
workers are trapped in their jobs, causing great strain on their families. This 
female interviewee’s situation is commonplace: 
I have two daughters, 9 months old and 2 years old, and I have not seen them 
for five months—they are living with my parents in Tashkent. I cannot have 
them here since we both need to work and cannot afford childcare. This year, 
only my husband will go home to see them in the summer since I would lose 
my job if I am not there every day and it is not a bad place to work. Also, 
our room is not too expensive to rent and we would lose that if we were both 
away because they would just put someone else in it. 
The last point about accommodation represents a further barrier to the formali-
sation of labour migrants since many struggle to formally register their living 
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tenants because they do not want to pay tax on the income; often they rent out the 
space to more people than allowed (many interviewees lived six to eight persons 
to one room), and/or the bureaucracy of registering them is a complicated and 
tedious process. Thus, even if migrants are lucky enough to be formally registered 
at their workplace, it is unlikely that they will enjoy similar good fortune with 
regards to their living arrangements. Again, this puts them at risk for detention by 
or needing to make informal payments to the police, given that often their docu-
ments are not completely in order. Overall, the labour framework is extremely 
problematic for migrants in Russia and they hold no power at all. Employers, 
landlords and the police collectively make migrants’ lives extremely stressful and 
insecure, yet they have no choice but to endure it because of the dire economic 
situation in their home countries. 
The societal lived reality for labour migrants 
The majority of Central Asian migrants in Russia are forced into informality 
and precarity with little hope of improving their situation. Whilst Russia has 
regularity frameworks surrounding migration, labour and employment, these are 
far too often circumnavigated by employers with the tacit support of the state and 
its various actors. This leads to a lived experience for many of constant worry 
due to low wages, a fear of detention by the police, a lack of permanency in the 
workplace, an underutilisation of their skills and no prospect of career progression 
or training. Furthermore, there is the knowledge that any period of illness will 
lead to dismissal and that a major health event would be catastrophic since 
access to the Russian healthcare system is barred. Some migrants purchase health 
insurance, but, often, interviewees indicated that it is too expensive for them to 
justify or they are tricked into making payments for worthless policies (see also 
Demintseva and Kashnitsky 2016). Because many migrants are young, there is a 
belief that ill health or an accident at work will not happen to them. Yet, given 
the many millions of labour migrants in the country, healthcare access remains 
a major issue for many. If ill health befalls them, migrants must make out-of-
pocket payments, which are often extremely expensive. Many drugs, with the 
exception of antibiotics, are available over the counter, but at a rather high price 
compared to the average wages in the country. As noted above, there are informal 
clinics staffed by doctors or at least people with some medical training; whilst 
costs in such places are lower than in official clinics, treatment still amounts to a 
significant percentage of one’s monthly salary. 
Overall, for labour migrants wages remain rather low, with interviewees saying 
a good salary would be around US$1000 per month. In addition to covering their 
living expenses, which are often as high as in Western Europe, migrants often 
support their families back home; thus, every rouble is accounted for and there 
is no provision for leisure activities. This is exacerbated by their informal status 
since almost every interviewee discussed how they had experienced problems 
with their salary, be it delayed, less than agreed upon or not paid at all. Of course, 
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successfully if they are cheated. One group of interviewees, for example, had 
not received payment for the construction work they had completed; collectively 
they approached a lawyer to try and help them but were told not to continue since 
drawing attention to the problem would only lead to difficulties with the police 
and migration services. 
Within the workplace, labour migrants also face difficulties in comparison to 
their Russian counterparts. This example from a bus driver is typical for many: 
I have worked here for a long time, but I am still treated differently. I get 
the worst shifts and have to work all of the holidays. I also get the worst bus 
to drive and I have to spend my own time making sure that it runs ok. My 
colleagues are friendly enough, but I know I will never be ‘one of them’. 
The vast majority of migrants do not work in their chosen profession, with 
the majority employed in manual or service work. Yet, whilst there is a strong 
discourse in Russia that Central Asian migrants are unskilled and lack the Russian-
language skills needed to work in Russia in anything other than ‘menial’ jobs, 
for many interviewees this was simply not the case. For example, amongst the 
cleaning staff we interviewed, many had a higher education degree and a number 
of them were teachers. Yet they were unable to find suitable work: 
I was a biology teacher, but the salary was almost nothing and often we were 
not paid. My husband was not earning enough in Moscow to support us all, 
so I left the children with my grandparents and moved to Russia. At times, it 
is a real struggle, but this job is ok and I can send money home each month. 
She works a 72-hour week (for around US$700 per month), with an hour’s 
commute to and from work, which she makes by bus—even though the metro 
would be quicker—because there are more police patrolling the metro system. Any 
spare time she has, mainly on Sundays, she spends cleaning private apartments for 
extra cash-in-hand income. 
As the above interviewee’s method of commuting hints at, for migrants, the 
biggest problem informality brings is how it is translated by politicians and the 
media. There is a symbiotic relationship between the two, with pronouncements on 
migration made by politicians followed by media stories. Such pronouncements 
are made through ‘investigative’ journalism, when reports reveal ‘facts’ about 
migration, such as multiple registrations at an apartment. Politicians, then, 
respond by calling for stricter legislation. Labour migrants from Central Asia 
are constructed as only aiming to act informally to avoid paying tax, breeding 
criminality and contributing nothing to Russia. This is based around constructing 
the ‘illegal’ migrant as an object to fear since they are constructed not only as ‘the 
other’, but as a violent, criminal, illegal body (see Round and Kuznetsova 2016; 
Kuznetsova and Round 2019). This reached an apogee in late 2013 when the main 
candidates for the Mayor of Moscow post competed with each other to make 
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increased raids in the city in areas with high concentrations of migrants garnering 
high levels of media coverage; in some instances, hundreds of migrants were 
placed into temporary camps in the city, in full view of the local population. After 
a few weeks, many of the detainees were quietly returned to their workplaces 
without charge. The outcome of such constructions was that migrants were seen 
as ‘fair game’ for attack by nationalist groups, and the actions of employers were 
further obfuscated. 
As the above sections have shown, Central Asian labour migrants are 
forced into informality by the actions of employers and the overly bureaucratic 
nature of Russia’s migration process. As a result, they form an extremely large 
precariat class of workers whose daily experiences demand attention and a 
concerted international effort through organisations such as the IOM, the World 
Trade Organisation and the like in order to increase their protection. Whilst the 
exploitation of labour migrants is not unique to Russia, what renders it atypical 
is the sheer numbers involved, the use of the media to demonise their practices 
and the xenophobic and racist elements within the processes (see Kuznetsova and 
Round 2019). Furthermore, within the debates on informal economic practices, 
forcing workers into informality receives little attention—a concern given the 
scale of the issue and the abuses this opens workers up to. 
Conclusions: stasis and a system working for all but the workers 
Given that Central Asian labour migrants contribute significantly to the Russian 
labour market and economic development, and despite the scale of abuse they face, 
the issues surrounding their employment demands attention. As demonstrated in 
this chapter, the vast majority of labour migrants are forced into informality along 
with all of the potential abuses and lack of security this entails. Such exclusion 
through the actions of employers adds a new strand to the emerging literature on 
informal economic practices and reveals a more nefarious side to these debates. 
These are not instances of entrepreneurs ‘testing the waters’ before committing 
to formalisation, nor of small and medium-sized enterprises attempting to avoid 
an overly bureaucratic state (although this is a problem in Russia). But, rather, 
this context appears to be employers deliberately avoiding Russia’s significant 
payroll tax and denying benefits to their workers. Such practices also benefit 
employers since they enable the enterprise to hire and fire at will, making them 
much more responsive to changes in demand. Even when labour migrants are able 
to negotiate formality with their employers, the time and cost of doing so with the 
state (in terms of losing salary whilst queuing to submit documents and making 
informal payments) pose the question of whether it is worth the investment. The 
value of formality, then, is questionable since the police simply say that any 
documentation is falsified, demand informal payments when leaving and entering 
the country and routinely view migrants as a source of income. 
This situation also contributes to debates on precarity, given that the workers
are forced to leave their homeland because of extremely low salaries even if
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low-skilled, unsecure employment. A further strand to such discussions is that
this precarity is based upon xenophobia and ethnicity. The lived experience of
Ukrainian labour migrants in Russia is quantifiably better than that of Central
Asian migrants, even if their labour and social practices differ little. Central Asian
migrants are increasingly becoming a scapegoat for all of Russia’s social ills— 
from crime to the health of the nation to unemployment, for example—which
goes far beyond the typical migrant-specific phobia existing in many countries.
Within this scapegoatism, we find a rash of new proposals to stem the migration
tide into Russia, despite President Putin arguing that the growth of the economy
depends upon such workers. These proposals are ill thought through and will do
little to alleviate the true causes of the problem: the actions of employers and the
state. However, what exists in Russia is a political–economic stasis within which
there is no incentive for the political and economic elite to enact meaningful
change. In other words, the current system works for too many people: for
employers, it provides the space to exploit workers and not pay taxes; for state
actors, it presents numerous opportunities for collecting informal payments from
both migrants and employers, who pay to avoid higher tax bills or punishments.
With so many people working and profiting in these spheres, often with low
formal salaries, why would they want to change this profitable status quo? Such
high levels of informality and exploitation have worrying implications for the
future economic development of countries experiencing such problems, given
that innovation, productivity and overall economic efficiency remain secondary
concerns to rent seeking. 
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Notes 
1 There is a popular discourse that argues that migrants commit 50% of all crimes 
in Moscow. At almost every round-table or urban development event, this figure is 
repeated by presenters and by members of the audience. The truth is rather more 
benign, with the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs putting the figure at 3.8%. Yet, all 
sides seized upon the former figure during the campaign for the Mayor of Moscow post 
in late 2013, further entrenching this discourse. 
2 No doubt the border guards would have had to make an informal payment to obtain 
the position, and see the taking of bribes as a way of earning this money back and sup-
plementing their relatively low wages. Such practices were witnessed at two different 
border points and were also observed in different research projects (see Williams et al. 
2013). Since 2014, migrants from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are allowed to stay in 
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3 Though as Turaeva (2014) shows ‘mobile entrepreneurs’ also play an important role in 
migrants’ transnational economic activities which social order is influenced by kinship 
and relations of trust (see also Chapter 5). 
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2 Driving in the shadows 
Rural–urban labour migrants as informal taxi 
drivers in post-socialist Tashkent 
Nikolaos Olma 
Introduction 
In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, Tashkent, the capital of 
Uzbekistan, underwent an abrupt demographic shift driven by two parallel and 
interrelated, yet opposing, migratory flows. The collapse of the republic’s indus-
trial and agricultural sectors and a scarcity of arable land led to unprecedented 
levels of impoverishment and unemployment in rural areas, forcing large parts of 
the local population to migrate to urban centres, with Tashkent receiving the 
lion’s share of this influx. In turn, the arrival of these ‘new poor’ (Ilkhamov 2001) 
intensified the discomfort Tashkent’s multi-ethnic Russian-speaking old-timers 
experienced as a result of the ‘nationalizing nationalism’ (Brubaker 1996: 4) of 
the Karimov administration and prompted thousands to emigrate to their titular 
countries, even if they had never set foot there before. Whilst the mass ‘exodus’ 
(Buckley 1996) of Russian speakers from Tashkent dwindled in the early 2000s, 
the flow of predominantly Uzbek-speaking rural–urban labour migrants into the 
city remains strong to this day given stagnant unemployment and low salaries in 
the provinces. But the integration of these individuals into Tashkent’s socioeco-
nomic life and job market is hindered by their low qualifications, limited knowl-
edge of Russian and stereotypes that follow them, as well as by the strict civil 
registration mechanism in place in Uzbekistan, known as propiska. The propiska
system seldom allows the poor surplus population to officially register in the capi-
tal and, hence, rural–urban labour migrants cannot obtain a legal residence status 
and/or work permits in Tashkent. Inevitably, their everyday lives are character-
ised by precariousness and uncertainty and they themselves become illegalised 
and deprived of basic citizenship rights (Turaeva 2016). 
Whilst from the mid-2000s onwards women also began to join these
migration flows (Hashimova 2008; Maksakova 2006), rural–urban labour
migration in Uzbekistan remains dominated by young men. These men move
to Tashkent impermanently with the aim of supporting their families, covering
expenses related to life-cycle events (e.g., weddings) or earning enough money
to build a house in their hometowns and villages. To that end, most resort to
labour-intensive, low-paid and insecure temporary or odd jobs in the ‘informal
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sorters—which they find either through kin- and locality-based networks
or in the informal labour markets known as mardikor bozorlari. Yet, as this
chapter will show, those labour migrants who either own a car or manage— 
via various channels—to obtain access to one gain the opportunity to join the
ranks of Tashkent’s private car drivers who generate income by offering paid
rides to their fellow residents. Most of the drivers involved in this practice,
locally known as ‘taxiing’ (in Russian, taksovanie), pick up passengers
occasionally—when, for example, on their way to and from work—provided
that the passenger’s destination is more or less along their route. However,
unfavourable socioeconomic conditions have forced a considerable portion of
Tashkent’s male population to take up taxiing either part-time as a source of
secondary income or full-time as their primary occupation. The majority of the
rural–urban labour migrants who become informal taxi drivers belong to the
latter category. 
Taxiing is, thus, a quintessentially informal activity in the sense that it is not 
only a precarious profession practised outside the institutional and legal bounda-
ries of the Uzbek state and its agencies but is itself informed by multiple modali-
ties of informality that permeate the subjectivities and the everyday lives of the 
drivers involved in it. From acquiring a car to finding their way around the city 
to escaping regulatory pressure, informal taxi drivers continually navigate a wide 
array of informal processes, negotiate power relations, adjust to market forces and 
manoeuvre through various legal frameworks. The involvement of rural–urban 
labour migrants in taxiing further exacerbates this informality due to the informal 
character of most of the actions and activities pertaining to these individuals’ 
settlement and employment in Tashkent. In this sense, the informal taxi becomes 
an index of how and where two seemingly independent mobility paradigms— 
rural–urban labour migration and informal urban transportation—converge. 
Simultaneously, it also provides a lens through which we can examine the vari-
ous informal processes and everyday livelihood strategies that rural–urban labour 
migrants employ in their attempts to deal with the uncertainty and precariousness 
accompanying their relocation to Tashkent. 
It is in this context that this chapter examines the practices and experiences 
of the rural–urban labour migrants who become informal taxi drivers. To do so, 
it draws on a total of 11 months of ethnographic fieldwork conducted amongst 
Tashkent’s informal taxi drivers between May 2014 and February 2015 and dur-
ing a follow-up two-month spell in autumn 2016. The chapter touches upon the 
limited employment opportunities available to labour migrants from the provinces 
in Tashkent’s formal sector and the taut relationship with the state that their sub-
sequent informality results in. Hence, it contributes to a broader understanding 
of migration-related informal practices in urban post-Soviet Central Asia. Just 
as importantly, it provides empirical evidence regarding the ways in which inter-
nal migration has given new momentum to taxiing, an informal urban mobility 
practice eradicated in most major post-Soviet cities. Thereby, it offers a glimpse 
beyond migratory flows and of an understudied type of informal urban transport 






















Karjanen 2014; Kovács et al. 2017; Morris 2016; Polese 2014; Urinboyev et al. 
2018). 
Entering Tashkent’s informal taxi industry 
The practice of offering paid rides in one’s private car existed as a relatively 
popular means of generating extra income in large Soviet cities already during 
the socialist era (Siegelbaum 2009). Yet, it was in the early 1990s that it evolved 
into a fundamental ‘survival strategy’ (Johnson, Kaufmann and Ustenko 1998), 
employed by people across the former Soviet Union in order to cope with the 
adverse socioeconomic conditions accompanying the transition to market 
economy. In recent years, decisive state-led offensives against the practice as 
well as the emergence of taxi aggregators and ride-sharing applications offering 
safer and more reliable services led to the marginalisation or even eradication of 
the once-ubiquitous informal taxis in most large post-Soviet cities. Nevertheless, 
in Tashkent, taxiing remains widespread thanks to the ambivalent stance of the 
local authorities towards the practice. This stance is a product of the authorities’ 
realisation that taxiing provides much needed employment to thousands of rural– 
urban labour migrants. Amongst these individuals, taxiing is widely considered 
one of the more dignified jobs available in the informal sector. Compared to 
the physically demanding and low-paid odd jobs offered in mardikor bozorlari,
taxiing provides better working conditions, a higher income, a sense of stability 
and a larger degree of freedom and autonomy. Yet, since access to a car is 
necessary for entry into Tashkent’s informal taxi industry, the fact that only a few 
labour migrants own a car and even fewer are in a position to purchase one allows 
only individuals with a certain amount of financial or social capital to take up the 
practice. 
Taxiing in Tashkent is not the first engagement with this type of economic
activity for all of the labour migrants who arrive in the city, since many have
previously worked as informal taxi drivers in their home provinces. However,
the working conditions in the provinces are quite different, as low salaries and
high fares have rendered taxis—formal and informal alike—rather unpopular
with local populations for short and medium distances. Thus, most drivers work
on long-distance routes, connecting localities otherwise poorly connected to one
another. Whilst new railway connections have recently been established between
Tashkent and large provincial centres such as Samarkand, Bukhara and Andijon,
the number of train services remains limited and ticket prices are relatively high.
Therefore, people travel via the much cheaper shared taxis that depart throughout
the day. In Tashkent, these taxis depart from and arrive at informal taxi stations
situated outside the large markets scattered around the outskirts, which means
that drivers who work on long-distance routes seldom enter the city. Yet, for
some of them, such as Abbas, a 27-year-old informal taxi driver originally from
the city of Fergana, bringing passengers from the provinces to Tashkent consti-
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Before coming here [to Tashkent], I worked as a taxi driver in the [Fergana] 
Valley, carrying people from Fergana to Namangan, from Fergana to Andijon 
and so on. … But the distances are long, people are poor and fuel is expen-
sive. So, at the end of each day, I made very little money. … One day, I took a 
group of men from Fergana to Tashkent. … They asked me to take them back 
to Fergana the next day. I slept at a cousin’s in Tashkent and the next day I 
drove them back. … [It was then that] I saw that I could easily become a taxi 
driver in Tashkent. In an hour, I could make the same amount of money that 
I made in half a day at home. … I returned to Fergana, and then came back 
to Tashkent a few weeks later. There are many passengers here, I can work 
more hours if I want to and so I make more money. 
Whilst Abbas came to Tashkent in his own car, many other potential informal
taxi drivers arrive in the city with little more than a suitcase. Therefore, one
of their main goals, second only to securing accommodation, is gaining access
to a car. Those with relatives or acquaintances already living in Tashkent are
often allowed to drive their cars for a few weeks, a concession quite illustrative
of the importance of social networks and ‘reciprocal ties based on mutual help
and exchange’ (Kandiyoti 1998: 561–562; Wegerich 2006). Such an offer does
not always come for free, for even relatives are usually expected to contribute
to the car owner’s household either in kind or in the form of a portion of their
daily income. Nevertheless, such arrangements are paramount to the prompt
entry of newly arrived labour migrants into Tashkent’s informal taxi industry,
for they grant them the opportunity to begin earning an income immediately, to
familiarise themselves with the city and to understand the industry’s structure
and workings. 
Access to a relative’s or acquaintance’s car becomes all the more important 
in light of the difficulties that labour migrants encounter in purchasing a car. The 
Uzbek state’s monopoly on the production of cars and the prohibitive import tar-
iffs protecting the national car industry habitually hinder the access of the poorer 
segments of the population to cars (Olma 2020). Not only is the new-car market 
characterised by systematic shortages, high prices and long waiting periods for 
the more popular models, but the prices for used cars can be very high as well, 
as the shortages offer plenty of room for speculation. Nevertheless, the fact that 
used cars, unlike new ones, are immediately available makes them more popular 
amongst labour migrants. Accordingly, many inaugurate their stay in Tashkent 
by visiting the Sergeli car market, located in the eponymous district in the south-
ern part of the city, where they can purchase a used car in cash or, if they do not 
possess the entire amount, they may ‘rent’ (in Russian, arendovat’) it. Renting 
involves leasing a car from a company or a private car owner for a predefined 
period—usually up to three years—with the expectation that by the end of this 
period the car will belong to the lessee. The final price depends on the size of 
the deposit, the frequency and size of instalments and the duration of the lease, 
often resulting in the car costing twice as much as if bought in cash. Nevertheless, 







amongst labour migrants, since it does not require them to have—or, if they do 
have, spend—any savings. 
Naturally, the cheaper the car, the easier it is to pay it back, which is why 
most labour migrants choose to buy or rent the locally produced Chevrolet Matiz. 
This affordable and fuel-efficient small car, depending on the politico-economic 
climate, can be bought at the used car market for anywhere between US$4000 
and US$7000 in cash, but can cost up to US$10,000 when rented. The popularity 
of the Matiz amongst informal taxi drivers has led many Tashkent residents to 
sarcastically call Tashkent ‘the city of Matizes’ (in Russian, gorod Matizov), 
but it has also generated a maintenance service structured around this particular 
car model, offering a wide line of auxiliary products, affordable spare parts and 
skilled mechanics. Despite the fuel efficiency of the Matiz, many drivers choose 
to convert their gasoline-powered models to compressed natural gas (CNG) in 
order to further save on fuel, the price of which has been steadily rising in recent 
years. Whilst such a conversion can cost them several million so‘m, it eventually 
saves them between 40% and 60% on their fuel costs, especially since informal 
taxis by definition rack up a high kilometre count. It also ensures that drivers can 
work unaffected by the frequent fuel shortages that Uzbekistan experiences. 
The way in which labour migrants obtain access to a car is defined by—and, in 
turn, itself largely defines—the length of their stay in Tashkent. Labour migrants 
arriving in Tashkent in their own cars are not bound to the city in any way other 
than their need to generate an income. Accordingly, free of the pressure exerted 
by the need to pay the car’s monthly instalments and free to choose themselves 
how much they work on any given day, car-owning migrants often travel to their 
hometowns throughout their spell in Tashkent and return home permanently once 
they have earned and saved the amount of money they had initially aimed at. 
Similarly, carless labour migrants who arrive in Tashkent with the aim of earning 
a certain amount of money before returning to their respective hometowns 
shortly thereafter do not buy or rent a car, but rather use the car of a relative 
or acquaintance, even if it means paying a daily fee to the car owner. Thus, it 
is primarily rural–urban migrants who permanently move to Tashkent or who 
decide to stay in the city for an extended period of time who buy or rent a car. 
Whilst such an arrangement binds them to the city for as long as the duration 
of the lease and forces them to taxi for this entire period in order to pay the 
instalments, it also provides them with a car that they can then take back to their 
home provinces. In the car-based society that is contemporary Uzbekistan, this is 
perceived as of paramount importance, for, in addition to the practical advantages 
that car ownership offers, it is also regarded as an index of the migrants’ success 
in the big city. 
Competition and friction 
Most of the labour migrants that I encountered during their early days in Tashkent 
viewed managing to obtain access to a car as the end of all their troubles, 
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within a few months they would manage to save enough money to allow them 
to buy or build a house in their hometowns and start a family. However, whilst 
Tashkent salaries are indeed two to three times the national average, the situation 
newly arriving informal taxi drivers encounter is somewhat different from what 
most envisioned. Given the large volume of informal taxis—some estimates put 
the number at 30,000—drivers fiercely compete with each other, which, in turn, 
has led to fares so low that, on occasion, informal taxis are cheaper than public 
transportation. This is because fare allocation is ad hoc, whereby the cost of each 
ride results entirely from a negotiation between driver and passenger, even if most 
parties involved know, more or less, how much each ride costs by taking into 
account a series of variables. 
The most important amongst these variables is distance—that is, the further 
the destination, the higher the fare—but the remoteness of the destination— 
or, put differently, the likelihood that the driver will find another passenger at 
the destination willing to pay for the return journey back to the city centre— 
is something that drivers take into account as well. Additionally, a series of 
secondary variables, such as car model, weather conditions or time of day, 
can also affect the fare. Drivers with larger cars, such as the Chevrolet Lacetti, 
charge more than their colleagues driving a smaller Chevrolet Matiz because a 
ride in a more spacious and luxurious car is viewed as an upscale service. Fares 
increase by as much as 50% on rainy days, since drivers take advantage of the 
higher demand for taxis. Snow or ice on the streets during the winter months can 
increase the fare by approximately 30%, given that driving on slippery surfaces 
is considered risky due to the higher probability of a car accident. During rush 
hour, the additional competition from occasional drivers travelling to or from 
work pushes fares down, whereas late at night the low supply and unavailability 
of public transportation increase fares by up to 100%. The number of passengers 
also plays a role: in a company of two or more, each extra passenger increases 
the fare by approximately 30%, since drivers claim that the extra weight results 
in higher fuel consumption and increases their costs. Simultaneously, two or 
more passengers make it unlikely for the driver to take other passengers along 
the way, and the extra charge compensates for this loss. Finally, asking the driver 
to drop a passenger in front of their apartment building also adds to the fare: 
since residential districts (in Russian, mikroraiony) are essentially mazes that 
are difficult and time-consuming to navigate, drivers charge extra to enter them, 
which is why most passengers prefer to be dropped off at the main street closest 
to their building and continue on foot. 
These pricing strategies became clear to me in the early hours of a rainy 
Saturday night in October 2014, when I stopped an informal taxi to take me back 
to the residential building where I lived, less than five minutes by car from where 
I was. I had taken the same route by taxi several times before and, thus, I knew 
that the usual fare was 2000 so‘m. Yet, the driver refused my offer and asked 
instead for 4000 so‘m, which I had to accept since there were no other cars on 
the street. After I sat in the car, the driver, a 23-year-old labour migrant from the 






particular part of the city and asked me to give him directions on how to reach 
my destination. Surprised, I inquired why he had asked for twice the usual fare 
if he did not know where my destination was. He replied that, at that time of day 
and given the weather, 4000 so‘m seemed like a reasonable price. Furthermore, 
since my initial offer had been 2000 so‘m, he assumed that my destination was 
not too far. 
In addition to illustrating how specific temporal and weather conditions can 
affect the fare, this ethnographic vignette is also quite illuminating regarding the 
fact that many labour migrants working as informal taxi drivers are unfamiliar 
with Tashkent’s physical layout. This does not necessarily hinder their ability to 
find their way around the city, since it is not uncommon for passengers to explain 
to drivers how to reach their final destination. Yet, it does affect their ability 
to charge accordingly for any given ride and, thus, substantially impacts their 
capacity to generate income, since inexperienced drivers who do not know the city 
well habitually agree to take every passenger they come across for whatever fare 
offered. Only after the destination has been reached do they ask the passenger for 
additional money, usually an extra 30%, claiming that the fare they had initially 
agreed upon was hardly enough to pay for the fuel. Nevertheless, in most cases, 
such pleas remain unheeded, since passengers appear unwilling to pay more than 
the fare the two parties initially negotiated. 
Low fares mean that labour migrants working as informal taxi drivers without 
another occupation beyond taxiing are forced to work 10 to 14 hours a day, six 
or seven days a week. Such long working hours physically exhaust them and 
increase their chances of being involved in a car accident. They also leave little 
time for leisure or community life, thus alienating labour migrants and hindering 
their integration into Tashkent’s social life. Their socialisation is further inhibited 
by the fierce competition amongst them, which often results in friction and leaves 
no room for a sense of camaraderie. This friction is most evident in the way in 
which drivers try to overtake each other by speeding and performing dangerous 
manoeuvres in order to first reach a potential passenger standing on the curb. 
Yet, even when they are not the first to reach a potential passenger, it is not 
uncommon for one or two cars to queue behind the first to stop in case its driver 
and the passenger do not reach an agreement on the fare. This practice benefits 
the passenger, since it offers the latter a potential alternative and strengthens their 
bargaining position, thereby placing drivers under pressure to accept whatever 
fare the passenger offers in order not to lose a ride. In this sense, the drivers’ 
elasticity and their capacity to momentarily adjust to the expectations of their 
potential passengers are, in fact, a token of their precariousness, since their need 
to generate income places them in a position where they have no choice but to 
accept the passengers’ perception of a fair fare. 
The lack of comradeship and the dangerous driving style of labour migrants 
working as informal taxi drivers are often employed by their counterparts native 
to Tashkent in order to establish themselves as urban and to differentiate them-
selves from rural newcomers, routinely regarded across Central Asia as primi-
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and Kosmarskaya 2012). In order to further distance themselves from such ste-
reotypes, most informal taxi drivers originating from Tashkent seldom admit 
that taxiing is their primary occupation, instead claiming that they only pick up 
passengers whose destination is along their route. Unsurprisingly, many labour 
migrants have adopted this strategy as well, presenting themselves as Tashkent 
natives, even when their knowledge of the city is inadequate for them to success-
fully find their way around it without assistance from the passenger. Central to 
such identity micropolitics is experience, understood here as the drivers’ famili-
arity with the flows of passengers and the practices of the population, which is 
acquired over months or years of taxiing in Tashkent. Outside rush hour, Tashkent 
drivers prefer to wait for potential passengers in central locations across the city, 
such as at markets or metro stations. However, migrants not yet familiar with the 
rhythms of urban life are constantly on the move, eagerly searching for passen-
gers. This practice increases their operating costs and identifies them as outsiders, 
since, as Jahongir, an experienced informal taxi driver in his forties who claims to 
be a Tashkent native, put it: 
You can tell who is new and who is old [in the profession] simply by looking 
at where one taxis. If it is rush hour and you look for passengers in Sergeli 
[Tashkent’s southernmost district, far from the city centre], it means that you 
are a kharyp who has a lot to learn. … Same with those who drive around on 
Sundays. … There are fewer passengers on Sundays, so it’s better to wait at 
[the] Chor Su [market] or [the] Alaiskii [market] for one to show up rather 
than drive in circles burning fuel. 
Familiarity with the mobility patterns of Tashkent’s population, thus, establishes 
the experienced informal taxi driver as an insider and, more importantly, as a 
Tashkenter (in Russian, Tashkentets). Contrariwise, migrant drivers are relegated 
to the status of a kharyp, a popular derogatory epithet used by non-Uzbeks, but 
also by ethnically Uzbek Russian speakers to refer to rural–urban migrants. This 
formulation is quite telling of the way in which migrant drivers—who often speak 
little or no Russian—are treated by both their colleagues and their passengers. 
Simultaneously, it highlights the obstacles and stereotypes they must overcome in 
their attempts to master their occupation and successfully generate income. 
Informal taxi drivers’ taut relationships with the Uzbek state 
Although low fares force drivers to work day and night in order to earn enough
to make a profit, they also render informal taxis quite popular amongst the local
population, thereby guaranteeing a stable flow of both passengers and income.
The majority of passengers are middle-class individuals who take informal
taxis on a daily basis, although lower-income individuals also use their ser-
vices, especially for destinations that are either quite close or quite far. As a
result, in addition to competing with each other, informal taxis are in a constant














counterparts. In fact, the preference that Tashkent’s residents show to informal
taxis has led to the abrupt decrease of the number of licensed taxis from 2664 in
2015 (Anhor.uz 2015) to 2507 in 2017 to 2212 in 2018 (Spot.uz 2018). It is
also detrimental to both the state and the city budgets, since, according to some
estimates, the Uzbek state annually loses 99.2 billion so‘m through tax evasion
and 25.4 billion so‘m due to informal taxi drivers’ failing to obtain an annual
taxi licence (ibid.). Recent years, therefore, have witnessed an offensive against
informal taxis carried out by Uzbekistan’s law enforcement agencies, as part of
which informal taxis have been discursively illegalised, with official documents
and the media alike habitually referring to them as ‘illegal taxis’ (in Russian,
nelegal’nye/nezakonnye taksi). 
In the early days of this offensive, drivers suspected of offering paid rides to 
their fellow citizens were supposed to be stopped and fined by inspectors from the 
State Tax Committee (GNK) in cooperation with traffic police officers. However, 
widespread street-level corruption and the difficulty in legally proving that a pas-
senger in a private car indeed paid for the ride resulted in a situation whereby most 
checks were resolved by means of a firm handshake between the parties involved 
(see also Urinboyev et al. 2018). Consequently, in 2011, a joint task force consist-
ing of plain clothes law enforcement officers from the Road Safety Directorate 
(UBDD), the Uzbek Agency of Automobile Transport (UzAvtoTrans), as well as 
the GNK assembled with the objective of conducting sting operations against per-
petrators. Since then, drivers caught providing unlicensed transport to passengers 
are levied quite high fines—ranging from 20 to 100 times the minimum monthly 
wage—which, for most drivers, can be financially devastating. Yet, whilst the 
threat of fines has somewhat demotivated occasional and part-time informal taxi 
drivers with alternate means of generating an income, it has had little influence 
on labour migrants who are financially dependent on taxiing and, hence, have no 
choice other than to continue the practice despite the risks. 
Similarly unsuccessful in this regard has been another measure adopted by 
the authorities involving the suspension of the driving licences of repeat offend-
ers. This measure has failed simply because many labour migrants do not have 
a licence, as its high costs—3 million so‘m in 2018—habitually keep them away 
from driving schools. Until the early 2010s, it was quite common amongst poten-
tial drivers to skip classes and to pass an exam organised by the UBDD by paying 
a bribe (RFE/RL 2011). However, in an attempt to allegedly improve road safety, 
in 2011, the government ordered the closing of all private driving schools across 
Uzbekistan, as it was rendered that the school owners’ inability—or unwilling-
ness—to enforce mandatory attendance to driving lessons and their facilitation of 
bribery and other illicit practices resulted in poor skills amongst drivers and an 
increase in traffic accidents. Accordingly, since 2011, the training, retraining and 
examination of drivers have been carried out within a stricter framework, leaving 
less room for bribery and, thus, further affecting the number of labour migrants 
willing to sit the exam. 
All this is quite telling of the fact that rural–urban migration and the deter-
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rendered state measures against informal taxis largely unsuccessful. In turn, this 
has prompted Uzbek authorities to adopt a more lenient stance towards Tashkent’s 
informal taxis, since they have come to realise that additional regulatory pressure 
would result not in the formalisation but in the eradication of informal taxis. Such 
a development would increase real unemployment and would gravely impact the 
everyday lives and income levels of a significant portion of Tashkent’s popula-
tion. In fact, as my research suggests, many informal taxi drivers are not against 
formalisation per se and agree that, under certain circumstances, they would con-
sider it, but excessive red tape, taxi company regulations, limited privileges and 
the high costs involved all hinder this transition. As it stands, formalisation is a 
rather complex endeavour, requiring the interested party, first, to obtain a taxi 
licence and, second, to join a taxi company. Yet, because the majority of labour 
migrants working as informal taxi drivers do not have a Tashkent propiska, they 
are neither eligible for a taxi licence in Tashkent nor allowed to officially work for 
a Tashkent-based taxi company. 
However, those who have managed to register in Tashkent also face various 
structural obstacles imposed upon them by taxi companies. Legally, in order to 
be eligible for a taxi licence, a driver must be over 21 years of age, already have 
a category B driving licence and have at least three years of driving experience. 
Fully owning a car is not a legal prerequisite, and owners of rented cars can 
qualify as well, provided that the lessor accepts the modification of the car into a 
taxi. Unofficially, however, taxi companies prefer older drivers—individuals aged 
30–45—fluent in both Russian and Uzbek with substantial driving experience. In 
addition, taxi companies seldom accept drivers with cars older than five years or 
rented, because they prefer to avoid potential problems stemming from a car’s 
ambiguous ownership status. All these considerations make it rather unlikely that 
labour migrants will be hired by taxi companies, since, in addition to the lack of a 
propiska and/or a driving licence, many do not speak Russian, cannot document 
that they have been driving for the required number of years and drive old second-
hand cars, which, as suggested already, are most often rented. 
Even if taxi companies did accept rented cars, however, many informal taxi 
drivers would still be unwilling to modify the private cars that they drive into 
taxis, since formalisation is a costly undertaking requiring the driver to invest a 
considerable amount of money before beginning to work. Expenses include the 
purchase and installation of taxi-related equipment (e.g., taxi sign, taximeter and 
cash register), various fees and licences (e.g., annual taxi licence and the registra-
tion of a cash register), several types of insurance (e.g., car insurance and carrier’s 
liability insurance) as well as the quintessential repainting of the car, all of which 
can set interested parties back by several million so‘m. In addition to the direct 
costs involved, modifying one’s car into a taxi is considered counterproductive 
by most drivers, because in Uzbekistan a private car is widely seen as a financial 
asset, which can be bought and then sold in order to finance the purchase of a 
new vehicle (Olma 2020). Thus, drivers are unwilling to modify their private cars 
into taxis, since this would compromise their resale and decrease the car’s market 







some cases, the lessors themselves prohibit the lessees from modifying the car in 
order to retain the latter’s market value in case the lessee fails to pay it back. 
In the shadows 
Requirements like those mentioned above essentially hinder the formalisation of 
informal taxi drivers and restrict many labour migrants to precarious labour in 
the informal economy. Yet, various socioeconomic parameters and the subjec-
tive views of the drivers themselves also impact their willingness to formalise. 
Licensed taxi drivers are employed in accordance with labour law provisions, 
meaning that they accrue seniority and are eligible for sick leave, paid days off 
and a pension upon retirement. Such long-term benefits are not viewed as impor-
tant by most labour migrants, who either cannot appreciate them or urgently need 
employment and an immediate source of income. Other labour migrants choose 
to stay ‘in the shadows’ (in Russian, v teni) because the idea of formalising and 
working for a licensed taxi company seems unappealing. This is because licensed 
drivers are expected to hand over to the taxi company they work for a hefty por-
tion of what they make each day, in the form of either a flat fee or a percentage of 
their earnings. Additionally, as Nozim, an informal taxi driver from Bukhara, told 
the popular news website Sputnik (2016): 
When you work for a taxi company, someone else regulates where you go, 
how many hours you work, how much you charge. … You no longer belong 
to yourself and you work for someone else [in Russian, rabotaesh’ na diadiu]. 
Literally meaning ‘to work for the uncle’, the expression rabotat’ na diadiu
Nozim used is a figurative colloquialism employed by informal taxi drivers to 
refer to wage labour, denoting a socioeconomic relationship between employer 
and employee that many view as nothing short of slavery. By contrast, ‘to work 
for oneself’ (in Russian, rabotat’ na sebia) is perceived by informal taxi drivers as 
a token of freedom, and more specifically of ‘freedom from’ bosses and the ‘free-
dom to’ work whenever and wherever they please (see also Sopranzetti 2017). 
As already mentioned, this also allows them to travel back to their home regions 
whenever the need or desire arises. In this sense, similar to Bangkok’s motorcycle 
taxi drivers, Tashkent’s labour migrants view taxiing as ‘a synonym of freedom’ 
(ibid., 75), but also as their sole road to success, not least because a popular con-
viction amongst youth across the post-Soviet space is that only by working for 
oneself can one get rich. It is in this context that many labour migrants working 
as informal taxi drivers often juxtapose taxiing with other informal jobs labour 
migrants are habitually forced to take up. As Alisher, an informal taxi driver in his 
mid-thirties coming from the Surkhandarya province, told me when I asked him 
why he had chosen to taxi: 
Most other men from my village work as construction workers, either 
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construction workers from my village who worked here in Tashkent, but a 
week before I left to join them, a cousin told me that the person in charge did 
not pay the workers the entire amount they had agreed upon. I had already 
planned my departure and needed a job, so I asked my father’s cousin who 
lives here to help me find a job. He offered to sell me his old car, which I 
rented on good terms, and now I make money by taxiing. [Unlike construction 
workers], I sleep in a finished building, I have a bed and a toilet, I choose the 
times I work, I sit comfortably in my car and I get paid any amount I want 
to get paid in a day. Nobody can cheat me and not pay me the salary I have 
worked for. 
In addition to freedom, then, taxiing provides labour migrants with autonomy 
both from neoliberal production regimes (see Morris 2016) and the whims of 
employers, not only ensuring that they will receive the money they have worked 
for but also offering them a higher income and better working conditions. Whilst 
most labour migrants find the income from taxiing adequate, at least compared to 
the wages earned in other informal jobs, they are nevertheless on the lookout for 
new ways to increase their earnings. For example, in recent years, many labour 
migrants working as informal taxi drivers have attempted to earn extra money by 
taking advantage of Yandex.Taxi’s entry into the Tashkent taxi market. Yandex. 
Taxi is a ride-sharing service owned and operated by the Russian multinational 
corporation Yandex, which specialises in internet-related products and services 
and is known across the post-Soviet space for its eponymous search engine. 
Given that in Uzbekistan only registered taxi companies are allowed to offer taxi 
services, Yandex.Taxi’s operations in the republic are officially limited to that of a 
taxi aggregator, whereby the company connects users with nearby taxi drivers, all 
of whom are, Yandex.Taxi maintains, licensed drivers working for registered taxi 
companies. Nevertheless, as both users and the media have reported, dozens of 
Tashkent’s informal taxi drivers have managed to connect to the service as well, 
thanks to the elasticity of employees working in shops acting as Yandex.Taxi’s 
focal points in Tashkent (Ozodlik 2018). 
Since fares through Yandex.Taxi are lower than those of licensed taxis but 
higher than those of informal taxis, informally connecting to the platform has 
offered informal taxi drivers the opportunity to increase their daily income by 
benefiting from the popularity of the application amongst passengers willing to 
pay a higher fare. At the same time, it has also broken them free of accepting 
passengers’ perceptions of a fair fare, for, unlike informal taxi drivers who find 
themselves under pressure to accept whatever fare a passenger offers, Yandex. 
Taxi calculates the fare for each ride and communicates it to the passenger a 
priori, leaving no room for negotiation. In other words, before they even enter the 
car, the passenger has already accepted the fare indicated on the screen of their 
smartphone. This function works in favour of Yandex.Taxi drivers, because it 
guarantees them that, at the end of the ride, they will receive a fare that not only is 
higher but also is calculated on the basis of more or less objective criteria. In this 

















for disembedding state-enforced labour regulations in the Global North and for 
retaining the informality of labour relations in the Global South (Rekhviashvili 
and Sgibnev 2020), in Tashkent, such applications could potentially increase the 
income of drivers, whilst allowing them to establish a somewhat more formal 
relationship with the Uzbek state. 
Conclusions 
Either because they buy cheaper cars already in disrepair or because the financial 
uncertainty that characterises taxiing does not allow them to service their cars 
properly, labour migrants working as informal taxi drivers typically drive poorly 
maintained cars. Accordingly, it is rather common for informal taxis to sport, 
among other, untrustworthy tyres, cracked windshields, inoperable safety belts 
and potentially dangerous CNG tanks. Combined with the fact that many drivers 
do not have driving licences and do not follow road rules, the poor state of their 
cars habitually leads to—often lethal—traffic accidents. As a result, Tashkent’s 
informal taxi industry has largely become synonymous with the epithets that 
Tashkent’s Russian-speaking old-timers have bestowed upon labour migrants 
at large—that is, rural, backward and premodern. Hence, despite the fact that 
informal taxis essentially facilitate urban mobility by covering gaps in Tashkent’s 
transportation infrastructure, the state-led offensive against them is viewed by 
old-timers and the media alike as nothing short of a modernising campaign, aimed 
at disposing those aspects of urban life that fail to fit with the image of a modern 
city. Such views have affected the livelihoods of labour migrants involved in taxi-
ing by limiting their formalisation opportunities, which, together with the state’s 
ambivalent stance towards them, forces many even deeper ‘into the shadows’, 
thus reproducing this informal practice. 
Notwithstanding whether they pick up passengers off the street or through
online applications, labour migrants who work as informal taxi drivers remain
largely marginal to urban life in Tashkent. Long working hours, low socio-
economic capital and negative stereotypes that follow them result in lim-
ited socialisation opportunities and, subsequently, hinder their integration.
Simultaneously, even those working for a semi-legitimate scheme like Yandex. 
Taxi are not guaranteed a stable income or an institutional safety net in the form
of social security or insurance that would protect them in case of illness, car
trouble or an accident. Finally, their lack of a propiska, a work permit or even
a driving licence exposes them to state-orchestrated raids against individuals
staying or working in Tashkent ‘illegally’. All this is quite telling of how the
practices and everyday lives of labour migrants working as informal taxi driv-
ers remain characterised by informality, precariousness and uncertainty. Yet, as
this chapter has shown, the barriers to the socioeconomic integration of these
individuals are not merely formal, but also informal and even subjective, sug-
gesting that the informality of labour migrants, apart from a condition inflicted
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3 Deportation regimes in 
the post-Soviet space 
Producing deportable migrants in the Russian 
Federation 
Rano Turaeva and Izzat Amon 
Introduction 
Central Asian labour migration to the Russian Federation (hereafter, Russia) 
reached its peak in the early 2000s. Estimates for the number of migrants cur-
rently residing in Russia reach at least 10 million (including unofficial figures).1 
As a result, the Central Asian economies became remittance-dependent, such that 
more than half of Tajikistan’s GDP is sourced from remittances primarily from 
Russia. The Russian migration infrastructure was unprepared to accommodate 
such a massive influx of labour migrants, creating spaces for flexible legal strate-
gies exercised by decision-makers within the justice system as well as security 
services. The latter use the legal and economic precarities of migrants, who, in 
turn, also attempt to deal with their semilegal, quasilegal, illegal and kind-of-legal 
situations as deportable and detainable at any time. 
Migration studies, studies of transnationalism and globalisation represent a big 
body of literature, which has shifted depending on the dynamics of migration 
and mobilities. More recent studies of migration emphasised blurring national 
boundaries, the transnationalisation of the migration experience, politics and 
economies, whilst the securitisation of national borders and policing migration 
have also intensified (Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Appadurai 1996; Hannerz 
1996; Gupta and Fergusson 1997; Vertovec 2009). This chapter contributes to 
migration studies by focusing on legal issues and deportation regimes as well 
as the experiences shaped by the deportability and detainability of migrants in 
Russia, in keeping with the work of De Genova and Peutz (2010) and De Genova 
(2019). The questions we consider here are as follows: How is deportability 
legally produced and operationalised? What legal and illegal means are used to 
render migrants deportable? And what does being deportable mean for the daily 
survival of migrants in Russia? 
We argue that the result of not having a clear regulatory basis for making deci-
sions about deportation as well as for legally violating laws during the deportation 
process result in chaos within the management of migration and mobility. We 
also argue that these gaps and contradictions within the legal system serve as both 
means and opportunities for Russian officials to illegally expel unwanted migrants 
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deportation as a weapon or punishment, in accordance with findings from Walters 
(2018) and Navasky (1959). The overall analysis of the practice of deportation 
and violating the human rights of migrant-victims indicates and supports the find-
ings of De Genova and Peutz (2010), whereby deportability and detainability are 
produced and experienced. 
It is not only contradictions and gaps within the legal system that create 
opportunities, but, also, the impunity of employees who overstep their privileges 
and responsibilities. This includes individuals who, for example, enjoy free 
access to databases they may manipulate if necessary. Such opportunities grant 
state officials rights over the lives and livelihoods of many labour migrants. The 
contradictory and paradoxical characteristics of Russian legislation relate to the 
deportation regime itself, where it is clear that legal provisions are not necessarily 
followed within that process, including the speed of the actual execution of a 
deportation order. 
The continuous state of deportability and detainability leaves migrants 
vulnerable to various kinds of exploitation and violence, maintaining migrants’ 
dependence upon those in power. Mobility, migration and uncertainties represent 
the central topics of this chapter, contributing further to the general discussion 
surrounding informality and mobilities (Hart 2006; Urry 2012; Urinboyev and 
Polese 2016; Turaeva 2013, 2014, 2018). Mobility, uncertainty and authoritarian 
governments are preconditions to the establishment of deportation regimes in a 
Foucauldian (Foucault 1975, 1980) understanding of the regime as a dispersed 
but powerful set of institutions, practices and objects. Power is central to the 
functioning of any regime, and Foucault’s recommendation is to ‘escape from 
the limited field of juridical sovereignty and State institutions, and instead base 
our analysis of power on the study of the techniques and tactics of domination’ 
(Foucault 1980: 102). In other words, power is constituted through strategies, 
dispositives, techniques and the economy (Foucault 1980). 
This chapter, then, contributes to an understanding of how uncertainties are 
produced through a continuous state of deportability and how mobility or a 
limitation to it leads to the violation of basic human rights related to mobility 
and the freedom of movement (Turaeva 2013). The informal and, at times, illegal 
use of rules and laws to practice deportation also show how much flexibility is 
possible within Russian legislation in order to easily punish those unwanted or, to 
use the wording in Russian legal texts, ‘undesirable’ (nejelatelnost`) (The Federal 
Law, latest version from 07.04.2020 № 111-FZ). 
In this chapter, we present an analysis of Russia’s judicial and political system 
related to the regulation and administration of migrants, focusing specifically 
on Central Asian migrants. Our analysis includes an examination not only of 
laws and practices implemented by government bodies and politicians but also 
individual examples of deportation cases derived from the second author’s 
work as an attorney. Here, we pay particularly close attention to the legislative 
changes related to the regulation of deportation and analyse the conditions of the 
deportability of migrants relying on the theoretical traditions of Agamben (1998), 
De Genova and Peutz (2010) and Foucault (1975, 1980). 
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The policies we discuss in this chapter concern the migration management 
efforts of the government and its legislative basis. We also discuss the individual 
experiences of victims and victims’ supporters, their families; the daily strategies 
of migrants living in fear of being deported; and other norms, institutions and 
practices which form the deportation regime in the post-Soviet space. Various 
actors within the deportation regime are presented, and we discuss different 
practices from within the deportation regime in order to understand how 
deportability is produced, conducted and experienced. 
We collected the data for this chapter collaboratively, whereby both authors 
participated in deportation cases filed in Russian courts against migrants. 
Specifically, the second author represented the migrants as their lawyer. The first 
author participated in the deportation case hearings and conducted interviews with 
migrants in Moscow within the framework of her field research in 2016 and 2017. 
The first author, employing anthropological methods of field research, conducted 
both recorded interviews and unrecorded interviews, informal conversations, 
discussions and follow-up contacts via mobile communication channels through 
the present. The second author works as a lawyer and human rights activist for 
migrants’ rights and is based in Moscow. Therefore, the data consist of not only 
research data in the form of the direct observation of deportation cases in courts in 
Moscow and interviews with migrants in Moscow (clients of the second author) 
but also official documents submitted to the court as part of the deportation cases 
in which the second author played a role. The names of the migrants presented 
here have been changed as well as the locations of the court cases to ensure the 
anonymity of all participants. 
This chapter is structured as follows to address the research questions 
and advance our arguments. First, we provide background information on the 
migration situation in Russia, situating our analysis within the migration studies 
literature. We then outline the legal basis of the migration administration and 
migration politics in Russia, followed by specific deportation case studies. These 
case studies are followed by our analysis of the regulation of deportation applied 
in Russia and an analysis of the entire deportation regime in Russia as regulated, 
practised and experienced by different actors participating in this regime. Our 
concluding remarks outline our arguments and indicate future gaps which need 
to be addressed in the research and policy work concerning deportation regimes 
globally. 
Migration to Russia: numbers and laws 
Migration studies, studies of transnationalism and globalisation itself all 
emphasise increasingly blurred national boundaries, whilst the securitisation of 
national borders and policing migration simultaneously intensified (Walters 2002; 
Guild 2009; Tsing 2005; Glick Schiller et al. 1995; Appadurai 1996; Hannerz 
1996; Gupta and Fergusson 1997; Vertovec 2009). Furthermore, Vertovec 
(2009) emphasised that the precondition for the expansion of processes related to 
migration stemmed from the development of a means for quick communication. 
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With more recent moves in globalisation studies, researchers began questioning 
social and political boundaries and fixed identities. They focused on the processes 
of deterritorialisation and the marginalisation of nation-states in a mobile and 
interconnected world (Appadurai 1996; Gupta and Fergusson 1997). Later, 
the critique of this approach prompted discussions of reterritorialisation and 
reordering the global world, bringing nation-states ‘back in’ as important actors 
(Braithwaite 1992; Cutler et al. 1999; Slaughter 2004; Appadurai 2006; Djelic 
and Sahlin-Andersen 2006). Some authors focused on the reordering process 
itself, enquiring into how the genesis and structuring of new modes of governance 
(conceptualised as practices of rule and regulations) frame and reproduce order 
(Djelic and Sahlin-Anderson 2006: 3). Reordering, placing the state back into the 
equation, associated with general trends amongst state powers aimed at controlling 
migration in light of global right-wing populism and antimigrant attitudes more 
generally (Bigo 2002; Calavita 2005; Chavez 2008; Cole 2002; Cornelius et al. 
1994; Doty 1998). There is by now a large body of literature dealing with the state 
and securitisation of immigration and migration (Ellermann 2009; Fassin 2011; 
Krause & Williams 1996; Nevins 2002; Simon 1998; Stumpf 2006; Welch 2002, 
2006; Willen 2007; Williams 2003). 
Central Asians have migrated en masse to other countries, particularly to 
Russia, in search of better work opportunities and living conditions (Urinboyev 
2019; Turaeva 2018; Schenk 2020; Heusala and Aitamurto 2016). Russia is the 
fourth-largest recipient of migrant workers in the world, whilst Central Asia 
represents one of the regions whose economy depends increasingly on remittances 
sent from abroad (IOM 2005: 397). The official numbers given by the Russian 
statistical agency, Rosstat, from 2011 to 2017 indicate that about three to four 
million migrants entered Russia, with unofficial numbers estimating twice as 
many migrants due to restrictions to official residence permits, which we describe 
below.2 As a reaction to these rapid developments, Russia introduced restrictive 
rules and policies to control mobility and migration, particularly in big cities such 
as Moscow and St. Petersburg. These rules and policies include policing migrants, 
and the administration of residence, labour and taxation along with various 
conditions governing them. Migration policies across all post-Soviet Republics 
have been renewed to fit the novel conditions of becoming independent states, 
aimed at ensuring state sovereignty and securing national borders. However, under 
the regulation within agreements amongst the post-Soviet Republics, a union 
known as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), mutual agreements 
exist on labour mobility, economic cooperation and security issues. 
Russian migration regulation following its independence was challenged by 
mass migration from other post-Soviet Republics. Such laws were developed 
gradually, fitting the dynamics of the migratory processes as well as the political 
and economic situation within Russia. Regulation of migration was organised and 
administered after the collapse of the Soviet Union through the creation of a state 
body, known as the Federal Migration Service (FMS) in 1992. FMS was a federal 
law enforcement agency, responsible for controlling, administering, investigat-
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within and outside Russia (Turaeva 2016). FMS occupied a higher-ranking posi-
tion as an institution within the migration control system and was more powerful 
than agencies such as the police department. On 5 April 2016, FMS was closed 
down and its functions were transferred to the Main Directorate for Migration 
Affairs within the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD a local abbreviation), a 
state agency that provides security and is less powerful than the Federal National 
Security Services, which belongs to the Ministry of Defence. This last develop-
ment within migration governance in Russia implied that mobility and residence 
were reformulated, relegislated and securitised, specifically such that migration 
control became an issue considered within security offices such as MVD (that is, 
the police and justice system). This represented a significant move, illustrating 
the complexities of power games played within the governing regimes in Russia 
(Ledeneva 1998, 2006). Details regarding the political machine of migration 
management in Russia, another understudied field, lie beyond our scope here. 
Instead, we focus on one of the many tools of this machine or apparatus, namely, 
the deportation regime. Specifically, we begin by outlining the legal basis of the 
deportation regime in order to understand through what means security officials 
operate in order to manage, control and benefit from migration. 
Deportation regime: the legal basis 
Federal Law No. 114, ‘On the Order of the Exit and Entry to the Russian
Federation’, and Federal Law No. 115, ‘On the Legal Status of Foreign
Citizens in the Russian Federation’, were adopted in August 1996, with further
changes to them introduced regularly, often annually (The Federal Law, latest
version from 07.04.2020 № 111-FZ). However, based on the second author’s
experience as a lawyer based in Moscow, the actual implementation of these
laws only began in 2013. This can be explained through the migration dynamics
in Russia, whereby the influx of migrants skyrocketed during the late 1990s,
with the general situation becoming difficult to manage towards 2010 and more
so during the economic crisis (2008) following the introduction of sanctions
against Russia after 2014 (due to the annexation of Crimea). The wording
of the law regulating the exit and entry to Russia deserves special attention
here: ‘reshenye o nerazreshenii vèzda v Rossiskuyu Federaziyu ili resheniye
o nejelatelnosti prebyvania (projivaniya) v Rossiskoy Federazii’, literally
translated into English as ‘a decision on non-permission to enter the Russian
Federation or a decision on the undesirability of a stay (residence) in the Russian
Federation’. Essentially, this refers to regulating permission to enter the territory
of Russia (a priori to migration) and/or the wishes (desire vs undesirability)
of the state towards a migrant. Permission to enter would or could be equated
with regulating entry or issuing visas, which would apply to those who wish to
enter Russia. Therefore, the condition for this decision cannot logically result in
any charges (administrative or criminal) against de facto residing migrants. The
part regarding the desirability of migrants cannot be legally measured vis-à-vis
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the sociological point of view. The semantic contradiction of this law already,
to our minds, allows much room for interpretation and abuse, as well as the
possibility of producing undesirability, and, thus, deportability and detainability.
The law further states: 
The deportation of a foreign citizen or stateless person with respect to whom 
a decision was made to not allow entry into the Russian Federation or a deci-
sion on the undesirability of staying (living) in the Russian Federation is car-
ried out by the federal executive body in the field of internal affairs or its 
territorial body in collaboration with other federal bodies, executive authori-
ties and their territorial bodies within their competence. The procedure for 
interaction between the federal executive body in the field of internal affairs 
and its territorial bodies with federal executive bodies authorised to make 
a decision on non-permission to enter the Russian Federation or a decision 
on the undesirability of staying (living) in the Russian Federation, and their 
territorial bodies when exercising control over the execution by foreign citi-
zens and stateless persons, such decisions are established by joint regulatory 
legal acts of the federal executive body in the field of internal affairs and 
interested federal executive bodies (The Federal Law, latest version from 
07.04.2020 № 111-FZ). 
In short, this says that if one is found undesirable or not permitted to enter
Russia, they should leave the territory of Russia; and if the ‘undesirable’ does
not leave, then s/he should be deported by a federal organ of the executive branch
of the government (that is, the police or security services). Since the deportation
law is formulated as a law on refusing entry (which does not make sense when
applied to already-residing migrants) and/or on undesirability (which is also
less than logical), we refer to these as the laws on the deportability or the de
facto deportation law in order to clarify the definition dictating and informing
practice. 
How does one become undesirable? Two administrative fines are sufficient 
according to the law on entry to and exit from Russia. This law regulates and 
defines the deportability of migrants as being fined two or more times for breaking 
residence regulations, such as the propiska, a regulation theoretically and 
practically impossible to follow (Turaeva 2016; Hojaqizi 2008). The regulation of 
residence and mobility within Russia is controlled through the propiska regime, 
which restricts the movement of both citizens and migrants (Hojaqizi 2008). 
Through this system, the number of individuals who became undesirable was 
rather high, reaching into the millions. According to official statistics from the 
Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation, from 2013 to 2014, over 
three million foreign citizens were deemed deportable for violating these specific 
federal laws.3 These laws regulate two methods of deportation: voluntary and 
compulsory. Voluntary deportation is enforced at the foreign person’s expense, 
whereas forced deportation is conducted at the state’s expense by transferring the 
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Deportation practices: semilegal means of deportation 
Certain passages from the abovementioned articles and clauses from federal 
laws and the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation both 
contradict and reinforce each other. The principle of ‘non bis in idem’ (from the 
Latin ‘not twice against the same [thing]’) prohibiting a second prosecution and 
punishment for a single action is regulated through Article 50 of the Constitution 
of the Russian Federation, which states: ‘No one may be twice judged for one and 
the same crime’. Contrary to this statement in the Constitution concerning the 
inadmissibility of punishment twice for the same act, Clause 4 of Article 26 of the 
Federal Law of 15 August 1996 reads as follows: 
[Those who r]epeatedly (twice or more times) within three years are found 
guilty for breaking administrative laws for committing an administrative 
offence on the territory of the Russian Federation are subject to deportation. 
For violating Clause 4 of Article 26 of the Federal Law—that is, committing (at 
times, even, not even committing) two minor offences, the executive body has the 
right to decide on the deportability of offender migrants. 
A protocol is drafted naming the offender. Based on this protocol, the offender
must pay an administrative fine. This is one punishment. This punishment then
results in further punishment for the same offence—specifically, this offence
then defines the offender as deportable, resulting in her/his deportation. After the
offender pays the administrative fine, s/he faces an additional punishment, namely,
deportation. That is, the person is punished twice for the same offence, which is not
permissible under the Constitution. In order to explain these legal contradictions
and how the deportation law is applied in practice, we provide several case studies
below in the narratives from victims defended by the second author (Izzat Amon). 
Another contradictory aspect to the deportation regime lies in the timing
following the actual court proceedings, detention and deportation itself. The timing
does not reflect the regulation for the time necessary to enforce court decisions,
the time allowed for the possibility of filing an appeal and the actual execution of
deportation. Namely, when a victim of the deportation regime is deemed deportable
by a court decision, legally and theoretically the victim should be granted time to
appeal, typically within ten days. However, deportees are granted three days to leave
the country voluntarily following the date of a court decision, which automatically
prevents deportees from the possibility of appealing a court decision. Much about
the legal contradictions and textual inconsistencies exists within the regulations of
migration control regimes in Russia. But, what happens in practice when all these
legal texts are put into practice? Below, we provide examples from actual deportation
cases, partly demonstrating how the deportation regime works in reality. 
The case of Mahmud 
Mahmud, a citizen of Tajikistan, came to Russia at the beginning of 2000s as a 
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time, he brought his wife and three children to Russia. In 2014, he received a 
residence permit (a clean propiska) since he managed to buy a flat, whereby he 
could finally obtain his propiska. In 2016, he travelled to Tajikistan to visit his 
parents but was not allowed reentry into Russia. At Domodedovo International 
Airport, he was informed that his entry into Russia was barred on the basis of 
Federal Law No. 114, Article 26, Clause 4. Mahmud’s family remained in Russia, 
and he was forced to remain in Tajikistan. The legal process to change the court 
decision took a year to complete. 
Legally, two approaches were taken to defend Mahmud’s case. The first was 
to argue based on his ownership of property within the Russian territory and his 
family living in Russia. Banning the Appellant from reentry to Russia violated his 
right to enjoy familial life, guaranteed by Article 8 Clause 1 of the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Moreover, according 
to Paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(adopted through UN General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) on 10 December 
1948), the family is a natural and fundamental unit of society and carries the right 
to protection from society and the state. 
The second strategy relied on tracing the administrative offences within the last 
three years to determine if two existed. A lengthy inquiry of his offence history 
yielded positive results, namely, that he had no more than one offence and that 
was a traffic violation, for which the fine was paid on time. Moreover, according 
to Russian regulations, the authorities did not have the right to prohibit a person 
from using his property. Due to the existing offences (less than two), the Appellant 
was also illegally punished with the deportation law. After successfully defending 
him—specifically by appealing the original court decision—a further lawsuit was 
filed forcing migration services to pay moral and physical damage (in the amount 
of 3000 Russian roubles) as a consequence of the court decision. Ultimately, 
he was not paid compensation despite a positive decision from the court to pay 
damages without any known reasons. The ignoring of the court decision such as 
paying the compensation is also part of the whole legal regime which uses any 
gaps and contradictions to the law when it concerns migrants’ rights. This legal 
nihilism at times stems also from the general attitude towards migrants as they are 
seen as those who can have no rights and can be abused with impunity such as 
police daily abuse, courts ignoring the rights of migrants and deportation regime 
just acting on migrants without consideration of laws. 
Furthermore, Mahmud’s case also reveals how entries in the database of 
offences are subject to being changed and manipulated. This case shows that a 
migrant was denied entry on the basis of the deportation law (the ‘Law on the 
Exit and Entry to the Russian Federation’), applied to any migrant who broke 
laws twice within three years. In the case of Mahmud, he had a clean propiska
(given that he owned a flat where he could register legally) and broke a law only 
once within three years. Yet, he was denied entry on the basis of a court decision 
against him. Without strong legal support, migrants are typically abandoned by 
legal regimes, which can remove a specific number of migrants to satisfy quotas. 
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The case of Shahrukh 
Here, we use the case of Shahrukh to demonstrate the contradictory legal 
provisions regulated by Russian law. The following case shows the details of 
the impunity enjoyed by officials and the system itself, which allows space for a 
securitised system to render unwanted migrants deportable. 
In March 2016, Shahrukh, a Tajikistan citizen, was detained in Moscow on 
suspicion of having committed a robbery. Shahrukh’s wife, a citizen of Russia 
and an ethnic Russian, actively worked to ensure legal support for her Tajik 
husband. The investigation of robbery lasted six months, yielding no evidence 
of Shahrukh’s participation in the crime. Thus, the criminal case was dismissed 
due to a lack of evidence. Despite this outcome, he was not released but instead 
was transferred from a pretrial detention centre to a special detention centre 
(deportation centre) for deportees. A district court in Moscow issued a decision to 
deport Shahrukh. A week later, Shahrukh was deported to Tajikistan, well ahead 
of schedule set for his deportation. The deportation was carried out before the 
court decision on the deportation had entered into force. His marriage to a Russian 
citizen and the existence of two minor children, both of whom were also Russian 
citizens, did not affect the court’s decision nor his subsequent deportation from 
Russia. 
If we follow the procedures used in Shahrukh’s case, we see how the entire 
process from the accusation of robbery to the fast-track deportation without a 
legal decision on the latter took place. In this process, we find no legal basis for 
transferring Shahrukh from a pretrial detention centre to a deportation detention 
centre. Suspecting Shahrukh might be a thief rendered him predestined as 
deportable at any cost. The case and procedures applied to Shahrukh demonstrate 
how security officials simply agreed that this migrant should be deported and 
how it was performed. Any counterarguments in his favour against deportation, 
such as the existence of his family and children who are Russian citizens, did not 
interest security officials in the least. His fate was left to the deportation machine, 
namely, transferring him to the detention centre for deportation. The court, then, 
becomes a symbolic backdrop, where the deportation decision is made, since the 
actual deportation of the victim is performed without any legal basis, in this case, 
without entering the court decision into force (usually there must be time granted 
to submit an appeal). 
This case also provides evidence that any wrong move (more than two 
administrative fines or other convictions or simply being a suspect) which draws 
the attention of Russian authorities can end with the deportation of migrants to 
fulfil quotas without ensuring that procedures follow Russian laws and or adhere 
to the basic human rights conventions. 
The case of Nasrulloh 
Early on a summer morning in 2018, the police knocked on the door of the flat 
that Nasrulloh, a Tajikistan citizen, and his family rented in a Moscow residential 
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officers) forcibly entered the flat, ordering everyone to lie down on the floor. 
After a thorough search, all of the flat’s residents were brought to the Federal 
Security Service’s central office, commonly referred to as ‘Lubyanka’ (migrant 
detention centre), a notorious place which migrants fear most. All of the detainees 
were interrogated in separate rooms. After two days, everyone but Nasrulloh was 
released. Nasrulloh was accused of financing terrorism, having allegedly sent his 
terrorist accomplices 25 million roubles over the past six years. 
The following facts were established by the defence: Nasrulloh was not involved 
in any financing of terrorism. He was trusted by labour migrants, who gave their 
salaries to Nasrulloh in cash. He then sent this money home to Tajikistan through 
various money transfer systems to safely coordinate the distribution of his fellow 
Tajik labour migrants’ salaries. Another monetary transaction in cooperation 
with a Tajik businessman who brought goods from Turkey was also established 
as having nothing to do with financing terrorism. The process of fact-finding in 
Nasrulloh’s defence took about six months. Although the investigation concluded 
that Nasrulloh was not involved in terrorism, all of the initial accusations against 
him were brought to court due to the unwillingness of the law enforcement officers 
to release Nasrulloh. 
During the court hearing, the case related to financing terrorism was 
reclassified as illegal entrepreneurship, violating Article 171 of the Criminal Code 
of the Russian Federation, even though Nasrulloh conducted all of these transfers 
legally. After his hearing, Nasrulloh was again detained and transferred to a 
special detention centre for foreign citizens (deportation centre). Subsequently, 
he was deported from Russia and banned for life from returning. It was impossible 
to establish who took the deportation decision with respect to Nasrulloh. All 
of the requests submitted by Nasrulloh’s lawyer regarding the decision on his 
deportation were ignored. This deportation case also did not end with Nasrulloh’s 
deportation, but extended to his other family members (his brother) and others 
within his networks (all Tajik migrants). In total, 30 migrants have been deported 
as a result of Nasrulloh’s case. 
This case of a deportation chain clearly illustrates how deportation serves as 
a tool for getting rid of unwanted or legally speaking ‘undesired’ migrants for 
whom suspicion surrounds. Whether false or not, the suspicion alone grants state 
authorities a reason to get rid of a migrant or an entire group of migrants by using 
regulations, officers and institutions within the deportation regime. 
The case of Khurshid 
Khurshid was a foreman at a construction company and oversaw a team of 28 people
who all worked for a Russian businessman named Seriy. Khurshid’s team built
multistorey buildings, performing the most difficult work with the most respon-
sibility: monolith and lining. Amongst construction workers, Seriy was notorious
for his fraudulent actions. Seriy had his krysha (protection within the state system)
within law enforcement agencies, namely, within the Ministry of Internal Affairs
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After Khurshid realised that he had been deceived and not been paid for the 
work he and his construction team had completed, he sought legal support to 
receive their wages. After communicating with Seriy, the latter became angry 
and made sure that the construction workers were expelled from their barracks 
(temporary sleeping quarters for construction workers within the building site or 
next to it). Furthermore, construction workers were denied access in order to col-
lect their belongings. A nongovernmental organisation (led by one of the authors), 
which provides support to migrants, decided to organise a public demonstration 
against Seriy’s construction company in front of the construction site where the 
workers were barred entry. The demonstrations were stopped by Special Security 
Forces (OMON a local abbreviation), who arrived in several buses and detained 
all of the participants of the demonstration. Within 24 hours, all 28 people— 
Khurshid’s entire construction worker team—were deported from Russia by 
order from a decision from Moscow’s Gagarin District Court. Khurshid himself 
was detained for a violation of Article 213 of the Criminal Code of the Russian 
Federation and placed in a special detention centre. Four months later, Khurshid 
was released from the courtroom by court order and placed in a special detention 
centre (deportation centre) for foreign citizens, where he was held for more than 
six months before being deported. 
This case shows that not only suspects do become undesired and fall under 
the wheels of the deportation machine, but simply angering a powerful person 
who is well connected to Russian security circles can end in deportation. As 
Khurshid’s case illustrates, a situation of uncertainty or continuously living under 
the fear of deportation is created, what De Genova and Peutz (2010) describe 
as a state of deportability. These fears and uncertainty are the main reasons that 
allow individuals such as Seriy to deceive migrants en masse. Such deception 
includes letting migrant construction workers toil for months and then not paying 
them at the end without fear of facing justice. Yet, there is also the reality that, at 
worst, all such migrants can be deported at any time. This also happened to the 
abovementioned migrant demonstrators, who were removed from the streets and 
subsequently deported en masse. 
Deportation as political revenge 
Deportation serves Russian authorities not only by enriching its security officers
who search for migrant-victims but also by gaining prominence amongst Russian
voters (Russian right-wing populism increased as the number of migrants
in Russia increased) who support political steps against migrants. Targeting
migrants for deportation proved effective as a ‘weapon’ (Walters 2018: 1) in
exerting pressure on Russia’s ‘former colonies’—that is, Central Asia. Central
Asian dependence upon Russia is well established. In the context of migration,
where millions of Central Asian migrants remit most of their earnings to their
home countries, it is politically and economically crucial for Central Asian
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Labour migrants have become bargaining chips between the Kremlin and 
the migrants’ countries of origin. For example, in 2011, the pilots of an aircraft 
belonging to a Russian airline were detained after illegally crossing the Tajik 
border. The pilots were subsequently handed lengthy prison sentences. The 
Kremlin’s reaction was predictable and expected, specifically resulting in the hunt 
for Tajik migrants, which began immediately after the detention of the Russian 
pilots. According to official records, within just one week, the courts illegally 
deported over 3000 Tajik citizens to Tajikistan. Public figures and human rights 
activists held a press conference on the topic of the illegal deportation of Tajik 
citizens from Russia and called upon Russian authorities to prevent the use of 
migrants for political purposes.4 This measure (deportation) affected Tajik 
authorities. They were forced to free the pilots, whereby following the sentencing, 
the pilots were pardoned by the President of Tajikistan and released.5 
Deportation regimes: an analysis 
Deportation studies gained increasing attention in scholarly analysis in the early 
2000s (De Genova 2002; Peutz 2006; Walters 2002; Kanstroom 2000; Coutin 
2003; Gibney 2008) when migration and mobility reached their peaks after the 
fall of communist regimes and other conflicts escalated following the end of the 
Cold War in the early 1990s. The internet and increasing global connectivity have 
served as the primary engines fuelling mobility and the globalisation of markets 
and capital. 
The deportation regime gained prominence with global political insecurities 
concerning state sovereignty, whilst the securitisation of migration expanded 
further afield (Coutin 2015; Bleichmar 1999; Drotbohm 2014; Drotbohm 
and Hasselberg 2014; Galvin 2014; Hasselberg 2014; Kanstroom 2000, 2012; 
Schuster and Majidi 2014; Walters 2002). Deportation became the primary tool 
to control migration and mobility (De Genova 2002; De Genova and Peutz 2010; 
Dreby 2012, 2013; Peutz 2006). According to De Genova and Peutz (2010: 34), 
‘the practice of deportation has nonetheless emerged as a definite and increasingly 
pervasive convention of routine statecraft’. Furthermore, these deportation 
practices became a ‘global regime’ of controlling mobility and migration (De 
Genova and Peutz 2010: 34). 
De Genova distinguished between the legal process of deportation (from 
above) and the state of being deportable (from below), not so much as the legal 
status of a person but as something experienced and perceived (living in fear), 
full of uncertainties and living with the risk of being deported every day. He 
describes this state of being amongst migrants as an ‘enforced orientation to the 
present’ (De Genova 2005: 427). Central Asian migrants also live with a constant 
worry that their businesses or economic activities will be stopped at any moment, 
filling them with the drive to make the best of the present or to think only in the 
short term. A continuous state of being deportable contributes to the vulnerability 
of migrants to exploitation, violence and abuse. Remaining silent and bearing 
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deported. Experiences of this state of deportability are accompanied by multiple 
sacrifices to freedom, rights, honour and the enjoyment of life. 
In all of the deportation cases presented in this chapter, we described the means 
and methods used to produce deportability, where legal instruments have been 
abused and used as weapons to fight migration and to gain political recognition 
amongst Russian voters. The deportation regime was created after the fall of the 
Soviet Union in order to fight migration and increased mobility, which challenged 
not only rigid national boundaries, but also authoritarian regimes. Migrants are 
‘undesirable’ not only in the destination country (Russia) but also in their homes 
by their governments, for whom they symbolise poverty and weaknesses related 
to the inability to manage their economies such that their citizens are forced to 
leave their countries. The latter brings the home governments (in Central Asia) 
into a bad light. For the Russian economy, although cheap migrant labour fill jobs 
Russian citizens would not like to do remains crucial to maintaining the economy, 
the Russian government is challenged by the high numbers of mass migration 
and must negotiate with the mood of Russian voters. The deportation regime is 
then an easy tool to manage the number of migrants. As we have also seen in one 
of the case studies presented in this chapter, not only do Russian government 
actors play a role, but so, too, do the governments of the sending countries which 
must cooperate with the former. Cooperation with several nation-states in order to 
manage mobility is a normal practice, but using migrants in political games such 
as revenge is anything but normal. 
Besides employing deportation as a weapon (Walters 2018: 1) and punishment 
(Navasky 1959), in the hands of powerful actors poor migrants not only experi-
ence deportation during the process itself but a priori state of deportability sym-
bolises the daily struggle played out through abusive and deceptive employers, 
police on the street, neighbours or simply others. Knowledge about the deportabil-
ity of migrants is widely shared through political promotions and media coverage, 
which do not necessarily serve as a criticism of the mechanism, but rather protect 
those who can easily abuse this weapon through exploitation as employers, vio-
lence in the street against migrants, enforcing obedience and silencing migrants. 
The creation of such dependencies and power relations between migrants and 
others in power has a number of implications for the vulnerability of migrants and 
for the security of their families. 
Conclusions 
We provided here examples of deportation cases, some personally defended by 
the second author, some involving court hearings the first author attended and 
some handled by both authors during field research conducted in Moscow in 2016, 
2017, 2018 and 2019. We also noted that deportation cases statistically increased 
after the procedure was put into practice in 2013 based on the personal experiences 
of the second author as a practising lawyer. The number of the deportation cases 
reached millions, where holders of Russian passports with Central Asian ethnicity 
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involving Russian passport holders with Central Asian ethnicity, the procedure 
of deportation followed the same pattern described by Agamben (1998), a pattern 
which lies somewhat beyond our scope here. Agamben (1998) and his Homo 
Sacer namely follows the same patterns such as individuals were first taken their 
identity papers away in order to act upon their pure bodies or ‘bare life’, where a 
human being without his official and civic papers is nothing more than flesh and 
soul. Agamben brings the example of Nazi camps where Jews and others have 
been exploited and killed only after the civic rights have been taken away from the 
victims. The same pattern follows the deportation cases where Russian citizens 
with Central Asian origin are deprived of their citizenships first and then deported 
to their countries of origin. The astonishing number of deportation cases against 
migrants in Russia who entered legally due to the visa-free regime speaks for 
itself. Beyond the statistical reality of deportation from Russia, we presented an 
in-depth analysis of the deportation regime, where not only state interests (national 
sovereignty and migration control) were supported, but we also show that there 
were additional interests and cooperation involved within the deportation regime 
such as collaboration with state officials from the deportees’ countries of origin. In 
this chapter, we demonstrated that Russia’s deportation regime not only concerns 
individuals who violated border-crossing regulations and should be deported, 
but we also identified a process of politicising deportation, which is becoming 
more relevant and an increasingly important machine for getting rid of unwanted 
migrants. We also noted a correlation between deportation and political events 
regarding, for instance, the arrest of Russian pilots in Tajikistan, which clearly 
indicates a process of politicising the deportation regime. 
Furthermore, we highlighted contradictory and paradoxical aspects of the 
Russian legal basis of the deportation regime, whereby it is clear that legal 
provisions were not necessarily adhered to within the practice of deportation, 
including the speed of the actual execution of a deportation or finding reasons 
for a deportation. We argue that the lack of a clear regulatory basis for making 
decisions about deportation, as well as the legal violation of laws during the 
process of deportation, results in a chaotic management of migration and mobility, 
opening space for police abuse. We also argue that these gaps and contradictions 
serve as the means and an opportunity for Russian officials to illegally expel 
unwanted migrants from Russia, specifically by using and abusing deportation as 
a weapon or punishment, mirroring findings from Walters (2002) and Navasky 
(1959). The overall analysis of the practice of deportation and the violation of the 
human rights of migrant-victims indicates and supports the findings of De Genova 
(2019), such that deportability is both produced and experienced. 
It is not only the contradictions and gaps in the legal system that create these 
opportunities but, also, as we demonstrated above, the impunity of employees 
who overstep their privileges and authority through, for example, their unhindered 
access to databases which can be manipulated if necessary. These opportunities 
grant state officials rights over the lives and livelihoods of many labour migrants. 
The continuous state of deportability renders migrants vulnerable to various 
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power. Mobility, migration and uncertainties formed the central topics of this 
chapter, which contributes to general debates about informality and mobilities. 
Furthermore, our work contributes to an understanding of how uncertainties 
are produced through a continuous state of deportability and how mobility or 
limitations to it lead to violations of the basic human rights to mobility and the 
freedom of movement. Informal and, at times, the illegal application of rules and 
laws to practise deportation also reveal how much flexibility is possible within 
Russian legislation in order to easily punish individuals classified as unwanted or, 
to use Russian legal text wording, ‘undesirable’ (nejelatelnost’). 
Notes 
1 It should, however, be noted that the statistics presented here require revision in light 
of the COVID-19 pandemic, which led thousands of migrants to return to their home 
countries. 
2 Rosstat migration data for the years 2011–2017, available online via https://showdata
.gks.ru/report/276650/ [accessed 24.03.2020] 
3 A later law, ‘On the Violation by Foreign Citizens or Stateless Person of the Rules of 
Entry into the Russian Federation or the Regime of Stay (Residence) in the Russian 
Federation’, was mentioned in Article 18.8 of the Code of Administrative Offences 
of the Russian Federation, dated 30 December 2001 (No. 195–FZ). Additions and 
amendments to the law were introduced in 2004, 2006 and 2018. Furthermore, on 
30 December 2001, the ‘Law on the Illegal Implementation by Foreign Citizens or 
Stateless Persons of Labour Activities in the Russian Federation’ was incorporated 
into the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation. Changes and 
amendments to the law were introduced in 2006 and 2018. 
4 ‘Russia has not calmed down: Tajiks will continue to be expelled from the country, 
despite the completion of the pilots’ case’. The article was published in Newsru.c
om on 23 November 2011. http://www.newsru.com/russia/23nov2011/tajikistan.html 
[accessed 17.08.2020] 
5 Oleg Kiryanov, ‘Released in the courtroom: In Tajikistan, the verdict against the 
Russian and Estonian pilots was reviewed’. 23 November 2011. Rossiyskaya Gazeta— 
Federal issue No. 263 (5639). Published online under: https://rg.ru/2011/11/22/sud-
site.html [accessed 17.08.2020] 
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In an attempt to uncover legal, informal and grey zones, this chapter explores 
the transnational labour market emerging within employment postings from 
Romania to Germany. Here, I analyse the roles and strategies of actors involved 
in recruiting Romanians to work in the German construction and meat-processing 
sectors—that is, companies that facilitate posting, migration intermediaries and 
migration networks. Furthermore, I show how these actors actively make use of 
grey zones and informal practices, creating transnational spaces that often do not 
fit within legal systems. Moreover, I argue that companies, agents and migrants 
experience different types of transnational realities. 
This chapter, therefore, contributes both to debates on recruitment to posted 
employment and to debates on the informalisation of transnational labour 
markets and transnational economic networks. Because mobile workers, brokers 
and companies engage with multiple national legal systems and cross-national 
boundaries, this multisite research moves beyond methodological nationalism 
(Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). 
Typically, a posted worker is sent abroad by their employer ‘to carry out a 
service in another EU member-state on a temporary basis in the context of a contract 
of services, an intragroup posting or hiring out through a temporary agency’ 
(European Commission 2019). For example, a Romanian firm subcontracted to 
lay the foundation at a construction site in Germany is allowed to bring its own 
employees in order to complete the job. Posting represents less than 1% of the 
total workforce in the European Union; however, it is highly prevalent within 
several economic sectors in high-income countries, including the construction and 
the meat-processing sectors in Germany (Wispelaere and Pacolet 2018; Wagner 
and Hassel 2016). 
Posted workers fall under a particular employment regime regulated by the 
following documents: European Directive 96/71/EC, its German counterpart ‘The 
Posting of Workers Act’ and European Directive 2018/957 (adopted subsequent 
to this research). Whilst regular migrants move through Europe on the grounds of 
the free mobility of labour, posted workers complete their work under the freedom 








country is only granted through their employer, with which they should have a 
history of standard employment in the country of origin. Moreover, at the time 
of my research, posted workers were not entitled to the minimum wages and 
working conditions above the minimum standards in the destination country.2 
Therefore, they were often paid less than national workers and regular migrants 
for the same job. The first indication of informal practices within posting is that 
most respondents held a contract with their employer only for the short periods of 
time they spent abroad (in the majority of cases, their contracts were terminated 
afterwards). 
Theoretical background 
In my analysis of the recruitment process for posted employment, I draw upon 
Lindquist et al. (2012: 9), for whom the migration infrastructure represents ‘the 
institutions, networks and people moving migrants from one point to another’. 
Researchers with similar views draw attention to the importance of infrastructures 
for the emergence and sustainability of migration (Xiang and Lindquist 2014; Lin 
et al. 2017). Such studies make use of concepts like ‘migration networks’ and the 
‘migration industry’ to describe the system that moves migrants from one place 
to another and to explain its functioning principles (Xiang and Lindquist 2014: 
122). Moving beyond established views claiming that migration becomes self-
sustaining through networks (Massey 1988), such approaches seek to determine 
the role of each component within the migration infrastructure. Moreover, whilst 
scholars of the migration industry insist on the business dimension of migration, 
this body of work takes into account the fact that agents (brokers) also deal with 
infrastructure issues, such as collecting documents, organising medical tests or 
organising pre-departure trainings (Xiang and Lindquist 2014: 122). 
According to Xiang and Lindquist (2014: 124), the concept of migration 
infrastructure includes the following dimensions: ‘the commercial (recruitment 
intermediaries), the regulatory (state apparatus and procedures for documentation, 
licensing, training and other purposes), the technological (communications 
and transportation), the humanitarian (nongovernmental and international 
organisations) and the social (migrant networks)’. 
Similar to other contexts (Turaeva 2013: Urinboyev and Polese 2016), posted 
workspaces ruled out by official regulations are replaced with informal practices. 
For example, Romanian subcontractors that complete work in Germany count 
on informal agents (individuals who charge a commission or financially gain 
from posting) to recruit workers. In some cases, agents or firms charge posted 
workers recruitment fees, whilst some companies make additional deductions 
from paycheques for transportation and accommodation costs in the destination 
country. 
The term ‘informality’ is primarily used in academic studies to ‘describe prac-
tices that emerge unofficially … or underground, constitute grey areas and form 
a variety of shadow, second or covert economies’ (Ledeneva 2018: 1). In cur-
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2001; Yalcin-Hackman 2014). Some researchers argue that it is rather difficult to 
distinguish between formal and informal arrangements and practices, which often 
coexist and are entangled within society (Williams and Round 2014). Therefore, 
van Schendel and Abraham (2005) propose using an analytical framework which 
shows that understanding the formal/informal or licit/illicit may vary depending 
upon social norms. 
Whilst most studies embrace the view that informality is embedded within 
the national boundaries of a single state, less research reflects how informality 
manifests within transnational spaces (Cieslewska 2013; Turaeva 2013; Urinboyev 
2017). Along this same line of thought, taking into account the principles by 
which posted work is organised, one can state that the actors involved in this type 
of employment act within ‘transnational social fields’ (Levitt and Glick Schiller 
2004). This concept is defined by Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004: 1009) as ‘a 
set of multiple interlocking networks of social relationships through which ideas, 
practices and resources are unequally exchanged, organised and transformed … 
which connect actors through direct and indirect relations across borders’. In 
order to distinguish between the different types of transnationalism experienced 
by the actors involved in posting recruitment, I make use of concepts such as 
‘transnationalism from above’ which refers to ‘transnational capital, global media 
and emergent supranational political institutions’ and ‘transnationalism from 
below’ which refers to an ‘informal economy, ethnic nationalism and grassroots 
activism’, as defined by Guarnizo and Smith (1998: 3). 
Simultaneously, posted work is organised and takes place at the level of 
transnational, supranational and national regulatory systems. In most cases, posting 
companies hire workers in their country of origin and bring them temporarily 
to other member-states to complete a specific job. Their employment involves 
regulations laid down by the European Union, as well as by the sending and 
recipient states; thus, the concept of ‘transnational governance’ from Djelic and 
Sahlin-Anderson (2006) might offer an analytical framework. According to Djelic 
and Sahlin-Anderson (2006: 2), transnational governance is conducted ‘between 
and across nations’ and ‘regulatory boundaries do not necessarily coincide within 
national boundaries’. In other words, in their conceptual framework, states are 
not central to the act of governing and should, instead, be regarded as one of 
the many actors involved in multidirectional interactions. In order to analyse 
transnational governance, they propose a revised field perspective which takes 
into account spatial topographies (with fluid boundaries between local, national 
and transnational spaces), network topographies (connecting individuals, groups, 
organisations or networks) and meaning (institutional forces which involve the 
negotiation of rules between actors with different interests). 
Data and methods 
This chapter is based on qualitative research conducted between December 
2015 and December 2016 in the German federal states of Baden Württemberg, 





19 construction workers and 13 meat-processing industry workers from Romania. 
Both economic sectors hire a high number of posted workers. In 2017, approxi-
mately 13% of all construction workers in Germany were posted.3 In the meat-
processing sector, around 70% of the workers hired by the four largest meat 
producers were posted based on estimates from the Food, Beverages and Catering 
Union (Brümmer 2013, in Wagner and Hassel 2016). However, the number of de 
facto postings is likely higher.4 
Field access for this research was rather difficult. The migration process for 
posted workers is organised by their employers; thus, they often remain isolated 
from German society. Moreover, as a consequence of their employer dependency, 
workers are, in many cases, reluctant to disclose work-related information. I 
approached posted workers through the local offices of the construction union, 
through personal contacts and through Facebook groups of Romanian migrants 
in Germany and used the snowball sampling method in order to find additional 
respondents. 
The age of the interviewees varied from 23 to 51, and only two respondents 
were women. Whilst the construction sector is male dominated, my attempts to 
interview additional women working in the meat-processing sector remained 
unsuccessful. With the exception of four respondents in the construction sector, 
most posted employees had worked abroad prior to posting (in countries such as 
England, Hungary, Israel, Italy and Spain). Six of the meat-processing industry 
workers had no previous migration history. Others had lived in Italy or had 
previously worked in Germany, the Netherlands and Turkey. 
I interviewed workers who, at any time, had been in posted employment. 
Interviews focused on their entire professional trajectories. For each posted job they 
held, amongst others, I explored their experiences with the recruitment process and 
the particularities of their contracts. Two interviews were conducted via telephone 
with migrants who had moved from Germany. I also interviewed two construction 
engineers, two migrant councillors and European-level representatives of IG Bau 
(the Trade Union for Building, Agriculture and the Environment) and DGB (The 
German Trade Union Confederation). Interview data were complemented with 
data collected through participant and non-participant observation. I visited one 
construction site each Saturday (for two months), I interviewed migrants at their 
workplace and accommodation sites and I translated for the construction union 
(IG Bau) during their attempts to organise Romanian posted workers. 
Interviews with migrants, construction engineers and migrant councillors were 
conducted in Romanian, whilst union representatives were interviewed in English. 
Informal discussions with local representatives of IG Bau were conducted in 
German. 
Situating the migration infrastructure in the 
construction and meat-processing sectors 
The recruitment system behind posting takes on a pyramid structure consisting 
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that finance a construction project), in some cases a general contractor (present 
largely in the construction sector), subcontractors, workers and, at times, agents. 
In the meat-processing industry, subcontractors are normally hired by the pri-
mary entrepreneurs, whilst in the construction sector a general contractor might 
be involved (usually a German company fully responsible for the implementation 
of the project). Currently, subcontractors are typically Romanian companies that 
hire Romanian workers. At times, even if hired in Romania, workers are posted 
through companies from a third country. However, beginning in 2014 as a result 
of union and media pressure, the six largest meat producers in Germany adopted 
a ‘self-commitment’ to abolish posted work. Subsequently, meat-processing fac-
tories hired only subcontractors registered in Germany who, therefore, operate 
according to home-country regulations. However, these subsidiaries continue to 
be managed by the same foreign subcontractors who resort to abusive practices 
(Mense-Petermann 2018). For example, workers are still hired for (informal) sala-
ries below the standards in the destination country and/or charged for accommo-
dation and transportation. 
Those actors involved in the recruitment process illustrate different types of 
transnational involvement (Guarnizo and Smith 1998). Companies, both at the 
bottom and at the top of the subcontracting chain, experience transnationalism 
from above generated by European Union regulations. Agents experience 
transnationalism from below. Workers experience both transnationalism from 
above (generated by European Union regulations) and from below (as generated 
by the transnational practices of intermediaries). Yet, even if not directly linked 
with the recruitment process, unions are grounded in the national regulatory 
framework. 
For the purpose of analysing rule-making and ‘transnational governance’, 
Djelic and Anderson (2006) proposed a framework that extends beyond a state-
centred perspective (and includes non-state actors) (see also Turaeva 2013). 
Because posting is regulated both officially by institutions acting at the national 
and supranational levels, and informally by companies, agents and migrants, the 
framework suggested by Djelic and Anderson (2006) is useful for exploring this 
type of employment. Drawing upon their revised field perspective (Djelic and 
Anderson 2006), below I consider posted work using spatial, network and mean-
ing dimensions. In the rule-making process, some actors who take part in posting 
manage to navigate between fluid boundaries across local, national and trans-
national spaces, whilst others are unable to. For example, companies are privi-
leged to negotiate between ‘an array of regulatory contexts defined only partially 
and imperfectly by geographical contingency, between which they can choose 
and strategise’, whilst workers cannot fully benefit from the industrial relations 
arrangements in the destination country (Wagner and Lillie 2014: 416). Posting 
is organised across the sending and recipient states (and, in some cases, a third 
state), as well as at the supranational level, through complex networks consisting 
of migrants, companies and agents. Simultaneously, the actors involved in this 
type of employment follow their own interest and are involved in power dynam-

















order to reduce labour costs, to enjoy flexibility and to absolve themselves from 
their obligations towards regular employees (Cremers 2011; Berntsen and Lillie 
2015; Lillie and Wagner 2015; Lillie 2016; Wagner and Hassel 2016). Moreover, 
either through their high bargaining capital (Mense-Petermann 2018) or through 
informal negotiations (Wagner 2015), meat-processing companies and transna-
tional companies in the German construction sector influence the official regula-
tory framework of posting to their advantage. For example, as Mense-Petermann 
(2018) explains, meat processors dictate the conditions of contracts in ways that 
constrain subcontractors to reduce workers’ income as the only opportunity of 
profiting. 
Yet, contracts in Germany involve higher gains for Romanian companies
than in their homeland. Given this economic opportunity, although regulations
stipulate that workers’ stays in the destination country should be temporary
and that a share of their activity should take place in their country of origin,
in many cases employers recruit for the sole purpose of posting. At the time of
my research, these companies benefitted from not being required to pay posted
workers above the minimum hourly wage in Germany (whilst workers in standard
employment contracts usually received higher salaries negotiated through
collective agreements). In addition, some posting firms circumvent regulations
by opening letter-box companies or by asking their de facto employees to engage
in bogus self-employment.5 Practically speaking, Romanian subcontractors
increase their profits either by circumventing regulations or through informal
arrangements with workers, agreements which allow companies to pay salaries
below the minimum standard and to take additional deductions from employee
paycheques. 
On the other hand, in search of better earnings, in some instances, posted 
workers are eager to change jobs. As a consequence of the highly flexible labour 
markets and the high turnover rate in the construction and meat-processing sectors, 
employers rely on an infrastructure that allows them to recruit workers rapidly. 
The posting recruitment process: workers 
initiate contact with a company 
Studies attest to the role of the migration industry in facilitating migration 
(Hernández-León 2013; Kyle 2000), specifically during the beginning of the pro-
cess when migrants lack information on finding a job or accommodation in the 
destination country. Correspondingly, upon their first departure to Germany, it was 
more common for informants working in the meat-processing industry to actively 
seek a company with which to be posted abroad. The majority did not work in the 
same field in Romania; therefore, they had fewer chances to develop social con-
nections that could facilitate a job abroad. Yet, most of the construction workers 
I interviewed were experienced in their sector and had previously worked abroad. 
Many found their current job through migration networks. However, a look at 
advertisements posted on Facebook groups of Romanian migrants in Germany or 
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working in the construction sector were also recruited directly by companies or 
by agents. 
In what follows, I use the example of a migrant who actively looked for a com-
pany with which to be posted abroad. Ana6 decided to leave Romania for economic
reasons after working for ten years in the hospitality industry. She decided upon
employment in the meat-processing sector in Germany, since it required neither pre-
vious work experience in the field nor knowledge of the German language. Because
she did not know anyone who could help her find a job abroad, she searched for
employment opportunities online. Some companies that post workers abroad use
the internet to connect with job seekers. Such companies share announcements
on their own websites, on e-commerce websites, on Facebook pages purposely
designed to promote vacancies, in Facebook groups of Romanians who live in
Germany or in Facebook groups of workers in the two economic sectors.7 
Ana found an announcement for a job on an e-commerce website, called the com-
pany and went to an interview (which included a practical assessment test). Even if
initially her employers did not agree that she held the required level of skill necessary
to work in Germany, Ana was keen to go abroad. Thus, she left her job and insisted
on engaging in unpaid work at the Romanian headquarters of the company: 
I didn't know how and where else to go for training and they agreed because 
they had nothing to lose; I didn’t ask for money. And after a week they saw 
that I was determined and I very much want that, [so] I had the contract to go 
to Germany. (Ana, former meat-processing industry worker) 
However, experienced migrants actively look for posting companies as well. For 
example, Luca worked in the meat-processing industry in Romania for several 
years and initially found two jobs in Germany through former colleagues. When 
his second contract ended, he returned to Romania where he contacted a company 
that secured him posted employment in Germany. 
Both workers upon their first migration experiences and, more seldom, those 
with a history of migration, might initiate contact with companies that post 
workers abroad. The examples here, involving job seekers recruited in order to 
be posted and who, in exceptional cases, participate in unpaid training with their 
future employers, illustrate how grey zones of recruitment have emerged as a 
result of loopholes within the regulatory framework on posting and through the 
lack of transnational control (Lillie 2016). 
The role of agents in the recruitment 
process for posted employment 
Migration brokers play an important role in informal transnational labour markets.
Whilst a body of work focuses on formal and informal recruiters in Asia (Lindquist
2010, 2017 Lindquist et al. 2012; Molland 2012; Spaan 1994), not much research
covers brokers in Europe. Elrick and Lewandowska (2008) analysed the role of









distinguished between agents and intermediaries, supporting the importance of agents
in the migration process. As such, Elrick and Lawandowska (2008: 722) defined the
agents ‘as persons who want to be materially rewarded for passing on information’. 
Ana’s second experience with posted migration illustrates how agents are posi-
tioned within the recruitment infrastructure of posting and how their interaction 
with posted workers takes place. When her first trip abroad ended after just a few 
months because she was unsatisfied with the intense rhythm of work in the factory 
and conflicts with her supervisor, Ana returned to Romania and looked for another 
employment opportunity online: 
I found a man from Oradea who, for the sum of €350, was willing to take 
you to the slaughterhouse, to offer work, accommodation and transport from 
Romania to the factory’s gate. (Ana, former meat-processing industry worker) 
Ana’s agent was the first link in a transnational subcontracting chain. He worked 
with a temporary employment business in Timișoara, a city in Western Romania. 
Through this company, Ana’s contract was registered with a firm based in Poland, 
which legally posted her to Germany. In practical terms, her path to the German 
slaughterhouse passes through three European countries and is organized by four 
actors with either formal or informal roles in the posting process: a Romanian 
agent, a Romanian recruiting company, a Polish subcontractor and the German 
main entrepreneur. The meat-processing company hired the Polish subcontractor. 
The later employed Ana through the Romanian company. The temporary 
employment business hired an agent responsible for recruiting workers. 
On a different note, whilst Ana did not know her broker before encountering 
him online, other agents are a part of the workers’ migration networks. Andrei, for 
example, obtained two of his posted jobs through an acquaintance of his colleague: 
She got us in there, this woman, … she probably charges the company a 
fee.… She didn’t ask for anything from us. … A friend at the construction 
site knows her and it was through her that we went both to Belgium and 
to Germany. ... She knew people and met the boss who asked for workers. 
(Andrei, construction worker) 
In the construction and meat-processing sectors in Germany, agents are either indi-
viduals who identified an economic opportunity or former or current migrants—in 
most cases—well connected with entrepreneurs and/or (future) workers in the two 
sectors. Practically speaking, they are a part of subcontracting chains consisting of 
several formal and informal actors. Typically, agents charge companies, although, 
in some cases, both migrants and employers are required to pay fees for their 
services.They offer their services to strangers or are embedded within migrant 
networks, such that recruitment is carried out either by word of mouth or through 
advertisements posted in newspapers and online. At the same time, agents might 
earn their living out of facilitating migration or they might be one-time brokers. 
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should be considered in relation to time , location and power-related dynamics 
(Lindquist et al. 2012:8). 
Risk associated with recruitment for posted employment 
Mckeown (2012) explains that agents are usually presented in a rather negative 
light in migration reports, either as traffickers or as providers of indispensable 
services for the beneficiaries of temporary work programmes. However, beyond 
illegal activities that harm migrants, agents handle documents, make connections 
and offer services creating fluid, temporary job markets (Mckeown 2012). 
In many cases, the interactions between agents and the workers involved in 
posting go well, as was the case for Ana. For a fee, she found a job in a short 
time. In other cases, these exchanges carry several risks. Although they pay for 
a service, migrants might not receive a posted job abroad or they might end up 
working in poor conditions. Ana explains: 
And many of them [the agents] are scumbags. They take people’s money and 
either leave them on the street or promise a price [a salary] at home, which 
has nothing to do with what they offer abroad. (Ana, former meat-processing 
industry worker) 
The case of Doru illustrates the risks brought about through interactions with 
agents. He was approached in his village by a former supervisor, who offered 
him a three-month posted job on a German construction site. Doru accepted the 
proposal and went abroad with four of his acquaintances. One-and-a-half months 
later, after realising that their employer would not advance payment, he and his 
colleagues stopped working. The Romanian subcontractor registered his posting 
with the German authorities, so that everything appeared legal on that end of the 
deal, but failed to register the workers’ contracts in Romania. Without a valid 
employment relationship, the company could not be held accountable by the 
authorities. Doru, who is aware of the commodification of his migration, describes 
his experience with the agent in negative terms: ‘So that was his purpose; he 
came, he placed us and left … just like slaves, he sold us.’ 
Labour abuses are not an exception to construction sites in Germany (Voivozeanu
2019). A migrant advisor of the Counselling Office for Posted Workers (BEB)
explained that, in other cases, taking advantage of migrants’ lack of knowledge
of both the German language and the regulations concerning posting, rather than
hiring them directly, recruiters ask a potential employee to open an individual
enterprise or a firm with which a contract can be concluded.8 Thus, migrants who
are able to set their own tariffs under this arrangement will charge sums below the
minimum wage. Because this recruitment process is informal, in cases involving
labour-related issues, migrants often have difficulties in identifying their employers. 
However, even posted workers recruited by formal actors (Romanian firms) 
might end up in highly precarious or abusive employment relationships. For 

















up working alone at a construction site for ten hours a day and was housed in his 
employer’s basement (for whom he presumably worked for no pay during his free 
time as well). Similarly, Gina paid her posting company a recruitment fee and had 
to deal with deductions for accommodation costs, despite companies not being 
allowed to impose fees for facilitating migration and being obliged to provide 
accommodation free of charge. 
These examples show that informal practices and—at times—illegal 
transactions are part of the posting system. Often, terms are negotiated in favour 
of the actors who control the process of recruitment. 
Interconnections between formal and informal, legal 
and illegal actors within the posting infrastructure 
Ana’s case also illustrates the processes of blurred boundaries between legal and
illegal, formal and informal, offering an in-depth insight into the dynamic character
of the posting infrastructure, which is organised beyond the legal system of a single
country. At the beginning of her migration history, Ana made use of the services
of an agent—that is, an informal actor who charged her a fee to facilitate her
migration. However, Ana ultimately signed a contract with a company registered in
Poland—a formal actor—whereby her posting contract was formalised and became
legal. The meat processor and the Polish company collaborated under the terms of
the officially signed contract; therefore, their relationship was also formalised. 
There are also examples of agents (brokers) who open their own companies 
and, thus, formalise their involvement within the posting business. In order to 
recruit personnel, they use their contacts in the construction industry in Romania 
and their ability to speak the workers’ native language. In some instances, agents 
work jointly with partners based in Germany that conclude the service provision 
contracts in the destination country. Mihai described the process as follows: 
They will see an engineer is efficient [and they will propose to them]: ‘You
will go to Romania and start a company on your behalf, you will recruit peo-
ple, … 60–40% gain, I’m searching here, I have the people who are negotiating
prices.’ Then, [workers will remain under contract] with the same employers;
they have about four or five companies. (Mihai, construction worker) 
Some workers under this type of arrangement remain employed in the destination 
country for a longer period than stipulated by the regulatory framework on post-
ing (i.e., more than 24 months). However, because their contracts alternate and are 
registered with different companies, their posting appears to be legal. 
The previous examples illustrate the dynamics between the actors involved in 
the migration process and show, in agreement with Lindquist et al. (2012), that the 
analytical distinction between legal and illegal (formal and informal) is difficult 
to define when it comes to the posting infrastructure and the manner in which the 
recruitment process unfolds in practice. Therefore, one can argue that formal and 
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The role of migration networks in the recruitment 
process for posted employment 
If some companies turn to agents in order to recruit workers, others resort to
migration networks of employees. In the construction industry, characterised by
short-term employment opportunities, this type of recruitment was particularly
common amongst my informants. Some companies use networks of construction
engineers who manage projects carried out abroad. In the following quote,
Mihai describes how, taking into account workers’ skills and abilities, engineers
contact either people with whom they had previously worked or people
recommended to them. He also claims that engineers are, in some instances,
mediators between companies and future employees. Thus, they set the starting
wages, whilst workers further negotiate with employers based on their skills
and experience: 
The employer allows every engineer to choose his people: ‘I have worked 
there with someone who is good at balconies, someone else knows the stairs, 
another one is good at the masonry.’ All engineers have a sort of agenda, 
and the employer says: ‘… gather your team, I have a job for you.’ Then, 
the engineer negotiates: ‘What is my salary, €2500–3000.’ That’s what it’s 
like on the construction site. And then he [the engineer] grabs his phone [and 
contacts the workers]. (Mihai, construction worker) 
Iulian, a construction engineer who worked for several years with Romanian sub-
contractors in Austria and Germany, explained that, by hiring known or recom-
mended workers, employers are confident that future employees will be skilful 
and committed: 
People continue to be recruited through acquaintances, not through
recruitment firms. … I heard that, ‘I know him, I’ve worked with him,
he’s a serious man, he has a team, he knows this, he knows that.’ (Iulian,
construction engineer) 
For posted workers, being hired through migration networks may bring security 
in an uncertain labour market. However, it may be bounded to constraints. Mihai 
describes the context in which Romanian construction companies post workers 
in Germany as a ‘closed circle’—that is, with employers who have the advantage 
of being able to check the history and reputation of potential employees. Beyond 
information about their skills, they might be interested in finding out whether 
workers are obedient or unionised or not. Mihai explains: 
‘Have you been to Germany before?’’ ‘Yes, I worked there for eight months.’ 
‘Where did you work, with what engineer?’ And this circle is a closed circle. 
They know each other. … And I, if I was there [in Germany] before, [what 









history in Germany, doesn’t he know things too well, isn’t he affiliated with 
trade unions, doesn’t he know too much?”’ (Mihai, construction worker) 
In other instances, companies recruit the acquaintances of employees who are 
already in the destination country. This is how Andrei found some of his posted 
jobs. During my fieldwork, I observed Andrei receiving calls from Romania 
enquiring about employment opportunities in Germany. For Gigi, who has been 
working in Germany for many years, acquaintances are just as important. Over 
time, he has developed social connections that he relies on every time he seeks a 
job abroad. The relationships between him and his colleagues rely on reciprocity. 
Here, he explains how the company that was going to post him abroad asked him 
to serve as an intermediary, at very short notice, so that two other workers would 
join the same project: 
So I was at this company. I went, I registered, and Mr [name] said: ‘…[Gigi], 
I need two more boys.’ And I took these boys, Cristian and George. We went 
to the firm on Thursday, we talked and on Friday we were on the bus [to 
Germany]. (Gigi, construction worker) 
The case of Alin is also interesting. After being posted for several years in the 
German and French meat-processing sector, he received a standard job as a team 
leader in France. He was then able to start a team consisting of former Romanian 
colleagues in a meat-processing factory in Germany (one more example showing 
how roles within recruitment infrastructures might change). As time passes, 
workers enlarge their migration networks. In the meat-processing industry, 
this serves as one of the factors that increase workers’ possibilities of finding a 
standard job abroad, as illustrated by Lari’s case. He previously worked in a meat-
processing factory in Romania and held two posted jobs in that sector in Germany. 
After 2014, when Romanians obtained free access to the German labour market, 
through former colleagues, he found standard employment in the German meat-
processing industry. He explains how networks are used by workers within the 
same economic sector: 
In our branch, we let each other know. Now, for example, I know people 
all over Germany and we keep in touch: ‘… Look, a new work station will 
open somewhere. Are you interested? These are the conditions.’ (Lari, meat-
processing industry worker) 
A slightly different situation existed for most of the construction workers I inter-
viewed. Although many had connections in the field, they were unable to find 
regular jobs in the destination country. This might be a consequence of the highly 
flexible labour market in that sector; however, further systematic research is 
needed here. 
Given the high turnover rates and the insecurity related to short-term postings,
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for a constant supply of cheap labour. Important for job seekers as well since
they might provide (better) employment arrangements, these connections also
reproduce power dynamics possibly leading to worker exploitation (Turaeva
2016). 
Conclusions 
This chapter uses the examples of posted work from Romania to Germany to 
discuss both recruitment in posting as well as the informalisation of transnational 
labour markets and transnational economic networks. 
Posted work is governed by supranational and national entities (institutions of 
the European Union and the sending and recipient states), as well as by companies 
(Wagner 2015; Mense-Petermann 2018), agents and migrants. Given the wide 
range of actors with different roles, practices and interests actively shaping its 
regulatory setting, I analysed the recruitment infrastructure (Lindquist et al. 
2012; Xiang and Lindquist 2014) of posted employment using the concept of 
‘transnational governance’ (Djelic and Andresson 2006). Moving beyond state-
centred views, this novel perspective considers non-state actors who participate in 
rule making, acknowledging that regulatory boundaries do not always correspond 
with national borders. 
Furthermore, I showed that the actors involved in posted work illustrate 
different types of transnational involvement (Guarnizo and Smith 1998). 
Companies experience transnationalism form above (generated by European 
Union regulations). Agents experience transnationalism from below. Workers 
experience transnationalism both from above (generated by European Union 
regulations) and from below (generated by the transnational practices of agents). 
Moreover, I argued that, in the context of the current European regulatory 
framework, the social fields created through posting are filled with informal norms 
and structures through which the actors involved negotiate across borders, thereby 
extending the literature on transnational informality (Cieslewska 2013; Turaeva 
2013; Urinboyev 2017). Within recruitment for this type of employment, formal 
actors (companies) rely on informal actors and practices to recruit workers. A first 
indication of informal practices is that, even if posted workers should have an 
employment history with firms, many are hired only for the short periods of time 
when they work abroad. Throughout the recruitment process, some companies 
and agents strategically resort to employees’ migration networks, which provide a 
constant supply of cheap labour. For the same purpose, other companies resort to 
agents, similar to findings from Lindquist (2010), who explained that recruitment 
agencies in Indonesia operate in similar ways. Arrangements involving agents 
and/or networks might be beneficial for migrants, since they could bring (bet-
ter) employment opportunities, whilst also possibly reproducing power dynamics 
favouring actors who control the recruitment process, thereby possibly leading to 
worker exploitation (Turaeva 2016). 
The examples and case studies on posting detailed in this chapter reveal that the 

















other words, looking closely at the entire migration process, where diverse actors 
develop both formal and informal relationships and practices, it becomes difficult 
at times to differentiate between formal and informal arrangements amongst 
companies, agents and migrants (Lindquist et al. 2012). 
Notes 
1 The freedom to provide services allows companies based in the European Union to 
pursue economic activities in other member-states. 
2 This will change at least at the official level with the introduction of European
Directive 2018/957. This document stipulates that, beginning in July 2020, posted
workers will be entitled to the same remuneration as workers in standard employment
contracts. 
3 In 2017, the German construction sector hired approximately 757,000 workers (Statista
.com, https://goo.gl/AAuiNa, accessed on 15 September 2019). In that same year, 
the Paritarian Social Fund, SOKA-BAU, officially registered 98,214 posted workers 
(European Commission 2016). 
4 The total number of posted workers is measured by the number of A1 forms issued by 
all member-states. This document proves that workers pay social security contributions 
in their country of origin. However, for several reasons, this offers only an indication 
of the number of postings. First, some employers do not comply with the regulations 
related to issuing A1 forms for each of their employees. Second, the statistics concern 
the number of postings, but not the number of posted workers (if a worker is posted in 
two different countries within a year, two A1 forms will be issued). Third, the data do 
not distinguish between the types of postings and will, for example, include the number 
of intracorporate postings. 
5 Letter-box companies are established in one member-state usually with no more than a 
postal address, whilst their activity is carried out in another country. The aim is usually 
to avoid taxation and circumvent social contributions. In the particular case of posting, 
letter-box companies have no economic activity in the country of origin and, therefore, 
no legal capacity to post workers. 
6 In order to protect workers’ identities, pseudonyms are used throughout the article. 
7 Here, I reproduce an ad used by one of the companies posting workers abroad: ‘We 
are recruiting unskilled butchers aged 18–55, able to work, with no medical problems 
and a clean criminal record, skilled or unskilled in bovine and pig butchering, with 
experience in slaughtering, slicing, boning, packing and stamping. The net monthly 
wage is €1900, working Monday through Friday 8h / day, respectively, 40h / 
week, with optional overtime paid at the end of the week. Contract period of three 
months with a possibility of extension by the foreign employer. Medical insurance, 
accommodation, allowances and a daily meal are provided throughout the contractual 
period. Seriousness is required! WE DO NOT CHARGE A COMMISSION FEE!!!’ 
8 Full name in English: ‘Counselling office for posted workers, EU citizens exercising 
their right to free labour movement and self-employed people with an unclear labour 
status’. 
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5 Smartphone transnationalism in 
non-Western migration regimes 
Transnational ethnography of Uzbek migrant 
workers in Russia 
Rustamjon Urinboyev 
Introduction 
Much research has explored the reproduction of transnational communities and 
relations, with a particular focus on locality, identity and culture. However, 
the existing research emanates from case studies of immigrant communities in 
Western-type democracies, whilst we know little about migrant transnationalism 
in non-Western migration regimes, such as those in the Russian Federation (or 
Russia) where migrant workers are subjected to numerous human rights abuses 
and have limited possibilities for transnational activism and collective mobilisa-
tion. Moreover, the role of new media, such as smartphones and social media, in 
migrant transnationalism remains under-researched. Given the historical, socio-
political and cultural differences between Western and post-Soviet societies, we 
cannot assume that the methodological tools and theoretical perspectives devel-
oped in Western contexts are necessarily applicable to Russia, where the repres-
sive sociopolitical environment, lack of democratic culture and arbitrary law 
enforcement leave little room for migrant legalisation and transnational activism. 
The above considerations inform my position in this chapter, which aims to 
contribute to debates within the migrant transnationalism literature in two distinct 
ways. First, I present the results of extensive multisited ethnographic fieldwork 
undertaken in Moscow, Russia and the Ferghana region of Uzbekistan. My case 
study examines Uzbek migrants in Moscow and their families and communities 
in the Shabboda village in Ferghana. Unlike in Western countries, where migrants 
establish relatively functional transnational communities, there is little in the 
way of an ‘Uzbek transnational community’ in Russia given the restrictive legal 
environment and antimigrant sentiments. Whilst Uzbek migrants’ transnational 
activism is hardly visible in public places, I argue that rapid improvements in 
communications technologies (e.g., smartphones and social media) have enabled 
Uzbek migrants to remain in touch with their home societies, as well as create 
permanent, smartphone-based translocal communities in Moscow, typically cen-
tred around migrants hailing from the same mahalla or village in Uzbekistan. 
Like all transnational communities engaged in the production of locality and iden-
tity, Uzbek migrants based in Moscow maintain daily interactions with their vil-







village-level identities, social norms and relations (e.g., reciprocity, trust, obliga-
tion, age hierarchies, gossip and social sanctions) as a form of law and governance 
when regulating their contractual obligations and relations in the informal migrant 
labour market. 
The existence of this smartphone-based transnational environment helps 
migrants cope with the challenges of musofirchilik (being alien) and avoid or 
manoeuvre around structural constraints such as complicated residence registration 
and work permit rules, social exclusion, racism and the lack of social security. 
Based on a ‘thick’ ethnography, here I advance the notion of ‘smartphone-based 
migrant transnational communities’ as a subset of the migrant transnationalism 
literature that describes hidden and low-profile transnational practices, relations, 
identities and networks in nondemocratic political regimes. Such communities 
emerge as a necessity to cope with the repressive political environment, 
xenophobia, weak rule of law, lack of social security and risks associated with 
informal employment. 
Conceptualising smartphone transnationalism 
in nondemocratic migration locales 
Transnationalism has undoubtedly become a fashionable research topic within 
migration studies (e.g., Schiller et al. 1992; Portes et al. 1999; Vertovec 1999; 
Levitt 2001; Mazzucato et al. 2017). The initial view confined the study of 
migratory processes to the territory of a single nation-state (Park 1964; Lieberson 
1980; Williams 1989). That view appears to have lost validity given the explosive 
growth of new communications and transportation technologies allowing 
individuals to maintain daily cross-border connections more affordably and more 
easily accessible than ever before (Ito and Okabe 2005; Hamel 2009; Hunter 
2015; Ryan et al. 2015). Whilst acknowledging long-standing forms of migrants’ 
connections to their homelands, current studies argue that today’s linkages 
differ from these earlier forms given rapid developments in new media, such as 
smartphones and social media. Thus, migrants can be ‘simultaneously situated’ 
in multiple geographically and culturally distinct worlds, thereby blurring the 
distinction between ‘here’ and ‘there’ (Portes et al. 1999; Levitt and Schiller 
2004; Licoppe 2004; Vertovec 2004; Nedelcu 2012). 
Accordingly, transnational practices represent a part of everyday life for a 
growing proportion of migrants worldwide (Warf 2013). These global trends are 
especially visible in the scholarly literature on migration and technology, where 
information and communications technologies (ICTs) are viewed as central drivers 
of migrant transnationalism (Licoppe 2004; Vertovec 2004; Horst 2006). Initially 
limited to a number of case studies and review articles (Vertovec 2004; Wilding 
2006) focused on cheap telephone calls and emails, research on migration and 
ICT is increasingly gaining ground. Scholars have not only explored the range of 
ICTs used and their role in increasing the frequency and intensity of transnational 
practices (Bacigalupe and Cámara 2012; Perkins and Neumayer 2013) but have 
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emotional bonds within transnational families (Benítez 2012). As such, studies 
have demonstrated that ICTs provide new possibilities for transnational care-
giving (Baldassar 2008), long-distance relationships (Aguila 2009) and ‘mobile-
phone parenting’ (Madianou 2012). This leads to the construction of co-presence 
through constant and real-time exposure to one’s home (Estévez 2009). 
Another line of scholarly work focuses on diasporic websites, online fora and 
hometown websites, suggesting that ICTs enable migrants to maintain cultural 
practices across borders and to construct the feeling of a home away from home 
(Nedelcu 2012). This, in turn, creates new forms of transnational identities, 
networks and imagined communities (Hiller and Franz 2004; Mallapragada 2006; 
Castro and Gonzalez 2009). 
However, critical views, often from anthropology and cultural studies, have
also shown that the availability of ICTs can accentuate social pressures on
migrants by left-behind family members as well as exert control by home coun-
tries’ governments. Examples include the extensive surveillance of migrants by
their home-country governments through the monitoring of their online postings,
blogs and newsgroups (Bozzini 2015); family tensions and conflicts between
migrants and their left-behind families (Baldassar 2008); increasing financial
pressure on migrants (Hunter 2015); and jealousy within transnational couples
(Hannaford 2015) triggering high levels of emotional strain on relationships
(Wilding 2006). 
Despite this extensive and diverse scholarship on the relationship between
migrant transnationalism and technology, one pattern emerges as consistent
across studies: they primarily focus on ‘old’ forms of ICTs such as emails,
diasporic websites, online fora, cheap international calling cards and mobile
phones. Within this literature, relatively few investigations exist document-
ing the impact of new media, such as smartphones and social media platforms,
on migrant transnationalism (cf. Aricat 2015; Madianou 2016; Yoon 2016;
Urinboyev 2017). This oversight persists despite new media’s emergence as
part and parcel of the everyday lives of migrants and their left-behind families
and communities in many parts of the world. Undoubtedly, continuity exists
between ‘older’ and new media, but the questions remain as to whether and how
these new technologies shape the nature of transnational practices. That is, how
do these processes manifest themselves in the everyday lives of migrants and
their left-behind communities? And, what implications do they have for existing
frameworks of migrant transnationalism? 
Another factor adding to this lacuna is that much of the scholarly literature on 
transnational migration relies on case studies of immigrant communities living in 
Western democracies such as Australia, Canada, Spain, the United Kingdom and 
the United States (e.g., Barbero 2013; McLaughlin 2010; Charsley and Liversage 
2013). Yet much less has been said about migrants’ transnational practices in non-
Western locales, including, for example, Central Asian migrant workers in Russia. 
Russia is one of the five largest recipients of migrants worldwide, with the Central 
Asian republics representing some of the most remittance-dependent economies 





















Western democracies and post-Soviet countries, methodological tools and the-
oretical perspectives developed in Western contexts may not necessarily trans-
late well to illiberal political regimes such as that in Russia. In this context, the 
repressive sociopolitical environment and lack of democratic culture leave little 
room for transnational activism and diasporic mobilisation. Armed with the ‘var-
ied geographies of transnationalism’ perspective (Dunn 2010), it is reasonable to 
assume that migrant transnationalism is not the same everywhere, holding dif-
ferent meanings, forms and functional roles depending upon the sociopolitical 
context, legal environment, economic system and cultural factors. Addressing this 
research gap is particularly important when considering the growing use of smart-
phones and social media tools amongst Central Asian migrants in Russia. Such a 
study may provide new insights on transnational practices within undemocratic 
and repressive contexts. Thus, the question becomes: What are the implications of 
the Russian migration context, combined with a focus on smartphones and social 
media, for migrant transnationalism and technology scholarship, as well as for 
broader debates within migration studies? 
This chapter contributes to debates on migrant transnationalism and tech-
nology and, more generally, to migration studies in three distinct ways. First,
unlike Western democracies, where a strong culture of the rule of law exists,
Russia is characterised by a weak rule of law, corruption, a poor human rights
record, a weak civil society and widespread xenophobia (Ledeneva 2013;
Abashin 2016). This implies that Central Asian migrants in Russia can hardly
engage in collective action or transnational activism, given the structural con-
straints and widespread antimigrant sentiments. Nonetheless, Central Asian
migrants do engage in transnational practices and reproduce their cultural
repertoires and norms in their host country, but their transnational practices,
networking and place-making primarily occur in a virtual environment. This
results from the restrictive sociopolitical environment, corrupt legal system
and widespread xenophobia compelling migrants to limit their visibility in pub-
lic places (e.g., parks, streets, shopping malls and public transportation) and
carry out their transnational practices and relationships via smartphones and
social media. The role of ICTs in shaping everyday transnationalism is well
researched within migration studies. Yet, within the Russian context, smart-
phones and social media are not merely tools for being ‘here’ and ‘there’. More
importantly, such tools are also crucial to migrants’ daily survival and liveli-
hoods in a repressive and xenophobic environment. In this sense, they provide
a virtual platform for various risk-stretching activities and social safety nets
unavailable from the migrants’ home and host countries. I investigate these
processes through multisited ethnographic fieldwork in Moscow, Russia and
the Ferghana region of Uzbekistan. 
Second, I use the aforementioned ‘thick’ ethnography to advance the notion 
of ‘smartphone-based migrant transnational communities’ to describe smart-
phone-based transnational practices in the context of undemocratic political 
regimes. Like all other transnational communities engaged in the production of 
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daily interactions amongst themselves and with their left-behind communities in 
Uzbekistan. However, their transnational practices, relationships, identities and 
networks are primarily conducted via smartphones and social media applications. 
Furthermore, such practices emerged as a way to cope with Russia’s repressive 
political environment, xenophobia, weak rule of law, lack of social security and 
risky shadow economy employment. Due to these risks and uncertainties, Uzbek 
migrants increasingly rely on smartphones to organise their precarious liveli-
hoods. Thus, smartphones and social media serve as the everyday technologies of 
transnational place-making, enabling Uzbek migrants to reproduce their village-
level identities, social norms and relationships across vast distances. These smart-
phone-based transnational interactions also serve as a ‘legal order’, regulating 
contractual relationships and obligations amongst migrants, exerting an identifi-
able impact on the outcomes of many practices Uzbek migrants (and other actors) 
engage in whilst in Moscow. 
Third, within the post-Soviet migration literature, few scholarly investigations 
have focused on Central Asian migrants’ transnational practices within the 
Russian context. Despite a growing interest on migratory flows and processes in 
the post-Soviet context, the literature on migrant transnationalism, particularly 
with regard to Central Asian migrants in Russia, remains limited to a few review 
articles and empirical studies (Atabaki and Mehendale 2004; Laruelle 2007; Ruget 
and Usmanalieva 2011; Schröder and Stephan-Emmrich 2016; Turaeva 2019). 
Existing research focuses on push-and-pull factors (Schmidt and Sagynbekova 
2008) as well as the economic and political impact of labour migration (Laruelle 
2013), discrimination, xenophobia and difficult working conditions (Round 
and Kuznetsova 2016), sexual risks (Weine et al. 2013) and migrant strategies 
for dealing with the repressive legal environment in the host country (Reeves 
2013). In addition, a growing body of anthropological literature has examined 
the effects of migration and remittances on the ritual economy, gender-based 
power relationships, traditions, social norms, status and hierarchies within the 
sending communities (Reeves 2012; Kikuta 2016). One common thread across 
these studies lies in their focus on social processes and events occurring in either 
the migrant-sending or recipient society, but not both. Drawing upon multisited 
ethnographic fieldwork in Moscow and Ferghana, this chapter represents one of 
the first ‘thick’ descriptions of migrant transnationalism (with a combined focus 
on new media) in the Russian context. 
I proceed in this chapter as follows. In the next section, I describe the
methodology and ethnographic fieldwork I conducted in Moscow, Russia and
Ferghana, Uzbekistan. I, then, provide an examination of the sociopolitical
and legal context of the migrant labour market in Russia, allowing for an
understanding of the nuances of the Russian context as well as the basic
characteristics of the case study group, Uzbek migrants. Finally, I present the
empirical material and analysis, and outline the implications of the ethnographic
material for migrant transnationalism and technology debates, and, more broadly








Rather than a specific ethnographic project on migration and technology, the 
research presented here stems from a project examining migration and legal cultures 
in post-Soviet societies. Thus, the research aims and questions explored can be 
described as an unexpected but intriguing discovery made during fieldwork. The 
ethnographic material presented relies on 13 months of fieldwork in Moscow and 
Ferghana conducted between January 2014 and May 2017. These field sites were 
chosen because Moscow has Russia’s largest number of Uzbek migrants, whereas 
Ferghana is the primary migrant-sending region in Uzbekistan given its population 
density and high unemployment rate. I collected a rich stock of ethnographic 
material primarily through observations and informal interviews. Due to my 
Uzbek ethnicity, village origin and cultural competence, I was well connected to 
the Uzbek migrant worker community in Moscow and their left-behind families 
and communities in Ferghana. These factors enabled me to participate in the daily 
life of migrants, thereby becoming ‘svoi’ (‘one of us, those who belong to our 
circle’), a term widely used in the post-Soviet context to refer to a person who 
has internalised the norms and values of a particular social group. In addition to 
traditional ethnography, I conducted a digital ethnography between January 2014 
and June 2020 by following Uzbek migrants’ daily discussion pages on social 
media platforms (Facebook, Odnoklassniki and Telegram Messenger), such as 
‘My migranty’ (We are migrants), ‘Migrant’, ‘Musofirlar taqdiri’ (Migrants’ fate) 
and Radio Free Europe’s ‘Sizdan Telegram’ (Telegram from you). 
All informants were asked for their consent to participate in this study. Given 
the sensitive nature of the data, I have changed the names and locations of all 
informants and omitted any information that could identify the individuals 
concerned. Because I collected ethnographic materials in two different locations, 
I present the data separately for each locale. This allows me to provide a detailed 
and clear description of my fieldwork, including data collection strategies and the 
selection of informants and fieldwork sites. 
First, in Moscow, I conducted observations at construction sites, bazaars, 
cottages, farms, dormitories, shared apartments, Uzbek cafes, railway stations 
and on the streets where Uzbek migrants worked, lived and socialised. My 
observations frequently turned into informal chats and interviews due to the 
numerous questions that arose on the spur of the moment. Thus, I applied 
various strategies during my fieldwork. These strategies included, for example, 
renting mattress space in shared apartments where migrants lived, participating 
in migrants’ daily construction work activities, accompanying migrants on the 
streets and public transport where they are often stopped and frisked by police 
officers, inviting migrants for lunch or dinner to cafes and ‘hanging out’ with 
migrants in bars. In addition, I maintained regular contact with informants via 
social media–based ‘village groups’, where they share various news items, videos 
and photos, update one another with Moscow and village news and spread gossip 
and rumours when someone acts unfairly towards other co-villagers. These 
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survival and livelihoods, which eventually became a key focus of my fieldwork. 
My observations and informal interviews generated first-hand information on 
migrants’ smartphone-based transnational environments, the various collective 
and individual coping strategies they employed within that environment, the ways 
in which they managed and maintained transnational relationships with their left-
behind communities and the ways in which they reproduced and enacted their 
village-level practices, norms and identities in their daily lives in Moscow. 
Second, and simultaneously, to keep up with the pace of developments in Uzbek 
migrants’ lives in Moscow, I conducted observations and informal interviews in 
the Ferghana region, in a village I call Shabboda, from whence most informants/ 
migrants originated. I aimed to explore the processes of everyday material, 
emotional, social and symbolic exchanges between Shabboda and Moscow 
and how these transnational interactions shaped the lives of Uzbek migrants in 
Moscow. Given my svoi status, I had direct access to all social spaces within 
the village, enabling me to gather first-hand information about Uzbek migrants’ 
and their left-behind families’ and communities’ daily transnational interactions. 
Again, the role of smartphones was crucial in transnational relationships. Many 
villagers I met possessed smartphones thanks to remittances sent from Moscow. 
During my fieldwork, I regularly visited migrants’ left-behind families and 
carried out observations and informal interviews at the village’s ‘gossip hotspots’ 
such as the guzar (community socialising space), choyxona (teahouse), gaps
(regular get-togethers) and life-cycle events (e.g., weddings and funerals) where 
many villagers, including women, children and religious leaders, came together 
on a daily basis and conducted the bulk of the village’s information exchanges. 
Because I typically met more than ten villagers on a daily basis during various 
social events, situations and spaces, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact number of 
individuals with whom I chatted during these site visits. Instead, the narrative I 
provide in the empirical section can be understood as a composite of the voices of 
the hundreds of villagers I encountered during daily visits to the guzar, choyxona, 
gaps, wedding feasts, circumcision ceremonies and funerals. 
In addition to the ethnographic study, between July and August of 2015, I 
also conducted 100 semi-structured (in-depth) interviews with Central Asian 
(Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek) migrant workers. I aimed to investigate the extent 
to which the findings from this ethnographic study (observations and informal 
interviews) are common amongst Central Asian migrants more broadly in Russia, 
so as to add more depth and detailed information to the ethnographic material 
and allow for some degree of generalisation. I, thus, conducted face-to-face 
interviews, through a conversational process, which lasted from 35 minutes to 
one hour. The interview questionnaire consisted of 91 open-ended questions and 
covered 15 different themes: (1) background and demographic questions; (2) 
the migrant labour market and working conditions; (3) immigration laws, actors 
and legal protection; (4) work permits and residence registration; (5) reentry ban 
and deportations; (6) street institutions, such as racketeers; (7) middlemen; (8) 
relations between migrant workers and the police; (9) corruption and bribes; 










workers’ legal culture and their knowledge and experiences with immigration and 
labour laws; (12) migrant workers’ informal coping strategies; (13) discrimination 
and racism; (14) migrants’ social networks; and (15) migrants’ transnational ties 
and practices. In selecting migrants for the in-depth interviews, I paid particular 
attention to diversity across ethnicity, country of origin, citizenship, age, gender, 
social status, occupation, educational background, Russian-language skills, legal 
status and migration experiences (experienced or newly arrived migrant). 
Briefly, the basic characteristics of my informants were as follows: 92% were 
male, given the reality of the gendered constitution of Central Asian migrants 
(approximately 80% of all Central Asian migrants are male). In addition, the 
majority of the interviewees were young, ranging in age from 21 to 45 years 
(92%), married (62%) and had completed upper secondary school or vocational 
education (84%). In terms of employment, they worked in construction (55%), 
at a supermarket (10%), as a cleaner and in housing maintenance (8%), in a 
warehouse (5%), as a domestic worker (4%), as a taxi driver (4%), in a bakery 
(3%) and in other sectors (11%). Only one-third of the informants (31%) could 
easily communicate in the Russian language. In terms of sampling, I used 
random, snowball and purposive sampling techniques to increase the diversity of 
my informants. I conducted interviews at 15 different locations in Moscow city 
and the Moscow province, in diverse settings and situations such as Uzbek cafés 
and choyxonas, bazaars, shared apartments, construction sites, dachas (summer 
cottage), parking garages, auto service centres, dormitories, furniture workshops 
and random street interviews in localities known for high migrant clustering. In 
this chapter, I present only a small portion of the interview data, which specifically 
focuses on the transnational ties and practices of Central Asian migrants. A more 
comprehensive description of the interview data and accompanying results can be 
found in both previous and forthcoming publications (Urinboyev 2016; Urinboyev 
2017; Urinboyev 2018; Urinboyev 2020). 
Uzbek migrant workers in Russia 
Labour migration from Uzbekistan to Russia began only in the mid-2000s (Abashin 
2013). According to statistics from June 2019, nearly 2.2 million Uzbek citizens 
were present within the territory of the Russian Federation (RANEPA 2019). The 
majority of Uzbek migrants in Russia are male, young, low skilled with a vocational 
college education and originate from rural areas or small towns (Abashin 2014). 
Most Uzbek migrants originate from the densely populated Ferghana Valley, 
where unemployment remains high (Laruelle 2007), and primarily work in the 
construction sector, agriculture, retail trade, service industry or transportation 
(Chikadze and Brednikova 2012). Because of the high cost of accommodation 
and precarious working conditions, migrants rarely bring their family members 
with them to Russia (Abashin 2014). Thus, migrants typically send their earnings 
home to provide for their families’ daily needs and other expenses (e.g., building 
a new house or buying a car, life-cycle rituals, medical treatment and education) 
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2013). For the majority of Uzbek migrants, permanent settlement in Russia is not 
the primary goal. Instead, they remain in Russia for two to three years on average 
(Urinboyev and Polese 2016). Whilst Uzbek migrants spend most of their time 
in Russia and rarely visit home, they regard their situation as ‘temporary’, and 
maintain close ties with their family and mahalla (neighbourhood community), 
assuming that they will eventually return to their homeland (Abashin 2014). 
Under a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) agreement between 
Russia and other post-Soviet countries, citizens of Uzbekistan are allowed to stay 
in Russia without a visa for up to 90 days. However, despite this visa-free regime, 
Uzbek migrants must obtain residence registration and a work permit in order 
to legally work in Russia. Precious few comply with these requirements given 
their low salaries, language test requirements and the prohibitively expensive 
work permit fees (Reeves 2015). This situation is further exacerbated by the 
notoriously corrupt Russian legal environment (Ledeneva 2013). Furthermore, 
even those migrants in possession of all of the necessary paperwork are not 
exempt from experiencing problems when they interact with law enforcement 
institutions (Round and Kuznetsova 2016). Under such circumstances, the status 
of ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’ hinges upon migrants’ knowledge of ‘street life’ and their 
ability to adapt to the weak rule of law (Urinboyev 2016). As such, many Uzbek 
migrants work in the shadow economy, where they can survive without language 
skills and documents (Urinboyev 2018). This trend is supported by Russian 
authorities’ statistics showing that nearly three million foreign nationals in Russia 
have violated their legal terms of stay (Pochuev 2015). Some experts estimate 
that the number of undocumented migrants in Russia could be much higher than 
official statistics, reaching around five million (Ryazantsev 2008; Chikadze and 
Brednikova 2012). 
Since the majority of Uzbek migrants remain undocumented and work in the
shadow economy, Russian employers have a strong incentive to exploit migrants
and withhold or delay payment of their salaries. This results from the fact that
claims related to transactions that take place within the shadow economy— 
outside labour regulations and tax codes—cannot be heard in state courts
according to the Russian Civil Code. Moreover, migrants might be reluctant
to approach state institutions, since doing so would reveal their undocumented
status and invite punishment by the state. Even those migrants who possess all
of the required permits and work legally cannot be certain that they will receive
payment for their work. Human rights groups and civil society institutions have
documented that Uzbek migrants (and migrants from other post-Soviet republics)
experience numerous abuses, such as exploitation, discrimination, unsafe
working conditions, wage theft and physical violence (Human Rights Watch
2009). In addition, Uzbek migrants must deal with corrupt police officers who
view migrants as a source of kormushka (‘feeding trough’) (Urinboyev 2020).
Even when documented, migrants are often asked for bribes when stopped by the
police on the street or in the metro (Round and Kuznetsova 2016). Furthermore,
Uzbek migrants experience racism on a daily basis. A 2016 survey conducted











the statement ‘Russia for ethnic Russians’ and nearly 70% of respondents felt
that the government should restrict the influx of Central Asian migrants and
undocumented migrants should be expelled from Russia (Pipia 2016). Thus, the
everyday lives of Uzbek migrants feature a constant sense of insecurity threatened
by exploitation, deportation, police corruption, racism, physical violence and
even death. 
Accordingly, given their semilegal status and involvement in the shadow 
economy, Uzbek migrants maintain a low profile and do not gather in public 
places. Today, anyone walking on the streets of Moscow can easily spot police 
officers checking the documents of Central Asian migrants. Therefore, Uzbek 
migrants try to make themselves as invisible as possible in order to avoid the 
attention of hungry police officers who often seek reasons to extort money from 
them (Urinboyev 2017). Consequently, Uzbek or other Central Asian migrants 
have few opportunities to publicly express and enact their transnational practices 
and diasporic identities in Russia (Urinboyev 2018). 
Despite these challenges, rapid improvements in communications technologies 
(e.g., smartphones and social media) have enabled Uzbek migrants to create 
smartphone-mediated transnational identities, communities and activities in 
Moscow. These typically involve migrants from the same mahalla, village or 
town in Uzbekistan. Furthermore, these transnational practices are distinct in 
the sense that they are conducted exclusively in a virtual environment, without 
involving frequent physical, face-to-face interactions amongst migrants. That 
is, Uzbek migrants’ transnational place-making practices occur via smartphones 
and social media. Such smartphone-based transnational communities are crucial 
to migrants’ survival and provide alternative avenues to adapt in an otherwise 
repressive sociopolitical environment, by, amongst other things, devising specific 
survival strategies, creating intragroup solidarity, distributing information about 
jobs and building an informal social safety net to share livelihood risks and deal 
with emergency situations (e.g., medical treatment or repatriation of a deceased 
individual to their home country). Thus, an important feature of the Russian 
migrant labour market is the presence of a smartphone-based transnational world 
of migrants based on its own economy, legal order and welfare infrastructure. 
In the next section, I present a ‘thick’ description of these processes. This 
description relies on ethnographic material from the everyday lives and experiences 
of Uzbek migrants in Moscow and their family members and communities in the 
Shabboda village in Ferghana. 
The Uzbek context: village-level social norms and cultural codes 
The village of Shabboda, located in the Ferghana region of Uzbekistan, is one 
of the most densely populated villages in the region, with approximately 18,000 
inhabitants. Administratively, the Shabboda village is divided into 28 mahallas
(neighbourhood communities). Each mahalla consists of 150 to 300 households 
(oila), consisting of around 20 to 30 kinship groups (urug). Many village residents 
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production. However, for the past ten years, remittances sent from Russia have 
become the primary source of survival (tirikchilik) for many households. 
At the time of my fieldwork, most village residents had sons or close relatives 
working in Russia. The proportion of women migrating to Russia was also 
increasing in the village. Daily conversations in Shabboda revolved around the 
adventures of village migrants in Moscow, the amount of remittances, deportations 
and entry bans. Most villagers owned smartphones with internet access, enabling 
them to exchange daily news with co-villagers residing in Moscow. In this way, 
absent migrants were ‘present’ in the village through smartphone-mediated daily 
information exchanges between Shabboda and Moscow. During my fieldwork, 
someone was always leaving for Moscow, where someone else was always 
waiting to receive that person, and someone was always returning to the village 
to attend a wedding or funeral ceremony. Shabboda, in the words of villagers, 
was a ‘Moscow village’, with most male villagers working in Moscow given 
the village networks existing there. Several villagers worked as middlemen in 
Moscow’s construction sector serving as gatekeepers to villagers seeking access 
to the Russian migrant labour market. Thus, Shabboda was a truly transnational 
village, since everyday material, family and social exchanges directly connected 
it to and with Moscow. 
Viewed from the macro-level perspective, these migratory processes represent 
the manifestation of broader social changes taking place in Uzbek society. Given 
the Uzbek state’s failure to provide employment opportunities, today, in both 
urban and rural Uzbekistan, migration has become a widely accepted livelihood 
strategy used by millions of households to secure their basic needs (Ilkhamov 
2013). As Salim (65, male), one village member, put it: 
The state no longer exists in Uzbekistan and died shortly after the fall of the 
Soviet Union. So, we (Uzbek people) must choose between sending our children 
to clean the streets of Moscow or staying at home and waiting for the promised 
great future that will never come. 
Given the ‘absent state’, villagers frequently rely on social safety nets and
mutual aid practices that take place within the realm of their family, kinship
group and mahalla. Villagers meet one another on a daily basis at the guzar and
choyxona to discuss and arrange mutual aid practices, which, in turn, produce
reciprocity, affection, shared responsibilities and obligations amongst villagers.
These reciprocal relationships produce economic and social interdependency
amongst villagers, generating an expectation that villagers should help and
support one another, especially when they are in a vulnerable situation. Thus,
social pressure and sanctions can be applied to a village member or her/his
family and kinship group if s/he (or they) is (are) not acting fairly or not helping
neighbours or village members who face a critical situation. Not wanting to
encounter social pressures, villagers often try to help members of their family,
kinship group or mahalla. These village-level norms, identities and mutual aid
practices continue to shape the villagers’ livelihoods even when they are in










The Russian context: reproducing Uzbek village 
practices and norms via smartphones 
Similar to Mexicans in the United States (Castro and Gonzalez 2009) and Indians 
in Singapore (Velayutham and Wise 2005), Uzbek/Shabboda migrants capitalise 
on their village-based identities and norms in their daily lives in Moscow. This is 
clearly illustrated by Halil (45, male), a village member who recently returned to 
his village for a short period to visit his family: 
Even if we move to Russia, a foreign country, and stay there for five to six 
years, we (Shabboda migrants) continue to follow our old habits, religion 
and way of life. If one of us gets into trouble, we quickly inform our village 
members both there (in Russia) and here (in Uzbekistan) via Telegram (a 
smartphone app) or an ordinary phone call. We, the migrants in Moscow, 
quickly collect money and try to help our fellow villagers. If you turn away 
and do not help your co-villagers, information about your egoistic behaviour 
will quickly spread amongst migrants and also travel to the village via the 
internet (e.g., Telegram Messenger). 
Accordingly, the existence of such village-based identities creates a sense of social 
responsibility amongst villagers that they must care for one another during their 
time in Russia. When talking to Shabboda migrants, it became apparent that their 
decision to migrate to Moscow not only stems from economic considerations but 
is also connected to kinship relationships between migrants, return migrants and 
non-migrants. Villagers believe that going to Moscow means joining the mahalla
and village acquaintances there. Once they arrive at Moscow’s Domodedovo or 
Vnukovo airport, they are quickly picked up by fellow villagers. Thus, villagers 
imagine their future migrant life as integrated into their village and mahalla
networks which already extend to Moscow. Even those few Shabboda migrants 
who received Russian citizenship continue to actively engage in transnational 
practices since they believe that they will eventually return to Shabboda. This is 
particularly visible in the words of Ozoda (40, female) and her husband Akbar 
(42, male) who, despite holding Russian citizenship, are building a rather posh 
house in Shabboda. They obtained Russian citizenship not to permanently settle 
in Russia, but to navigate around the structural barriers and repressive legal 
environment. 
Whilst most Shabboda migrants did not share communal accommodation 
or worked in different places in Moscow, they maintained daily contact with 
villagers in Moscow. They did so through smartphones, which they used to stay 
in touch with one another in Moscow, as well as to check the latest news, view 
photographs of Russian and Uzbek girls and make video calls to their families 
and village networks in Shabboda. Only a small group of migrants I encountered 
used social media to discuss Uzbek politics since most were afraid that doing so 
would invite unnecessary surveillance and punishment by their home country’s 
government. Some migrants even speculated that they accidentally met several 
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information about politically active or religious migrants. Due to these fears 
and suspicions, many Shabboda migrants were reluctant to talk about politics 
or religion in public settings. Instead, migrants primarily used smartphones to 
organise their precarious livelihoods and reproduce their village-level practices in 
a virtual environment. 
The state is ‘absent’ not only in Shabboda, where villagers use mahalla-driven 
solidarity to create alternative public goods and services but also in Moscow, 
where solidarity with and support from mahalla networks compensated for the 
complete lack of security from Russian state institutions. Shabboda migrants were 
completely unaware of the existence of Uzbek diasporan organisations or migrant 
rights organisations that could provide some form of support. Additionally, they 
received little to no support from the Embassy of Uzbekistan in Moscow when 
experiencing problems with dishonest employers or corrupt police officers. 
Given this complete lack of security, Shabboda migrants reproduced most of 
their village-level mutual aid activities in Moscow to compensate for the absence 
of formal protection mechanisms. Smartphones and social media applications 
served as platforms for carrying out such activities. Shabboda migrants, for 
example, quickly informed each other and mobilised resources when someone 
fell ill, was caught by the police, needed to send something home or desperately 
needed money. These smartphone-based transnational interactions were crucial to 
the migrants’ survival and served as an alternative social safety net, as explained 
by Abduvali (38, male), a construction worker from the Shabboda village: 
We usually avoid public places because there are hundreds of police 
officers on the streets, seeking to extort money from us (migrants). Instead, 
we use smartphones and social media to resolve problems, socialise with 
our co-villagers in Moscow as well as to maintain daily contact with our 
families, mahalla and village friends in Shabboda. It is Moscow, and things 
are unpredictable here; we rely on our village connections when we get into 
trouble. We are all migrants here, so we cannot turn our backs when our 
fellow villagers are in trouble. But, in order to reach your co-villagers, you 
must always have a mobile phone with you, and you must memorise their 
phone numbers. For example, let’s assume that you are a migrant worker 
who is caught by a police officer and brought to the police station. Normally, 
police officers keep you in the cell for a few hours and check your documents 
very carefully, a thing usually do to further scare migrants. After finishing 
the check, police officers give you two options: (1) you can pay a bribe 
immediately and go home or (2) if you have no money, police officers allow 
you to phone your friends so that they can bring money and secure your 
release. The second scenario is more common, and you need to call your 
co-villagers for help. Therefore, you must always have your mobile phone 
with you. A police officer might allow you to use their mobile phone to 
contact your co-villagers, but not all police officers are nice. If you do not 
have a phone with you and are caught by the police, there is a high risk that 



























The repatriation of the deceased from Russia to Uzbekistan provides another
relevant example of smartphone transnationalism. Shabboda migrants, like other
Central Asian migrants (Reeves 2015; Round and Kuznetsova 2016), experience
difficult living and working conditions in Moscow, including discrimination,
hazardous working conditions and physical violence. They are, therefore, aware
that the threat of death is ever present in their daily lives in Moscow. As one
Shabboda migrant said, ‘Death can be the fate of any migrant in Russia since
we are working in a bespredel [limitlessness, lawless] country where anything
can happen.’ Aware of their own precarious livelihoods, migrants voluntarily
contribute to repatriation expenses if someone from their mahalla or village
dies from a work-related accident, disease or a neo-Nazi skinhead attack. Given
these risks, Shabboda migrants tended to capitalise on their mahalla traditions
(such as norms of reciprocity and solidarity, as well as good neighbourliness) as
a means to cope with the challenges of being an alien in Russia. When someone
was killed, news spread swiftly amongst villagers as migrants immediately
contacted their mahalla networks via smartphones and social media. There was
no standard amount for contributions, and migrants determined how much to
contribute based on their financial situation and income level. Because the threat
of death was ever present in migrants’ lives, news of a death deeply affected
everyone, and many migrants stepped forward to assist with the repatriation
expenses. As such, Shabboda migrants viewed their contribution to body
repatriation as a form of insurance in the case of their own death, as illustrated
in the following:
I always make a contribution to body repatriation, because I know my 
co-villagers would do the same favour for me if I were to suddenly die from a 
work-related accident or disease. Body repatriation is a hashar—a collective 
mahalla project where everyone is expected to contribute. If you are greedy 
and do not contribute, there is a high likelihood that your body will not be 
taken care of if you die. Nobody wants his body to remain in Russia. We all 
want to be buried in our homeland. (Nodir, 26, male, migrant worker from 
Shabboda village) 
Accordingly, smartphones and social media serve as the everyday technologies 
of transnationalism, reproducing and maintaining village-level identities, social 
norms and relationships across distances. Other studies have similarly shown 
that mobile phones do not ‘fracture’ localities, but extend and reproduce them in 
migrant-receiving societies (Pertierra et al. 2002; Vertovec 2004; McKay 2006; 
Nakamura 2013). However, the literature on ICTs and transnationalism tends to 
focus on their functional role, primarily exploring how ICT availability increases 
the frequency and magnitude of transnational interactions and blurs the distinction 
between ‘here’ and ‘there’. The case of the Shabboda village demonstrates 
that smartphones and social media not only facilitate the intensity of everyday 
exchanges between Moscow and Shabboda, but, also, and more importantly, 
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regulates the daily practices and behaviour of village residents both locally and 
transnationally. 
One episode I witnessed in Moscow illustrates how Shabboda-level norms
and practices extend to Moscow through smartphones. One Wednesday
afternoon—on 30 July 2014—‘Zaur’ and I were in the car heading towards
a construction site in Balashikha, a small city in Moscow province where the
majority of Shabboda migrants work. Unlike his co-villagers who work in the
construction sector, Zaur works as a clerk at a grocery store in Moscow. This
position granted him the nickname Russkiy (Russian) amongst his co-villagers
given that he received a higher salary and was not obligated to engage in
chornaia rabota (‘black work’ such as construction, agriculture or janitorial
services). Because Zaur was considered more successful and better connected
than other migrants, individuals from the Shabboda village often contacted him
with requests. 
As we neared the construction site, Zaur received a call on Viber (a smartphone-
based free phone application) from Uzbekistan. He usually picks up calls from 
Uzbekistan and immediately answers them. It was Zaur’s neighbour, ‘Ozoda’, 
who had an urgent request. From their phone conversation, I learned that Ozoda’s 
husband, ‘Ulugbek’, who worked on a greenhouse farm in Vologda city, recently 
underwent an appendectomy and was on a train to Moscow. Ozoda was quite 
worried about her husband since he was physically unable to work and had no 
money to purchase a train ticket back to Uzbekistan. It was clear that Ozoda asked 
Zaur to help her husband return to Uzbekistan. After finishing the conversation, 
Zaur said that we needed to return to Moscow and meet Ulugbek at the Kazanskaya 
railway station when he arrived from Vologda. On our way to the station, Zaur told 
me that he was obliged to help Ulugbek and buy him a train ticket to Uzbekistan 
using his own resources. Zaur also made it clear that he would not be reimbursed 
because his assistance would be treated as a ‘mahalladoshlik’ (shared mahalla
origin) obligation. This would not be the case if Zaur and Ulugbek did not live in 
the same mahalla. 
Rather than travelling all the way to Moscow and then to Tashkent, Ulugbek 
could have taken a train directly to Tashkent if he had waited in Vologda for a 
further ten days. However, Ulugbek knew that he would be taken care of by his 
mahalla network if he travelled first to Moscow, where many Shabboda migrants 
are based, a reality that guided his decision. Ulugbek was also aware that Zaur 
would have difficulty refusing to help if his family members from Shabboda were 
involved in the process. Zaur told me that if he refused to help Ulugbek and other 
mahalla acquaintances, mahalla members would spread gossip about him. Of 
course, Zaur was in Moscow and could just ignore the gossip. But, he had to 
consider his family members’ situation, since they would bear the consequences 
of his decision. Zaur hoped that at least Ulugbek would appreciate his help and 
tell fellow mahalla members about his odamgarchilik (good deeds). Therefore, 
to preserve his family’s good reputation and prevent possible mahalla pressure 
and gossip, Zaur decided to help Ulugbek, even though doing so would cost him 


























In addition to the train ticket, Zaur also had to cover other costs and concerns. 
For instance, he had to drive from Balashikha to the Kazanskaya railway station. 
By taxi, this trip typically costs at least 3000 roubles (approximately US$50). 
Moreover, it is quite difficult to secure a train ticket for the next day since tickets 
typically sell out, requiring one to buy them at least three days in advance. Thus, 
Zaur had to bribe the train provodnik (conductor) and arrange a place (without 
a valid ticket) for Ulugbek. Many thieves and racketeers extort money from 
migrants at the Kazanskaya railway station. Given his many years of work in 
Moscow, Zaur took advantage of his multiple established connections at the 
railway station, ensuring that Ulugbek safely boarded the train and reached home 
without any problems. 
Events unfolded exactly as Zaur described. We arrived at the Kazanskaya 
station at 4 pm. Ulugbek’s train arrived one hour later. After meeting Ulugbek at 
the station, we all headed towards a small fast-food cafe, where migrants could 
secure fake work permits and residence registrations. There, we met an Uzbek 
woman who was well connected with the train provodniks. Zaur paid her 7500 
roubles, and she then guided us through the station and quickly arranged a special 
seat for Ulugbek on a Moscow–Tashkent train. After a short conversation with 
the provodnik, she assured us that Ulugbek was now in safe hands and would be 
in Uzbekistan in five days’ time. Zaur gave an additional 1000 roubles to Ulugbek 
and told him to use it for food expenses during the long trip. We shook hands with 
Ulugbek and watched as the train departed for Uzbekistan. 
At the time of writing, the role of these smartphone-based transnational
practices proved especially pivotal during the COVID-19 pandemic, which had
dramatic and unprecedented effects on migrants’ everyday lives in Russia and
beyond. As the number of coronavirus cases drastically increased, Russia, in
parallel with many other countries around the world, introduced strict lockdown
measures to prevent the spread of the virus. Whilst Russian regions had some
degree of autonomy in defining the level of COVID-related restrictions, in
Moscow, where the majority of Shabboda migrants work, the city government
introduced strict lockdown measures. As a result, a considerable number of
Shabboda migrants, especially those working in the service industry, factories
and bazaars, lost their jobs. This led to a ‘catch-22’ situation, whereby migrants
neither had the savings necessary to cover their living expenses nor the possibility
of returning to their home country due to travel restrictions introduced by the
Russian government on 18 March 2020. Despite the COVID-related restrictions,
some sectors of the Russian economy, notably, the construction sector, continued
to operate. Since the majority of Shabboda migrants worked in the construction
sector, they quickly assisted their unemployed co-villagers, providing them
with temporary jobs and accommodation at construction sites. In cases when it
was not possible to find jobs, villagers collected money, pooled their resources
and provided food products to their members who needed it. These mutual aid
practices were possible owing to the extension of village-level social norms,
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In reality, such smartphone-based transnational practices can also be observed 
within various migrant communities in Russia. During my fieldwork, I also con-
ducted in-depth (semi-structured) interviews with 100 Central Asian migrants 
(Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek migrants) in Moscow between July and August 2015. 
Here, I provide some empirical findings from these interview data, focusing on 
their transnational ties, identities and practices and the role of smartphones and 
social media in these processes. 
As Table 5.1 shows, more than half of migrants rely on their relatives and co-
villagers (zemlyaki) when they need urgent help. This illustrates the importance 
of a shared territorial origin and kinship relations in migrants’ everyday lives in 
Russia. Thus, I argue that the mutual aid and social safety nets described in the 
Shabboda migrants’ example also extend to other migrant communities. 
Table 5.2 shows that it has become a norm amongst Central Asian migrants 
to collect money for body repatriation expenses. This practice even transcends 
village-level practices, whereby many migrants are willing to contribute to the 
repatriation costs even if the deceased migrant is not from their village or district 
in their home country. 
The use of smartphones is also quite common amongst migrants, as shown 
in Table 5.3, testifying to the shift from the mobile phone to the smartphone era 
amongst migrant communities. Smartphone use, in turn, leads to a higher level of 
internet use and social media activism amongst migrants. 
Table 5.1 Source of help when migrants are in need of urgent help 
Q. Imagine yourself in a situation facing problems (e.g., if you are very ill or injured, 
short of money or cannot find accommodation) and you need urgent help. In such a 
case, who would you rely on? 
My relatives and co-villagers (zemlyaki) also work in Russia, so I would rely on 58% 
them. 
I would rely on my new friends that I have met in Russia. 14% 
I would rely on my employer. 13% 
I would rely on colleagues in my workplace. 12% 
I would try to solve my problems independently. All migrants have problems, 2% 
so I don’t want to be a burden to others. 
I would pray to and rely on Allah (God) during hardships. 1% 
Table 5.2 Body repatriation and the collective pooling of resources 
Q. Imagine a situation in which one of the migrant workers dies and migrants are 
collecting money in order to transport the deceased by airplane to Central Asia 
(Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan or Uzbekistan). How would you react if you are requested/ 
invited to make financial contribution to the transportation expenses? 
Yes, I would contribute financially even if the deceased migrant is not my 89% 
acquaintance. 
I would contribute if the deceased migrant is my friend or acquaintance. 11% 











Table 5.3 The use of mobile phones amongst migrants 
Q. Do you have a mobile phone? If yes, what type of mobile phone do you use? 
Smartphone (Android/iPhone/Windows phone) 69% 
Basic mobile phone (without any smartphone functions) 31% 
I don’t use a mobile phone 0% 
Table 5.4 The frequency of internet use amongst migrants 
Q. On average, how frequently do you access the internet? 
Daily  73% 
Weekly  10% 
I don’t use the internet  17% 
Table 5.5 Social media use amongst migrants 
Do you use social media (e.g., Whatsapp, 




Due to the widespread use of smartphones, 73% of the migrants I interviewed 
stated that they use the internet on a daily basis (Table 5.4). 
Accordingly, as shown in Table 5.5, 81% of interviewees regularly use social 
media applications, which I infer to mean that smartphone-based transnational 
practices are common not only amongst Shabboda migrants but also amongst the 
various migrant groups I interviewed. 
Overall, a brief snapshot from the semi-structured interviews indicates that 
smartphone-based transnational practices and identities seem to be common 
amongst various migrant communities in Russia. Although the empirical material 
presented in this chapter focuses largely on Uzbek migrants’ smartphone-based 
transnational practices, it is important to emphasise that these experiences are 
common to all Central Asian migrants in Russia and resonate with the experiences 
of other migrants from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Syria and Ukraine given 
their exposure to similar sociolegal environments and structural constraints. 
Discussion and concluding remarks on 
smartphone transnationalism 
I have argued that much of the migrant transnationalism literature emanates from
case studies of immigrant communities in Western democracies. As such, few
studies have investigated these issues within non-Western migration contexts
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for (overt) transnational activism and the public expression of cultural identities.
Referring to the sociopolitical and cultural differences between Western and post-
Soviet societies, I argue that migrant transnationalism may carry different mean-
ings, forms and functional roles in the Russian context. Furthermore, I contend
that the bulk of the ‘migration and technology’ literature focuses on ‘older’ forms
of ICT, such as email, mobile phones and diasporic websites. Thus, here, I update
this scholarship by examining recent technological developments, including
smartphones and social media, which provide almost unlimited opportunities for
transnational interactions. I have described these processes by ethnographically
attending to the everyday transnational lives of Uzbek migrants in Russia and their
left-behind communities in Uzbekistan. As the results indicate, unlike Western
democracies, where migrants established relatively functional (also ‘physically’
visible) transnational communities and diasporic groups, very little in the way
of an ‘Uzbek transnational community’ has been established in Russia given
its repressive environment and antimigrant sentiments. Whilst Uzbek migrants’
transnational activism remains primarily invisible in public places, I demonstrated
that smartphones and social media platforms enable Uzbek migrants to remain in
touch with their societies of origin. Such technology has also allowed migrants to
create smartphone-based transnational community in Moscow, typically centred
around migrants who hail from the same mahalla or village in Uzbekistan. The
existence of a smartphone-based transnational environment helps migrants cope
with the hardships of being alien, allowing them to avoid or manoeuvre around
structural constraints. Thus, by exploring the interplay between migrant trans-
nationalism and smartphones in a non-Western migration context, this chapter
moves the migrant transnationalism literature beyond a Western-centric paradigm,
providing new insights into the role of new media in migratory processes. 
Through my ethnographic study of the Shabboda village and its smartphone-
based transnational form in Moscow, I explored the ways in which the home 
village is maintained in Moscow as a social association through smartphones and 
social media. As I have shown, rapid improvements in ICTs enabled Shabboda 
migrants to remain in touch with their home village and to create a smartphone-
based translocal community in Moscow. Whilst most Shabboda migrants in 
Moscow do not share communal accommodation and meet infrequently due to 
the punitive sociolegal environment, they are actively engaged in transnational 
place-making owing to smartphones and social media. It is this virtual space that 
I call the ‘smartphone-based transnational community’. Whilst the Shabboda 
migrants’ smartphone-based transnational community does not take on a material 
or physical form, their daily practices are clearly linked to a physical place and 
the maintenance of village-level social norms and relations. That is, their daily 
actions and decisions are determined by the norms of their home village. Thus, 
the migrants’ smartphone-based transnational community orients towards the 
physical village—in this case, to Shabboda. 
Empirically, this chapter adds to the post-Soviet migration literature (e.g., 
Atabaki and Mehendale 2004; Laruelle 2007; Ruget and Usmanalieva 2011; 



































migration, particularly those concerned with the Russian migration context, pri-
marily focus on social processes occurring in either the sending or recipient soci-
ety. By ethnographically exploring everyday transnational interactions between
Moscow and the Shabboda village, this chapter moves beyond methodological 
nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). Furthermore, it provides unique 
empirical material and insights on migrant transnationalism in post-Soviet socie-
ties (that may not be collected by other researchers). This results from my posi-
tion—that is, my ethnicity, village background and language skills as well as 
through my extensive contacts—and my access to such practices. 
Furthermore, this chapter offers important implications for the overall study
of international migration. Through an ethnographic study of migrant trans-
nationalism in Russia, I provide new empirical material on and comparative
insights into migration studies in general. As previously mentioned, much
of the migration literature relies on case studies of immigrant communities
in Western democracies. This focus can be partly explained by the ongoing
legacies of the ‘three worlds division’ of social scientific labour (Pletsch 1981;
Chari and Verdery 2009), which continues to overlook the role and contribution
of non-Western migrant-receiving contexts in the comparative and theoretical
debates about contemporary migration systems. Simultaneously, non-Western
societies have traditionally been viewed as ‘exporting’ migrants to Western
Europe, North America and Australia (Castles and Miller 2009). Their role
as magnets for labour migrants from other countries has, thus, been obscured.
Addressing this research gap is particularly important when considering the fact
that non-Western countries, such as Russia as well as Kazakhstan, Malaysia,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, have become ‘migration hotspots’ worldwide
resulting from their improved economic conditions (e.g., Gülçür and İlkkaracan
2002; Garcés-Mascareñas 2010; Anderson and Hancilová 2011; Gardner et al.
2013). Given these global trends, here I argue for the need to move beyond
Western-centric paradigms and developing alternative frameworks for under-
standing migratory processes and social change in non-Western migration
contexts. 
As an aside, I should emphasise that this study carries some limitations in terms
of gender dynamics and its overall generalisability. First, my fieldwork primarily
focuses on male migrants. Ideally, I would have included the experiences of female
migrants. However, this was a conscious choice dictated by the reality of the gen-
dered constitution of Shabboda migrants in Moscow—90% of such migrants were
male. Another factor that led me to focus on male migrants had to do with my
own gender (male). According to the cultural and religious norms in the Shabboda
village, it is inappropriate for men to approach women when their spouses are not
present. Not wanting to cause any inconvenience to female migrants, I decided to
focus primarily on male migrants. Thus, this chapter highlights the need for fur-
ther research covering the transnational experiences of female migrants in Russia.
Another limitation to my research relates to the generalisability of my findings.
Since I conducted an ethnographic study amongst Shabboda migrants in Moscow
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whether my findings can be extrapolated to other migrant communities in Russia.
However, because both Central Asian and Caucasian migrants experience a simi-
lar sociopolitical environment in Russia and given that the use of smartphones is
common amongst various migrant groups, we can assume that the findings here
may prove relevant to understanding the general environment within the Russian
context. That said, clearly, further research is needed in order to develop a deeper
understanding of migrant transnationalism in Russia. 
Note on Transliteration 
Throughout this chapter, Russian and Uzbek terms are spelled according to the 
standard literary form based on the following two criteria: (1) whether a Russian/ 
Uzbek word or phenomenon is central to the study and (2) if an English translation 
does not fully capture the meaning of the Russian/Uzbek word or phenomenon. 
Russian and Uzbek words are presented in italics. 
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 6 Central Asian female migrants’
transnational social spaces 
Straddling illegality and tradition 
Sherzod Eraliev and Anna-Liisa Heusala 
Introduction 
This chapter employs the concept of transnational social space to examine Central 
Asian female migrants’ relationship with the law in the Russian Federation (or 
Russia), where labour migration primarily reflects (temporary) rotations. Much of 
the existing research on migrants’ legal experiences in the Russian context tends 
to focus on the case of male migrants and their relationship with the Russian legal 
system and law. However, less attention has been paid to the social circumstances 
or transnational practices and thoughts relevant to understanding Central Asian 
female migrants’ experiences within this system. This chapter contributes to 
‘migrant legality–illegality’ (Coutin 2000; De Genova 2004; Menjívar 2006) 
debates through the perspective of gender. We also contribute to the migration 
and legal transnationalism scholarship, in which the Russian case has received 
increasing attention in recent years (e.g., Kubal 2016; Urinboyev 2018). 
However, we argue that vulnerable migrant groups such as women often do not fit 
into transnationalism, informality or legal culture narratives without taking into 
account the specificities of the female experience. 
In 2001, Kivisto analysed the dominant perspectives on the study of migrant 
transnationalism, underlining the importance of immigrant communities for 
understanding the manifestations of transnationalism from below (Kivisto 2001: 
561). His conclusions echoed Basch, Schiller and Blanc-Szanton (1994: 1), 
who examined transnational processes in which immigrants built social fields 
connecting their countries of residence and origin. Faist defined these as social 
spaces which 
not only refer to physical features, but also to larger opportunity structures, 
the social life and the subjective images, values and meanings that the specific 
and limited place represents to migrants. Space is thus different from place in 
that it encompasses or spans various territorial locations. 
(Faist 2000: 45–46) 
Along a similar vein, Vertovec (2001: 578) underlined the significance of multilo-
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and reproduction of social identities. These identities play out and position indi-
viduals in the course of their everyday lives within and across each of their places 
of attachment or perceived belonging.’ 
In line with Faist’s definition and Vertovec’s (2001: 576) critical appraisal 
of a single theory of transnationalism for all migrant groups, we examine some 
aspects of transnational social spaces relevant to understanding the legal choices 
made by Central Asian migrant women in the Russian Federation. We also 
consider criticisms. These include those lobbed at the role of migrant agency 
in transnationalism research for emphasising the free decision-making role of 
migrants and, thus, overlooking power relations, politics and conflicts amongst 
different actors and at different levels in transnational mobility (Koser 2007; Pries 
2008). The unevenness, instability and inequality of transnational social spaces 
represent topics deserving further attention (De Jong and Dannekker 2018: 493). 
These discussions are relevant to research on migrant legal cultures, in which 
agency is often underlined as an important and positive factor. Writing about 
legal pluralistic outlooks, Kubal (2013b) describes how its proponents view legal 
cultures as needing to be established and upheld by the state, as well as an integral 
part of the overall culture of a people. Furthermore, in his study on Central Asian 
migrants in Russia, Urinboyev (2020) characterises migrants’ legal adaptation as 
a combination of skills in manoeuvring around official structures alongside an 
ability to construct unofficial rules within migrant communities, which facilitate 
living under few legal protections. Framed in this way, an informal legal culture 
underlines actors’ rational choices and individualism, and creates a borderline 
legal-nihilistic outlook on formal law and state structures, possibly becoming a 
hindrance to self-determination and a ‘fluid existence.’ 
Migrant communities in Russia are primarily dominated by a younger 
generation of male workers, resulting in overlooking the female experience. 
Although the literature on migrant transnationalism in the Russian context has 
recently expanded, the female experience continues to attract less attention. In this 
regard, previous studies have specifically focused on family and kinship relations 
across borders (Rahmonova-Schwartz 2012), social hierarchies in translocal 
livelihoods (Schroder and Stephan-Emmrich 2014), remittances and gender-
based power relations in sending countries (Reeves 2012) and migrants’ political 
remittances to their home countries (Ruget and Usmanalieva 2011). Urinboyev 
(2018) found that Uzbeks’ traditional village and mahalla-level legal orders, such 
as trust, obligation, shame and neighbourliness, extend across borders through 
telephone-based translocal communities and exert a considerable impact on the 
lives of migrants in Russia. However, his work examines the experiences of male 
Uzbek migrants, whereas the same conclusions may not automatically apply to 
female migrant experiences. 
Migrant illegality has been widely studied in many Western immigrant-
receiving contexts. More likely, it is linked to informality and the absence of strong
legal protections, which Coutin (2000) referred to as a state of legal absence in a
society. Such categories and concepts as liminal legality (Menjívar 2006), legal
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and a-legality (Lindahl 2010) are used to describe the complexities of migration
legality. Scholars have even dubbed the process legal violence (Menjívar and
Abrego 2012) or the legal production of illegality (De Genova 2004). Writing
about the US experience, Ngai stated that illegal or undocumented immigrants are
‘at once welcome and unwelcome’ in the US: excluded as citizens, but ‘woven
into the economic fabric of the nation’ as cheap and disposable labour (Ngai 2004:
2). Critical observers, such as Menjivar (2006: 1002), argue that the contemporary
immigration laws of migrant-receiving countries ‘create and recreate an excluded
population and ensure its vulnerability and precariousness by blurring the bounda-
ries of legality and illegality to create gray areas of incertitude’. 
On a global level, these frameworks have covered both male and female 
experiences (see, for example, Boyd and Grieco 2003; Carling 2005; Lutz 2010; 
Boehm 2012). This reflects the fact that almost half of the world’s migrant popu-
lation consists of women.1 However, research on legality and transnationalism 
focused specifically on female experiences in Russia remains fragmentary, if not 
entirely nonexistent. Gorina, Agadjanian and Zotova (2018) explored the effects 
of their legal status on migrant women’s economic success in Russia. In doing 
so, they found a significant gap in the perception of pay equality between tem-
porary-status and permanent-status migrants, illustrating the importance of legal 
status in mitigating adverse experiences within the labour market. In addition, 
Tyuryukanova (2011) analysed the process of the feminisation of migration flows, 
describing various models of female migration behaviour, along with individual 
and family migration strategies, including migration with children. Scrutinising 
the dynamics and structure of spheres of employment amongst Kyrgyz and Tajik 
female migrants, Poletaev (2018) shed light on their formal and informal employ-
ment practices and strategies in defending their infringed labour rights. Male and 
female migrants exhibited no differences in complying with laws, their vulner-
ability during interactions with the state or in relations with employers and land-
lords as well as during transnational practices (Rocheva and Varshaver 2017). 
To examine the transnational social spaces of Central Asian female migrants 
in Russia, we ask the following questions: What are the peculiarities of female 
migrant experiences within the Russian legal system? Moreover, how do national 
traditions in the home society influence the choices of female migrants in the 
host society? To answer these questions, we utilise the life stories of four female 
migrants2 originating from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, all residing in Moscow. 
These cases share the experience of childbirth in Russia and acquiring sometimes 
fake documents in order to prove that they are the legal guardians of their children 
born in Russia. We argue that Central Asian female migrants’ legal culture in the 
Russian Federation should be understood as a part of such transnational social 
spaces and that they are shaped by the collective circumstances of women in 
their countries and communities of origin. We chose these cases on the basis that 
they represent theoretically relevant examples of the life experiences of the most 
vulnerable groups in the migrant communities and reveal important dynamics in 
female transnational social spaces. In addition to taking into account the absence 
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practices and ways of thinking related to the lives of women in their countries and 
communities of origin affect their agency in decision-making related to family 
and migration law in Russia. 
The research material consists of expert interviews with migration lawyers 
and informal discussions with labour migrants, which took place in Moscow 
in 2017 and 2019.3 We selected four female case studies for closer analysis to 
identify what might lie behind the female experiences of legality–illegality in 
Russia and how perceptions of local culture and traditions in the sending societies 
affect migrants’ coping strategies in the recipient society. In the material we 
collected, two case studies of migrant women, Farida and Nazira, stood out as 
examples of particularly troublesome cases from both the legal and human rights 
perspectives. At the time of data collection in 2019, it was clear that it might take 
at least several months, if successful, to find a legal solution. Therefore, following 
our fieldwork, we remained in touch with our informants’ lawyers to follow up on 
these and other issues related to our fieldwork. The third story emerged through 
the Uzbek media. A migrant woman, who travelled to Russia as the ‘second’, 
unofficial wife of a migrant, was left in a difficult situation and chose to share 
her story in the media.4 Because the story resulted in a discussion in an Uzbek-
language group on Facebook, we followed the issue with the woman’s pro bono 
lawyer, an informant from our fieldwork, who then facilitated our introduction 
to the migrant. The story of Lobar was later introduced as a separate case study. 
Russian migration policy and Central Asian female migration 
Russia is one of the main destinations for migrants in the world. In 2019, it stood 
fourth globally both as a destination (around ten million migrants) and as the 
country of origin for immigrants (IOM 2019: 26). Migrants from Central Asia 
constitute the largest portion of the migrant workforce, mostly employed in 
unskilled jobs. Given the varying methods and purposes of registering foreigners, 
Russia’s responsible agencies provide a range of figures on the number of economic 
migrants.5 Labour migrants’ economic output is estimated as representing 10.5% 
of the Russian economy (Ryazantsev 2016). 
Russia’s immigration and citizenship legislation underwent significant 
transformations following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Ivahnyuk 2009; 
Malakhov 2014; Abashin 2017). Whilst the citizenship regimes and immigration 
laws changed and evolved across the entire post-Soviet space, a historically 
determined attachment to documents persisted. Documents were viewed not 
just as identity documents, but also as guarantors of authority, a mechanism 
for the production of political subjectivity (Reeves 2013a: 154) and a means to 
population control in which ‘national security’ was an essential component of 
policy developments (Heusala 2018). 
Currently, Russia maintains a visa-free regime with members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); thus, almost all migrants from 
Central Asia can enter Russia legally. Central Asian labour migrants must obtain 
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not limited to, a migration card, a temporary residence registration and a patent
(work permit), which necessitates health, Russian-language and Russian history/ 
law certificates, all acquired at a significant expense. Citizens of Kyrgyzstan, a 
member of the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union, are theoretically on equal 
footing in terms of labour rights with the local population. Furthermore, since 
1995, Russia and Tajikistan have agreed upon dual citizenship, allowing many 
Tajiks to obtain Russian citizenship simultaneously. 
Complex and constantly changing rules also render retaining legal permits an 
arduous task for migrants. Moreover, a large number of migrants are employed 
in the informal sector. Researchers have often critically assessed the development 
of Russian migration policy. For instance, Kubal (2016) argues that Russian 
migration policies produce insecure and legally ambiguous migration statuses 
through inconsistent and arbitrary law enforcement. Moreover, the less-than-
complete implementation of these rules by Russian authorities discourages 
migrants from becoming ‘legal’. Abashin (2014) states that even migrants who 
do not violate any law are often perceived as having done so since migrant status 
typically connotes illegality. 
The informal document market amongst migrant workers continued to thrive 
in the mid-2010s, the period when our cases evolved. This market enabled 
migrants to adapt to the restrictive legal environment through the production of 
‘clean fake’ Russian, Kyrgyz and Tajik passports, residency documents, various 
certificates and work permits (Reeves 2013b; Dave 2014). In order to become 
‘legal’, migrants resort to various semi-legal and outright illegal practices of 
legalisation through middlemen (posredniki) (Dave 2014). In 2015 and 2016, 
Russian authorities introduced new rules regarding work permits for everyone, 
which amongst others meant that migrants needed to provide fingerprints. Whilst 
these and other steps limited the possibilities of forging documents, the informal 
document market nevertheless continues to survive and operate, albeit more 
cautiously and at higher prices.6 
Complicated legalisation procedures and high fees for work permits push
migrants further into the shadow economy (Heusala and Aitamurto 2017).
Experiences with the Russian system of labour migration led researchers to
question its unintentionality. For instance, Schenk (2018) argued that these
legal ambiguities should be viewed as a key feature of migration governance
since they keep the number of documented migrants low so that Russian offi-
cials can deploy the population’s antimigrant sentiments and generate infor-
mal benefits (kormushka). Attention has also been paid to the characteristics of
the globalised economic conditions, where the Russian shadow economy and
pathologies in the migration regime are linked to questions regarding global
economic competitiveness and to foreign policy goals in the Eurasian space
(Heusala 2017: 1). 
Since the early 2000s, labour migration from Central Asia has been primarily 
male dominated.7 However, tendencies in recent years reveal a growing share of 
female migrants. Women constitute at least 38% of migrants from Kyrgyzstan; 
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(Rocheva and Varshaver 2017). Whilst construction sites, farms and similar areas 
where physical strength is required primarily employ men, female migrants can 
find jobs predominantly in trade (supermarkets and shops), catering (restaurants, 
hotels and food factories) and domestic (care) and cleaning services. 
In her study on the implications of migration for Russian social policy, Linda 
Cook provides an account of both de jure rights and de facto access amongst 
migrants to social services, including healthcare access for migrant women 
and the rights of migrant children to schooling. She points out that reliance on 
informal health documentation plays a prominent role in migrants’ lives (Cook 
2017: 137–139; see also Kashnitsky and Demintseva 2018). 
Women from Central Asia represent the most vulnerable group. They endure 
the worst living conditions and face major problems in terms of accessing medical 
services (Tyuryukanova 2011). Gorina, Agadjanian and Zotova (2018) found that 
female migrants from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan earn lower salaries compared with 
male migrants. Amongst Central Asian migrants in Russia, there are consistently 
more divorced and widowed women and fewer single women than men (Rocheva 
and Varshaver 2017). From existing research, it seems that (both male and 
female) migrants’ sexual and reproductive behaviour is characterised by limited 
access to information about risks (Weine et al. 2013; Rocheva and Varshaver 
2017). Kazenin et al. (2019) found no significant differences in the reproductive 
strategies of female migrants from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, a member state of 
the Eurasian Economic Union and a non-member, respectively. Agadjanian and 
Zotova (2011) explored sexual risks amongst Central Asian women associated 
with migration. In a survey conducted in 2011 amongst Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek 
female migrants, around 19% had a partner or lived in a civil marriage (Agadjanian 
and Zotova 2011). We may assume that a significant number of female migrants 
accompany their spouses in migration. 
The overwhelming majority of migrants, regardless of gender, rent so-called 
koiko-mesto (a single bed-sized space) in shared flats. Often, women and men 
share separate rooms in apartments. High housing prices in large cities do not 
allow couples to rent a separate flat. At best, a couple can rent a room of their own 
(in a flat) if both are working and can afford the extra expense. Children typically 
remain in the home countries with extended family members, unless the parents 
plan to stay in Russia for an extended period of time. Although this might have 
changed recently, only in very rare cases have parents brought their children with 
them (Alexandrov et al. 2012). 
Whilst local Russians treat migrants from the Slavic countries of Belarus and 
Ukraine either neutrally or positively, individuals from the non-Slavic Muslim-
majority countries of Central Asia with a poor command of the Russian language 
are perceived as alien and unwanted in Russian society. Periodic polls indicate 
consistently high rates of dislike and xenophobia against Central Asian migrants 
(Levada 2019). Racism specifically targeting Central Asians is rampant in today’s 
Russia (e.g., Reeves 2013a; Round and Kuznetsova 2016; Mukomel 2013). 
Simultaneously, we must note that Central Asian migrants, especially female 
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fellow migrants (Agadjanian et al. 2017), including experiencing sexual harass-
ment (Agadjanian and Zotova 2011). Three out of the four women we interviewed 
also faced abuse from other labour migrants. 
Occasional cases emerge in the Russian media of Central Asian women 
abandoning their toddlers or authorities taking custody of children from presumably 
careless parents. This gives the impression to many locals that female migrants 
come to Russia to give birth to ‘anchor babies’ in order to claim welfare benefits 
for their children, and resulting in possible abandonment when faced with financial 
or other difficulties.8 As Rocheva’s (2014) study of Kyrgyz women’s reproductive 
choices demonstrates, a child born on Russian soil is not automatically eligible 
for future citizenship and migrant parents cannot claim welfare benefits (so-called 
maternal capital, a lump sum of money provided by the Russian government to 
stimulate childbirth) unless one or both parents are Russian citizens. Furthermore, 
the difficulties migrants face in using Russian public healthcare services have led 
them to develop their own medical infrastructure (Kashnitsky and Demintseva 
2018). 
Case studies of female experiences 
Our first case study documents the story of Nazira, a woman with dual Russian 
and Tajik citizenship. As a native of Tajikistan, she obtained Russian citizenship 
whilst living in Dushanbe. Early in the 2010s, Nazira moved to Russia for work. 
She met another labour migrant, a citizen of Uzbekistan, with whom she began 
living in a civil partnership and with whom she had two children who were born 
in Russia. In 2015, the police stopped her civil partner and fined him for ‘a lack 
of proper documents’, a typical charge the police frequently use to extort money 
from Central Asian migrants. This led to a court decision and his subsequent 
deportation from Russia. Now, left on her own, Nazira tried to obtain Russian 
citizenship for her children. But, to do so, she needed to have, amongst others, 
registration at her place of residence, which she did not possess. Although Nazira 
held Russian citizenship, she was using a temporary registration, which she had 
to extend every three months. 
She received advice from her friends to return to Tajikistan, obtain Tajik 
foreign travel passports for her children and then with those apply for Russian 
citizenship. Nazira returned to Dushanbe, convinced her civil partner (who 
travelled to Tajikistan following Nazira’s urging) to sign a statement that he was 
abandoning the children and received passports for her children. She obtained 
passports for her children using her own surname, although the children’s Russian 
birth certificates listed the surname of their father. Back in Russia, she now had 
two children officially unrecognised by any birth certificates. Not only could she 
not claim Russian citizenship for her children, but, more importantly, she could 
not prove that the children actually belonged to her. 
Another woman, Munira Usmonova9, originated from Andijan, Uzbekistan. 
Brought up as an orphan by impoverished grandparents, she was unable to marry 
by the time she reached her early 20s, a situation considered shameful by many 
  
 
Central Asian female migrants’ transnational social spaces 121 
traditional families in Central Asia. She agreed to become a ‘second wife’ to 
Umid, who was already in an official marriage with another woman with whom 
he had a child. Faced with financial difficulties, Umid left to work in Moscow 
and brought Munira there in 2013. Before the birth of her first child, Munira lost 
her passport. Umid persuaded her to present herself at the hospital staff using his 
surname, Razzakova, and later brought a fake certificate to the hospital confirm-
ing the loss of ‘Munira Razzakova’s’ identity documents, including her passport 
and work permit. That document had the seal of Ryazan police department, a city 
200 km away from Moscow, and a stamp from Moscow’s Chertanovo district 
police department. Moreover, the document stated that ‘Munira Razzakova’ was a 
citizen of Morocco. As expected, the maternity ward issued a birth certificate stat-
ing not that the child was born to Munira Usmonova, a citizen of Uzbekistan, but 
to ‘Munira Razzakova’, a Moroccan citizen. Munira and Umid continued to live 
together, not paying much attention to recovering the document. In the meantime, 
their second child was born. In 2018, police stopped Umid for an ID check and 
discovered that he had overstayed in Russia without proper documents, leading to 
his deportation. At first, Umid promised that he would send money to Munira so 
that she could recover her documents and return to Uzbekistan. However, he later 
stopped corresponding with Munira, who was now in Russia without the proper 
means to support herself or her children. 
Initially, some friends and sympathisers in a shared flat helped with the housing 
rental and food expenses, but gradually she was left with nothing. Because she 
was kicked out of several rental flats, her case gained Uzbek-language media 
attention. This led to heated discussions in an Uzbek segment of social media. 
With the Uzbek Women’s Committee10 endorsement and the Uzbek Embassy’s 
support, Munira was able to, first, recover her own identity documents and, later, 
her children’s documents. This took her and her pro bono lawyer visiting many 
organisations in Russia and several months. Ultimately, Munira was able to leave 
Russia with her children (with money raised via social media) in mid-March 2020, 
just before the pandemic-induced lockdowns began in Russia and Uzbekistan. 
The third case study focuses on the story of Farida, a female migrant from 
Uzbekistan, who became a mother of two children at the age of 16 and was herself 
raised in a single-parent household by her mother. Desperate to find a job, her 
mother went to Russia, taking 11-year-old Farida with her. In Russia’s Lipetsk 
city, because they were living in a shared apartment with other tenants, another 
migrant raped the then 12-year-old Farida when her mother was at work. The 
rapist was sentenced to jail, but Farida became pregnant and decided not to abort, 
thus giving birth to a child at the age of 13. Since Farida herself was a minor, 
her mother was listed as the mother of the newborn child on the Russian birth 
certificate. Farida’s mother juggled temporary low-paid jobs and, when Farida 
turned 15, she decided that her daughter should marry someone who could sustain 
her. Because Farida was still a minor, her mother decided that a nikah, a religious 
marriage ceremony not recognised by state authorities, was sufficient in order 
for her and another 35-year-old migrant to live together. Farida was 16 when she 
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abandoned her. Farida now found herself in a trap: she had neither a place to live 
nor documents to return to Uzbekistan. First, it would be extremely difficult with-
out her mother’s presence to obtain a passport from the Embassy of Uzbekistan 
in Moscow. Second, even if she managed to leave, she would not be able to travel 
with her older child, who is legally her mother’s daughter. Technically, it would 
be possible to obtain travel documents if Farida’s mother applies for her passport 
and signs a power of attorney for the child to travel with Farida. But Farida does 
not know her mother’s whereabouts. 
Lobar came to Russia with her husband very soon after their marriage. Late 
in her pregnancy, she was working as an assistant in a grocery shop, whilst 
her husband worked in a car service station, both in a town outside Moscow. 
Determined to return the debt they had accrued to cover their wedding expenses, 
both took extra hours and saved as much money as possible. This worsened 
Lobar’s health, and she gave birth during the eighth month of pregnancy. The 
premature baby was admitted to the intensive care unit for several weeks. Later, 
the hospital staff demanded that the parents pay for the child’s stay in intensive 
care, stating that foreigners are eligible for free medical care for only five days. 
Lobar, who was discharged from the hospital by then, and her husband did not 
have the requested money. As the days passed and the hospital bill kept climbing, 
the parents were not allowed to see their child. The child’s health improved by 
the fifth week, and the hospital staff were preparing documents to send her to an 
orphanage. Desperate for the return of their own child, Lobar and her husband 
sought help from friends, which led to them becoming acquainted with rights 
activists. It was only through a petition from the Russian Red Cross Society 
that the parents were able to reunite with their baby and officially register their 
parenthood. 
Tradition in the transnational social spaces 
of Central Asian female migrants 
Central Asian societies represent an interesting blend of modernity and religious 
traditions. For centuries, Islam has played an important and deciding role in the 
organisation of societies’ lives (Khalid 2007; Louw 2007). Whilst the Russian 
empire, which conquered the Central Asian khanates in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, did not interfere much in the internal structure of these states, the Soviets 
carried out intensive modernisation projects impacting all aspects of life. Along 
with economic modernisation, Soviets’ atheism and women’s emancipation poli-
cies deeply affected the social organisation of the Central Asian republics (Edgar 
2006; Northrop 2004). However, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
nation-building policies in each Central Asian country to some degree were 
accompanied by the partial reestablishment of traditional Islamic norms, influ-
encing the social structure of society, especially the position of women (Alimova 
and Azimova 2000; Peshkova 2014). 
Some claim that the post-Soviet period witnessed a rise in strong patriar-
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societies (Tokhtakhodzhaeva 2008). Indeed, in some rural areas, domestic vio-
lence remains a serious issue (Haarr 2007; Childress, Panchanadeswaran and 
Joshi 2017). At the same time, we must note that the position of women in Central 
Asian societies is not homogenous and differs not only from country to country, 
from town to village, but also within communities. Akiner (1997) views contem-
porary Central Asian women as poised between two value systems of modernity 
and tradition, subscribing in part to both, but not entirely to either: 
Central Asian women themselves are caught between conflicting impulses: 
some feel the need to return to their ‘authentic’ roots, with a renewed emphasis 
on traditional domestic obligations; others, to continue along the road to 
greater personal independence and freedom of choice. The great majority, 
however, would like to retain the balance between tradition and modernity 
that was reached, slowly and sometimes painfully, during the Soviet period. 
(Akiner 1997: 263) 
In other words, Central Asian societies have accommodated both the traditional 
and modern lifestyles of their populations, although the role of Islam has 
significantly grown in recent years. The level of a tradition’s impact on people’s 
lives varies territorially as well. Whilst individuals in urban locations are at ease 
choosing whether to strictly follow traditions, in rural areas traditions (mostly 
formed by Islamic norms) place intense pressure on determining an individual’s 
behaviour. 
At a community level, the mahalla (literally, neighbourhood) plays an 
important role as a unit of traditional self-governance in Tajik- and Uzbek-
speaking communities across Central Asia. Whilst serving as an institution of 
mutual assistance and welfare, the mahalla also influences the attitudes of its 
residents through gossip as a powerful instrument of control (Urinboyev 2011; 
Dadabaev 2013). Therefore, people in their everyday activities attempt to refrain 
from actions that may yield disapproval from coresidents. In other words, in 
order to avoid gossip, one tries to behave in a way that is generally accepted as 
adhering with the rules of Islam and local traditions (which are mostly mixed and 
inseparable). Kane and Gorbenko (2015) also claim that it was the institution of 
the mahalla that was left intact by Soviet modernisation, which reinforced gender 
conservatism in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. 
Hierarchies and social positions as well as gender roles in the family and
community are largely defined by patriarchal and traditional values, where males
are granted priority in making decisions (Cleuziou and Direnberger 2016). In
a traditional family in Central Asia, men are considered the head of the family
and, as such, are responsible for earning money, whilst women are viewed
as homemakers and, thus, responsible for bearing children and taking care of
household chores. The eldest male is delegated the authority to make most of the
decisions, which become obligatory to other family members. Whilst cautious of
fallacious generalisations, we must note that younger female family members in
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this does not mean that women in Central Asia are passive followers of men’s
orders without any agency of their own. As Akiner (1997) puts it, women are able
to negotiate a position acceptable to themselves, if not publicly, then within their
families and their communities. Moreover, social disruptions associated with
economic decline, high unemployment rates and population impoverishment in
recent decades have altered gender roles within a significant share of families
across the region. Initially, men became labour migrants, finding jobs mostly
in Russia.11 In many places across Central Asia, women—sometimes as the
only breadwinner and sometimes together with a spouse—also became labour
migrants. 
As mentioned above, there are consistently more divorced and widowed 
women and fewer single women than men amongst Central Asian labour migrants 
in Russia (Rocheva and Varshaver 2017). Our own previous fieldwork also con-
firmed this tendency. Divorce in most traditional families across Central Asia is 
stigmatised, especially for women. A divorced woman may sometimes find her-
self unwelcome in her parents’ home since she might bring shame to the family. 
This is especially true for rural areas. The need to sustain children independently, 
to buy one’s own housing, to escape possible harassment or to simply start a new 
life may push divorced women to seek employment in Russia, where salaries are 
higher and one’s marital status does not result in gossip. This also supports the 
notion that migration may not always derive from economic reasons alone. 
According to transnationalism studies, migrants remain connected to several 
places—both to their sending and recipient societies—simultaneously. These 
connections are carried out through ideas, values and practices amongst others. 
Central Asian migrants more or less constantly live and work in Russia for a 
long time—sometimes for up to 15 years; but, they also maintain quite diverse, 
regular and intense relationships with their countries of origin, and the rhetoric of 
‘returning home’ remains predominant for the overwhelming majority of Central 
Asians (Abashin 2016). This tells us how migrants—both male and female— 
carry their values and understandings of traditions. As Kubal (2013b: 68) notes, 
migrants respond to the legal environment of a host society in a plurality of ways, 
reflecting differences in values and attitudes towards law, different understandings 
and interpretations of it and, finally, different patterns of behaviour vis-à-vis law 
at the level of their respective societies. Moreover, as Mahler and Pessar put it, 
‘gender operates simultaneously on multiple spatial and social scales (e.g., the 
body, the family, the state) across transnational terrains’ (2001: 445). We see 
this in the actions of the women in our case studies through the ‘traces’ of their 
cultural baggage, which they carried from their home societies. 
For instance, it may seem odd that Farida chose to keep her child when she 
became pregnant following being raped. Islam importantly influences women’s 
and men’s decisions related to multiple aspects of reproductive, as well as mater-
nal and child health, in the Uzbek context (Barrett 2009). Given that Islam prohib-
its abortions, it is quite possible that religious norms might have played a rather 
important role (whilst not ignoring the combination of other factors known only to 
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Traditional and patriarchal norms appear to have played a significant role in 
Munira’s choices as well. In the interview to BBC, she explained that she knew 
Umid already had an official family. Nevertheless, she accepted becoming a 
‘second wife’ (someone from another context might use the word ‘mistress’). 
‘First, I was afraid; but since he was sincere and persistent [in his courtship], I 
agreed’, she explained.12 Several times she justified her decision ‘because I had 
devoted myself’, an expression in societies with predominant Islamic traditions 
used to indicate a wife’s adherence to her husband’s choices. Her complete reli-
ance and dependence upon Umid’s decisions crossed borders and continued in 
Russia as well, where both men and women are responsible for their own actions. 
Furthermore, it may seem strange that Munira did not care much about ‘recover-
ing the proper documents’ even after the birth of her second child in Moscow. 
Yet, she relied on Umid and thought it would be fine because of his assurances. 
This may be partly due to the fact that men are primarily expected to take care of 
official documents in rural Central Asia. 
The issue of single women living as civil partners with male migrants in Russia 
also deserves attention. A 2011 survey found that around 19% of Central Asian 
female migrants had a partner or lived in a civil marriage (Agadjanian and Zotova 
2011). This number was the smallest amongst Kyrgyz women (8%), whilst Tajik 
(25.6%) and Uzbek (22.5%) women exhibited higher rates of civil partnerships. 
However, when these figures were examined for a ‘second wife’ status (i.e., 
when asked if she knew the partner had an official wife or another partner in their 
home country), the percentage was lower amongst Kyrgyz (5.5%), Tajik (22.5%) 
and especially amongst Uzbek (14.3%) women (Agadjanian and Zotova 2011). 
Interviews with both migrants and migration experts we conducted in 2017 and 
2019 also confirmed that a certain proportion of single (divorced or unmarried) 
female migrants agree to live as civil partners with other male migrants. Whilst 
a relatively free environment in a large city (such as Moscow) allows room 
for individual lifestyle choices, the interviewees also insisted on economic 
justifications for this: male partners agree to cover some of the expenses of female 
migrants (e.g., rent, work permit fees and board). 
Our case studies also partially confirm this idea. At least in Farida’s case, 
her mother decided that Farida’s ‘marriage’ formalised by a nikah (she could 
not officially marry, since she was still a minor) would relieve her of increasing 
expenses (renting a separate room and feeding a toddler). Whilst illegal and not 
widespread, having a civil partner in addition to an official marriage—or in other 
words, a man marrying, religiously, several women—has somehow become 
indicative of prosperity and success amongst a certain proportion of the male 
population in Central Asia. The great majority of women who accept becoming 
second wives were formerly married, but were either repudiated, divorced 
or widowed13 (Cleuziou and Commercio 2016). It is unsurprising then that a 
number of female migrants in Russia, if they are not young, unmarried women or 
accompanying their spouses, are divorced or widowed. In this regard, accepting 
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Conclusions 
This chapter examined the specificities of the formation of transnational social 
spaces for labour migrants in Russia from the female perspective. Because most 
labour migrants are younger males, research has focused on their agency in male-
dominated transnational social spaces, characterised by technological mobility 
and networks based on informality. Our case studies show that, although the rea-
sons behind labour migration might be similar for both men and women, the con-
sequences of migration can be drastically different for more vulnerable immigrant 
groups in migrant communities, particularly for women. 
Our case studies demonstrate the significance of the tradition and practices 
of the sending countries in the formation of Central Asian female migrants’ 
transnational social spaces and subsequent legal choices in Russia. Examining the 
legal culture (Kubal 2013b) that female migrants bring with them in connection 
with family structures and gender roles which shape their transnational social 
spaces in Russia help us understand how female migrants relate to their host 
country’s laws and regulations. 
Through our research, we raise the question regarding agency-focused 
transnationalism as an overarching perspective in the study of labour migrants 
in Russia. We found that transnational social spaces in our case studies did not 
include informed or equal choices for women. The female migrant case studies we 
present as representatives of vulnerable groups demonstrate limited opportunities 
of such migrants to endure the precarious migrant life. They were not in a position 
to manoeuvre around official state structures with individualistic strategies. The 
revolving door migration between Central Asia and Russia, a lack of social capital 
and financial resources, their dependent position within migrant communities 
and strict family traditions limit the real agency of many female migrants, which 
the concept of transnational social space assumes. Simultaneously, we note that 
migration can widen the transnational space of some female migrants who can 
utilise new opportunities in Russia. 
Further studies should focus more on the structural and cultural circumstances 
of female migrant groups in relation to legal matters. Informality, which includes 
multiple types of actors and reasons, currently sustains a transnational social space 
wherein the relatively well-connected migrants—that is, typically, men—acquire 
rights and exercise these rights, whilst leaving other groups such as women and 
children in highly dependent positions. Instead of serving as an empowering 
source of survival for female migrants, the current transnational social space in 
which Central Asian migrant women live recycles the organisational pathologies 
of Russian authorities and the inequalities of the sending countries. Thus, the 
decisions female migrants take regarding legal matters in Russia often remain 
random, unpredictable and dependent upon informal networks. 
Our examination suggests a need for further systematic investigation on the 
impact of the revolving door migration between Russian and Central Asia, spe-
cifically examining both the legal culture and transnationalism frameworks. In 
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the roles of family members in the lives of female migrants, as well as on the 
sending country strategies in cross-border migration regimes amongst various 
migrant groups. 
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project uses the case of Russia, a hybrid political regime and one of the world’s 
largest recipients of labour migrants, to investigate how undocumented migrants 
negotiate and manoeuvre around the restrictive socio-legal environment through 
the production of new means of informal governance and legal order. 
Notes 
1 Globally in 2019, 52% of international migrants were male; 48% were female (IOM 
2019: 22). 
2 We strictly adhered to the principles of confidentiality and anonymity in order to protect 
the identities of the migrants we spoke with during our fieldwork. 
3 The empirical data collection was conducted under the research project ‘Migration, 
shadow economy and parallel legal orders in Russia’, by Anna-Liisa Heusala, Kaarina 
Aitamurto and Rustamjon Urinboyev in 2017, and Sherzod Eraliev in 2019. 
4 BBC Uzbek Service, ‘A migrant who became a second wife is kicked out with two 
children’ (in Uzbek), 20 December 2019. Accessed 25 May 2020, https://www.bbc
.com/uzbek/uzbekistan-50872438. 
5 The Russian Ministry of Interior reported that there were 2.1 million people from 
Uzbekistan, 1.2 million from Tajikistan and 700,000 from Kyrgyzstan in late 2019. 
Selected indicators of the migration situation in the Russian Federation for January– 
December 2019 with a distribution by countries and regions (in Russian), 22 January 
2020. Accessed 25 May 2020, https://xn--b1aew.xn--p1ai/Deljatelnost/statistics/migr
acionnaya/item/19365693/. 
6 When one co-author of this chapter visited Moscow in the autumn of 2019, he was 
approached several times by posredniki (middlemen) or qog’ozchilar (literally, 
papermen in Uzbek) in and around Kazansky railway station, with offers of different 
types of ‘clean’ documents. 
7 According to Russian officials, one-third of migrants are employed in retail, 16% in 
construction, 14% in transportation and communications, 7% in the hotel industry and 
8% in domestic services (such as cleaning and caring for the elderly). Sputniknews, 
Trudovye migranty v samoizolyatsii, 6 April 2020. Accessed 25 May 2020, https:// 
tj.sputniknews.ru/columnists/20200406/1031017523/trudovye-migranty-samoizolya
ciya-perevody-koronavirus.html. 
8 Fergananews, Podkidyshi i tishina (in Russian, Foundling and silence), 25 February 
2020. Accessed 25 May 2020, https://fergana.ru/articles/115439/. 
9 BBC Uzbek, ‘A migrant who became a second wife is kicked out with two children 
(in Uzbek)’, 20 December 2019. Accessed 25 May 2020, https://www.bbc.com/uzbek/ 
uzbekistan-50872438. 
10 A government agency in Uzbekistan inherited from the Soviet period that dealt with 
women’s issues until its incorporation into the newly established Ministry of Mahalla
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11 One of the social consequences of this migration is that many male migrants found new
families and divorced their wives. One study found that, each year, 14,000 Tajik migrants
established new families in Russia and abandoned their wives (Malyuchenko 2015). 
12 BBC Uzbek, ‘A migrant who became a second wife is kicked out with two children 
(in Uzbek)’, 20 December 2019. Accessed 25 May 2020, https://www.bbc.com/uzbek/ 
uzbekistan-50872438. 
13 As Cleuziou and Commercio (2016) note, women agree to a second wife status 1) to 
acquire economic resources in economically challenging times; 2) to acquire marital 
status in what remains a traditional society that dismisses an ‘old maid’, single or 
divorced woman and 3) to acquire biological resources, that is, to have children. 
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7 Spiritual mobility 
Alternative healing practices amongst Central 
Asian migrants in Moscow 
Anna Cieślewska 
Introduction 
Central Asia is known for various forms of magical and healing practices. Folk 
medicine represents a part of cultural traditions based on plants, rituals, charms 
and prayers. Along with the collapse of public services and the deterioration 
of medical care following the fall of the Soviet Union, folk healing became 
increasingly popular. Currently, some people combine the methods of folk 
medicine with official healthcare to provide ‘double protection’. Services from 
local healers are also attractive given their modest price in comparison with the 
cost of services from professional medical doctors. Furthermore, folk medicine is 
available almost everywhere and is accessible to everyone (Tursunova et al. 2014; 
Penkala-Gawęcka 2006, 2014). 
Migrants from Central Asia in the Russian Federation (or Russia) represent 
every social layer, including spiritual leaders such as mullas, clairvoyants, kin-
achi (a person who removes charms), Ismaeli khalifa, bibi otuns (female reli-
gious leaders), tabibs (healers) and others. Spiritual professionals offer various 
methods of healing and spiritual services to Central Asians and other Muslims 
as well as non-Muslim populations (see Oparin 2017; Cieślewska, Błajet 2020). 
Hüwelmeier and Krause (2010: 1–10) called this movement of people and reli-
gious entities ‘the travelling spirit’, referring to the circulation of imaginaries, 
money and ideas. The ‘travelling spirit’ involves channelling and transformative 
rituals related to prayers, musical performances, poetry recitation, amulet making 
and ritual foods as well as the development of newly emerging formal and infor-
mal spiritual places for the diaspora. 
In this chapter, I examine how the mobility of migrants from Central Asia
contributes to the transfer of alternative healing practices to Russia. In particular,
I am interested in how migrants create informal and formal spaces for expanding
spiritual healing and the way in which these practices function in the local alternative
medicine market. Specifically, my research is guided by the following questions:
Does a specific type of healing contribute to its formalisation? Does the migrant
healer’s position in Russia and/or her/his relationship to the Russian state or to a
certain spiritual/religious institution determine the informal or formal character of














absorbed by the local market of spiritual services, both informally and formally?
Are traditional healing services an alternative to official medicine (biomedicine/ 
Western medicine, also other terms) due to cultural factors or because many
migrants have limited access to medical services in Russia resulting from a lack of
registration documents, funds or medical insurance amongst other reasons? 
To address these questions, I present three case studies of migrant spiritual 
healers and/or religious leaders from Central Asia who provide spiritual services 
in Moscow. Each case depicts different aspects related to the mobility of healing 
services, migration and informality. First, I present the case of a woman from 
Tajikistan named Niso who works at a bazaar in Tioplyi Stan providing hijama
to migrants in precarious situations. Niso’s clients primarily work illegally and 
have no access to formal medical health services. Her informal activity is mostly 
determined by her personal situation since she also functions at the bottom tier of 
the Moscow migrant world. 
The next case details the activity of khalifa Sultanbek, officially registered at 
the Ismailli ‘Nur’ centre (Regional Public Organisation NUR), an official organi-
sation for the Ismailli community in Russia based in Moscow. Stultabek provides 
religious services to Ismailli migrants, and informally writes talismans, a practice 
transferred from Pamir to Moscow. His case illustrates how the informality of 
spiritual service is determined by a formal institution such as the Nur centre, and 
how migrants cultivate their culture as part of their identity construction under the 
conditions of Moscow. 
Lastly, I present Jamila, a clairvoyant from Kyrgyzstan who works at a registered
medical facility in Moscow. She moved to Russia several years ago and began
offering spiritual healing services to people not only from Central Asia but also to
Russians and others. Her activity provides an example of how mobile spirituality
becomes formalised and adapted to the local conditions. Simultaneously, however,
she still exists on the verge of formal recognition, since the traditional Kyrgyz
methods of healing she uses are mostly rejected by traditional biomedicine/ 
Western medicine and treated with scepticism by many people. 
I argue that the informal nature of healing practices is related to the migrants’ 
status in Moscow. This informality also reflects the role and function of these 
methods within a particular spiritual tradition. Various healing practices have 
come to Russia with migrants from Central Asia as part of their religiosity, and 
have, thus, become services offered on the ‘spiritual market’ to migrants and 
nonmigrants. This transfer takes place primarily informally through trust networks 
and is embedded in social relations. Some migrants use informal healing services 
as a coping strategy due to their limited access to medical care in Russia. Migrants 
also view certain practices as part of their identity, which helps them in their 
experience as migrants by connecting them with their country of origin. 
Materials and methods 
The materials presented in this chapter consist of data collected during fieldwork 
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I conducted the research together with Zuzanna Blajet (MA from Jagiellonian 
University), within the framework of the project ‘Changes in the religious tradi-
tions of migrants from Tajikistan in the Russian Federation’.1 The research meth-
odology relies on participant observation and in-depth interviews. The interviews 
were conducted in mosques, other religious facilities, in private flats and houses, 
in medical facilities, in cafes, at community events, in offices and marketplaces, 
as well as where Central Asian migrants frequented. Additionally, ethnographic 
material was collected during rituals and religious lessons we attended. In order 
to maintain their anonymity, the real names of the individuals we interviewed 
as well as the exact location of the research sites have been anonymised unless 
otherwise stated. 
In Moscow—a large and multicultural agglomeration—migrants are dispersed, 
living and working in various places. Therefore, our research was conducted 
across multiple sites, and amongst people who are not always related to each 
other and belong to various networks (see Robben 2012). Migrants from Central 
Asia move to Moscow and travel to other cities or their countries of origin. Gupta 
and Ferguson (1992: 6–23) found that migrants belong to many places; hence, the 
nature of their relationship to a particular place is constantly reformulated. This 
relationship further influences the activities they undertake, including the spiritual 
and healing services attached to those locations. With regard to spiritual activities, 
some are performed at official Islamic institutions and medical facilities, whilst 
others take place in places such as the flats of clients or spiritual professionals, 
cafes and private businesses. In some cases, spiritual leaders contact their clients 
online or over the phone, creating an additional space of interaction. Therefore, 
the concept of ‘translocal ethnography’ is also relevant to this research, since 
various actors and activities are interconnected and interact with each other across 
multiple sites simultaneously (see Hannerz 2012). 
Informality, migrants and spiritual services 
Following Ledeneva (2018: 1–5), and Morris and Polese (2014), I consider infor-
mality as including various unregulated activities aimed at solving specific problems
in circumstances when formal institutions and practices limit or prevent effective
actions. Informality can be described as ‘ways of getting things done’. In most
cases, informal practices are related to economic and market mechanisms, although
the ways in which they are exercised are determined by sociocultural factors. 
Alternative forms of healing have always occupied spaces between formal and 
informal spheres given their uncertain status vis-à-vis biomedicine. In Central 
Asia, complementary and spiritual healing is mostly provided informally by 
spiritual leaders. Spiritual leaders have always been highly esteemed, and their 
formal status is much less important than their personal charisma, family origin 
and/or healing abilities. In addition, various alternative methods of healing are 
legitimised by Islam and traditions passed from generation to generation. Other 
forms of alternative medical practices recently emerged, and have been absorbed 
and adjusted to local conditions. Moreover, since the 1990s, attempts have been 
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made to formalise some folk medicine practices, especially in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, in order to regulate the industry of alternative healing and prevent 
quackery. These attempts also stem from the pragmatism of local authorities 
aware of the difficulties faced by official healthcare services. Alternative medi-
cine, to some extent, represents a substitute for public services. As a result, a 
number of facilities for alternative medicine or associations of healers have been 
registered (see Penkala-Gawęcka 2006, 2018). 
Regardless of the status of healing services in the countries of origin, tradi-
tional practices are channelled abroad mostly informally through various net-
works and flows. The process of their mobility is associated not only with the 
movement of people but also with other kinds of circulation, such as the transfer 
of money, images, information, technologies and ideas. Some healing and spir-
itual activities are moving from Central Asia to Russia. Other religious practices 
are absorbed by migrants in other regions (i.e.: Europe, the Middle East, the Gulf 
states and Pakistan) and, then, transferred to Russia or to their countries of origin. 
This process is fluid and depends on a particular practice and/or spiritual leader. 
Most migrant healers modify their activities, adapting them to the conditions of 
migration (see Rosenberg and Shannon 2018). 
Following Wong and Levitt (2014: 1–2), I consider the transfer of religious 
ideas not as a homogeneous process, but as producing different levels of contact 
with their potential recipients in the places they reach. Similar to other travellers, 
migrants transfer faith and spiritual practices in various ways and for various pur-
poses. Moreover, the spiritual dimensions of religious practices do not exclude 
their commercial functions. Consequently, healing services represent a part of 
the spiritual industry operating within the mechanisms of capitalism. Religious 
symbols, ideas and practices can represent ‘goods’ or ‘commodities’ in relation 
to their production, promotion, distribution and appropriation (Obadia and Wood 
2011: xix). Those religious practices are redistributed in an open and competitive 
market (Obadia and Wood 2003, cited in Obadia 2011: xx). In the context of the 
‘travelling spirit’ and the circulation of spiritual services, Central Asian migrants 
are relatively new suppliers. Their popularity resulted from the increasing demand 
for such practices in Russia not only amongst Muslims but also amongst non-
Muslims. Various spiritual figures from Central Asia occupy a specific niche in 
Moscow, competing with each other as well as with other practitioners. 
Krasheninova (2015: 110) found that the demand for alternative healing ser-
vices in Russia has dynamically developed. Various forms of alternative medicine 
have gained popularity amongst people. In particular, this appears to stem from 
the failures of the Russian healthcare system as well as the cultural and ideo-
logical attitudes of people who do not trust official medicine. Informal health-
care includes alternative healing practices as well as some activities associated 
with biomedicine/Western medicine that escape official records. Some alternative 
healing practices function legally within the medical services market. Despite the 
specific nature of alternative medicine and spiritual or healing practices, they also 
take on forms similar to other informal practices, such as tax evasion and the lack 
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Barsukova and Ledeneva (2018: 487–488) point out, however, that legal 
rules in Russia are often ambiguous across various spheres, such that alternative 
healing is not exceptional. There is no clearly defined border between formal rules 
and informal practices. In fact, some informal practices are connected to formal 
rules and institutions. As a result, in many cases, informality is not an option, 
but a necessity, forming part of the system of governance. In terms of healing 
services, their status can be described as what Polese et al. (2017) call informality 
‘beyond the state’ since they are not effectively regulated, managed or recognised 
by state institutions. Thus, the state is unable to work out the proper mechanisms 
of identifying and formalising such informal practices. 
According to Kashnitsky and Demintseva (2017: 11), given an uncertain 
financial and legal status, poor knowledge of the mechanisms of healthcare as well 
as unclear rules for receiving medical assistance in Russia, many migrants seek 
formal healthcare only in extreme situations. Galeazzi (2017), who conducted 
research amongst African migrants in Calabria (Italy), argued that indigenous 
practices of healing brought by migrants become part of their coping mechanisms 
stemming from the lack of other alternatives to medical care. Thus, migrants 
create their own informal networks to disseminate traditional healing practices, 
adjusting them to new conditions. 
In Russia, many migrants are pushed into the informal sphere, obtaining false
residence registrations (propiska), working without work certificates (patent) or
operating informally in other ways (see also Turaeva 2018). In Moscow, it is possi-
ble to buy a false patent, registration or even an ID card if one knows the right people
and places. Therefore, not infrequently, informality dominates over formal actions
and institutions, such that healing practices are not exceptional. Even if migrants
follow all of the legal rules and have the right to use formal healthcare services, it is
not guaranteed that they will receive appropriate treatment. One solution available
to them is to seek assistance within their networks of migrants and use alternative
methods of healing such as ‘emergency assistance’. Only when health-related issues
become serious will individuals do everything they can to secure the funds neces-
sary to seek formal medical care. Others decide to return to their country of origin
where they have a network of family and friends they can rely on for assistance.
In most of the cases I observed, spiritual healing services were provided infor-
mally based on networks of friends, co-workers and family with the exception of 
a few officially registered alternative medicine centres. Healers or spiritual pro-
fessionals work without a patent and do not attempt to formalise their activities. 
Notwithstanding this reality, most of them have been legitimised by religious or 
cultural institutions, such as mosques or religious centres. 
Spiritual mobility and its practices 
Case study 1: Hijama at the Tioplyj Stan bazaar 
One of the popular practices amongst migrants and other Muslims in Russia is 




















the Prophet Muhammad, hijama is an example of a practice brought from the 
Middle East and other Muslim regions and popularised in Russia and Central 
Asia following the collapse of the Soviet Union.2 Some believe that hijama can 
remedy almost all ailments, and can even replace traditional medical treatment. It 
is performed by various categories of people including mullas, healers and others. 
As a rule, hijama therapy should be provided by a man to male clients and by a 
woman to female clients. In Russia, hijama is widely advertised on the internet 
by various specialists, with some practitioners claiming to hold a medical degree. 
Places also offer courses on hijama and issue certificates, although no formal 
medical education is required to enter a course. Practically anyone can learn how 
to perform hijama, and cupping therapy equipment sets are available in most stores 
that sell Muslim devotional items and literature. A few specialists offer this form 
of healing in registered facilities; in most cases, however, it is offered informally 
in private flats, mosques and other locations. Hijama is available to everyone for a 
low price, which, according to Islamic tradition, represents a voluntary gift to the 
therapist (Krasheninnikova 2016: 328–329; Cieślewska, Błajet 2020). 
I met Niso (52 years old) through my male friend who offers hijama to men. 
Niso is from Dushanbe (Tajikstan) and, at the time of my research in 2017, she 
had been working in Moscow for 15 years. For several years, she had also sold 
jackets at a market near the Tioplyj Stan metro station. Prior to coming to Russia, 
Niso had a husband, but he was drug dependent and she left him. Eventually, she 
became the second wife to another man. Her current husband comes from the 
Gharm region of southern Tajikistan, where he lived with his first wife and four 
children. Whilst working for years in Russia, Niso met her husband only on rare 
occasions during her visits to Tajikistan. 
Whilst living in Dushanbe, Niso worked in a shopping centre. She also per-
formed the tasks of a kinachi (charm remover). In her own words, people called 
her tabib (healer). She inherited the art of removing kina3 from her ancestors: her 
grandmother, great-grandmother and her former mother-in-law were all kinachi. 
Her mother did not accept the gift (nasiba) and, as a result, was punished by 
the spirits—her children were sick, such that a few died. Niso could not become 
pregnant for 15 years and finally decided to adopt her sister’s daughter.4 Someone 
told Niso that she also has a gift, which should be used to heal people and remove 
the evil eye. Niso said that she had a pari5 spirit which helps her during rituals. 
In Moscow, however, she rarely removes spells, because she sometimes drinks 
wine. Since alcohol is haram (forbidden in Islam), she considers herself ritually 
impure. Thus, she could not deal with removing charms. Furthermore, at Tioplyj 
Stan, activities related to removing spells were performed by the Luli women of 
Samarkand,6 who typically stood on the street to attract potential clients. Niso 
likes the Luli because one of them saved her life during childhood. Therefore, she 
sometimes sent clients to them.7 
Five years ago, Niso was working at another market in Moscow selling 
vegetables. She met a Chinese woman there who taught her massage techniques 
and the cupping therapy. Later, Niso began performing hijama. In her opinion, 
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pressure, gout (arthritis), allergies, headaches, diabetes and even black magic. 
During the process of hijama, the Quran should be read. Niso, however, does 
not know the suras from the Quran, so she uses YouTube-recorded suras whilst 
performing cupping. Despite the religious recommendation that a woman cannot 
provide hijama to men, occasionally Niso does, for which she has been criticised 
by other religious individuals. Nevertheless, others respected her for her skills 
and knowledge. Since she is also a kinachi, her knowledge is associated with a 
centuries-long tradition of Central Asian spirituality. This grants Niso legitimacy 
to perform hijama, despite the fact that she does not have any medical qualifications 
or scriptural knowledge of Islam. 
Niso provides hijama services primarily to migrants from Central Asia and 
the Caucasus, but also to Vietnamese working in the bazaar and only rarely to 
Russians. She is recommended by friends to other people and, in this way, gains 
new clients. This provides her with a relatively high status within the hierarchy 
of migrants at Tioplyj Stan, although does not change her general situation in 
Moscow. Like many migrants, she balances between formal and informal 
activities. She is in Russia legally, although she does not have a work permit 
(patent). She lives illegally in a small flat with ten other migrants. Yet, Niso does 
not attempt to change her situation or formalise some of her activities. 
Legalising all activities as a poor migrant in Moscow is difficult, involving deal-
ing with the authorities and bureaucracy with no guarantee of a positive outcome.
Many migrants work informally through networks connecting them with employers
who run formal businesses. Niso’s Azerbaijani employer has a legal business at
Tioplyj Stan, although Niso is employed informally. If the police raid her workplace,
she walks between stalls and pretends to be a client. If caught by the police, she
could be deported to Tajikistan unless she or her employer pay a bribe. Despite this
unstable situation, Niso never considered formalising her activities by, for example,
opening a massage and hijama salon. All of her activities rely on informal rela-
tions: the place in her flat (Russian, koyka), ‘permanent’ work at the bazaar, hijama
and massages. Niso viewed her stay in Moscow as a temporary stage in her life,
despite lasting 15 years. Finally, at the beginning of 2018, Niso decided to return to
Tajikistan.8 In 2019, she returned to Moscow once again for a short period of time.
Niso said that she currently performs hijama in Dushanbe for family and friends.9 
The Tioplyi Stan bazaar in Moscow is a popular place, not only amongst 
Central Asia migrants but also amongst other Muslims. Apart from stands with 
ordinary goods, there are halal food stands, stores selling Asian goods, shops 
with Muslim devotional accessories, small restaurants with regional food from 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, bakeries selling Central Asian pastries, hairdressing 
salons and beauty salons, as well as tailoring shops and other services mostly 
targeting migrants. Most of the clientele are involved in trade, whilst some find 
other types of employment. Migrants tend to be employed informally, perform-
ing various tasks within formally registered businesses. Apart from this visible 
(although semiformal) layer to Tioplyi Stan, there is also its ‘invisible’, ‘hidden’ 

















Many migrants do not have insurance. Therefore, they cannot use formal 
medical facilities. Whilst several low-cost clinics for migrants operate in 
Moscow, mostly run by the Kyrgyz, many migrants cannot afford even such 
treatment. In addition, patients are often unable to afford the costs of medicines 
and transportation. Thus, some migrants opt to begin treatment only in emergency 
situations (Kashnitsky and Demintseva 2017; Cieślewska, Błajet 2020). Hijama,
by contrast, represents an easy-to-access, low-cost treatment option, and many 
migrants do not have other alternatives. Sometimes hijama healers such as Niso 
provide advice regarding health issues, recommending other methods of healing 
such as herbs and pills that can be used on an ad hoc basis by the migrant in need. 
The hijama service can be performed at home or in other places. This form of 
healing does not require any official procedures, insurance or registration with a 
formal medical facility where one can be asked to present documents. 
Both of the interlocutors who practise hijama in this study, as well as their 
clients, believe that it can help to restore balance to the body. This view corresponds 
with the original Arabic name of the practice (Al-hijama), which means ‘to reduce 
in size’, ‘to return the body back to its natural state’ or ‘to balance the bodily 
humours’ (Qureshi et al. 2017: 174). As previously mentioned, Central Asians 
tend to believe in alternative forms of healing as much as in biomedicine/Western 
medicine. One reason for this stems from their limited access to good quality 
medical services. However, such beliefs are also rooted in a specific understanding 
of health in Islam based on the assumption that the body and mind represent a 
single integrated unit. Thus, using healing methods perceived as ‘Islamic’ (i.e., 
hijama) is considered appropriate in healing various afflictions (see Majed 1999). 
In Moscow, where the migrants’ situation remains uncertain, hijama, as well as 
other religious practices, may also offer psychological support. Thus, it gives 
people a sense of belonging to the spiritual community of Muslims. Although 
some of my interlocutors, for various reasons, do not pray or attend a mosque 
regularly, all of them consider themselves Muslims. They view performing or 
using the hijama as part of the religious practices belonging to the Islamic spiritual 
system. In a sense, this is also viewed as a way to express their piousness and 
devotion to Islam. Some people perceived hijama as a complementary form of 
healing, whilst others believed it could help them to resolve most health problems. 
Migrants adapted their attitude towards healing to the local conditions in Russia,
transforming it and absorbing new practices. This process is well illustrated in the
case of Niso, a traditional healer (kinachi) who learnt to perform hijama in Moscow
and offers her services to migrants, whilst also transferring this practice to Tajikistan.
This practice provides her with an additional income as well as raises her prestige
since she is considered a tabib at Tioplyi Stan, a ‘bazaar doctor’ who helps people in
need. In Dushanbe, she also uses her new skills to heal people and to earn an income. 
Case study 2: Talismans and teshtobs 
Another popular spiritual practice is writing talismans (tamor or tumor) and 
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at securing good health, success and love, and getting rid of fear as well as helping 
with other life problems. The tumor is wrapped in a piece of cloth, hung on a string 
and worn around the sick part of the body or close to the body. It is both curative 
and preventive in nature. The writing comes from the Quran, Hadith or other 
spiritual books (Koen 2003: 157–158; Cieślewska, Błajet 2020). A teshtob is a 
piece of paper with a spiritual writing. In the case of an illness or other adversity, 
a teshtob is dissolved in water and drunk. As a rule, a khalifa or mulla acquire 
knowledge regarding preparing talismans and teshtobs within a family network, 
learning from special books and tables (Cieślewska, Błajet 2020).10 Amulets and 
talismans represent popular forms of protection against misfortune throughout 
Asia. Talismans are prepared by spiritual professionals but can also be made by a 
person in need or bought at bazaars or other places (Penkala-Gawęcka 2006: 157). 
Sultanbek (40 years old) is a khalifa officially registered at the Nur centre 
within the Ismaili Tariqah and Religious Education Board (ITREB), a unit 
responsible for religious education. He graduated from the Institute of Oriental 
Studies in Khorog (the Tajik Badakhshan), where he learnt the Arabic and Persian 
languages. Shortly after completing his education, he worked as a journalist and 
interpreter in Tajikistan but struggled to make ends meet. As a result, in 2002, he 
and his wife moved to Russia. Initially, Sultanbek did not speak Russian well and 
took many odd jobs to survive. Afterwards, he enrolled at the Moscow Islamic 
University, where he learnt to recite the Quran and the principles of Islam. In 
2007, he became an official khalifa registered at the Nur centre. He is, thus, 
eligible to conduct rituals such as weddings and funeral ceremonies as well as 
other rituals. In addition, he writes talismans and teshtobs. Officially, all khalifas 
working in Moscow should be registered at the Nur centre in order to obtain a 
certificate. However, there are also folk mullas who provide similar services 
without being registered at Nur. Some enjoy a great deal of respect and popularity 
in their respective circles. 
Nur’s authorities do not openly support the use of talismans and teshtobs. 
They believe that such practices are not in line with the vision of ‘modern’ Islam 
promoted by Aga Khan. Furthermore, they explain that those healing methods are 
based on old spiritual wisdom, which served people in the past. Since medicine 
has advanced, they view these old methods as no longer useful. 
However, people still order talismans and teshtobs from mullas and khalifas, 
believing that charms and prayers written within a talisman have the power to 
heal, protect them from evil or harm, bring good luck or provide hope to solve 
their problems. Some migrants order talismans from the ‘Moscow’ mullas or 
khalifas, whilst others bring or order them from their trusted mullas who live in 
Pamir. 
In this context, Sultanbek’s activities can be regarded as psychological 
assistance. The complex set of challenges migrants face trigger psychological 
strains. Most migrants from Central Asia are quite reluctant to seek professional 
psychological help. Even if some agree to do so, seeking psychological support 
is complicated and expensive, such that only a few well-established migrants can 






















from a respected person from within their network or from a spiritual figure rather 
than a professional psychologist. Not infrequently, religious leaders provide 
migrants with counselling for emotional problems or moral dilemmas. Therefore, 
the role of the khalifa can be understood as a link between the world of Pamir, 
for which migrants long, and Russia. His religious activity, as well as talismans 
and teshtobs, can be regarded as a coping strategy to which migrants resort whilst 
looking for relief from everyday problems. 
According to tradition, the khalifas’ work represents a community service
and is unpaid. They only receive some informal remuneration from their clients
in return for performing certain services. Sultanbek receives his income by
working for a transportation company. In addition, he writes talismans and
teshtobs mostly for Ismailis but for others as well. Despite the fact that Sultanbek
is an officially registered khalifa, and the Nur centre does not encourage writing
talismans, given the existing demand, he provides such services. In some
measure, the informal nature of his activity is determined by tradition, but also
by Nur’s rules since his work is based on discretionary donations from people,
and channelled through the network of Pamiri migrants. Sultanbek’s education,
religious upbringing and work with the Nur centre grant him legitimacy to act as
a spiritual leader. On this basis, he has been able to establish a group of followers
in Moscow.11 
Marquardt et al. (cited in Knott 2016: 80) argue that, in addition to facilitating 
the migrants’ adaptation, religious practices, narratives and symbols help people 
to accept and understand the dislocation process as well as shape their new identi-
ties and realities. Gordy (2018: 217–220) points out that a shared identity within a 
certain group functions as a source of solidarity between migrants who possess the 
same values and recognisable symbols. Informal activities performed within the 
group can act as support for its members, especially in difficult situations. Pamiris 
in Moscow form quite a hermetic circle: they do not attend a mosque, since their 
religious practices are treated with distrust by some Sunni migrants. The Nur cen-
tre brings together the Ismailis from Pamir, organising various activities, some of 
which are of a religious nature. Yet, in the case of the practice of writing talismans 
and teshtobs, people transfer the practice through informal channels within their 
ethnic network. The social capital based on their spiritual practices helps Pamiri 
migrants to cultivate their identity abroad as well as to reconstruct their social 
world and continue their relationships with other compatriots abroad. At present, 
Ismaili talismans are mostly circulated within the Pamiri network, representing 
something new on the local ‘spiritual market’. It remains to be seen if these prac-
tices move beyond the Pamiri network to become yet another product for the 
wider public in the spiritual industry in Moscow. 
Case study 3: A Kyrgyz psychologist 
Jamila (55 years old) is a clairvoyant and healer, who removes charms and heals
people. She also graduated from medical college. Jamila performs divination
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her grandfather also cast stones. This means of divination is popular amongst
Kazakhs and Kyrgyz. The clairvoyant casts 41 stones, grains or dried balls of
sheep dung. People believe that their arrangement allows one to see the past,
clarify the present, predict the future or diagnose and predict the course of
various ailments or the effects of charms (Penkala-Gawęcka 2006: 157). In
addition, Jamila performs rituals to remove an evil spirit or to open someone’s
path. 
Jamila is from Jalalabad in Kyrgyzstan but has worked in Moscow for several 
years. Previously, she worked in Bishkek and Almaty. In both cities, she was 
employed in alternative medicine centres. She came to Moscow at the invitation 
of a wealthy Kazakh, who had experienced persistent sleeping problems. Because 
she managed to cure him, he introduced her to several influential people, who 
also became her patients. Finally, she moved to Moscow, and together with a 
medical doctor of Russian origin, opened a medical facility which fuses Western 
medical therapies with alternative healing methods. Today, four people work in 
the clinic: Jamila, a Ukrainian masseur, a Chinese acupuncturist and the above-
mentioned Russian who runs the business. The facility is located in the centre of 
Moscow and has a number of patients. The director of the clinic presents Jamila as 
a ‘psychologist’. Following my question about her profession, she called herself 
közüachik, a term used for a clairvoyant in Kyrgyzstan. 
Jamila earned her reputation as a solid specialist and accepted a wide array 
of people from different backgrounds: Russians, Kazakhs, Caucasians, Tatars 
and others. Migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan or Uzbekistan rarely come to 
the clinic, since most of them cannot afford to pay for the visit. Jamila shares 
her income with the medical facility and, thus, she cannot lower the price of her 
services even for her compatriots. In most cases, she provides them with advice 
only over the phone. In this way, she also casts stones to look into the situations 
of her clients. 
Since Jamila’s patients belong to various nationalities and religions, she must 
adapt her communication methods to different worldviews and beliefs. Endres 
(2010: 119–123), writing about spirit mediumship in Vietnam, found that mas-
ters of rituals adapt their performance to a particular situation, absorbing new 
ideas and transforming old practices. That is, they tailor some services to the 
demands of the clients. Jamila also adapts Kyrgyz practices and rituals to the local 
conditions. She developed new methods of work for her practice with people in 
Moscow. For example, she advises her Christian patients to visit the church as 
part of the healing process. People who do not belong to any denomination are 
told to visit a place with strong energy. Amongst her Muslim clients, Jamila sends 
them to the mosque to pray and perform rituals. 
Krasheninova (2015: 107, 110), describing informal medical services in Russia, 
pointed out that a sceptical attitude towards alternative forms of healing lowers 
their status on the medical services market, despite some practices representing a 
part of the formal scheme of healthcare, balancing between medicine and healing 
services. In the case of Jamila, regardless of her status and the terms describing 








casting stones or removing charms is not recognised by official psychotherapy, 
nor it is supported by many Muslim religious leaders. At the same time, she has a 
legally registered business activity and pays taxes. Thus, she has formalised and 
professionalised her practices, which were traditionally performed informally. 
At the beginning of her life in Moscow, Jamila conducted various forms of 
healing informally for her clients. She registered her activity only at a later stage. 
She also needed time to convince her non-Asian clientele that her methods of healing 
were appropriate to them. At present, she holds a well-established position as a 
healer given her years of experience, knowledge and extensive personal contacts. 
Nevertheless, Jamila should not be considered a typical economic migrant, since 
her decision to move to Russia was not forced by an urgent economic need, as 
in the cases of Niso or Sultanbek. Jamila, by contrast, arrived in Moscow at the 
invitation of her rich client, sizing the opportunity to develop professionally and 
to change her life.12 In this way, Kyrgyz traditional practices have become part of 
the spiritual mobility influencing the Moscow alternative medicine industry. 
Conclusions 
Alternative healing services are brought to new locations by migrants, where such 
practices are transformed and adapted. Whether these practices are performed 
informally or registered officially depends on cultural factors and the rules of a 
specific institution, but also depends on the status of the migrant healer. Migrants 
use informal healing services because of their wide availability and low cost, and 
because they trust alternative methods related to their spiritual system. 
Varshaver and Rocheva (2018) argue that those migrants who came to Moscow 
long ago have managed to obtain a certain status and are ‘growing old’. They are 
established in Russia, often live with their families, have properties, own busi-
nesses and work legally. Thus, they are not interested in functioning informally 
(from the point of view of the Russian legal system), such as the case of Jamila 
who has a legally registered business and a wide circle of friends and patients. 
Yet, the traditional Kyrgyz spiritual practices she performs are not fully recog-
nised neither by practitioners of biomedicine/Western medicine nor by some reli-
gious leaders from the Central Asian diaspora. 
Khalifa Sultanbek, who arrived in Moscow 15 years ago, functions on the verge 
of formal and informal activities when providing spiritual services, although he 
also has a stable job in a transportation company, which grants him a formal and 
regular income. Khalifas in Moscow perform various services for the commu-
nity, which are officially supported by the Nur centre. Yet, the remuneration they 
receive is informal, not only owing to their legal status but in accordance with 
tradition as well. Officially, the Nur centre does not support writing talismans 
and teshtobs, although people order them for themselves or their relatives. Even 
if talismans and teshstobs function on the margins of what is formally accepted, 
they carry a cultural legitimacy. These practices are part of a phenomenon van 
Dijk (2011: 102) describes as creating a ‘home away from home’. He applies this 
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all elements which pave the way for migrants to build material and spiritual bonds 
in a new place. 
With regard to hijama, although it is performed in some registered places in
Moscow, migrants such as Niso provide it mostly informally to other migrants.
Despite living in Russia for a long time, she never established herself sufficiently
to leave the informal sphere. This reality reflects a consequence of circumstances
as well as her attitude towards her work in Moscow, which she always treated
as an interim stage of her life. Many of her clients cannot afford alternative
treatment beyond informal practices. Others use hijama to supplement official
medicine. 
To conclude, migrants create multiple networks of informal connections; spir-
itual services are transferred from their countries of origin, where they are not 
always officially recognised, whilst holding social legitimacy. In Moscow, spir-
itual or healing practices serve as a source of support for people as well as a 
means of improving one’s social position and increasing their income. Migrants 
find a niche amongst various alternative forms of healing, gradually transforming 
the spiritual market in Russia. Furthermore, migrants’ social and geographical 
dislocation also triggers their transformation, since they adapt to the local condi-
tions and reformulate the meanings of their practices. Some of these meanings 
are transferred back to their countries of origin, influencing the local market for 
alternative healing practices. 
Notes 
1 The article was written as a part of the project no. 2016/21/DHS1/03403 financed by 
The National Science Centre in Poland within the programme ‘Sonata 11’. 
2 According to some of my interlocutors, the hijama was previously little known. Some 
claimed that traditionally Central Asian gypsies performed cupping, and the entire pro-
cess was carried out using the horn of an animal. Nevertheless, further research is 
needed to explore this topic. 
3 According to beliefs, kina (the evil eye) can be cast unintentionally or by a person who 
has bad intentions towards someone. Kina could result in headaches, depression, vari-
ous diseases as well as failures in life; kina is negative, but it is not a curse (in Tajik,
jodu) the removal of which is more difficult and requires very specific skills (see, for 
example, Cieślewska 2017: 108; Snesarev 1969: 35; Tursunova et al. 2014: 52–56). 
4 According to Central Asian practices, if a couple or a person cannot have children, their 
relatives can give away one of their children to a childless couple/individual. 
5 Pari is a spirit present in various legends and beliefs in Central Asia, probably derived 
from Avesta or earlier beliefs. 
6 Roma (Gypsies) who live in Central Asia; they are known by the common name
‘Luli’. 
7 In Moscow, the Luli from Central Asia practise fortune telling, remove charms and sell 
Islamic accessories. They work in various bazaars as well as around the main mosque 
(author’s field data 2017, 2018; see Bessonov 2008). 
8 All of the information about Niso and her activities were collected in October and 
November 2017 in Moscow during interviews and meetings with her as well as through 
observing the hijama she performed. 
9 We met Niso during Ramadan in 2019 at Tioplyia Stan when she returned to Moscow 
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10 They are labelled tables of correspondence, which include magic formulas as well as 
various columns and indices to prepare talismans, teshtobs and the like. 
11 All of the information about Sultanbek and his activities were collected during inter-
views and meetings with him in 2017 and 2018, as part of the collection of ethnographic 
material completed together with Zuzanna Blayet. She also collected information on 
the functioning of the Nur centre and the work of khalifas in Moscow. 
12 All of the information about Jamila and her activities were collected during my visit 
to Moscow in 2014 as well as through research completed in 2017 and 2018. This 
research involved interviews and meetings with Jamila and observations of the rituals 
she performs. 
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8 Roadsides of mobility 
Informal socioeconomic strategies in 
suburban western Poland 
Agata Stanisz 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the significance of infrastructure modernisation in the 
postsocialist transformation. In doing so, I examine the impact of the A2 motorway 
in parts of western Poland, focusing specifically on the people, communities 
and businesses located along its corridor and the roadway it replaced—national 
roadway 92 (DK92)—previously the primary east–west route running through 
central Poland. The A2 is a concrete belt with acoustic barriers and a high fence 
running parallel to it. Parking spaces, service centres, toll stations, intersecting 
bridges, overpasses and trestles accompany the A2. The motorway can be perceived 
as a material object, yet I primarily view it here as a co-inhabitant whereby people 
and animals reside in the same local universe with it bordering the Wielkopolskie 
and Lubuskie provinces. The motorway, supported by European funding and 
supplanting an incomplete communist-era roadway-construction endeavour, 
serves as a perfect symbol of infrastructure modernisation. Furthermore, I 
recognise its connection to the geopolitical reconfiguration accompanying the 
postsocialist shift in Poland. I argue here, however, that the actual function, 
meaning and impact of this project—and others like it—cannot be understood 
without reference to social practices and meaning making in communities. Thus, 
the emic perspective on infrastructure, modernisation and transformations adopted 
here and the focus on informality allow us to move away from a focus on the 
success stories of Poland’s supposed ‘return to Europe’ and instead gain insight 
on the less visible aspects of emerging entrepreneurialism and poverty obscured 
by the concrete walls and neon lights of the motorway. 
Informality is applied here to a broad constellation of phenomena: some obvi-
ously illegal, others exploiting loopholes, but primarily representing daily acts 
of simply getting by. Informality is then understood as being co-constitutive of 
modernisation and the postsocialist transition of the economy, social relations, 
life chances and migration patterns in a borderland region. Informality is some-
thing that transforms the functions of an object as monumental as a motorway. 
My central question, then, becomes how is the infrastructure that forms a key 
part of Poland’s postsocialist modernisation interpreted, used and transformed by 




















play in these processes? I also explore the multiple shades of informality, transect-
ing the spectrum of illegality to legality, criminality to kinship. The local region 
of Lubusz–Greater Poland and the Polish–German borderlands are situated within 
the broader context of globalisation, global crises and migration patterns, as well 
as in the context of shifting conceptions of Eastness and Westness in Europe. 
I argue that modernisation represents an uncompleted process, but that 
developing a large roadway infrastructure has been ideologically employed 
to mark Poland’s transition to a modern and Western European country as 
complete. However, the impact of the A2, like many infrastructure projects, is 
multidirectional, resulting both in emerging forms of entrepreneurship and in 
new forms of poverty. Thus, my analysis primarily focuses on other grassroots 
economic practices taking place in local roadside communities. That is, I focus on 
the activities of the people who create them, and, thus, the activities undertaken 
within the conditions of increased mobility and flows. By doing so, I reveal the 
rarely perceived mechanisms and effects of modernisation, a concept synonymous 
with the postsocialist transformation. 
Some impacts are paradoxical. The apparent democratisation of mobility after
1989, including easier access to motor vehicles and an expanding roadway infra-
structure, resulted in decreased immobility for some alongside significant and
wide-ranging changes. Public transportation cuts took place, whilst opportuni-
ties to shop became increasingly concentrated in larger centres. Simultaneously,
informality helped individuals navigate around these new inequalities. As I show
below, informality emerged through increases in door-to-door trade, neigh-
bours assisting one another with transportation or through private often unli-
censed minibus services moving labour migrants to the region from farther east
or onwards to Germany. Mobilities associated with labour migration reflect the
broader region, increasingly representing a transit zone marked by temporary
settlement. Yet this also mirrors a historical pattern given the region’s recent
history, thereby effecting population transfers. Local German populations were
removed and replaced by Poles, either as voluntary settlers from central Poland
or as forced migrants from Poland’s eastern borderlands, becoming part of the
USSR after 1945. In general, the area is marked by a certain tension, such that
the area is geopolitically isolated with several generations feeling ‘at home’. The
opportunities—or the necessity—of labour migration, however, also disrupt and
unsettle populations. 
My ethnographic research, therefore, traces the attitudes and practices of the 
population and those using this borderland space which, whilst particular in its 
history and location, could also offer insight into broader debates on modernisation 
and the areas affected by deindustrialisation or the loss of key industries. 
Here, I present my research conducted over a three-year period from 
2013 to 2016, which formed a part of a larger project ‘Moving modernisations: 
The influence of the A2 motorway on local cultural landscapes’1. As a part of 
this project, my approach predominantly concentrated on speaking with people. 
However, reality at times cannot be expressed with words alone. With this in 
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and bars, and read announcements placed at bus stops and on posts. Our research 
team archived thousands of internet websites, studied police and fire department 
reports and analysed private and official chronicles stored in libraries and public 
administration and forestry district offices. Many of us on the larger project team 
lived onsite during our fieldwork, thereby experiencing the paradoxes of just 
how difficult it is to move around this space marked by a roadway infrastructure 
project without a private car at our disposal. We used bikes, hitchhiked and took 
journeys offered by local residents. I worked in the spirit of multisite ethnography, 
following people, objects and problems. Often, I returned to places I previously 
visited. 
The research area ultimately encompasses the 170-km motorway connecting 
the Polish–German border in Słubice with Poznań. The most intensive research 
was conducted around the area with towns varying in population size (from 
Świebodzin with 22,000 inhabitants to Jarosławiec with about 12 inhabitants), 
social structures, institutional and cultural settings and quality of public infra-
structure. Despite these differences, the specific roadside aesthetics and economy 
remained a shared feature. The landscape amongst these primarily small villages 
is littered with establishments catering to long-distance transportation and tourist 
industries (motels, hotels, petrol stations, bars, restaurants and nightclubs) and 
service points, the operation of which revolves around automobility (purchasing 
pallets2, lorries, satellite-navigation device repair shops, tyre retreading services, 
service stations and car washes), warehouses or shipping and logistical centres. 
The visual aesthetics hardly reflect urban landscapes. 
Additionally, during the period of our research, these visual aesthetics were 
undergoing changes. Small local shops began disappearing from the landscape 
of most towns. This also happened to wayside bars, petrol stations and even 
motels and hotels. Instead, large real estate ‘for sale’ signs appeared, new service 
centres for long-distance transportation opened and new discount stores quite 
popular in Poland were added to the scenery. Here, then, I provide some flavour 
to the postsocialist transformation, as an open-ended process connected to global 
processes, complete with changes to migration patterns and labour markets, as 
well as regional shifts in the dynamics of relationships between East and West. 
These features clearly emerge in the 100-km section between Nowy Tomyśl and 
the Polish–German border crossing in Świecko, the focus of this chapter. 
In what follows, I begin by outlining emic definitions and practices of 
informality, focusing specifically on their significance for understanding 
postsocialist modernisation efforts. Then, I present information related to the A2 
motorway project and the region under investigation, in particular, the economic 
and social conditions in the vicinity of the A2 and DK92 corridor. I, next, examine 
specific informal practices and economies that span spectrum continuum, from 
illegality and criminality to everyday practices of just getting by. Drawing upon 
my ethnographic research, I analyse the illegal fuel trade specifically, then cuts to 
public transportation and innovative neighbourhood informal transit solutions— 
that is, some of the paradoxes of (im)mobilities. Next, I turn to the sex trade in 





highlighting the connection between sex work and international migration. This 
leads to a presentation of international transit and labour migration, followed by 
an outline of the informality involved in clientelism, or securing passing trade 
from tour buses or the hospitality industries’ bypassing of regulations to secure 
customers. Next, I explore what Tomasz Rakowski (2016) called the ‘art of 
informality’, with a particular focus on the (de)stabilisation of the population in 
this Polish–German borderland resulting from the broader socioeconomic impact 
of the postsocialist transformation. I conclude by offering reflections on how 
the impact of informality in this space is typical of other localities affected by 
infrastructure modernisation in the postsocialist space and beyond. 
In keeping with my view of the roadway infrastructure as an actor and 
co-inhabitant of the spaces it occupies, I also view human actors as capable 
of transforming this infrastructure. Thus, I argue that informal practices 
and conceptions of it remain crucial to modernisation and the postsocialist 
transformation. 
Emic definitions of informality 
Obvious differences exist between emic and etic understandings of informality. 
For a scholarly analysis, we must find the most fitting interpretation or analysis of 
local understandings of the concept of informality and related ideas. 
In this section, I present local definitions of informality that emerged in my
research and as practised in the context of roadside communities. The following
quote from the owner of a nightclub offers one such illustration of ways of get-
ting by: 
You were always up to something, right? This area is like this: you always 
have to be up to something. There are times for such activities, now there are 
times for others. … Nothing’s changed, only the name, right? People don’t 
change. Only the system has changed, but what about it? There’s always 
some issue, something’s happening, so the people stuff their pockets, right? 
Here, the informant suggests that, whilst social and political systems might change, 
and infrastructure may be transformed, ordinary members of the community 
get by only through informality and rule bending. Inherent in this is the idea of 
kombinowanie or ‘being up to something’. 
Informality, which I present as a response to the roadside living conditions, 
has been more broadly influenced by the postsocialist condition of Polish 
society as a whole (see Bernhard and Karakoç 2007; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 
2013). Although difficult to identify precisely for various reasons, we can treat 
informality as normative. The category of informality that I use cannot be 
interpreted in one specific way, since my conception was grounded in what my 
interlocutors said and did as I observed them. Informality, thus, emerged in this 
context as a coping mechanism, enabling individuals to get by in the ongoing 
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dynamics of this transformation are conditioned, I argue, primarily by increased 
flows and mobility. I, therefore, treat informality as a socioeconomic category, 
which, on the one hand, permeates everyday practices, whilst, on the other hand, 
also exists as imagined in situations where any success is perceived by the local 
community as illegal. This imagined construction is driven by a lack of social 
trust that denies the possibility of success through legitimate means, a lasting 
effect of the transformation unlikely to dissipate in the near future (Sik 2012; 
Rakowski 2016). 
Local concepts concerning the economy (especially, the informal economy) are 
never straightforward or easy to identify (Misztal 2000; Sindzingre 2006). This is 
because informal activities are often hidden within formal economic connections 
and chains of services, whilst their grassroots perceptions remain context depend-
ent. Thus, differences persist across various situations and amongst the individu-
als or groups involved (Galemba 2008). In academic research, informality usually 
relies on an economic perspective. Although analyses attempting to focus instead 
on the social aspect are becoming increasingly common, many continue to apply 
a binary approach with a definite division between formal and informal, com-
plemented by notions of legal and illegal (Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur and Ostrom 
2006). 
Social researchers’ interest in post-communist economic practices has 
grown over the past two decades or so (Alexeev and Pyle 2003; Gel’man 2004; 
Ledeneva 2006; Smith and Stenning 2006; Grødeland 2007; Hale 2011; Aasland 
et al. 2012; Abdih and Leandro 2013). Yet, the majority of those studying post-
communist informality concentrate more on institutions rather than the informal 
sociocultural context (Ledeneva 1998; Misztal 2000; Morris and Polese 2014). 
This concentration first appeared in the works of Julius H. Boeke (1942), Arthur W. 
Lewis (1954) and Keith Hart (1973), who attempted to describe the dual economic 
models functioning in the market economy, distinguishing between the formal and 
the informal spheres. For the last 20 years, informality as a term has become more 
established in studies on institutional micro- and macroeconomics. Consequently, 
however, its definitions have broadened, and the formal–informal dichotomy has 
undergone further refinement. Most existing definitions situate informality as a 
synonym with concepts such as the informal sector, the informal sphere, informal 
unemployment and an informal economy (ILO 2012). Many interpretations and 
classifications of informality also encompass illegal organisations, groups of 
relatives, interpersonal networks and informal political and citizen structures 
(Granovetter 1973; Lomnitz 1988; Shelley et al. 2007; Thelen 2011). Thus, the 
concept of informality clearly refers to quite different phenomena. Rooted in 
sociology, it is becoming increasingly difficult to characterise. Informality, then, 
has lost some of its conceptual and analytical sharpness, serving instead as an 
umbrella term covering a vast array of phenomena falling outside formal and legal 
spheres. Effectively, then, informality encompasses what the nightclub owner 
described as ‘being up to something’ or perceived as being up to something. 
In the post-communist world, depending upon informal contacts, connections 
and networks, or on exchange, mutuality, occasional gifts and meetings, is not 
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extraordinary. Such systems are (or have been) in place globally, although most 
are limited to specific contexts. The differences between informality in post-com-
munist countries and informality in other parts of the world remain relatively 
unstudied. However, some existing research indicates that in post-communist 
countries informal practices are not only more widely spread and historically 
established, but also much more important than in capitalist or even developing 
countries (Sik 1994; Butler 1995; Rose 1995; Begg and Pickles 1998; Ledeneva 
1998; Böröcz 2000; Grødeland 2007). 
Informality and everything it entails is perceived as an effect of transition and 
an adaptation to a market economy, since informality becomes most pronounced 
during the turbulent conditions of change. Informal ways of dealing with both 
business and institutional ventures, or even in everyday life, characterise the 
more recent history of Central European countries undergoing postsocialist 
transformations. In this region, the 1990s featured new rules, laws, fiscal orders 
and economic freedom, but for many it also represented a time of sudden 
impoverishment (Humphrey 2010; Henig and Makovicky 2016; Kideckel 2002; 
Knudsen and Frederiksen 2015; Ledeneva 1998, 2006; Yurchak 2002). The notion 
of a transformation in sociological studies is sometimes defined as a process or an 
effect of socioeconomic and political changes (Wojtaszczyk 2009). Application of 
the term, however, is problematic primarily due to the eternal question of whether 
a given post-communist transformation is complete (Kozłowski 2004). The notion 
of a post-communist transition should be treated as an all-encompassing, directed 
social change, entailing a set of both planned and spontaneous changes related to 
moving away from a communist society. These processes have not resulted solely 
from more than 25 years of political democracy and the prevalence of private 
ownership in the economy. The causes of those changes vary, as revealed by my 
grassroots-level, bottom-up perspective on local economic strategies. Such causes 
can be endogenous (e.g., the impact of economic crises or changing political 
and economic visions) and exogenous (e.g., pressure from the international 
community, currently dominating trends concerning an effective economy 
and a proper political system, as well as the current geopolitical situation) (see 
Chałubiński 2010). The post-communist transformation also makes societies 
more open to cultural diffusions and external influences and, thus, intensifies 
globalisation processes, which, in turn, modify various institutions of communist 
provenance (Ziółkowski 1998; Wiatr 2006). I, thus, agree with Chałubiński, who 
argues that ‘[t]ransformation (or rather transformations) is history in the making, 
which comprises many fast, dynamic changes’ (Chałubiński 2010). 
The events of 1989 and their aftermath most importantly enabled the growth 
in the number of self-employed individuals who established family businesses 
or became private traders. Whilst a consequence of the political transformation, 
this expansion also served as a conducive factor in additional shifts, which I 
call modernisation. These shifts involved in the creation of the Polish middle 
class were significant to further economic, political and social changes (see 
Mielczarek-Żejmo 2010). Thus, I argue that informal activities can be viewed 
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that, in Poland, particularly during the period when I conducted my research, ‘the 
transformational discourse’ was substituted in political and colloquial narratives 
with ideas that had no direct association with post-communism and postsocialism. 
These narratives specifically included modernisation, Poland’s final accession to 
Europe and how the country regained its pride, all of which mark ongoing, open-
ended processes (see Sztompka 1999). 
The new A2 motorway 
One symbol of Poland’s transformation and its move away from communism and 
towards Europe—and modernisation—can be found in the A2 motorway. Short 
sections of the A2 were constructed in the 1980s, but the economic crisis and 
political turbulence left realising the dream of connecting Berlin and Moscow via 
a motorway impossible. Instead, those existing sections were upgraded or subject 
to ‘modernisation’ to use the Polish term and incorporated into an infrastructure 
project partially funded by the European Union (EU). The A2, thus, symbolises 
broader processes related to the socioeconomic transformation affecting the 
roadside communities I investigated, whilst also marking shifts in the trajectories 
of connections between Eastern and Western Europe. 
The turning point for the Greater Poland region was the construction and 
commissioning of a new section of the A2 motorway on 1 December 2011. This 
investment carried multiple economic, cultural and social consequences at a time 
when political and media discourses on the end of Poland’s modernisation pro-
cess increased. Investments connected to the motorway construction were sym-
bolically important (Stanisz and Kuligowski 2017). As a result, today’s national 
roadway 92 (DK92) lost its place as the most important route between the East 
and the West across central Poland when the new section of the A2 motorway 
opened. Symbolically, this was expressed as depriving DK92 its status as an 
international route and resulted in a new name as ‘the Old Two’ (Stara Dwójka,
referring to its former name as roadway no. 2). The towns and villages the Old 
Two crosses differ in terms of populations (ranging in population sizes from 12 to 
22,000 inhabitants), social structures, cultural centres and available institutions, 
as well as in terms of the quality of public infrastructure. What they share, how-
ever, is their particular roadside aesthetics and economy. This landscape, filled 
mostly with small villages, consists of specific places where services are pro-
vided for long-haul transportation and the tourism industry (motels, hotels, petrol 
stations, bars, restaurants and nightclubs), service points with activities centred 
around automobility (pallet, lorries, lorry purchasing centres, satellite-navigation 
systems and CB radio repair points, tyre retreading centres, repair stations and car 
washes), warehouses or forwarding and logistical bases. The visual appearance of 
this space is hardly reminiscent of traditional notions of the countryside and rural 
communities. 
The most important social, micropolitical and economic connector within those 
towns and villages is, of course, the roadway infrastructure. This connection stems 








differences stemming from the contrasting histories of the communes and districts, 
which now form a part of Greater Poland or Lubusz Voivodships. Many of my 
interlocutors have much in common, especially their memories of the communist 
period. Typical narratives refer to the closing of the state collective farms (PGR), 
a form of collective land ownership in Poland in place from 1949 until 1993. 
PGRs were an inherent part of the economic and social landscape for the majority 
of roadside towns and villages. Yet, remembering and referring to the communist 
and post-communist economic conditions did not leave my interlocutors nostalgic 
for the socialist era. Instead, such nostalgia was reserved for ‘the golden 1990s, 
when there was no competition and you practically didn’t even have to try’, 
for ‘the El Dorado of the 1990s’ and for the ‘freedom of the early days of the 
transformation’. 
However, the memory of the old days proved volatile, with most of my 
interlocutors’ narratives including overlapping events and situations from both 
the communist days and the initial years following the political shift or the more 
recent consequences of Poland’s accession to the EU and the Schengen Area. The 
individuals with whom I spoke clearly could not locate in time most of the changes 
and turning points of the transformation, making it impossible to definitively pass 
judgement on the informal activities they undertook. 
Mobility and informality: the economies on 
the peripheries of the A2 motorway 
In order to understand roadside informality, we must emphasise that the villages 
and towns located along DK92 continue to experience heavy traffic despite the 
construction of the A2. Thus, there is a large flow of various types of goods 
carried on long-haul lorries as well as labour migrants and tourists, combined 
with the everyday micromobility of the inhabitants. Each type of movement along 
with its direction and intensity influence the economic status of the roadside 
communities. Everyday life forms overlapping zones of complex flows: transit 
and international, local (both public and private), tourist and migrant (internal and 
external), as well as the flow of capital and goods. 
It is important to note that these flows take place in the context of the locality 
and on the peripheries, whilst also recognising that they form a part of cross-border 
movements. This context is significant for the economic strategies that, in many 
cases, can be described as informal. In an attempt to understand them, we must 
return to the 1990s and the initial period of political transformation, when the Old 
Two was infamous as a channel enabling the flow of illegal goods. This type of 
flow has now lost its significance since there is no longer any economic rationale 
for continuing an illegal tobacco and alcohol trade or need to smuggle clothes and 
cosmetics from Germany. At present, inhabitants enjoy unlimited access to such 
goods. Crime has also changed across these years. The political transformation 
and changes to the country’s borders resulted in a significant increase in border 
crime rates at the beginning of the 1990s. According to my interlocutors’ secret 
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cars, involving both individuals and organised crime groups (Polish and Russian). 
After Poland was accepted to the Schengen Area in 2007, the number of stolen 
cars and trucks (especially from Germany to Eastern European countries) grew 
and the flow of drugs intensified, although the overall number of cases decreased 
according to official statistics from the early 1990s. Indeed, Polish clients are no 
longer patted down in German supermarkets (which, in many cases, have set up 
shop in Poland), whilst smuggling gangs, based on the Polish side of the border, 
have also disappeared (Łada 2014). As one of my interlocutors stated, the notion 
that western Poland is ‘the wild frontier of capitalism is totally outdated’. 
The flows along today’s DK92 have continued to be influenced by political 
changes, with most current dynamics most significantly affected by the Polish 
accession to the EU in 2004, the Schengen Area in 2007, the global economic 
crisis in 2008, the Ukrainian–Russian conflict since 2014 and even the Polish– 
Russian transport wars (Bereźnicki 2016; Polska kontra Rosja 2016). As a result 
of Poland’s accession to the EU, Western European labour markets opened up. 
This did not cause an influx of people to Poland, but rather motivated Poles to 
migrate internally for economic reasons to places located along DK92. This 
migration is specifically seasonal and shuttle based. 
Initially, the flow along this route intensified due to tourists, clients interested 
in local goods (e.g., garden gnomes, forest fruits or homemade preserves) and 
the systematic development of the Polish transportation network. However, in 
the wake of the economic crisis, these forms of mobility began declining. Many 
of my interlocutors—particularly businesspeople whose companies survived due 
to their ability to change the areas of business within which they operated, their 
ability to employ many informal methods and as a result of running multiple 
diversified companies—indicated that intranational as well as global fluctuations 
were responsible for this decline. They argued that it was not the A2 motorway 
that led to the downfall of petrol stations, roadside bars, hotels or restaurants. 
According to them, this recession was already felt by the time the new section of 
the motorway opened. The latter event simply ‘finished off’ local businesses. Yet, 
they believed in the potential of the motorway, specifically its ability to enhance 
the area’s overall prosperity and quality of life. 
Having conducted ethnographic studies in the area for many years, I have 
observed a variety of informalities. The roadside communities that are the 
protagonists here have been affected by a dramatic qualitative transition over the 
last decade. Clear changes have taken place in the communes the A2 motorway 
passes through and those located near DK92. The towns and villages near 
the transit route, profiting in various ways from automobile traffic, have been 
separated from the primary traffic flow by the motorway. What they experienced 
was a micro-scale version of a ‘great change trauma’ (Sztompka 2000)—that is, 
experiencing an unexpected, external and rapid degradation for which no one was 
specifically to blame. The towns and villages which had until recently been along 
the primary transit route, the Old Two, were forced to find new economic strategies 
and re-evaluate the idea of locality and, indeed, the idea of flow itself in the wake 







effects. The ‘trauma’ caused by these changes and the potential growth in mobility 
offered by the presence of the A2 motorway means that the overall socioeconomic 
processes defy any precise definitions. The significant role of informal economic 
practices in the shadow of the A2 motorway means that attempts to pinpoint the 
nature of the postsocialist transformation become even fuzzier. 
The illegal fuel trade 
One of the consequences of the increased transit traffic along both DK92 and the 
A2 motorway can be found in the illegal diesel trade, which continues despite 
technological developments making it more difficult. Both lorry drivers and 
local inhabitants are involved in this illegal business, with petrol station car park 
security employees, for example, turning a blind eye to such activities. Trade also 
takes place in car parks near large long-haul transportation service centres next to 
the Old Two and in service areas next to the motorway. I witnessed some dealings 
myself, with my interlocutors describing it and recognising it as illegal. In an 
age of fuel probe use, the process of extracting fuel from a fuel tank has become 
more difficult and requires greater ingenuity and knowledge of the latest digital 
solutions used to register diesel consumption. The illegal fuel trade usually takes 
place between lorry drivers when transporting goods (usually in car parks where 
they take their 24-hour or weekend breaks) or when they are driving their own 
passenger cars to the bases of the Western European transportation companies 
that employ them. It is also common to buy a smaller amount of fuel and include 
a larger amount in the invoice. The driver receives cash, and clients are sought 
through an anonymous associate from a specific station. The illegal fuel trade also 
operated in this region during the construction of a section of the A2 motorway, 
drawing diesel from construction and other smaller machinery. Leaving aside the 
lorry driver community itself and the reasons why they engage in such activities, 
this type of trade is also significant for local communities since specific individuals 
are involved in it and treat it as a way to earn additional income. 
From the perspective of the local consumers of the stolen fuel, this trade allows 
them to lower the costs of their micromobility. It should be borne in mind that 
all of the inhabitants of roadside towns and villages are in some way involved in 
increasing the intensity of flows and mobility. Developments in infrastructure, 
enhancing transfers, service, localisation, integration and accelerating functions 
mean that inhabitants increasingly move between locations entirely by car. This 
has also created a specific local employment market focused on transportation, 
logistics, forwarding and all types of services connected with transport. Therefore, 
the opportunity to purchase cheaper fuel can serve the family economy well and 
prove decisive in whether small companies survive or not. 
Public transportation cuts, private (im)mobility 
and innovative informal infrastructures 
The everyday to-and-fro flow of local inhabitants along the Old Two results 
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healthcare institutions and public service offices. This area is characterised by an 
increasing decline in the public transportation network and services, contradicting 
its mobile nature. 
Families typically own a few cars. Thus, the inhabitants of roadside towns 
and villages rarely travel by foot or bike, whilst surviving public transportation 
connections between locales are generally considered insufficient. This deficiency 
is complemented by an informal system of neighbourhood transportation, primarily 
used by the elderly, whose socioeconomic status does not permit full participation 
in the everyday micromobility—the elderly do not own cars nor possess a driving 
licence; yet, they are lonely or may not live close to their families. In order to 
travel from point A to point B or to a doctor’s office, banks or public service 
offices, they must rely on the transportation offered by other inhabitants. This 
system is fee based and rarely results from bartering. 
Another informal response to the declining bus connections is the development 
of door-to-door sales and trades. The social isolation of the elderly, people with 
disabilities and poor families is intensified by their immobility. However, with 
small local shops closing due to their unprofitability, mobile trade has visibly 
increased. This trade offers a wide range of products (clothes and footwear, all types 
of household appliances and cleaning agents from Germany or even layers). One 
specific example of this door-to-door trade can be found in a mobile shop (e.g., a 
camper van) owned by an elderly married couple, who receive a small, additional 
off-the-books income by delivering products directly to homes. Exemplifying 
how integral such innovative informal solutions are to the community becomes 
apparent from the fact that commune authorities rely on this service to distribute 
material social aid to the poorest families in the area. 
An informal transport system is also used by shuttle-based labour migrants often 
involved in seasonal labour migration, typically to Germany or the Netherlands, 
during their commutes to factories in Brandenburg near Berlin. Many inhabitants 
of the towns and villages located closer to the Polish–German border commute to 
work each day (up to 300-km return), whilst others return at the weekends or upon 
receipt of their remuneration. Such shuttle migrants work for companies that offer 
mail-order clothes and footwear, recycle garbage or sort courier parcels, as well 
in the meat-processing industry. The employees of companies situated near Berlin 
typically carpool to work, thereby reducing their transportation costs. 
A similar mechanism of informal transport is used by labour migrants from 
Bulgaria, Egypt, Russia, Turkey or Ukraine, who rent small rooms in the towns and 
villages located along the Old Two and commute to work in Germany. Here, we 
note that these small rooms are often illegally rented to foreigners. Such landlords 
do not have a legal business and likely evade paying taxes on rental income. Thus, 
information about available rooms to rent spread via word of mouth. 
The increased flow of goods observed in the 1990s led to a boom in the used 
car trade, mostly those imported from Germany. This business played a significant 
role in the early, wild capitalism from Poland’s accession to the EU. The flow of 
used, often stolen, cars was intensive and allowed many local families to earn 




place further to the east. The Old Two and the A2 are both used to transport cars 
primarily to Ukraine and Russia. This marks a symbolic shift in the border of 
Eastness in Europe, since this business was once focused on the Polish–German 
border. 
However, this trade has also left a legacy, since it enabled the systematic 
development of small family businesses dealing with transportation and the 
automotive industry: car tyres, pallet purchasing centres, tyre retreading centres, 
car washes and petrol stations. With the increasingly transit-focused nature of 
the area, business survival depends on multiple informal strategies. The pallet 
purchasing centres feature the shadiest status. In Poland, contrary to general 
opinion, pallet purchasing centres are a legal business, offering an opportunity 
for less wealthy entrepreneurs. The pallet market has undergone multiple changes 
in Poland, caused by, amongst others, the introduction of the 2007 amendment 
to ‘The Industrial Property Rights Act’. This legislative change increased the 
responsibility of pallet users to place pallets without a certificate of legality on 
the market. Despite this regulation, the illegal trade in pallets remains profitable. 
Lorry drivers use the fact that there is no information about a pallet being returned 
in the documents, declaring the pallet disqualified, whereby it then ends up in a 
purchasing centre and is sold. For years, pallet purchasing centres along the Old 
Two have remained one of its most prolific visual features. The legal regulation 
described here forced many to close, yet the illegal pallet trade still functions in 
surviving centres. According to an employee of one such centre, it is not the legal 
regulations that caused the biggest problem, but the lack of solidarity amongst 
lorry drivers taking part in the business. 
The sex trade 
Poland’s political transformation has also led to the development of sex trade in 
rather broad terms. The transitory nature of the Old Two and its location close to 
a border resulted in the dynamic growth across a wide range of sexual services. 
Currently, the sex trade has two faces. Firstly, discreet services are provided by 
escort agencies. These usually involve nightclubs, which offer additional services 
apart from the company of women and guest rooms. Nightclubs are primarily 
staffed by Bulgarian and Ukrainian women who either live in flats provided by 
their employers or rent on their own in the towns and villages where the clubs 
are situated. These women are visible in public spaces in the towns and villages, 
both recognised and never negatively perceived by the inhabitants, who instead 
refer to them with respect and understanding—inhabitants label them ‘our nice 
ladies’. This perception of the female employees of nightclubs stems from the 
clubs not causing disturbances to the public order. However, other reasons 
justify such perceptions as well. Such a high tolerance towards this side of the 
sex trade also stems from the fact that the nightclubs employ local inhabitants 
as security workers, technicians, cleaning staff or bartenders. Furthermore, the 
nightclubs also provide a source of additional income to nonprofessional drivers, 
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of these clubs often sponsor local events and co-finance local investments (e.g., 
by renovating the floors or repairing the roof of a parish church). Ultimately, the 
female employees of the clubs are also consumers who buy goods in local shops 
and use the services offered by small local businesses. 
The second face of the sex trade focuses on lorry drivers, taking the form 
of roadside and car park sex work. This market is characterised by the lower 
earnings of the sex workers and the far-reaching involvement of organised 
criminal groups. Activities within this form of the sex trade take place primarily 
in vehicles and forests, reflected in such women being referred to as ‘blackberry 
cakes’, ‘mushroom pickers’ or ‘forest mammals’, as well as in motels and hotels. 
Such business is dominated by foreigners, whose national and ethnic origins 
remain difficult to identify given the complex organisational systems created by 
the groups involved. However, most sex workers employed here are Bulgarian. 
Of particular significance in terms of informality within this side of the sex trade 
is, firstly, that security employees at large car parks turn a blind eye to the sex 
workers, who are constantly monitored by their bosses and who allow women to 
seek out clients freely in car park areas. Secondly, oral agreements between hotel 
reception employees and representatives of these organised groups informally 
agree to allow sex workers to engage in their trade on the premises. 
Treated as a form of sex work, another type of sex trade involves ‘sponsorship’, 
consisting of a longer, informal relationship with one person, often involving 
some emotional attachment. Here, one person offers sex primarily in exchange 
for financial or material benefits. In this case, romantic relationships may form 
between Eastern European lorry drivers who regularly traverse along the Old Two 
and some female inhabitants of the roadside towns and villages. 
Clientelism, economic informality and international transit 
Economic informality exists everywhere, extending even to businesses that 
operate entirely legally, such as into hotels and restaurants connected to the sex 
trade. Informality also extends to the sale of field, garden and forest products, the 
production of which is not registered on local markets. Including vegetables, fruits 
and preserves used in roadside bars and restaurants, their informal sale generates 
additional income and supplements family budgets. Another characteristic 
feature of informality lies in loyalty cards, ensuring a constant flow of clients 
into restaurants. Agreements are entered into informally and made with coach 
drivers who bring clients to restaurants in exchange for a free meal or a 50% 
discount (large coaches usually carry tourists or pilgrims, whilst smaller buses 
bring labour migrants). In addition, small roadside bars advertise on the CB radio. 
In such transmissions, advertisements—delivered in Russian or Ukrainian— 
simply describe their current offers directed exclusively at Eastern European lorry 
drivers. This type of advertising lacks a clear legal status in Poland. 
Hotel owners use various strategies to attract clients. However, a persistent 
characteristic for this type of business is that it depends almost entirely on word-



















comments posted to social media platforms. Maintaining a favourable reputation 
also means allowing clients some leeway by, for example, allowing them to 
bring in and consume their own alcohol in hotel restaurants during work-related 
parties and turning a blind eye to all-night boozy parties in rooms. Still, the 
hotel business has experienced a significant downturn in recent years, with some 
entities adapting by changing to motels or bed-and-breakfasts, types of businesses 
that pay lower taxes. The Old Two is used increasingly rarely by both Polish 
and foreign tourists, for various and complex reasons. Still, the near-complete 
disappearance of organised tourist transit has directly led to many roadside hotels 
and motels situated along DK92 closing as coaches use the A2 motorway. Such 
establishments have also lost their raison d'être as changes to travel patterns 
have diminished coach-based transit. It is now faster, safer, more convenient and 
cheaper to travel long distances by plane. This reality emerged in 2004 when 
the first low-cost airlines appeared in Poland (Gross and Schröder 2007). The 
development and popularity of such airlines have had a further consequence— 
namely, an increase in vans carrying the luggage of labour migrants who travelled 
to Western Europe by plane. Transporting their belongings separately enables 
migrants to lower their costs even further. The presence of such vans is evident in 
the region I investigated, with luggage loaded and unloaded in car parks, petrol 
stations and even roadside lay-bys. 
A picture is emerging of the region around the Old Two and the A2 as a
location increasingly marked by transit and international connections. This affects
not only the lives of the area’s inhabitants or the people passing through from
further east but also local produce. The informal roadside sales of forest produce
(mushrooms and berries abundant in this area), fruits, vegetables, eggs, honey
and all types of preserves along the Old Two feeds into an international economy.
Such roadside sales are typically associated with semilegal activities. Polish law
clearly states that if a person wishes to sell goods along a roadway, they must
acquire all of the necessary types of permits and pay various fees, the amount of
which depends on the area and time the sales require. Administrative decisions
in this respect are made by a road supervisor. Fines are levied for trading without
a permit or in a way that inhibits road traffic. These limitations to the trade are
bypassed by moving small stalls from the roadsides, pavement, crossroads and
forest lay-bys to private properties such as yards, garages or simply houses.
Selling such products is advertised on handwritten boards, typically displayed on
property fences. 
Picking up forest groundcover, especially mushrooms, is a common, 
unregistered and, thus, informal economic activity that the inhabitants of many 
towns and villages undertake. Their yield is immediately sold on the local market 
in accredited and, thus, entirely legal purchasing centres, which then distribute this 
produce to German and nationwide supermarket chains. The construction of the 
A2 motorway has fragmented forest areas, however, directly affecting how people 
move around. The local forest produce pickers use the motorway underpasses to 
move smaller animals across the road. Using these underpasses is forbidden, yet 
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The art of informality in a postsocialist borderland 
As many of the examples outlined above show, informality can operate in a 
legal grey zone, enjoying social acceptance whilst maintaining social coherence. 
Yet, some obviously illegal activities also shape the A2–Old Two corridor. 
Kinship relations within families and neighbourhoods are enmeshed in networks 
of informality, whilst they can also serve to exploit legal loopholes emerging 
in the postsocialist economy. One of the most common kinship relations lies in 
the rotation of small enterprises between relatives. Companies facing financial 
difficulties unable to pay taxes can, thus, continue in new forms, whilst holding 
on to tangible assets, equipment or goods. Such mechanisms are often applied 
when the preferential, lower social insurance contribution period ends. Here, I 
rely on the example of one entrepreneur who uses family relations to operate his 
widespread business in the area using family relations. This entrepreneur owns 
general stores, motels, hotels, restaurants, bars, car parks and rental properties, all 
of which may play a role in the informal activities outlined above. His businesses 
are officially registered to various family members, and he himself does not 
even hold a bank account, opting to always deal in cash. Owing to this, he finds 
numerous ways to evade various legal regulations whilst continuously investing. 
Informal activities should not be perceived as ad hoc practices (Morris and 
Polese 2014), because they reflect a means of economic protection (Gërxhani 
2004) and exchange mechanisms (Smith et al. 2012). In other words, informal 
activities represent a part of everyday life. An anthropological lens views such 
activities as spontaneous and complicated elements of social cooperation. Thus, 
they are particularly valuable in analysing the form of postsocialist modernity 
emerging in spaces like the A2–Old Two corridor. Tomasz Rakowski (2016) 
produced several particularly significant studies analysing the Polish context. In 
doing so, he developed the concept of the ‘art of informality’, which recognises 
the significance of both cultural conditions and socioeconomic cooperation. 
Informal activities located in legal grey zones (e.g., the grey market, illegal work 
and unofficial ways of coping with problems) are recognised by Polish (and 
other) researchers and publicists as an obstacle to proper social development. 
These activities are often hidden, closed and, to some extent, entangled in local 
games played by authorities, resulting in competition and status acquisition, all 
of which is more broadly connected to the unofficial art of acting informally. 
Rakowski (2016) interprets the mechanisms of this unofficial form of state 
existence as a form of grassroots-level agency and the spontaneous creation of 
a state by its citizens. Thus, rather than forming a barrier to social development, 
it seems that informality serves as a crucial driver of postsocialist development 
or transformation. Large-scale infrastructure projects alone cannot boost the 
surrounding economy but instead provide a conduit for productive informality (as 
well as illegal activities). 
The concept of an informal economy, which Keith Hart (1973) defined as 
an unregulated, quiet, economic practice, can be applied to a situation where 







political transformation. Informal groups of activities can, thus, reveal both the 
mechanisms triggering the free market and those which provide a foundation for 
unregulated, illegal transactions. Various means of informal circulation, spheres 
of quiet favours, mutuality, agreements beyond the legal realm and institutional 
regulations reveal a certain type of solidarity, support for one’s people and 
maximising the profits of one’s team or a closed family circle. Alena Ledeneva 
(2011) classifies the activities stemming from social connections not only as areas 
of quiet and highly skilful control of economic transactions but also as a rich system 
of communicating the social and understandable often without words, expressed 
through the single blink of an eye. The sphere of informal activities is nothing 
other than a specific way of coping, getting by and building new communities 
(often with a sociological and historical continuity) within unfamiliar post-
transformational conditions, where recognising the local and public also becomes 
possible (Rakowski 2013). 
The idea of development, which ran through conversations with inhabitants 
across all of the roadside towns and villages, is similar everywhere. Here, I 
explored the effects of modernisation resulting from motorway construction and 
its impact on mobility. However, other factors lead to development in everyday 
life, features beyond the appearance of chain stores and discount shops, internet 
access, proper pavement, a well-functioning sewage system and traffic lights, 
decent-looking public utility buildings or new cycling paths. Development also 
refers to ‘changes in mentality’. The consolidation of these geographic areas, 
which are, after all, an example of the ‘Recovered Territories’ or areas of post-war 
Poland formerly part of pre-war Germany, has never succeeded at the social level 
(see Dulczewski 1961; Labuda 1966; Markiewicz and Rybicki 1967; Kwilecki 
1970; Jasiewicz 1973; 1999; Sakson 2006; Bazuń and Kwiatkowski 2015). It is 
only recently that social changes have become apparent, driven by a strengthened 
agency amongst younger generations. Consequently, managing the local identity, 
always collective and public, has shifted. National, religious and social differences 
appear not to affect local socioeconomic phenomena as much as they did amongst 
previous generations. These identifiers have become blurred, such that discussing 
common and shared features is much easier today. The most important elements 
affecting these areas are class diversification and social inequalities, ranging from 
poverty, pathology, dysfunction, post-PGR to the local millionaires. 
In order to understand the dynamics of changes in the local cultural landscapes, 
we must take note of the transformation in the approach to private property and 
public spaces. New approaches emerged only after Poland joined the EU—not in 
the 1990s when the process of widely understood privatisation intensified most 
(see Fic and Fic 2005). The last decade specifically witnessed more community-
level concern for private property, interest in the quality of public spaces and 
engagement in local issues. This new approach to locality was coupled with new 
settlements, altering the spatial, social and capital quality of roadside villages and 
towns and beyond. The specific nature of this approach in the area studied stems 
from the fact that the new ‘settlers’ were specifically internal migrants: families 
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market, to larger, more conveniently located places in terms of road infrastructure. 
Such settlers also include migrants returning from Germany, the Netherlands, 
England or Ireland, who usually settle temporarily—sometimes permanently— 
in their hometowns. Still, the new inhabitants do not solve the problem of rural 
depopulation, although the demographic decline explains why local businesses, 
such as general stores and various service points, are closing (see Gołdyka 2005). 
However, the construction of the A2 between Nowy Tomyśl and Świecko 
should not be automatically deemed the primary reason for the decline in the 
profitability of businesses connected to transit, which lead to increasing poverty 
levels in roadside towns and amongst the areas’ inhabitants, thereby intensifying 
migration. The reasons for the economic downturn are much more complex 
than they seem at first sight. The rapidly changing socioeconomic situation 
after 1989 was characterised by unpredictability and remains neither completed 
nor entirely local. Any collapse of previously successful businesses, such as 
the dynamic and mostly informal reactions to changing external conditions 
representing partial adjustments to new realities, are always linked to globalisation. 
Entrepreneurship, and the flexibility it entails, as well as the ability to implement 
something new quickly—something adequate for the new situation—is a skill the 
older Polish generation has not mastered. Alongside additional problems, such as 
changes in the mentality and the behaviours of the younger generation, life and the 
economic dimensions of satisfying one’s daily needs have taken priority. Taken 
together, all of these factors contribute to the crisis resulting in the deterioration 
of local community life. Despite these issues, as a borderland region, both nation-
states and along the Greater Poland and Lubusz Voivodship borders, the region 
has witnessed the creation of nongovernmental organisations and the promotion 
of skills building related to acquiring financial resources and developing human 
capital and grassroots democracy (see Żuk 2004; Nietschke and Flakowski 2009). 
The economic flaws in the towns and villages I describe did not result solely 
from a combination of structural and historical factors. These flaws also cannot be 
simply explained by cultural differences, which theoretically could influence the 
‘entrepreneurial habitus’ and effective economic strategies. Closing many roadside 
businesses and ‘new poverty’ typically result from the same infrastructure intended 
to boost the economy and expand opportunities. Poor public transportation, a 
gradual limitation to small-scale trade, competition from nearby developing 
cities as places to live and work, changes to the mindset leading individuals to 
seek comfort and ever-higher expectations concerning their standard of living, 
mismanagement of the requirements to a market economy and an inability to 
adjust to rapidly changing economic conditions, coupled with a decrease in births 
and the depopulation of the countryside, all lead towns and villages to slowly 
lose their attractiveness to inhabitants. Those who remain depend on small-scale 
informal strategies, more often than not bordering legality. 
What influences the cultural, social and economic conditions in towns and 
villages located along the Old Two also leads to lifestyle changes that become 
most visible in the differences between generations. These are connected to a 
















raised (related to the abundance of available material goods and a more lenient 
attitude towards morality), resulting in less attention focusing on the needs of 
parents and grandparents. This pertains not only to local communities but also to 
those individuals flowing through the Old Two and the A2: that is, long-haul lorry 
drivers, tourists, labour migrants or road construction workers of all nationalities. 
In the face of the immensity of consumer goods, young people want to earn 
money easily, quickly and in large amounts, clashing with how their parents 
are accustomed to earning an income. Consequently, the changes in the morals 
and the ways of maintaining socioeconomic relationships within the nearest 
neighbourhood become undeniable. 
Conclusions 
The descriptions I presented here illustrate how informality has revived, continued 
or strengthened along with the infrastructure modernisation accompanying the 
continuing economic transformation (Stanisz and Kuligowski 2017). Although 
far from extraordinary and remaining hidden in everyday life, informal practices 
reveal the dynamics of encounters between large- and small-scale modernisation. 
That is, modernisation represents a transformative national practice with formal 
and informal strategies of adapting to the local (spatial and economic) possibilities 
depending on the availability of specific social actors. 
Here, I have attempted to capture the grassroots quality of post-transformational 
modernisation processes in Poland, viewing informality as a category which 
can be observed given the conditions of the roadside stimulated by all types of 
mobilities and flows. This includes the flow of people—both local populations 
and international migrants—as well as the flow of local agricultural or forest 
products, finished goods and services. The construction of the new motorway 
resulted in the area increasingly becoming marked by transit, with impermanent 
residents settling in the area or locals engaging in seasonal or shuttle-based labour 
migration. Simultaneously, the area has become increasingly enmeshed in global 
processes. Thus, the region is characterised by an increasingly transitory nature 
not simply resulting from infrastructure modernisation, but also stemming from 
globalisation. The resulting overlapping and multiple changes are typical, then, 
of a postsocialist transformation. This localised study, therefore, contributes 
to a broader understanding of the longer-term social, cultural and economic 
consequences of the transformation from a socialist state. 
A common shortcoming to expert and scientific discussions concerning Polish
modernisation—and more broadly postsocialist modernisation in Central and
Eastern Europe—lies, firstly, in that social issues are often overlooked and, secondly,
such discussions are rarely connected to the broader debate on transformation.
Indeed, it might be that transformation as a concept is too narrow (Wołodźko 2013),
remaining ‘utterly material and technocratic’ (Rogaczewska 2013). Transformation
as a concept is perceived by decision-makers and politicians solely in terms of
infrastructure, including, for instance, motorway construction (Kucharczyk
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Polish postsocialist modernisation under the conditions of increased mobility, it is
important to note the specific transfer of materialistically defined modernisation in
terms of its meaning within Polish society. Thus, the anthropological perspective
encompasses not only what is understood, but what is actually made and put into
practice by the population. In this respect, modernisation and transformation cannot
be explored without reference to the anthropological constant of informality. This
focus on informality renders the Świecko–Nowy Tomyśl section of the A2 motorway
even more interesting empirically, since it serves as an example of transforming
Poland through a motorway. This infrastructure change is part of further shifts,
including changes in technology, markets and marketing affecting more than just
the roadside communities explored here. For instance, local entrepreneurs and the
broader population have been forced to adapt their qualifications, skills and trade
practices. Yet, the impact of infrastructure changes in postsocialist Poland can be
fruitfully compared in future research to areas affected by deindustrialisation and
losses of once-thriving and crucial industries. 
The towns which, until recently, were situated along the primary transit route 
connecting East and West—benefiting from automobile traffic resulting from 
modernisation through the expansion of mobility infrastructure and which deferred 
the post-transformative consequences—were forced to establish new economic 
strategies and re-evaluate their approaches to locality in the new transit-centred 
setting. The ‘trauma’ caused by these changes and the theoretical growth in the 
potential of mobility provoked by the ‘presence’ of the A2 lead us to treat the 
socioeconomic processes, which we observed, as equivocal. That is, the regimes 
governing them, the discourses surrounding them and their manifestations as 
well as the manner of ascribing value to them, in addition to experiencing and 
utilising modernisation, all emerged as important to understanding the current 
socioeconomic conditions at the local level in Poland (Stanisz and Kuligowski 
2015). 
By focusing on the impact of infrastructure on modernisation and 
industrialisation, it is clear that the motorway’s impact cannot be limited to 
how it enables the transit of people, goods and services. Instead, this piece of 
infrastructure becomes a part of a network, relating not only to other roads but 
also to the global economy—that is, a macro-level perspective. However, from an 
opposing analytical viewpoint and my own focus here, the motorway is linked to a 
host of social practices and shared emotions, ranging from fatalism to euphoria, all 
of which form a part of the road to postsocialist modernisation and transformation, 
processes and phenomena which are open-ended and ongoing. These large-
scale processes, as I have shown here, must be thought through from the emic 
perspective, since they co-create and transform the nature of postsocialism. 
Notes 
1 Research funded by the National Centre for Science under the grant ‘Moving 
modernisations: The influence of the A2 motorway on local cultural landscapes’, NCN 
OPUS number 218958. 
  
  
        








2 A pallet is a wooden flat transport structure, which supports goods in a stable fashion 
while being lifted by a forklift or a pallet jack. 
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Part III 
Informality as state practice 
dealing with mobility 




9 Symbolic state imagery, 
informal state practice 
Caress Schenk 
Introduction 
Immigration controls in the Russian Federation (hereafter, Russia) have evolved 
since 2002, when the government began taking seriously the issue of managing 
the population of temporary migrant workers entering the country. To manage 
the millions of Central Asian workers arriving each year, in 2007 the government 
instituted a quota, or a numerical cap, limiting the number of work permits 
available. This technocratic solution erected a symbol of immigration control 
that appealed to rationality. As it became clear that the immigration sphere was 
resilient to policy change, state actors changed their strategy, utilising more 
securitised measures of immigration control. During this era, deportation became 
a policy strategy that used emotive symbols of police raids and blacklists to signal 
effective immigration control. Persisting across both eras, however, was the 
widespread use of informal strategies by migrants and state actors alike. 
The policies of quotas and subsequently deportations have met with myriad 
contradictions, gaps and inconsistencies during the implementation process. In 
this way, Russia’s immigration policy sphere shares the seeming pathologies of 
immigration systems the world over, causing many scholars to render migra-
tion impossible to control or plagued by ineffective policy. When state actors 
are engaged in informal practices, the contradictions inherent in the immigration 
system seem particularly acute. This chapter, however, questions the ineffective-
ness thesis, arguing that despite a cluttered field of immigration control practices, 
erecting a key symbol of immigration control is a strategy governments use to 
create a focal point of state activities and to drown out the noise of contradictions 
on the ground. These symbols become important legitimacy-seeking efforts by 
the state in order to justify the effectiveness of immigration control policy. Amid 
these macro-level strategies, state actors rely on readily available informal prac-
tices to navigate the nuances of everyday migration management. 
Informality and effectiveness immigration control 
Drawing upon a range of methods from ethnography to survey, this chapter 

















control—in other words, ‘the state’ and its efforts to manage flows and popula-
tions of migrant workers in Russia. However, instead of a reified state, distinct 
from society or the individuals that make it up, this chapter embraces a view of 
the state as a resilient and tireless manager of barely contained chaos given that 
power and decision-making is divided amongst a vast array of agents and institu-
tions acting officially in the name of the state. By engaging the nexus of mobility 
and spaces of power, this chapter shows how the state is a complex and diverse 
field of power that pursues a variety of goals simultaneously. 
Mainstream political and other social science approaches to the state often 
begin with a Weberian definition of the state, specifically with the ideal of a 
legal-rational variety. From this starting point, a normative vision of the state is 
constructed that uses a set of official written rules to produce clean and distinct 
boundaries between the state and society (Weber 1946: 78), between official and 
unofficial, written and unwritten, public and private, relational and impersonal, 
formal and informal activity (Weber 2019). Mainstream studies often further 
blur state and regime processes, or as Beissinger (2017) aptly notes, use a ‘neo-
Weberian yardstick’ which merges the assumptions of the Weberian state, 
modernisation theory and state theory to assess modern states. Consequently, 
many approaches use informal practices as a measurement of state weakness and 
see informal processes as inimical to the rule of law (e.g., Taylor 2011; Mendras 
2012; Sakwa 2011). 
Based on this foundation, studies of Russia can come away with the
perspective that the political system is weak, backwards or persistently
underdeveloped because of informality and corruption; that it cannot modernise
unless informal ways of conducting politics give way to formal institutional
development (Gel’man 2004, 2012; Hanson 2007; Ledeneva 2013). Amid these
predictions, it is important to address the puzzling reality ‘that more states don’t
simply fall apart’ (Migdal 2001, 135) despite their seeming dysfunctions. Instead
of suggesting that state actors rely on manipulation and façade to legitimise
themselves, this chapter argues that a selective (but authentic) picture of state
activity is erected symbolically as a focal point for immigration control efforts.
This symbolism can serve to smooth over the public image of a field of policy
implementation that seems contradictory and can reveal the ways in which state
actors who circumvent state regulation can use these unregulated activities to
uphold state legitimacy. 
Migdal’s (2001) concept of the state as a two-sided ‘field of power’ involv-
ing image and practices is a helpful corrective to a Weberian framework. Image, 
according to Migdal, is the projection of the state as cohesive and in control, 
also encompassing peoples’ perceptions of this projected image. Practices 
are the ‘routine performance of state actors and agencies’, which are not par-
ticularly cohesive (as the image is wont to represent), and can be contradictory 
because they are constantly arbitrating between different sets of laws and codes, 
both formal and informal. Migdal goes as far as saying that ‘theories that do not 
incorporate the two sides of the paradoxical state end up either over-idealising 
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everyman-out-for-himself, corrupt officials’. This statement captures the limits of 
an essentialised picture of the state and informal activities. 
Migdal’s conceptualisation of the state allows for the analysis of the ways in 
which the image and the practices of states interact. In particular, those practices 
of state actors that are image-reinforcing, seeking to create and maintain the 
projection of a strong and effective state, are crucial for building legitimacy.1 
In this sense, it is the efforts to produce an image of a capable state that often 
become a focal point for official activity. Adopting this perspective, we can leave 
aside notions present in the state capacity and the rule of law literature that argue 
stronger state institutions result in less informality because they are capable of 
producing certain effects valued by and consistent with officially sanctioned 
procedures and laws. We can also move beyond the idea that the willingness to 
adopt and implement policies represents a linear process that seeks the same goal 
and that unimplemented or unenforced policies mark weak institutions (Levitsky 
and Murillo 2009). Rather, we can embrace the idea that policy (a part of image 
creation) and implementation (aspects of practice) might have different goals but 
are inherently legitimacy-seeking activities. Furthermore, the policies issued by 
state elites at the top and the ways in which policies are practised by street-level 
bureaucrats are mutually constitutive, because lower-level officials act as the 
face of the state at the micro level, mediating and interpreting policy vis-à-vis 
individual migrants (Fassin et al. 2015). 
Using Migdal’s perspective as a point of departure, it is possible to see that 
the image and practice of immigration control, and specifically labour mobility, 
in Russia are at times serving different, although equally essential, purposes. The 
image of the state is upheld through the rhetoric of officials, by passing of laws 
and policies and other attempts by officials to legitimise the state. This includes 
the production of official statistics. Practices refer to how immigration control 
is enacted or, more generally, how state actors interact with migrants. This 
chapter explores how a range of practices, both formal and informal, can serve to 
either uphold the image of immigration control or undermine it. In the following 
case studies, I survey the complex field of practices associated with two policy 
mechanisms: quotas and deportations. I demonstrate the ways in which formal 
and informal practices either uphold or contradict the image of immigration 
control (see Table 9.1). Both formal and informal practices play an essential role 
in the immigration sphere, either upholding or supporting official state policy 
or providing flexibility to migrants, employers and other interested actors who 
operate in a labour market with a structural need for foreign workers. I suggest 
that, from this field of varied practices, one practice or set of practices is elevated 
to the level of the symbol in order to counter any potential criticism that the policy 
is ineffective due to existing contradictions. 
In the first case study, quotas regulated work permits for migrants originating 
from Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries from 2007 through 
2014. In this case, the process of planning quotas served as a reinforcing practice 
that was further erected as a rational symbol of immigration control. In the second 


















Table 9.1 Image and practice 
IMAGE Immigration policy is appropriate and effective 
FORMAL PRACTICES 
Reinforcing practices Reinforce the image of a particular mechanism of 
immigration control as effective 
Contradictory practices Undermine the image of a particular mechanism’s 
effectiveness for immigration control 
INFORMAL PRACTICES 
Compensating practices Undermine the image of a mechanism’s utility for 
effective immigration control, BUT address structural 
demands by giving migrants access to the labour 
market 
Coordinating practices Uphold the image of a mechanism’s effectiveness 
(robustness) for immigration control despite the 
informal and/or illegal nature of the practice itself 
raids and document checks were rendered symbolic, although the reinforcing role 
of official data was also crucial. While in each case symbols were put on public 
display, the rational appeal of quota planning and the uses of official data contrast 
with the emotive appeals of securitised actions by law enforcement. 
Many migration analyses end with a discussion of contradictions created by a
varied field such as this, but I argue in this chapter that if state officials can erect a
primary symbol as a focal point, attention can be drawn away from the contradic-
tions within the system. A symbol takes on an important function in mediating
between image and practice since it serves to bolster the legitimacy of an image
in light of a varied field of practice.2 A symbol, in this exposition, is something
that can be used to demonstrate the image of immigration control, encompassing
several characteristics. In the two cases I discuss below, a symbol (1) highlights a
genuine state activity that has a (2) ritualistic or repeated performative pattern with
(3) a visible manifestation that is widely publicised, and which taken together are
used to (4) uphold the image of immigration control. Symbols can evoke rational
or emotive responses, either of which can be used to make legitimacy appeals.
However, I suggest that the combination of rational and emotive appeals are
important. 
As a marker of genuine state activity, symbols are not erected as facades, but 
as representations. In other words, they are a type of map of state activity, which 
is an abstraction or simplification, yet represents something concrete and not fab-
ricated (Korzybski 1958; Scott 1998). In this way, a symbol provides a simpli-
fied and selective picture of state activity, although it should not be relegated 
to window dressing. Symbols are not merely promises that fall short of reality. 
They are real and authentic aspects of state activity towards specific goals despite 
contradictions within the system. That is, symbols are more than mere promises 
because they both mobilise and utilise the state machinery to produce policy, data 
and activities to illustrate and defend the use of the symbols. 
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Symbols also involve ritual and performance. These activities may be spec-
tacular and episodic (Cummings 2013; Wedeen 1999) or they can encompass eve-
ryday routines. Through the daily activities of state actors, such as the behaviours 
of judges or the interactions between law enforcement officials and migrants, ritu-
als become embedded in institutions and serve as the raw material for producing 
outputs such as official statistics. 
Work permit quotas 
When the government instituted work permit quotas for migrants coming from 
CIS countries in 2007, they set the limit at six million, which experts estimated 
was sufficiently large to allow all migrants already in Russia at the time to become 
documented. Quotas were a part of a larger effort to develop a migration policy 
amid growing numbers of labour migrants. When quotas were instituted, the 
package of immigration reforms, which also included bans on foreign workers in 
certain economic sectors, received wide press coverage. 
Following the expert-recommended quota in 2007, quotas were set by regional 
commissions based on employer requests and a number of other considerations. 
The 2008 quota of 1.8 million was erected as a symbol of technocratic, rational 
immigration control. When the quota for 2009 was set at four million based on 
these same criteria, however, there was an immediate backlash in the media as well 
as from regional governors and representatives of trade unions who questioned the 
increase in the quota in the wake of the global financial crisis. The issue entered 
the national stage during ‘A Conversation with Vladimir Putin’ in December 
2008, when a woman asked Putin why migrant quotas should be so high during a 
financial crisis. Putin agreed, suggesting ‘that the quota be reasonably reduced by 
no less than 50%’. These statements were widely covered in the press, heralding 
that the ‘quota for migrants decreased twofold’, to around two million. 
Putin’s statement stands as a key moment for how quotas would be used as a 
mechanism of immigration control. The intervention of a sympathetic leader on 
behalf of the average worker who felt their labour market position was not being 
protected by bureaucrats issuing the quotas or market-driven employers interested 
only in cheap labour erected an appropriate image of immigration control through 
the quota. Putin superseded bureaucratic procedure and labour market signals 
but nevertheless demonstrated how emotive logic must be considered alongside 
rational displays. The quota itself became a lasting image of immigration control 
since after 2009 it never again increased beyond two million until the mechanism 
was repealed altogether at the end of 2014, clearly taking a signal from Putin 
about how high the quota should be set. 
To maintain the image of quotas as a display of immigration control (see Table 
9.2), the bureaucratic quota planning apparatus moved mountains of documents 
each year to produce a rational calculation of the labour market need for migrants 
that would also be accepted by the public. These activities are what Migdal 
(2001) calls practices, and we can classify them as reinforcing in that they seek to 








Table 9.2 Image and practice of quotas 
IMAGE Quotas are an appropriate and effective mechanism of 
immigration control 
FORMAL PRACTICES 
Reinforcing practices Quota planning 
Contradictory practices Work permits issued by Federal Migration Service 
(FMS) 
INFORMAL PRACTICES 
Compensating practices False work permits 
Legal impunity 
Coordinating practices Sale of quotas 
bureaucracy. Quotas are further useful because they uphold the personal promise 
of Putin. Nevertheless, they continually reinforced a picture of the labour market 
that did not correspond to reality. While the quotas produced numbers that were 
publicly palatable, they did not allow enough work permits to legalise all of the 
migrants working in Russia. 
Quotas were determined by the Ministry of Health and then the Ministry of 
Labour, but it was the Federal Migration Service (FMS) that issued work permits. 
We could classify the FMS practices as contradictory to the activity of the quota 
planners, since FMS officials often issued work permits with general disregard 
to the lists of employers approved to hire migrants compiled during the quota 
planning process. In many cases, regions obeyed the numerical cap placed on 
work permits, but in some cases the quotas were flouted quite dramatically. This 
could be framed as adding flexibility to the system or correcting the estimates 
of the quota planners by issuing work permits in an on-demand manner. It is 
notable, however, that though in certain regions FMS officials issued more work 
permits than the quota allowed, the federally aggregated number of work permits 
issued annually never exceeded the nationwide quota. As such, the FMS practices 
contradicted the quota plans, and the contradictions between image and practice 
were kept in check and, most importantly, out of the public eye. 
A great deal of bureaucratic effort was put into creating the image of immi-
gration control through quotas as well as into producing official data that cor-
responded with Putin’s signals. Consequently, there were never sufficient work 
documents to legalise migrant workers. Elsewhere, I have called this a scarcity 
of legal labour (Schenk 2018a). As a result, a number of informal practices arose 
to mediate a formal space that narrowed in order to create a certain image of the 
state. These informal practices can be called compensating practices, because they 
address structural demands in the labour market and facilitate migrants’ abilities 
to operate within the system (either legally or illegally). 
Compensating practices include the industry that arose to provide migrants with
false work permit documents. In fact, an active sector of migrant intermediaries
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intermediaries that provided false work permits helped migrants to operate within
the system with some degree of legal coverage (in the sense that they were at least
able to produce a document when asked, in the hopes that it would be sufficient).
At the same time, these practices allowed more ‘documented’ migrants into the
system than the number allowed by the quota. The fact that these false work per-
mits did not appear in official statistics, however, reinforced the quota numbers. 
Another informal practice that could be viewed as compensating is when law 
enforcement officials looked the other way when faced with migration violations. 
This looking the other way occurred if a migrant paid (either a bribe or sometimes 
in labour).3 These corruption-related practices allowed migrants to continue oper-
ating within the system with legal impunity (although not without consequences), 
thereby reinforcing a more market-driven population of migrants than the quota 
numbers allowed. 
Other informal practices can be considering coordinating, because they 
uphold the image of immigration control through the quota despite their informal 
or even illegal nature. One such practice was the use of quota by intermediary 
companies. Many times, subcontractors would apply for quota (sometimes in 
very large numbers), which they would then either sell to other companies or 
subcontractors, or use themselves by acting as an employment placement agency 
(sometimes registering themselves as the official employer). The layers between 
the recipient of quota (named in the Ministry of Labour quota allocations) and the 
actual employers who interacted with migrants were often shadowy and complex. 
Nevertheless, they allowed migrants some degree of access to legal work 
documents, and some legal cover (or plausible deniability) to employers who either 
did not have a direct relationship with migrants or who hired more migrants than 
they were strictly allowed (some with work permits and some without). Another 
coordinating practice can be found in corruption schemes, which provided work 
permits to migrants if they paid a bribe or unofficial fee. These schemes were 
extortionist and exploited migrants, yet they upheld the image of the quota as 
an effective mechanism of immigration control and simultaneously provided a 
reward to bureaucrats who worked to uphold the image of the quota. 
Amid the field of practices that assumed various relationships to the image
of immigration control through the quota, the symbol of a technocratically
planned quota, based on authentic and routinely practised state activity, was
erected as the key focal point of an appeal to effective state policy. The quota
was announced yearly in the mass media and was presented as an objective indi-
cator of what the government would do in the coming year. The planned quota
was often announced alongside an estimate of how much of the quota was used
in the previous year (at the federal level), reinforcing the effectiveness of the
mechanism. Putin’s intervention in the quota system warrants a few words of
reflection, however. If the planning activities of bureaucrats served as a sym-
bol of rational and technocratic immigration control, Putin’s announcement to
decrease the quota injected an emotive appeal into the symbolic framework. This
suggests that rational appeals can gain additional traction when adjustments are









Though quotas for CIS citizens remained in place until the end of 2014, increas-
ing numbers of migrants were able to obtain work documents through alternative 
means, namely by buying pay-as-you-go monthly permits called patents. Because 
the number of officially counted labour migrants increased, new mechanisms 
were needed to re-establish the image of immigration control. Quotas remain for 
other categories of immigrants (e.g., workers from outside the CIS and tempo-
rary residents), thereby retaining the rational appeal of the mechanism albeit on 
a much smaller scale. In this increasing space, deportations and associated meas-
ures emerged as a way to project a new image of immigration control. 
Deportations 
In 2012 and 2013, legislation was amended to increase the penalties for migrants 
who committed administrative and other migration-related violations. These 
changes served as the starting point for a dramatic increase in the number of 
migrants deported, administratively expelled or put on a reentry ban list (Kubal 
2017; Troitskii 2016).4 The amendments to the migration law in December 2012 
and July 2013 and the administrative code in August 2013 came amid several 
events that elicited resolute state action to address immigration control problems.5 
From the beginning of 2012, during Vladimir Putin’s re-election campaign, 
migration issues were mobilised as a priority for government attention. This 
ushered in a period lasting until the end of 2013 characterised by a dramatic 
increase in antimigrant rhetoric in the media (Tolz and Harding 2015). Media 
rhetoric converged with other statements and declarations from state officials, 
as well as visible migration control activities. Deportation and its surrounding 
policies became a primary focal point for this image of control, while official data 
served as an important measure of effectiveness and the foundation for erecting 
the image. Police raids and mass arrests, I argue below, became particularly 
symbolic during this period of effective immigration control. 
The elevation of deportation to a primary mechanism of immigration control 
through changes in legislation and enforcement came as Russia was preparing for 
the free movement of labour likely to follow Kyrgyzstan’s entry into the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU), and amid calls to move towards the adoption of a visa 
regime. By using increasingly security-oriented immigration control measures, 
the government could move forward with plans for the EAEU while still assur-
ing the public that border control would be tightened, keeping out the ‘wrong 
kinds’ of migrants (presumably, criminals, although in actual fact many migrants 
were added to a reentry ban list for relatively minor administrative violations).6 
The timing in response to critical voices and corresponding media coverage amid 
greater geopolitical securitisation more generally are important for creating the 
symbolic image of immigration control. 
Certain activities of state officials and agencies can be considered image-rein-
forcing practices, upholding the image of immigration control through deporta-
tion (see Table 9.3). These practices include the construction of migrant detention 









Symbolic state imagery 183 
Table 9.3 Image and practice of deportation 
IMAGE Deportation is an appropriate and effective mechanism 
of immigration control 
FORMAL PRACTICES 
Reinforcing practices Detention centres 
Increased prosecutions (deportations) 
Official data 
Blacklists 
Contradictory practices Blacklist database uncoordinated 
INFORMAL PRACTICES 
Compensating practices Corruption schemes 
Legal impunity 
Coordinating practices Self-executed deportations 
Visible document checks 
Raids and arrests 
cases and the production of official data. In particular, the production of data 
became crucial for upholding the image of immigration control. 
In August 2013, the FMS submitted draft legislation proposing the construction 
of 83 new detention centres in 81 regions of Russia.7 This proposal was reported in 
the Russian- and English-language media, although it was not adopted into law at 
that time. Nevertheless, according to the Global Detention Project, of 88 detention 
centres currently operating across Russia, 76 were established in 2014.8 Though 
government documents have never specified the number of detention centres that 
should exist, from the end of 2013 government orders and orders issued by the 
FMS and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) began providing much more explicit 
instructions for how migrant detention centres should be used.9 
The number of court decisions on deportations (administrative expulsions) also
provides image-reinforcing practices on the part of the judicial system. The num-
ber of decisions increased from 40,396 in 2011 to 137,097 in 2013 and 198,371 in
2014, before declining slightly to 177,821 in 2015 (Troitskii 2016). An increase in
arrests (Abashin 2017) leading to these court decisions signified systematic activ-
ity by the police in upholding the image of immigration control. However, the
flow of 20 to 30 million foreigners across Russia’s borders each year has remained
steady and even increased in more recent years. This suggests that, contrary to the
image, deportation policies do not have a marked impact on migration flows.10 
The numbers of foreigners placed on reentry ban lists (blacklists) parallel court 
decisions, increasing from 65,000 in 2011 to a peak of 645,000 in 2014. This 
might seem natural, since deportation comes with an automatic five-year reentry 
ban. However, many of the practices constituting the entry-ban list are contradic-
tory to its image as effective immigration control. 
Research on the entry bans reveals a lack of institutional coordination 
(Bahovadinova 2016). The legal basis for applying an entry ban rests on a web 









can declare foreigners ‘undesirable’ or add them to a blacklist for any number of 
reasons. The migration services can also cancel a visa, the courts can order expul-
sion or deportation, and the border agency can deny a foreigner entry. Therefore, 
the mechanisms for foreigners being removed from or denied entry into Russia 
are many and varied, and not captured in a single set of statistics or within a single 
‘blacklist’. Government agencies have different lists, which may or may not show 
up in the border agency’s records, and therefore may or may not result in an indi-
vidual flagged by a particular agency being prevented from entering the country. 
This lack of coordination works against the image of immigration control and, 
therefore, can be seen as a contradictory set of practices. 
It is also important to note that many banned migrants are placed on the list 
while in Russia for any number of administrative violations. These migrants may 
be placed on the reentry ban list without even knowing it. Many of these migrants 
remain in Russia even though they are prohibited from entering the country. To 
the degree that the blacklist encourages migrants to stay in Russia rather than risk 
being barred reentry, the mechanism itself serves to reinforce illegal migration 
rather than act against it. While these migrants may appear in the official statistics 
of the blacklists and remain in Russia to continue working, and thereby address 
structural rigidities in similar ways to coordinating practices, in this case it is not 
the routine informal actions of state officials that allow migrants to remain in the 
system. Rather, migrants’ activities are either based on a lack of knowledge or a 
desire to utilise existing loopholes. These types of activities of migrants, while 
important in the immigration sphere, are not the focus of this chapter. 
As seen with the quota case, informal or off-the-books practices by state 
officials can compensate for the rigidities created by formal immigration control 
policies in the context of a structural labour market need for migrant workers. 
Compensating practices include judicial and law enforcement practices that do 
not prosecute migrants to the full extent of the law and, therefore, allow migrants 
to remain in Russia. These include a number of practices, often involving the 
police, that offer migrants legal impunity via various corruption and extortion 
schemes. 
Azamat,11 a return migrant interviewed in Bishkek, explained to us that there 
are often police officers in each district of a city who take it upon themselves to 
know the registration status of migrants. If a migrant has a registration in one 
place, but physically lives in another, these district police officers (uchastkovyi) 
know. ‘If one is lucky’, Azamat explained, ‘he can pay that uchastkovyi 2000 to 
3000 roubles each month (at the time of the interview $30–50 USD), so that the 
officer does not bother him.’ These relationships between the uchastkovyi and 
migrant can even approach a sort of friendship, as Azamat recounted the story of 
a friend and housemate of his who, over time, became ‘friends’ with his uchast-
kovyi. This type of scenario has been well documented in ethnographic accounts 
of migrants in Russia (Reeves 2015) and represents an informal practice that con-
tradicts the image of migration control in that it avoids channelling migrants who 
violate registration procedures through official channels so that they can appear in 
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for migrants to mitigate risk and remain in Russia without their migration viola-
tions being discovered. As Azamat says, ‘the uchastkovyi is interested in keeping 
you safe from other police officers’, allowing migrants to live in relative peace 
and avoiding the consequences of deportation regardless of their legal status. 
Other informal practices by state officials may include corruption, or they may 
simply result from navigating the decision-making implicit in their professional 
duties. To the degree that any of these practices uphold the image of immigration 
control through deportation, they can be considered coordinating practices. 
The initial results from a new project compiling a database of court cases 
related to migration violations indicate that women are more often allowed to 
‘self-execute’ their expulsion, whereas men are more likely to be remanded to a 
migration detention centre to await removal from the country by state officials. 
The decision of a judge to assign self-executed versus forcible removal is well 
within the scope of judicial discretion. However, to some degree, assigning self-
executed departure allows migrants the possibility of remaining in the country, 
even if it is not the intention of the judge. Thus, this practice can serve to address 
the structural demands of the labour market, while simultaneously contributing 
to robust prosecution statistics, thereby serving to uphold the image of the 
deportation policy as effective immigration control. 
Other informal practices that uphold the image of immigration control include 
occasions when state officials might allow migrants to enter Russia even if they 
are on the blacklist. Some illegal entry practices may be migrant-driven as in 
the case of return migrants in Kyrgyzstan. These migrants told us stories of 
obtaining a new passport with a different name or a different spelling, crossing 
the border using passport stamps from friends or even crossing the border without 
a passport altogether. If officials deliberately allow irregularities, however, this 
is a coordinating practice that does not interrupt (and thus upholds) the image of 
immigration control through deportation and entry-ban procedures and statistics. 
In Kyrgyzstan, Altair told us about a friend of his who was on the blacklist: 
[He] decided to cross the border by car. How he was able to cross the border, 
I have no idea. He got his documents there and now he is working. When I 
asked him how he was able to do that, he told me that he paid a fine. When I 
asked how much, he told me nothing but the fact that it was expensive. 
Strategies like this do not disrupt deportation or blacklist procedures, or the 
official construction of statistics. Yet, they allow migrants to find ways to remain 
engaged in the Russian labour market. 
Certain activities of state officials have a complicated relationship with the 
categories of formal and informal practices I have outlined thus far in this chapter. 
The practices surrounding document checks and raids are official, formal reinforc-
ing practices that uphold the image of immigration control through deportation 
policy. Officials also regularly engage in compensating practices, for example, 
when migrants are extorted during document checks and raids, and subsequently 







irrespective of whether they channel migrants through formal legal channels into 
deportation proceedings or the blacklist mechanism. As a symbol of immigration 
control, raids use the official position of the police and military actors, enacting 
routines that can be visibly displayed to the public to uphold the image of immi-
gration control. 
Visible public document checks and arrests of migrants are frequently framed 
as extortion schemes, where police detain migrants until they either pay a bribe 
or are remanded to the courts for deportation (Urinboyev 2018; Round and 
Kuznetsova 2018). While the migrants who are willing to pay are not in the end 
included in the court, deportation and blacklist statistics, they may be recorded 
in police reports and certainly offer a type of rent or reward to state officials for 
producing visible displays of immigration control such as street arrests. Large 
migration raids take this logic a step further. Raids covered in the media become a 
dramatic exemplar of state activity in pursuit of immigration control. 
A July 2013 fight in a Moscow market led to a number of migration raids and 
mass detentions, to the extent that police station holding facilities were filled and a 
makeshift camp was created. Moscow Mayor Sobyanin, himself in the midst of an 
election campaign that frequently focused on migration-related issues, defended 
the crackdown, saying ‘in any society, in any country, if an emergency situation 
happens, then the government and society begin to act more harshly’ (Myers and 
Roth 2013). The fact that the original fight was between Dagestanis (Russian 
citizens) and the police, yet the migration raids and detentions primarily targeted 
Vietnamese, belies the image-making nature of the episode. Both the mass deten-
tions and an ensuing announcement by the FMS that 83 new detention centres 
would be constructed the following year were covered in the Russian-language 
media as well as by international English-language media and rights groups. 
During a research trip to Moscow, I accompanied human rights activists to 
the site where a migration raid had been conducted in the run-up to the FIFA 
World Cup in summer 2018. While talking to migrants, it became clear that 
law enforcement had strategically chosen the timing of the raid. After sundown 
during Ramadan, many migrants were breaking their fast in cafes near a market 
on the outskirts of the city. Police separated Central Asian migrants from other 
restaurant patrons, sending away those of other nationalities. Some migrants were 
taken to holding facilities, some were beaten and others were let go after paying 
a bribe. Other raids take place during the daytime, as in a recent raid in Tula in 
October 2018, which was widely publicised in regional newspapers and on social 
media. Photos showed migrants organised in long lines, while masked special 
forces troops stood guard with large guns in hand. As a symbol, raids provide 
a highly visible display of routine and authentic (i.e., according to the official 
position) state action. 
The spectacular show of securitisation used during migration raids plays a role 
in symbol- and image-making, even though the exercise of catch and release (for 
bribes) rather than a systematic implementation of policy as written could call 
the effectiveness of a policy into question. The key element relies on visibly and 
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out attention from the informal activities those same state actors may be per-
forming on the side. Making visible public displays of authentic (albeit selective) 
routinised state activity becomes a primary tool to make legitimacy appeals. In 
other words, the symbols are integral to demonstrating that immigration control 
is effective, by focusing on a limited measure of control that can be more easily 
controlled and projected for public consumption. 
Discussion and conclusions 
Two policy mechanisms—quotas and deportations—provide a window into
the image and practice of immigration and labour mobility control in Russia.
Symbolic immigration control mechanisms are lifted up to dominate the
landscape and absorb any attention from inconsistencies or contradictions that
make the policy appear ineffective. Contradictions in the system should not be
used to argue for policy ineffectiveness in and of themselves, since both formal
and informal practices by state officials work together to coordinate a complex
field of human interactions and mediate between conflicting goals. The two cases
suggest that, despite policy changes, informal practices adapt to new policy
spheres to ensure migrants can remain and address structural labour demand.
This picture of immigration control is quite different from a typical estimation
of policy effectiveness based on how closely enforcement matches policies on
paper. Rather, this view demonstrates that informal strategies are essential to
mediate and compensate for a seemingly uncoordinated and arbitrary space when
state image and practice diverge. 
Symbolic control policies that produce visible displays for the public are 
based on official, routine activities of state agents, ranging from the everyday to 
the spectacular. Together these aspects of symbol serve a legitimacy function, 
highlighting policy mechanisms (or certain aspects of these) that are effective, 
even for the limited goal of producing official statistics. Thus, they serve specific 
immigration control goals. 
It is equally important that the policy landscape is sufficiently porous to allow 
sufficient numbers of workers to satisfy labour demands and help decision-makers 
balance the disparate needs of various actors in Russia seeking different outcomes 
from migration policy. Policies are perhaps most effective at controlling the 
proportion of migrants who have access to legal documents and a secure status, 
although they do not ultimately reduce the numbers of immigrants in the country. 
Tracing outcomes over a number of policies suggests that while symbolic policies 
are erected to serve a certain policy goal, the management of migration depends 
on the continuity of a mixture of formal and informal practices. While policies 
may change rapidly, stability stems from a resilient understanding of this formal– 
informal mix. Informality is necessary because it allows the system to flexibly 
adapt to new policies and ensures migrants can find ways to remain in Russia and 
continue contributing to the economy. 
This chapter utilises a view of the migrant population as a mass of mobile labour






















Accounts that look at the individual experiences of migrants in response to policies
create a very different picture of the impact of migration policy in Russia. My aim
is to demonstrate how the state, writ large, sees the migration situation and how it
reacts accordingly. From this perspective, focusing on individual migrant experi-
ences does not help to determine how the state system views migrants primarily as
official statistics (or through the interactions that produce those statistics). 
Taking this view shifts our focus from a state that is actively working to 
produce illegality or deportabilty (De Genova 2002) as some (Reeves 2015; Kubal 
2017) have argued. Rather, this view shows that the state is working through 
myriad actors and processes to produce a certain picture of legality. Managing 
the balance between the picture of legality (image) and the on-the-ground 
reality (practice), which requires a reliable stock of migrants (regardless of their 
legality), is often devolved to lower state agents (Schenk 2018a). Examples of the 
activities of bureaucrats, courts and law enforcement in this chapter demonstrate 
the importance of these non-elite state officials. In their interactions with state 
officials, migrants are variously made legible through fake or real documents 
(Reeves 2013). But, from the view within the state, legibility is not attached to 
the individual personhood of a migrant. Rather, legibility emerges in terms of 
numbers that can be recorded and preserved in official statistics and documents. 
While the consequences for migrants on the ground may be the same (illegality
and vulnerability), this ‘migrants as a mass’ view, whereby statistics are the end
goal, reveals important attributes of the state. The state is not merely decision-
makers in Moscow who design policy and enact it through laws and implementing
orders. It is also not primarily street-level bureaucrats who interact with migrants
and employers and write reports that are then aggregated into statistics. The field
of the state extends to those agents that mediate between various goals and needs
of the state, iterated at different levels. For all state agents, the availability of both
formal and informal strategies is essential to creating an image of immigration con-
trol while still providing the space for migrants to remain in Russia, engaged in the
labour market (either formally or informally). Thus, because the state can rely on
informal practices, actors can use symbolic policies to meet some goals, while not
upsetting the general migration governance landscape. This chapter further sug-
gests that combining rational appeals, such as that to state planning or official data,
with emotively oriented displays, such as the personal intervention of the President
or highly securitised policy actions, is a powerful combination that can be mobi-
lised in support of legitimacy appeals. The examples of quotas and deportation
policies and practices suggest that state actors have learned across policy periods
how to combine various elements of symbolic displays in their routine activities. 
Notes 
1 Similar concepts call image-making efforts by the state symbolic (Edelman 1967), 
spectacular (Cummings 2013; Adams 2010), political theatre (Pisano 2014) and per-
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about the mythical or ceremonial nature of formal politics or state function (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977; Migdal 2001). 
2 Verdery (1993) discusses the legitimacy function of symbols in the context of nations 
and nationalism. 
3 See Bahovadinova (2016). This topic also came up with the author’s own interview 
with a migration expert in Krasnodar in 2012. 
4 While administrative expulsion, deportation and reentry bans are separate legal 
mechanisms, migrants in our field interviews (summer 2017) often referred to them 
synonymously as deportation, blacklist (chernyi spisok) or entry ban (zapret na v’ezd). 
I use ‘deportation’ to refer to this package of policy mechanisms. 
5 Elsewhere, I have called this an ‘invented crisis’ of illegal immigration, where ‘the 
invented nature of the crisis at hand is not the fact of illegal immigrants on the ground, 
but rather the characterisation of why migrants are illegal, what potential dangers these 
illegal populations pose to society and what mechanisms will reduce illegal migration’
(Schenk 2018b). 
6 Some have also suggested that the timing of the legislation was aimed at reducing the 
numbers of migrants in the country during the 2018 FIFA World Cup. If there is any 
merit to this argument, perhaps it stems from a desire to avoid the type of international 
coverage criticising migrant exploitation and discrimination during the preparation for 
the Sochi Olympics in 2014. It is also plausible, however, that accompanying increases 
in administrative expulsion–deportation proceedings were aimed at removing migrants 
who had worked on Olympic construction projects. 
7 The proposal can be found at http://regulation.gov.ru/projects#npa=13509, accessed 25 
October 2018. 
8 See https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/europe/russian-federation, accessed
31 October 2018. 
9 These efforts to reinforce the image of immigration control have a parallel in later 
efforts to consolidate the issuing of patent documents through the construction of 
numerous government migration centres (Schenk 2018a). 
10 These figures for the total number of foreigners crossing into the country are rarely, if 
ever, mentioned in the media. 
11 All names are pseudonyms. 
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10 Informal practices and the rule of law 
Russia, migration and the ‘Arctic route’ 
Joni Virkkunen and Minna Piipponen 
Introduction 
When the border between the Russian Federation (hereafter, Russia) and Norway 
and, later, between Russia and Finland ‘opened’ during the ‘migration crisis’ of 
2015 and 2016, the so-called Arctic route through Moscow and Northern Russia 
became another major channel to the European Union. Migrants from various 
Asian, African and Middle Eastern countries chose this route given its cheaper 
price and, significantly, because it was considered safer than the overcrowded 
route through the Mediterranean Sea to Greece, Italy and Spain. Those using the 
Arctic route consisted of several groups of migrants migrating for varying reasons, 
including real and perceived threats such as war, conflict, poverty and religious 
extremism experienced in their home countries as well as acute insecurities in 
Russia. Due to extensive coverage in social and online media, reports of and 
rumours about the Arctic route quickly spread amongst migrant communities and 
smugglers in Russia and globally. 
This study examines the Russian state as a legal power operating through 
informal practices, and how these practices manifested in the Arctic route. 
Specific attention is paid to informal practices such as corruption and migrants’ 
ambivalent encounters with Russian authorities facilitating migration to and from 
Russia, whilst simultaneously creating severe insecurities and distrust amongst 
migrants, pushing them to negotiate their daily survival and possible future in 
Russia. In addition, smugglers and other intermediaries with links to authorities 
assisted migrants whilst also taking advantage of migrants’ insecurities. Such 
individuals and intermediaries organised tickets, documents, permits, hotels and 
vehicles and provided migrants with information about possible routes. For some 
migrants, smugglers organised the entire journey through Russia to the Finnish 
border. By mingling with the Russian legal system, they played a central role in 
how the Russian North and the Arctic became a functioning route to Finland and 
the EU’s Schengen Area. 
Urinboyev (2016) argues that the presence of millions of irregular migrants in 
Russia affects the functioning of its formal institutions and leads to the emergence 
of informal structures and responses, that is, a ‘parallel legal order’. Rather than 
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to adapt to the current ‘informality environment’ in order to ‘get things done’ 
and, thus, create various ‘legal orders’ to regulate their working lives and seek 
solutions to their problems. As such, Kubal (2019: 168) illustrated how everyday 
life perspectives on immigration and refugee law reveal a more complex view of 
law: migrants try to avoid or bypass the complex bureaucratic structures of the 
country, like ordinary Russians, but the rule of law ‘does not necessarily entail 
the rule of disorder and mutual abuse’. An everyday life perspective, she argues, 
reveals the cultural expressions of legality and should not be suppressed under the 
universal rubric of the rule of law. 
In this chapter, we argue that informal practices between migrants, different 
intermediaries and authorities contributed to the establishment of the Arctic route 
and functioned both as push and pull factors for migration. These informal practices 
were simultaneously domestic and transnational, structural and experienced. 
Furthermore, informal practices become a part of the fabric of everyday life in 
which a complex set of law and legal practices, administrative procedures and 
networks are amalgamated with migrants’ everyday life experiences. Immigration 
laws and regulations create legal categories, such as irregular migrant status, 
which shape migrants’ incorporation, position and wages in the labour market and 
their life chances in general (Agadjanian, Menjívar and Zotova 2017: 2). At the 
same time, refugee smuggling flourishes particularly in countries where the rule 
of law is weak and public officials are prone to corruption (OECD 2015: 3), and 
where the informal practices of officials and governance, particularly payments 
to police officers, migration officials and border guards, as well as life subjected 
to ‘violent entrepreneurs’ who abuse migrants’ vulnerabilities, become staple 
features of migrant life (Reeves 2013: 518; Malakhov 2014: 1070). These realties 
create a context where migrant bodies are not only vulnerable, but also particularly 
untrustworthy, prone to fakery and, thus, legitimate targets for document checks, 
fines and threats of deportation (Reeves 2013: 509). 
Here, we examine migrants’ experiences with Russian informal practices, 
intermediaries in the process of migration and encounters with the Russian legal 
system through narrated stories. In doing so, we aim to improve our understanding 
of migrants’ experiences in Russia as a country of immigration and transit, and 
our understanding of the everyday insecurities and opportunities such informal 
practices amongst migrants generate. The chapter relies on a content analysis of 
the narrated stories from the asylum application protocols of 1164 asylum seekers 
who used the Arctic route and applied for asylum in Finland in 2015 and 2016. 
The materials were produced by the Finnish Border Guard, the Police of Finland 
and the Finnish Immigration Service. 
The Arctic route from Russia to Finland 
The Arctic route emerged as one of the European migratory routes asylum seekers 
used to enter the Schengen Area during the 2015 and 2016 ‘migration crisis’. The 
route traversed through Moscow and the northernmost border-crossing stations 
between Russia, Norway and Finland1 (Figure 10.1). Asylum seekers arrived 
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in Finland through border-crossing stations at Raja-Jooseppi and Salla between 
September 2015 and February 2016 (Finnish Border Guard, 8 January through 4 
March 2016). 
Surrounding the Arctic route, existing immigrant networks and the reputation 
of Norway as a wealthy, tolerant and open society meant that Norway emerged 
as the preferred and first destination amongst asylum seekers. Neighbouring 
Finland was much less well known and gained interest especially in November 
2015 when Norwegian border guards began returning asylum seekers to Russia, 
whilst Russian border guards simultaneously stopped accepting those travelling 
to Norway without valid Schengen visas (Moe and Rowe 2016: 88–89). Rumours 
began quickly circulating in news outlets and on websites about the ‘open borders’ 
to Finland, and migration changed course to the Russian–Finnish border. 
In Finland, the ‘episode’ lasted until February when the Finnish and Russian 
ministries and, then, Presidents Niinistö and Putin negotiated and agreed upon a 
180-day closure of the Raja-Jooseppi and Salla border stations to individuals who 
were not Finnish, Russian or Belarus citizens (Nerg & Järvenkylä 2019; Huhta 
2016a, 2016b; Koivuranta 2016). President Putin’s public address on the issue 
to the FSB (Federal’naia Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, Security Service of the Russian 
Federation) of the ‘necessity to strengthen the control of refugee flows both to 
Russia and in transit to European countries’ played a role in closing the route 
(Nerg and Järvenkylä 2019; Putin 2016). 
Russia and the Arctic route functioned as alternatives to the crowded 
Mediterranean and Balkan routes, which were expensive and hazardous because 
of the extreme maritime dangers and the extensive rebordering of East and Central 
European states like Serbia and Hungary. A total of approximately 38,100 persons 
applied for asylum in Finland in 2015 and 2016, of whom only 1756 (4.6%) entered 
Finland from Russia through the Arctic route (Finnish Immigration Service 2017; 
Finnish Border Guard, 8 January through 4 March 2016). Our research material 
consists of the 1164 asylum application protocols from those who submitted 
their applications in Finland. Up to 281 (24%) of these 1164 asylum applicants 
reported residence in Russia prior to arriving in Finland.2 Overall, the group was 
quite heterogeneous reporting a variety of countries of origin; transit migrants 
whose aim was to travel through Russia to ‘Europe’; remigrating students and 
labour migrants from Russia; extended families consisting of several generations; 
and those travelling alone to Russia from different parts of the world. Unlike 
Middle Eastern, African and other South Asian immigrants, most Afghans were 
accompanied by children and family members. 
Because the route through the Russian north and the Arctic took place following 
the occupation of Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, both the Finnish and 
Norwegian media presented the episode as related to geopolitics and, possibly, 
representing a part of Russia’s hybrid warfare. Particularly puzzling were 
questions related to border management: Why did the previously well-functioning 
cooperation with the Russian border guards suddenly fail, and why were migrants 
without Schengen visas allowed into and through the Russian border zone (Skön 
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Russian border represented less than 5% of all asylum applications submitted in 
Finland in 2015 and 2016, these questions rendered migration through the Russian 
or ‘the Eastern’ border politically more sensitive (Virkkunen 2018). 
In Finland, both the government and media described asylum seekers from ‘the 
East’ as part of contemporary geopolitics and Russia’s increased hybrid warfare: 
Russia used migrants and asylum seekers as pawns in its European politics (see, 
e.g., Honkamaa 2016; Rautio 2016). Simultaneously, statements related to the 
rule of law emphasised that asylum seekers should not have the right to freely 
choose the country of asylum, since both Finland and Russia are considered 
safe (Lindroos and Hamunen 2016). We have argued elsewhere that the Arctic 
route should be examined as a part of broader global and European contexts, on 
the one hand, and in the context of highly restrictive and unstable immigration, 
asylum and labour market policies in Russia, on the other (see, e.g., Piipponen 
and Virkkunen 2020, 2017; Virkkunen et al. 2019). The Arctic route was neither 
separate from the ‘refugee crisis’ taking place in Europe nor an event simply 
organised or manoeuvred around by the Russian state. Instead, it resulted from 
different vulnerabilities and survival strategies migrants tackled both in Russia 
and in their home countries. 
Most of the asylum seekers traversing the Arctic route fell into the status of 
irregular migrants and were, thus, excluded from regular labour and housing 
markets as well as most health and social services when their visas or work 
permits in Russia expired. At the same time, stories of racist, indifferent and even 
illegal behaviour amongst the Russian police and authorities were common. In 
what follows, we describe some of these vulnerabilities from the perspective of 
informal practices and the rule of law. Clearly, whilst such practices negatively 
affected migrants’ feelings of security and quality of life in Russia, these also 
provided prospects for migration. 
Empirical framework of this study 
Our analysis relies on the qualitative content analysis of 1164 asylum application 
interviews conducted by the Finnish Border Guard, the Police of Finland and the 
Finnish Immigration Service (see Table 10.1). Asylum seekers who completed 
the asylum interview process represented 32 nationalities and countries of origin, 
with the largest groups consisting of citizens of Afghanistan, Nepal, Syria, India, 
Iran, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Iraq and Pakistan as well as Palestinians specifically 
from refugee camps in Lebanon. Our materials exclude children (n = 322) who 
were not interviewed given their young age, and almost 300 individuals of 
different nationalities who disappeared before interviews took place. 
As the table illustrates, the majority of asylum seekers using the Arctic route
transited through Russia. In particular, Afghan citizens entered Finland with their
extended families including individuals from several generations, partially reflect-
ing the large share of individuals who stayed in Russia many years as immigrants.
Nearly one-fourth of all asylum seekers had stayed and lived in Russia as immi-
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Table 10.1 Country of origin for asylum-seeking applicants by citizenship, immi-
grants in Russia, transit through Russia and family status. 
Citizenship Total Immigrant in Transit migrants With family 
Russia members 
n % n % % 



















































Pakistan 31 5 16 26 84 1 
Other countries 192 78 41 114 59 2 
Arctic route 1164 281 24 883 76 – 
immigrants and transit migrants stemmed from several aspects of an applicant’s
story: length of stay; initial intentions and plans, if available; and statements regard-
ing work, renewing visas, residence permits, asylum in Russia and their reasons
for remigrating. A short stay did not automatically indicate one’s status as a transit
migrant or longer stay immigration. In addition to these empirical materials from
asylum application protocols, we relied on research literature and reports, seminar
discussions and information from other sources (e.g., news items and statistics) to
contextualise our study and to better understand the migrants’ interpretations. 
Asylum interviews as narrated stories 
The asylum interview protocols are confidential and sensitive. We collected 
and read through these protocols viewing them as qualitative and quantitative 
data, which were compiled in an extensive Excel file at the Finnish Immigration 
Service’s premises in Helsinki. We, then, conducted a qualitative content analysis 
of these materials. Our research interests and analysis focus on asylum seekers’ 
experiences and interpretations of their motives for migration and asylum, their 
residence and everyday lives in Russia, as well as their narratives of their travel, 
border crossings and the organisation of their journeys. We were also interested 
in migrants’ images of Russia, Europe and Finland. We did not include in our 
analysis Finnish asylum policy, the asylum process or the grounds for seeking 
asylum in Finland. 
As official documents, asylum interview protocols describe the specific
context of these narratives. Interviews are conducted in a formal institutional
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the authorities, the asylum seeker and a translator. The materials can, therefore,
be characterised by various asymmetries (Tanttu 2017). Applicants occupy a
quite vulnerable situation with immense expectations and uncertainties regarding
their future, whilst the interviewer’s task is to determine the applicant’s travel
details and motives for asylum. In theory, this process is completed in the asylum
seeker’s native language through an interpreter, who also functions as a cultural
mediator. 
The highly sensitive issues discussed during the interviews conducted within 
this formal institutional setting mean that establishing trust in the process does 
not lie exclusively in the hands of the interviewer: the applicant’s background 
and previous encounters with authorities, for example, influence their capacity 
and willingness to talk openly. Because it is entirely possible that the applicant, 
despite encouragement from the interviewer, conceals or adds details with the 
expectation of a positive asylum decision, we cannot interpret the information 
in the protocols as ‘facts’, but rather as a particular type of narrative that reveals 
and conveys some important aspects of asylum seekers’ experiences. The large 
volume included in our sample may also reveal details regarding the broader 
migratory processes within which Arctic route migration occurred. 
We analyse the protocols as narrated stories in which asylum seekers 
reconstruct their migratory journeys, experiences and interpretations in relation 
to their social and cultural contexts. According to Patterson and Monroe (1998: 
330), narrated stories are a source of information in which people make sense 
of their lives, assemble information, conceive of themselves and interpret the 
world. Such stories include both the experiences and means of interpreting them 
available to those telling them. 
In practice, the asylum application protocols conducted during the 
(occasionally) complicated moments of interviews include several narrators. Some 
parts of the stories are written verbatim as the translator conveyed the applicant’s 
words; however, large parts of these documents consist of the words used by the 
interviewing authority to tell the applicant’s story. In the empirical part of this 
chapter, the narrated stories may, therefore, appear disorganised and disoriented. 
Yet, the form of these stories allows us to organise information about applicants’ 
migratory contexts and motives. In addition to ‘real experiences’, life contexts 
and motivations, the stories include various fears, prejudices and imaginings that 
may be secondary, yet still guide migrants’ hopes, intentions, plans for the future 
and the perspectives related to their agency. In relation to informal practices, the 
narratives incorporated descriptions of peer social networks, as well as encounters 
with other migrants, intermediaries, smugglers and authorities along the migration 
route. 
Repeated and highly emotional illustrations of informal practices and maltreat-
ment within the frameworks of the Russian legal system, governance and, particu-
larly, law enforcement, as well as the clear presence and involvement of different 
smugglers and intermediaries, tied informal practices to the rule of law. These not 
only produced severe daily insecurities amongst migrants, pushing them to leave, 
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State authorities and informal practices in Russia 
In Russia, informal payments have become instruments to overcome suspicion,
whilst the exchange of gifts and payments to police officers, migration offi-
cials and border guards has become staples of migrant life (Reeves 2013: 518).
Such practices clearly link to a broad culture of corruption that, according to
Malakhov (2014: 1075), has emerged as the primary factor determining cur-
rent immigration politics in today’s Russia. In Russia, corruption is a systemic
phenomenon closely linked to status inequality during interactions between citi-
zens and the state (Rimskii 2009; Gorenburg 2009). Whilst small payments are
both pervasive and potentially morally acceptable, actions taken by local-level
officials do not follow the legal–rational logic but, rather, the logic of material
interests. In places and sectors such as the healthcare setting, where the law is
inscrutable, corruption inevitably becomes a fact of life (Malakhov 2014: 1075;
Reeves 2013: 518). 
Migrants’ distrust of and frustration with police relates to the overall dissatis-
faction with officers’ tendency towards systematic involvement with self-serving 
corruption, contrary to the public interest (Semukhina and Reynolds 2014: 162). 
In this context of widespread corruption, migrant bodies are viewed simultane-
ously ‘as particularly untrustworthy and liable to fakery—and thus particularly 
legitimate targets for document checks, fines and threats of deportation’ (Reeves 
2013: 509). For migrants who often appear noticeably different and are non-citi-
zens without legal documents, this creates a space of uncertainty where, as Reeves 
(2013: 508) explains, ‘the states’ documentary regimes, racialising practices and 
migrant workers’ experience of everyday precariousness coincide’. 
Within the Arctic route, the behaviour of authorities and the self-guided mindsets 
of governance were crucial in creating insecurities amongst different groups of 
migrants. Such authorities formed practices that simultaneously allowed racism, 
different forms of misbehaviours, discrimination and abuse. Agadjanian et al. 
(2017: 2) argue that immigration laws and regulations create legal categories that 
include and exclude crucially shaping immigrants’ incorporation and life chances. 
In the context of widespread racism in Russian society, racialised practices and 
resentment towards ‘black’ are common amongst officials, businesses and housing 
markets. Boundary between legality and illegality is blurred, for example, when 
corrupt officials give consent to employers to act as ‘violent entrepreneurs’ 
(Voronkov 2002 in Malakhov 2014). They are thus not obligated to adhere to 
minimum wage laws and can exploit migrants. 
From the perspective of migrants, we can identify the intersectional charac-
ter of insecurity,3 where informal practices and concerns related to justice create 
overlapping insecurities that impact migrants, their positions and their relation-
ships within society when they attempt to manage their survival in extremely pre-
carious life contexts. In the next section, we examine the most obvious informal 
practices along the Arctic route. Whilst stories of mistrust of Russian officials, the 
judiciary and the rule of law dominated, informal practices obviously also created 
opportunities for migrants. These included the possibility of getting off scot-free 
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when they violated a law by, for instance, overstaying their visa or not obeying a 
deportation order issued by a local court. 
The Russian judiciary and migrant vulnerability 
The mindset towards the Russian judiciary amongst migrants using the Arctic route 
centred on the arbitrary, or even illegal, conduct related to Russian governance. 
In many cases, different structures of governance were used interchangeably, 
reflecting their interconnected and obscure character, migrants’ unfamiliarity with 
the system and their upsetting encounters with Russian authorities, businesses 
and, sometimes, Russian society in general. Most descriptions detailed corruption 
and how both the Russian legal system and Russian society felt unjust. A 34-year-
old Afghan man, who had applied for asylum in Russia several times, for example, 
expressed it: 
The Russian authorities can make up [the reasons for a negative asylum 
application decision] themselves. I appealed the decision to the court. They 
sent a letter to my home indicating that my court appearance date was three 
days before [the letter arrived]. They had sent the letter late intentionally, so 
I did not have a chance to appeal. That was in 2011, when I received my first 
negative decision. (Row 284) 
This man believes that the court intentionally acted against his interest. Another 
29-year-old Afghan man raised the question of racism, which was particularly 
obvious in descriptions of the police, but also in descriptions of other authorities. 
Such narratives usually reflected specific encounters with racism in Russia, on 
the one hand, and the arbitrary use of legislative power, on the other. Instead of 
receiving assistance, the police rejected this man’s criminal report of assault and, 
instead, verbally attacked him. In addition, this man’s entire family was issued 
a deportation order, even though they had lived in Russia for five years and his 
children were born in the country. 
[The applicant] turned to the help of the Russian authorities in 2015 as he 
feared being in danger of death. Relatives and the ex-husband of his Russian 
partner attacked him and the applicant tried to file a criminal report. ‘The 
authorities said, “Russia is a country of Russians and you can’t report a crime 
against them.”’ They issued a deportation order to the applicant and his 
family, even though his children were born in Russia. (Row 35) 
In contrast to members of national diasporas, immigrants and transit migrants 
rarely had a high educational background or sufficient knowledge of the Russian 
language and society, including Russian legislation, as well as labour and housing 
markets. Consequently, such individuals were easily subjected to different kinds 
of abuses, pressures and shams. As irregular migrants, they were threatened with 
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of the following characteristics common to global and Russian migrant labour 
markets. These included big promises by agents and intermediaries, harsh realities 
and unrealistic expectations amongst migrants and abuses of power by business 
owners: 
I was promised that I could save 70 000 rupees a month [€625], get a job at a 
hotel, but everything was a lie. Instead, I was gardening in Moscow and was 
paid nothing at all. Only money for rent and container living. The working 
hours were a minimum of 12 hours, sometimes 18 [per day]. … When we 
were working there and demanded our salary for food, we were told, ‘If you 
demand money, we will call the police and return you to Nepal.’ … We are 
not machines, but people. If you were sick, you got no money and faced 
hunger all the time. … Russia is a bad place; they have no laws or system. I 
do not understand their language. (Row 146) 
Agadjanian, Menjívar and Zotova (2017) observed in their analysis of Central 
Asian migrants in Russia how migrants’ legal status directly correlated with the 
likelihood of experiencing harassment at the hands of law enforcement agents, 
other authorities and various actors. This also emerged in our materials, where the 
largest risk for abuse was amongst irregular migrants who may have arrived in 
Russia legally but who, for one reason or another, could not renew their residence 
or work permits even after several years’ residence in the country. Consequently, 
they would avoid the police and migration officers as well as public places for fear 
of being arrested and deported. Incidents of corruption, maltreatment and abuses 
of power amongst migrants were common. 
Corruption, maltreatment and the abuse of power 
Migrants using the Arctic route described a highly negative overall impression 
of Russian state officers. The main concern shaping this impression related to 
the above-described culture of corruption, but it also stemmed from the severe 
maltreatment and abuse of power perpetrated by state authorities, particularly by 
the police. Because deportation orders (see below for further details) and travel to 
the border were primarily organised by smugglers and other intermediaries, the 
migrants’ personal encounters with the Russian court system and border services 
in the north remained limited. Despite confusing various authorities stationed 
along the Northern border areas, illustrating well the vague notion of the migration 
process in general, the below description from a 26-year-old North African man 
on his transit to Finland provides a rare, neutral, if not slightly positive, view of 
Russian authorities: 
In Murmansk, the police said that we had to leave the country since our 
visas were running out. The police said that we must connect with Finland or 
Norway. He also showed us a taxi that would supposedly get us to the Finnish 
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was working at a checkpoint before the border. That police officer collected 
and checked our documents at the checkpoint and called the border to tell 
them that we were coming. He told the border agent that we should be able to 
cross the border swimmingly well. (Row 73) 
In contrast, stories frequently described constant stops, arrests and forced bribery 
as well as ‘robberies’ and ‘kidnappings’, where police officers not only demanded 
money and detained individuals for an hour or two but even transported migrants 
to a forest to exert further pressure on them. Based on studies amongst African 
immigrants in Russia (see, e.g., Virkkunen et al. 2019; Bondarenko 2018; 
Bondarenko et al. 2009), the experiences of highly educated national diasporas in 
Russia were also quite different from the experiences of ‘new’ African immigrants. 
Businessmen and diplomats who completed their education in Soviet or Russian 
universities, who knew the Russian language, received Russian citizenship and 
integrated into a transnational lifestyle did not face, or at least describe, similar 
concerns or experiences. Despite a similar status within the ethnic hierarchy as that 
amongst newer African migrants, their social and economic status complete with 
solid contacts and a transnational lifestyle directed these members of diasporas 
to an entirely alternate living environment and experiences in the country. Thus, 
members of such diasporas neither left Russia through the Arctic route nor were 
they represented in our materials. 
In addition to the asylum seekers’ social and legal status in Russia, the arbitrary 
behaviour of police officers represented one of the main reasons justifying 
migrants’ decision to leave Russia. A 22-year-old Guinean man described how he 
experienced fairly common incidents of racism and a racialised implementation 
of the law. This man arrived in Russia as a student in 2012, three years before 
leaving for the Arctic, and ended up doing odd jobs as an irregular migrant when 
his university closed and his visa expired. After being physically attacked in the 
Metro, he wanted to file a report on the incident to the police but was refused 
given his background. For him, the arbitrary actions of the police represented the 
overall racism within the country: 
But if you don’t have anything in Russia, you are nothing. I cannot even talk 
about it. I was beaten up on the Metro twice. I tried to explain that to the 
police, but they were not interested since I was an African. I have worked 
a lot and did not get paid, and they just tell me to go away. … Russians 
often say, ‘You, African, why are you here? Why don’t you live in France 
or somewhere else?’ Russia is the most racist country, even they [Russians] 
say so. (Row 190) 
According to Agadjanian et al. (2017; see, also, Levada Centre 2019), the idea of 
‘Russia for ethnic Russians’ has been fully or partly supported by half of Russia’s 
population since the early 2000s. In larger cities, there are numerous public 
places (such as Metro stations) where migrants are exposed to police checks of 
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years’ experience in Moscow well crystallises the ambiguity of the document 
check procedure, which is officially justified by the rhetoric of security. For most 
of the time, he and his family did not occupy the position of irregular migrants. 
Yet, he still struggled with residence registration, which is simultaneously the 
cornerstone of the Russian residence system5 and, in general, one of the most 
problematic sources of insecurity for immigrants in Russia (Piipponen and 
Virkkunen 2020; Nikiforova and Brednikova 2018; Reeves 2013). Because he 
stood out given his skin colour, he was constantly stopped: 
when the Russian police sees that your skin colour is different and recognises 
you from that. They tell me to come over. Even if you have your documents, 
they will bring you to the police car, check and empty your pockets and let 
you go. They have even learned Dari, since there are many Afghans over 
there. (Row 79) 
The document check was described in detail as a racialised practice by many 
asylum seekers, including South Asian and sub-Saharan and North African 
migrants. In order to add to the emotional impact, the procedure involved not only 
a formal ID check and check of possible registration and work permit, but also 
included demands for bribes. Because such interactions could well lead to arrest or 
deportation, this man experienced them as extremely frustrating and frightening. 
Many of the Afghan migrants, for example, who grew up in Russia or in Iran 
and had no contacts in Afghanistan, were particularly terrified of possible forced 
deportation. The following narratives from two Nepalese men, a 31-year-old and 
a 26-year-old, respectively, capture how irregularities were ‘open to monetary 
negotiation with state officials’ (Reeves 2013: 518) along the Arctic route as well. 
In this context, informal payments helped ‘to overcome the space of suspicion 
between physical and documented person’ (ibid.) on behalf of the police, whilst 
simultaneously creating serious insecurities among migrants: 
It was very difficult to move around. As soon as the police see us, they want
money. If you don’t give them [money], they will take [it]. Sometimes they
caught us and brought us to the forest. … If we give them 500–1000 roubles,
they leave. If you give them less than 500–1000 roubles, they will take you to
the forest and leave you there. When I was new and did not even know my way;
it was difficult to get back. Besides, I did not have lots of money. (Row 95) 
If you don’t give the money, you will be driven far away and left there. 
We were afraid all the time. They always told me that if ‘you don’t give us 
money, you will be returned back to Nepal’. (Row 146) 
In her study, Reeves (2013: 517) also emphasised that it was not only the status
of the document per se that was important regarding perceptions of legality but
also familiarity with the Moscow Metro that could signify a broader ability to
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background due to their different skin colour, ‘you’ve got to walk like you know
where you’re going, even if you haven’t a clue’ (ibid.). Apart from avoiding
public places, this cultural adaptation was presented as another way to avoid
‘falling’ to the police. 
Ambiguous deportation orders 
Informal practices in our material also related to the twofold use of deportation 
orders as components of the Russian migration policy and the Arctic route. 
Kubal (2019: 67–69) introduced Daniel Kanstroom’s (2000) twofold model of 
deportation—that is, deportation as border control and deportation as social order. 
Whilst deportation as border control refers to ‘a consequence of a violation of 
the contract between the migrant and the host country as inherent to immigration 
law’, the social control model signifies a ‘method of control of the behaviour of 
non-citizens for their post-entry misconduct’ (Kubal 2019: 67-68). In the latter 
case, a deportation order is typically issued by a court as a result of a non-citizen 
breaking the laws of the host-state territory. A deportation order carries both 
regulatory and punitive elements. 
In the context of Arctic route migration, deportation orders certainly carried 
both functions. Most migrants entered Russia legally but ended up in the country 
as irregular migrants since renewing documents was exceedingly difficult, and 
they were often persecuted for different forms of misconduct whether they broke a 
law or not. For migrants, this control resulted in abusive and arbitrary encounters 
with the police or other authorities leading to a possible forced deportation, 
contributing to other daily insecurities. 
Yet another understanding of a deportation order that was rather desirable 
consisted of an administrative procedure, allowing migrants to cross the border to 
Finland. Formally, a deportation order followed the usual procedures of justice. 
It was issued by local courts in Moscow or Murmansk as a result of breaking 
a law, typically overstaying a visa. In this case, both the deportation order and 
court procedures functioned as tools of the Russian migration policy and border 
governance, allowing migrants to leave whilst also restricting their return to the 
Russian Federation following departure. For immigrants and transit migrants 
alike, with or without a valid visa, this guaranteed them access across the Russian 
border to the Finnish border and increased their expectation of successful 
migration to Finland. The asylum interview with a 28-year-old Nigerian woman 
(as summarised by the interviewer) describes her journey across the Russian 
border checkpoint: 
Went to the Nigerian embassy after about 6 years and got herself a passport. 
Next, she got the exit permit from authorities and paid the 5000-rouble fine. 
Flew from Moscow to Murmansk where the authorities questioned the appli-
cant and checked the legality and authenticity of her documents. ‘They asked 
me where I was going, and I answered that I was going to Finland. … At the 
border, the Russian authorities completed a security check and checked my 
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documents, took away the exit permit at the last checkpoint. That is called 
a deportation order. If you did not pay, you could not get away.’ (Row 294) 
Since travel was often organised by family members, and assisted by family 
members, smugglers and other intermediaries, migrants themselves were 
not necessarily aware of all of the required documents and procedures. In our 
materials, deportation orders were also referred to as ‘exit permits’, ‘exit passes’ 
or, in some cases, ‘exit visas’. Interestingly, the deportation order and the officials 
organising those transformed from corrupt and something necessitating fear to 
supportive and purely administrative components of the process. The examples 
of the Nigerian woman above and of this 29-year-old Afghan man well illustrate 
this contradiction: 
The Russian border authorities treated us ok even though we did not have 
a residence permit in Russia. In Moscow, we got a 5000-rouble fine for 
being in the country illegally and we were given a pass to exit the country by 
ourselves. (Row 222) 
Intermediaries negotiating the Arctic route 
Russia plays an integral role in global migration, and the Arctic route appeared to 
serve as an alternative route for many transit migrants. Whilst much of the media 
attention on migration routes focuses on the role of traffickers and smugglers, 
Leman and Janssens (2015: 1) noted that neither illegal migration nor all illegal 
transport of people by individual smugglers or ‘soloist’ traffickers across borders 
without the acquisition of real profits accounts for people smuggling. By definition, 
this involves illegal profits accumulated by a trafficker through transport. Yet, 
this is usually facilitated by a range of agents, smugglers and transnational 
intermediaries, such as travel agencies, global smuggling networks, local mafia-
like groups, individual business owners and business-minded individuals, who 
view migrants as an opportunity to earn extra income. Corruption also plays a 
fundamental role in migrant smuggling (McAuliffe and Laczko 2016). 
The last section of this chapter deals with the seemingly non-state informal 
practices that remained tightly connected to the above-described weaknesses of 
the state. The migrants relying on the Arctic route were rather heterogeneous. 
Whilst some migrants were totally dependent on agents and smugglers, others 
organised their trip to Russia and through the North themselves without (almost) 
any assistance. 
Agents, smugglers and transnational criminal activities 
Along the Arctic route, many of the migrants used agents and smugglers during 
their trip to Russia and further to Finland. These ‘agents’ actually represented a 
diverse set of well-networked smugglers and other actors in different places and 
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illegal human smuggling business, friends, family members and acquaintances 
as well as travel agencies were crucial in providing migrants with assistance and 
information about various possibilities. Instead of forming a straightforward 
process, travel typically took place in segments, such as first to Moscow, then 
to other parts of Russia or the post-Soviet space, where the migrants stayed in 
hotel rooms or apartments whilst their agents organised documents and sought 
solutions for subsequent legs of the journey. The role of agents—or smugglers— 
were pivotal both for labour migrants who intended to stay in Russia for work 
purposes and for migrants passing through Russia to the European Union. The 
following asylum interview with a 26-year-old Palestinian asylum seeker from 
Lebanon describes the process with ‘full service’ to Finland: 
Applicant’s mother paid US$7000 to the smuggler who organised the
[applicant’s route] from Lebanon to Finland. The smuggler stayed in
Lebanon. … Four Russian-speaking persons met the applicant in Moscow
and helped him further to Murmansk. … The smuggler in Lebanon organ-
ised everything for the trip and there was always some Russian-speaking
person to escort [them] further. … In Murmansk, the applicant was told that
if he pays US$500 more for the Russian assistant, he will be allowed into
Finland faster. The applicant got more money from his mother in Lebanon,
paid the required sum to the Russian assistant and was able to continue his
trip. (Row 1098) 
This Palestinian used the well-connected international ‘smuggling service’ net-
work to organise his trip to Russia and further to Finland. Those immigrants 
who lived in Russia and knew the Russian language could organise their travel 
to Murmansk independently with no need for expensive agents or smugglers. 
However, for most transit migrants and other immigrants, the trip to Russia and 
further to Finland was possible only through intermediaries with contacts and 
local expertise. Such migrants’ poor knowledge of Russian and the country in 
general, combined with lofty promises and future expectations, led to vulnerabili-
ties, whereby they were subjected to shams and abuses. The following narratives 
from two Nepalese men, 24- and 26-years-old, respectively, who were originally 
labour migrants, illustrate how misleading promises related to legal documents, 
high-paying jobs, an improved quality of life and the possibility of sending remit-
tances can lead to completely unrealistic expectations, disappointments and deci-
sions to remigrate: 
Agents organised the work visa to Russia for me. I don’t remember his name, 
but he was Nepalese. I had to pay him about 600 000 rupees (about €5000). 
I signed a contract that included a visa, plane tickets and a Russian work 
permit. In the contract, they promised me a job, food and that I can save about 
US$700 per month. There was no work, but I got work from somewhere else 
in Moscow. In the toy store, my salary was US$330 a month. The salary was 
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The smuggler organised all the work-related things. He promised a good
job and a salary. Nothing he said came true. I had to work 16 or 17 hours
a day. I got food once a day. … In Moscow, I went to some travel agency
where they let me know how I can get to Finland, and we booked flights to
Murmansk. Perhaps the name of the travel agency was on my plane ticket,
but it was in Russian. I paid 4500 roubles for the plane ticket to Murmansk.
(Row 137) 
Whilst both of these Nepalese men were cheated and endured long working hours 
and relatively low pay, a common occurrence for labour migrants in Russia, they 
did not experience serious abuses, such as that described by a number of migrants 
from different parts of Africa. A Nigerian woman described the realities of human 
trafficking in Russia, similar to descriptions appearing in the international media 
in recent years (see, e.g., Taub 2017; Kuronen 2019): 
The woman had other girls in Russia who had been involved with
prostitution. The woman demanded that I join them. She had paid for my
trip to Russia and I had to work for her since I had no friends that could
help me. I told the woman that I do not want to do that work, but that I can
do hair. … In Nigeria, there is no work. … I have no one in Nigeria. My
mother and father died in 2010. I am not threatened by anything in Nigeria.
(Row 692) 
According to Taub (2017), thousands of young Nigerians on their way to Europe
are subject to human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation. As a
highly gendered phenomenon, this sort of exploitation also involved different
forms of physical and psychological violence (Gerassi 2018; UNODC 2018).
In our materials, sexual exploitation amongst trafficked individuals involved
deprivations of liberty, rape, death threats and extortion. In this respect, the
stories of human trafficking in our materials were part of a wider international
phenomenon: 
‘One woman brought me to Russia and promised me work as a dressmaker, 
but when I came to Russia she forced me into prostitution.’ … When the 
applicant refused prostitution, the woman beat her and took her phone. She 
was not allowed to leave the house freely. The applicant lived in the house of 
that woman for years (and worked as a prostitute between 2012–2015) until 
one day she found her passport and ran away. (Row 694) 
The victims of human trafficking, like the 38-year-old Nigerian woman above, 
were usually tricked to Russia with stories of ‘regular’ jobs in hair salons, 
restaurants or dressmaker’s shops. In reality, they ended up in serious debt and 
forced prostitution. Smugglers and intermediaries demanded that they repay all 
travel-related expenses in amounts totalling up to US$45,000. Only the border-
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Taxi drivers and local businesses 
The last group of intermediaries along the Arctic route examined in this chapter 
consists of local actors ranging from individuals to business owners who helped 
migrants in the North close to the Finnish border. Since the Arctic route was used 
in autumn and the depths of winter and traversed the remote Arctic periphery 
with up to a two-week queue close to the Finnish border, migrants travelling from 
Murmansk to the border required external assistance related to transport, lodging 
and local knowledge. Apart from global networks, assistance was provided 
by ‘soloist’ actors and well-organised businesses, such as taxi companies and 
hotels with solid contacts with the police and the border services. These soloists 
understood the local conditions, infrastructures and contexts of border crossing. 
The price, quality and risks of a ‘service’ depended upon the assistance required, 
the character of the provider and, undoubtedly, how dependent the migrant was on 
the intermediary. During his asylum interview, a 38-year-old North African male 
transit migrant described how he organised his travel to Murmansk on his own 
and how he found his driver in the lobby of his Murmansk hotel: 
Heard how to travel to Finland from the internet. There he was told that he 
could get a flight to Moscow and to Murmansk, and from there he could get 
across the border. Received no assistance from anyone in organising his trip 
but organised it himself. Took a taxi from Murmansk airport and went to the 
hotel. … In the hotel lobby, he was asked if he was on his way to Norway. He 
told the individual that he was on his way to Finland, and the person offered 
him a ride for US$500. There were also other passengers in the car. It was not 
a taxi, but a civilian car. Before the border check, they were given bicycles 
and the applicant continued to the border. (Row 196) 
This man did not use international smuggling networks or other intermediaries 
before reaching Murmansk. Whilst travel to the border was typically organised by 
taxi drivers, the narratives of the following 28-year-old Syrian man and 36-year-
old Guinean man reveal the essential role of hotels along the Arctic route. Hotels 
functioned not only as places of accommodation and waiting, but also significant 
spaces for interaction between migrants, intermediaries and authorities: 
Spent a week in Murmansk. At the hotel, people speaking Arabic told him 
about a Russian van driver who drove him close to the Finnish border. … Paid 
US$1200 for a bicycle, transport and hotel accommodation. (Row 391) 
At the first border guard/army checkpoint in Kantalahti, people in the car 
were informed about two hotels in Kantalahti and that more information can 
be received at the hotel. … Upon arrival, the hotel personnel wrote down the 
information of the person arriving and let the authorities know. … There are 
two hotels in Kantalahti and both hotels have the same system: Immigration 
Service officers come to the hotel to tell asylum seekers whose turn it is to 
depart to Finland. The applicant says that he has heard that it is possible to pay 
  



















Informal practices and the rule of law 209 
to progress more quickly in the queue, but the applicant did not pay anything 
extra and instead waited for his turn. … The list was at reception. … The 
personnel from the Immigration Services determine the number and decide 
whose turn it is. (Row 864) 
These fragments from quite different migrant stories closely touch upon a matter 
widely discussed in Finland when the Arctic route immigration took place, namely, 
how likely the entire scenario was without the direct involvement, or at least the 
acceptance of, the FSB and the Russian state (see, e.g., Nerg and Järvenkylä 
2019; Huhta 2016b; Rautio 2016). These narratives clearly demonstrate that both 
migration and the Arctic route represented a combination of global migration, 
engagement amongst diverse intermediaries and engagement with the state, 
particularly at the border. Therefore, it was also possible to close the route through 
bilateral negotiations. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, we analysed the Russian state as a legal power, focusing on informal 
practices and the ways that these informal practices contributed to migration during 
the so-called Arctic route to Finland. A careful study of migrants’ narratives on 
Russia and their journeys along the Arctic route reveals how various state and 
non-state informal practices and issues related to the rule of law intertwined and, 
thus, influenced both people on the move and the route in general. Whilst the deep-
rooted culture of corruption and migrants’ ambivalent encounters with Russian 
authorities, such as the police created deep-seated frustrations and insecurities 
amongst migrants, these understandings simultaneously facilitated migration to 
and from Russia to Finland. At the same time, non-state actors such as agents, 
smugglers and business owners functioned as intermediaries by negotiating and 
navigating through migratory practices along the route. 
The individuals using the Arctic route for migration varied. For transit
migrants, the route functioned as another route in global migration, an
alternative to the crowded Mediterranean and Balkan routes to the European
Union. After hearing about the route via (usually online) traditional or social
media platforms, or from family members, friends or acquaintances, many
organised their travel relatively independently to Russia and further to the
North. However, many others used agents, human smuggling and other well-
connected transnational crime networks during the process. These nefarious
actors not only subjected migrants to varying vulnerabilities and insecurities
along the way but, importantly, made their migration possible. Amongst the
other group, consisting of labour migrants, students and refugees residing in
Russia, a rather different situation emerged. Many of them, although certainly
not all, possessed better linguistic and other knowledge necessary to organise
their own travel to the North, where they joined transit migrants towards the
Finnish border. Because the Arctic route ‘episode’ took place in late autumn and
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of travel in the North was possible only with assistance from local taxi drivers,
businesses and individuals who helped migrants not only with transport but also
with accommodation. Apart from gaining material benefit from the situation
themselves, these local actors also functioned as mediators between migrants
and the state. 
Confirming assumptions held by the Finnish public and put forth in political dis-
cussions, the Russian state bureaucracy was aware and, even, somewhat involved 
in the Arctic route by granting asylum-seeking migrants with deportation orders 
(that is, ‘exit permits’, ‘exit passes’ or ‘exit visas’, as migrants referred to them) 
to enter the normally well-guarded border zone in the North and to approach the 
Finnish border. The route was not a state-organised practice. Migrants exhibited 
their own agency, and, with assistance from intermediaries between migrants and 
the state, could manage their trip to Finland and the European Union. In other 
words, because informal practices functioned as the contextual foundation for 
migration in Russia and along the Arctic route, transnational and local intermedi-
aries with their contacts negotiated concrete solutions and practices for migrants 
and the state bureaucracy alike. Without these, neither transnational migration nor 
the Arctic route would have been possible. 
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Notes 
1 For Norway, see Moe and Rowe (2016) and Mikhailova (2018). 
2 The asylum application protocols consist of asylum investigation protocols (turvapaikk 
akuulustelupöytäkirja) conducted by the Finnish Border Guard or the Police of Finland, 
and asylum hearing protocols (turvapaikkapuhuttelupöytäkirja) conducted by the 
Finnish Immigration Service. The former are fixed forms, whereby an officer verifies 
the applicants’ travel documents, identification, route travelled, border crossings, 
accompanying persons and other family members and former places of residence, 
including possible asylum applications pending or submitted in other countries. The 
latter determines the grounds for the applicant’s application of asylum. Because the 
conditions and motivations for asylum vary, the hearing questions are determined on 
a case-by-case basis. Here, we use the term ‘asylum interview’ or ‘asylum application 
protocol’ to refer to these materials as a whole. 
3 The idea of the intersectional character of migrants’ insecurity derives from the theory 
of feminist sociology, which focuses on how an individual’s social identities, such 
as gender, race, class, age and sexuality, combine when describing and explaining 
different kinds of social, political and personal inequalities (see, e.g., Yuval-Davis 2015; 
Smith and Marmo 2011). Thus, migrants’ insecurity in Russia was comprehensive and 
not determined by a single factor, such as by race or gender alone but, rather, by a 
combination of factors. 
4 The row numbers of the quotations refer to the collected Excel dataset of the original 
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We avoided collection of applicants’ names and other personal information unneces-
sary for the research. 
5 The procedure for residence registration dates back to the Soviet-era residence permit 
system and the infamous institution of ‘residence registration’ (propiska) (Nikiforova 
and Brednikova 2018; Reeves 2013; Nozhenko 2010). The propiska anchored 
individuals to a particular place, usually a city or town, allowing them access to the 
labour market and social services in that location. Formally, the propiska was abolished 
after 1993, but it was essentially reintroduced as the ‘residence registration system’
(registratsia), an important entry point to legal status and social benefits, such as 
education, health services and the Russian housing market. 
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11 ‘Ask us decently and then we 
will not reject anyone!’ 
Providing informal healthcare in a Kazakh 
medical space 
Bakyt Muratbayeva and Benjamin Quasinowski 
Introduction 
Mobility tends to accompany new, strange and unknown contexts otherwise 
deemed stable and familiar, contexts characterised by taken-for-granted and 
approved, ‘good’ practices and ways of living. Thus, mobility can increase social 
contingency. As such, it also creates spaces of insecurity and fluidity, which, 
in turn, provide the conditions for the emergence of new forms of informality. 
Studying such spaces facilitates a theoretical examination of the connection 
between everyday aspects of mobility and informality. Vigorous debate surrounds 
the role and breadth of practices related to informal welfare provision in post-
socialist countries (Polese et al. 2015). Is informality per se counterproductive 
with regard to attempts to guarantee universal welfare through the establishment 
of corresponding state infrastructures? Or can practices of informality take on a 
complementary function, existing alongside formal practices, in spaces beyond 
the reach of states’ formal practices related to welfare provision? 
This chapter is an empirically grounded attempt to contribute to this debate. 
We focus on informal practices in primary healthcare (PHC) services for people 
occupying the margins of official regulations in rural Kazakhstan. Primarily, we 
argue that in post-Soviet Kazakhstan a number of practices related to the informal 
provision of healthcare have emerged in connection with a new mode of translocal 
mobility and the emergence of a new category of ‘paperless’ migrants. Alongside 
initiatives to reform and digitise the country’s healthcare system, these practices 
have recently come under pressure, although they persist today. These practices 
of informality tend to take on a complementary role to the formal provision of 
healthcare services, particularly in rural contexts where regulatory frameworks 
are often inconsistent or entirely absent. 
Kazakhstan offers an interesting case for examining the connection between 
everyday aspects of mobility and informality for at least two reasons. Firstly, 
mobility is both a historical and contemporary constant of the country. According 
to the International Migration Report (2017), 20% of Kazakhstan’s population 
consists of international migrants. In absolute terms, this equates with over 3.5 
million people, which, in turn, accounts for around 66% of the approximately 5.5 
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population inhabiting Kazakhstan, the ninth-largest country in the world in terms 
of landmass, has long been mobile, from Kazakh nomads seeking better pastures 
(Olcott 1995) to the deportees sent there by Stalin (Pohl 2007), from students 
arriving through Khrushchev’s Virgin Lands Campaign to today’s Oralmandar— 
that is, the ‘returnees’ of the Kazakh diaspora (Diener 2005). 
Secondly, Kazakhstan offers a paradigmatic case in mobility leading to 
new informal practices. In the literature on global health, the notion of PHC is 
often associated with the Alma-Ata Declaration (Packard 2016: 227). Although 
some serious efforts have been made by the Kazakh Ministry of Health towards 
implementing reforms (Obermann et al. 2016; Jones et al. 2017), universal health 
coverage and PHC remain unrealised (Lane 2018; Shukshin 2019). In particular, 
the ‘[p]rovision of healthcare in rural areas is one of the main challenges facing 
the Kazakh health system’ (Footman et al. 2014: 190-191f). The decrease in 
financing available to the healthcare system after 1991 has yet not been completely 
reversed, leading to considerable amounts of private out-of-pocket payments for 
healthcare services (Shukshin 2019: 250). Rural areas and PHC facilities remain 
undersupplied in comparison to urban areas and hospitals (Rechel et al. 2013). 
Moreover, rural populations tend to have less access to pharmaceuticals (Footman 
et al. 2014: 190). Finally, a tradition of informal payments for health has existed 
for quite some time and remains widespread (Ensor 2004: 239). 
In what follows, we first introduce the ethnographic field site from whence 
we drew our data. The structure of the chapter then proceeds in a way similar to 
a pair of binoculars, whereby we zoom in to focus on ever-smaller sections of 
the landscape at two different times: from a historical sketch of the emergence 
of biomedicine in Kazakhstan during the era of Soviet internal migration to 
its repercussions in a rural village community; then, from the flows of return 
migration amongst the Kazakh diaspora in the post-Soviet era back to the rural 
community, now undergoing some grave changes vis-á-vis its hospital, its 
discourses surrounding marginalised outsiders and informal practices related to 
healthcare provision. 
Ethnographic research in a rural hospital 
The research presented in this chapter was carried out within the context of 
two PhD projects: one focused on the role of ethnicity in medical interactions 
(Muratbayeva), and the other on the global diffusion of biomedical institutions 
(Quasinowski). We conducted ethnographic fieldwork in a village in eastern 
Kazakhstan and, specifically, in a local hospital. An acquaintance of ours, 
the director of the hospital, assisted us in gaining access to the community of 
Kyzylzhar1 as well as to the hospital itself. The hospital served as our primary 
field site for more than 12 months between 2015 and 2017. 
Kyzylzhar is located in a sparsely populated steppe area bordering China. Since 
the mid-twentieth century, Kyzylzhar has been home to a population of several 
thousand residents. A wave of out-migration followed the disintegration of the 
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and Germans left. Today, about 8500 people continue living in the village. Whilst 
the 1990s witnessed the shutdown and relocation of several factories and state-run 
enterprises, some important administrative and state-run infrastructure remains, 
including the local government office (akimat), a postal and telecommunications 
office, a police station and the local hospital. The hospital is divided into a number 
of functional sections. Firstly, it houses a clinic that primarily provides outpatient 
PHC services. Secondly, a small inpatient facility houses 15 beds. Thirdly, a small 
emergency department is staffed 24 hours a day with a paramedic (fel’dsher). 
In the hospital, we completed observations, talked with and learnt from staff 
members and, with their consent, made video- and audio-recordings of their 
daily work activities. One focus of these observations was the daily conferences 
(pyatiminutka), which take place at 9.00 each morning and which most staff 
members attend. These daily conferences provide an organisational space for 
the exchange of information and for status updates on work-related issues, 
such as patients’ health conditions or the hospital’s current medical supplies. 
They also serve as nodes for orders and instructions—that is, for organising the 
administrative and organisational work of the hospital. 
Here, we primarily rely on the existing literature on biomedicine and migration 
to and within Kazakhstan, data from our own observations and on our interviews 
with hospital staff. 
Mobility and medicine in Soviet Kazakhstan 
In order to develop an initial understanding of the daily affairs within the village 
hospital, it is important to situate it within a broader historical context and 
within the processes that led to the consolidation of biomedical knowledge and 
institutions in Kazakhstan (Michaels 2003; cf. Lock and Nguyen 2018 on the 
notion of biomedicine). The introduction of biomedical institutions in Central 
Asia is a relatively recent phenomenon, deeply interwoven with the establishment 
of Soviet power. The first period of this process of establishment, from around 
1918 to 1941, was characterised by a slow but continuous growth and the spread 
of biomedical institutions into the rural areas of the country. According to the 
plans of Soviet officials, the benefits of biomedicine were to reach every corner of 
this large Soviet republic (Michaels 2003: 109). During that period, ‘the original 
emphasis was on communicable disease control and the development of a rural 
primary healthcare infrastructure’ (Katsaga et al. 2012: 15). 
However, as Michaels shows, biomedicine—compared to more traditional
forms of medicine—served not only the purpose of improving the overall health
conditions of the population, but also held political significance. In the Kazakh
Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), the institutionalisation of biomedicine helped to
diffuse and popularise the ideas of the Soviet cultural revolution. As Michaels
argues, the Soviet authorities ‘saw medical educational institutions as laboratories
of social engineering’ (2003: 96). Having learnt about political economy in special
courses included in their curricula at universities, the new medical elite was not only
charged with propagating the newest standards of hygiene but were also expected
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to spread the words of Marx and Lenin. Doctors often became authoritative figures
in their local communities and served as models of the ‘new Soviet person’. 
A second important period for the development of the biomedical infrastructure 
in Kazakhstan was the Second World War. Throughout this time, the Kazakh 
SSR witnessed two large migratory flows of members of the medical profession: 
one into the country, and the other out of the country. On the one hand, many 
practitioners were drafted into the Red Army, with many sent to the frontline 
of the war. As a consequence, the Kazakh SSR struggled with a severe lack of 
medical practitioners. The Soviet government attempted to compensate for this 
shortage by increasing the number of trained professionals. Simultaneously, Nazi 
Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 led to the evacuation of a number 
of important medical facilities from Moscow, Leningrad and other cities at risk 
of being attacked. Amongst the evacuated staff were some of Soviet Russia’s key 
professors. After the end of the war, these professors began to play major roles in 
establishing medical facilities in the Kazakh SSR. 
One consequence of these developments was that after the war more doctors 
and other medical professionals had been trained than ever before. Moreover, 
these professionals were no longer concentrated in the country’s urban areas. As 
Michaels writes, ‘By the early 1950s, meaningful headway had been made in 
bringing biomedicine to even the most remote areas of Kazakhstan’ (Michaels 
2003: 109). Thus, these developments suggest that migratory flows have been a 
key feature, or even driver, of biomedical institutionalisation in the territory of 
what is today the Republic of Kazakhstan. 
This mode of mobility was not confined to medicine, however. Instead, 
mobility represented an experience historically shared by large parts of the 
country’s population—that is, it represents a collective experience. In addition to 
the previously mentioned events specifically affecting the medical profession, a 
number of other events contributed to the formation of this collective experience 
in more general terms. Firstly, collectivisation, relocation and dekulakisation (the 
dispossession of peasants conceived of as large property owners) decimated the 
Kazakh population, from 3.6 million in 1926 to 2.3 million in 1939. These events 
also destroyed the last remnants of the nomadic way of life in the region (Kindler 
2014; Olcott 1995; Alekseenko and Masanov 2000: 380). Secondly, with the 
onset of Stalin’s purges in the mid-1930s, the sociocultural configuration of the 
Kazakh SSR continued to dramatically change as the country became the new 
home for hundreds of thousands of deportees (Martin 2001: 328). Amongst these 
were approximately 449,000 Germans, 24,500 Chechens, 100,000 Koreans and 
81,000 Ingushets (Alekseenko and Masanov 2000: 390). Finally, with the land 
reclamation programmes initiated by Khrushchev following Stalin’s death, which 
were intended to solve problems related to supplying the USSR with agricultural 
products, another estimated 1–2 million settlers came to the Kazakh SSR (Pohl 
2007: 238; Olcott 1995: Ch. 10). These people were mainly sent to the northern 
parts of the country, which likewise became the primary destinations for forced 
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As a consequence of these multifaceted migratory flows, many rural villages
suddenly comprised a mixture of socially and culturally diverse groups. Routines
related to dealing with cultural and ethnic alterity and difference in everyday life
became necessary. It seems that the collective experience of being a stranger, migrant
or refugee or a victim of Stalinist repression facilitated the social integration of the
newly emerging diversity. Thus, we argue that this very specific kind of collective
experience of mobility laid the foundation for a particular kind of conviviality,
which is often mentioned by members of the country’s older generation when
pressed to describe Soviet times (Pohl 2007: 251). If only because they often had
no other choice, people devised ways of managing their daily dealings with cultural
and ethnic others, even under circumstances where almost everyone was a stranger. 
Conviviality was also encouraged by the creation and propagation of a mighty 
bureaucratic apparatus that supported the implementation of the Soviet model 
of international friendship (Martin 2001: 432–461). Soviet leaders propagated a 
view of the Kazakh SSR as a paradigmatic case of Soviet multiculturalism, and 
people learned to see the country as a ‘laboratory of the friendship of peoples’. 
This model of multiculturalism aimed to secure the harmonious coexistence of a 
diverse population intended to bring about a bright socialist future. 
A rural hospital and its institutional biography 
The institutional biography of Kyzylzhar’s hospital can be traced back to the 1970s.
Officials originally chose a remote location to build an administrative centre for the
newly organised district (rayon) in the east of the Kazakh SSR. In order to foster the
development of the new district and its centre, young specialists from various fields
and from different parts of the Soviet Union were sent there through government
programmes. Doctors with their assistants, nurses and midwifes arrived in the
village, all with the aim of providing healthcare to a population sparsely distributed
over the large sandy semi-desert landscape of the district. These local residents
included the aforementioned resettled peoples, including individuals from the
Caucasus, the Volga region and the Turkmen and the Uzbek SSRs. The hospital
had the official status of being a central district hospital at that time, and featured
various departments and housed a relatively broad range of medical professionals. 
Many of the newly arrived professionals to Kyzylzhar also shared the 
experience of having settled down in a distant, unfamiliar place, as indicated 
earlier. In addition, almost all of the older members of the hospital staff shared 
similar experiences of geographical mobility—that is, everyone once came here 
as a stranger. But, in order to make a living, people had to build trust in each other 
and help one another. 
Kyzylzhar’s infrastructure, including the hospital itself, was poorly developed 
at that time. In an interview, one doctor who arrived in the early 1970s recounted 
how the hospital lacked access to drinking water then: 
Kyzylzhar was terrible. Why? First, because there was no drinking water. 
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was small and in an adobe building. … There was a kind of dormitory in 
the centre. Over there was the polyclinic, the treatment room and so on. In 
general, it was a terrible building. 
(Interview with Olga Stanislavovna, June 2017) 
Despite such adverse circumstances, the young professionals working in the 
hospital were motivated and relied on each other. Living close to one another, they 
helped each other out and managed to deal with the many challenges accompanying 
the process of starting a new life in a desolate place. Many relations amongst 
staff members at that time were characterised by ties of friendship, community 
or kinship. Amongst the medical practitioners, an emotionally invested sense of 
belonging exists, to the hospital and the village alike. 
Therefore, in the institutional biography of the village hospital, we can find the 
kind of collective experience of mobility that we described as typical for many 
people having grown up in Soviet Kazakhstan. We argue that this experience not 
only affected the medical practitioners of the village but also affected the village 
community at large. As such, it shaped not only many individual biographies 
but also the identity of the village community, its image and representation of 
itself as well as of outsiders. Or, to state this argument in the terminology of 
Appadurai (1996: Ch. 9), in Kyzylzhar, mobility served as a constitutive moment 
in the ‘production of locality’. 
However, social and economic processes that have been underway in 
Kazakhstan since the disintegration of the Soviet Union have also left their 
traces in Kyzylzhar. One consequence of these transformations is that the general 
parameters of mobility have changed for large parts of the country’s population. 
As previously argued, whilst mobility has been a constitutive yet rather singular 
(non-recurrent) factor in people’s individual life histories, in more recent years 
mobility has become something that many people recurrently experience. 
Temporary migration from Kyzylzhar to the larger urban centres, like Almaty 
or Karaganda, represents just one instance in a range of new kinds of translocal 
mobilities, which have begun to restructure peoples’ lives. 
As another case in point, consider the shuttle traders (chelnoki) who started 
a new way of doing business resulting from the introduction of a free market 
economy in the 1990s. Their business consists of buying goods, often imported 
from China, and then selling them in one’s native or neighbouring village. Shuttle 
traders from Kyzylzhar have used the opportunities of the newly emerging 
transportation infrastructure as well. Whilst during Soviet times there was 
only one bus travelling to Almaty each week, now a number of shuttle buses 
(marshrutka) leave several times a day for Almaty and other cities in the region. 
Additionally, many taxi drivers connect Kyzylzhar to Almaty and other cities. 
A significant part of this recently emerged transportation infrastructure caters to 
people working in faraway places, whilst maintaining their homes and families in 
their native village of Kyzylzhar. 
To summarise, the experiences and practices of geographical mobility typical 




220 Bakyt Muratbayeva and Benjamin Quasinowski
for our research, these changes led to a new kind of collective experience, one 
analytically worth distinguishing. In contrast to the collective experiences shared 
by many people who arrived in Kyzylzhar before 1991, the post-Soviet collective 
experience of mobility seems to be much more translocal, dynamic and in flux. 
Kazakhstan’s repatriation programme and the Oralmandar 
To a considerable extent, this new form of collective experience of mobility 
is associated with the repatriation and migration of the Kazakh Oralmandar. 
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan was the only 
successor state to the USSR in which the ‘titular nation’—that is, the ethnic 
Kazakhs of Kazakhstan—was not the demographic majority. However, this 
situation changed in subsequent years when Kazakhs again became the country’s 
demographic majority. This was partly due to the emigration of people belonging 
to ethnic minorities, for instance, many Russians and Germans emigrated to their 
‘ancestral homelands’. But it also resulted from the immigration of Oralmandar, 
that is, Kazakh repatriates born outside of Kazakhstan. According to Kaiser et al. 
(2017), as of 2016, the number of Oralmandar who have returned to Kazakhstan 
totals just under 1 million. The overwhelming majority of them have arrived from 
Uzbekistan (61.5%), whilst others have migrated from China (12%), Mongolia 
(7.3%), Turkmenistan (3.9%), Russia (3.7%) and a number of other countries 
(Kaiser et al. 2017: 22). 
The post-Soviet government initiated this repatriation programme with the 
declared aim of fostering the return migration of the Kazakh diaspora in 1992. 
By showing a clear preference for a right to immigration based on blood ties and 
ethnic heritage (jus sanguinis), in comparison to rights based on the place of birth 
(jus soli), such new migration laws in part resembled repatriation programmes 
adopted in Germany and Israel (Zeveleva 2014). According to the Kazakhstani 
law ‘On the Migration of the Population’ (Zakon Respubliki Kazachstan o 
migracii naseleniya 2011), an Oralman is 
an ethnic Kazakh who permanently resided outside the borders of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan at the time of the acquisition of sovereignty, and her/ 
his children of Kazakh nationality who were born and permanently resided 
after the acquisition of sovereignty by the Republic of Kazakhstan outside its 
borders, and who arrived in the Republic of Kazakhstan for the purpose of 
obtaining permanent residence in the historic homeland and who received the 
corresponding status in the manner established by this Law. 
(§1, section 13; translation by the authors) 
The repatriation programme was in part motivated by the government’s interest in 
rebalancing the demographic situation mentioned above. Initially, the programme 
was accompanied by an optimistic spirit and an official rhetoric that served to 
legitimate ethnic immigration (Bonnenfant 2012). Proponents of the repatriation 
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pointing to the prospective revival of Kazakh culture and traditions. This discourse 
has semantically underlined what is understood as ties of blood and historical 
kinship (Bonnenfant 2012: 33–34). A legislative and institutional framework was 
established, and Kazakhs born abroad could apply for inclusion in a quota system 
that provided social and financial benefits to them as returnees. At the same time, 
it was possible to immigrate as an Oralman outside of the quota system, with the 
overall rate of this second approach greatly exceeding that of those immigrating 
within the quota system (Kaiser et al. 2017: 22). The quota is defined annually by 
the government, and the rate of people included has changed considerably since 
1992. In this regard, Bonnenfant (2012: 38) summarised the trend as follows: 
While the number of households included in the quota in 1993 was 10 000, 
during the period of the economic crisis in 1999, this number dropped to as 
low as 500. Between 2005 and 2008, 15 000 families have enjoyed benefits 
as ‘quota Oralmans’ each year; since 2009, this number has increased to 
20 000 families annually. 
However, in 2009, for the first time since the system was launched, the number of 
Oralman families actually immigrating to Kazakhstan fell below the quota (Zakon 
2010). 
The dynamics of the quota system clearly reflect changes in the country’s 
migration policies and political discourses, since ‘Kazakhstan adjusted its 
repatriation policies as its political needs changed’ (Werner et al. 2017: 1569). 
Whilst at the beginning of the repatriation programme official rhetoric was 
optimistic, in later years, when the perceived demographic problems had been 
solved, the initial optimism gave way to a discourse pointing to the social problems 
associated with immigration, such as an unwillingness amongst the Oralmandar to 
adapt to their ‘historic homeland’ (Bonnenfant 2012: 34–35; Werner et al. 2017: 
1578). 
A public statement by Timur Kulibayev, one of Kazakhstan’s most powerful 
businessmen, and son-in-law of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev, 
illustrates how these dynamics are reflected in the country’s political climate. 
When, in 2011, oil field workers went on strike in the town of Zhanaozen, the 
government of Kazakhstan announced a state of emergency and several people 
were shot by the police. According to Kulibayev, the strikes were instigated 
by Oralmandar coming from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Kulibayev eagerly 
singled out problems that these migrants allegedly had with integrating into 
Kazakhstani society (Tengrinews 2011). His statement is striking, because in 
the political culture of the country public denigrations specifically referring to 
another’s ethnicity or nationality are usually frowned upon, whereby an unwritten 
ethics of ‘politically correct’ language is common. 
However, when one looks at Kulibayev’s public statement within the 
broader context of changes in political discourse that took place after the initial 
optimism about Oralmandar repatriation faded, his apparent transgression of 
















222 Bakyt Muratbayeva and Benjamin Quasinowski
as a problematic social category. Thus, Kulibayev’s criticism simply echoed 
a resentment felt by many Kazakhstanis today. Not coincidentally, the quota 
system for Oralmandar was suspended for the two years following the strikes in 
Zhanaozen (Natsuko 2013: 7–9). 
Who are the Oralmandar of Kyzylzhar? 
We identified repercussions from these political discourses, which associated 
the term ‘Oralman’ with a range of social problems, extending to Kyzylzhar 
as well. Almost one-third of the village’s population is Oralmandar. Oralman 
families have been arriving in the village since the early 1990s. Most came from 
Uzbekistan’s Karakalpakstan republic and from the Xinjiang autonomous region 
in China. In Kyzylzhar, the Oralmandar seemingly occupy outsider positions, not 
unlike the ‘newcomers’ in the social configuration famously described by Elias 
and Scotson (1965). Through these outsider positions, the Oralmandar stand in 
stark contrast to ‘established’ community members, many of whom once came 
to the village as migrants themselves. Unlike the Oralmandar, however, these 
established community members, at least their families, have lived in the village 
for many decades now. Many of them share the kind of collective experiences 
associated with the Soviet-era mobility we described above. 
This social configuration between outsiders and established community 
members is reflected in the social structure of the village. Kyzylzhar was a 
large livestock-breeding kolkhoz (collective farm) in Soviet times. In fact, many 
villagers still make a living as herders and stockbreeders. However, herding and 
stockbreeding are particularly common amongst the village’s Oralman families. 
Yet, the Oralmandar are rarely engaged in small or middle-size businesses, and 
even less often occupy positions within municipal institutions and administration. 
Moreover, this social configuration of outsiders and established community 
members is also reflected in the hospital’s social structure. A handful of 
Oralmandar from Karakalpakstan work in the lower strata of the occupational 
hierarchy, for example, as cleaners, cooks or electricians. Amongst the medical 
staff, there is only one Oralman working as a paramedic. By contrast, in the higher 
occupational ranks, such as amongst medical doctors or medical assistants, there 
are no Oralmandar. In other public or state institutions such as schools, the ‘house 
of culture’, the police or the municipal administration, the situation looks quite 
similar. 
In addition to unequal access to prestigious positions in the community’s social
structure, this social configuration is discursive as well. Although the Oralmandar
are viewed as keepers of the Kazakh language, culture and traditions, they are
often shunned by established members of the community—that is, by Kazakhs and
non-Kazakhs born in Kazakhstan. From the perspective of many of the established
community members, the Oralmandar are perceived as uneducated, unhygienic,
either too religiously zealous or individuals who drink too much alcohol. Thus,
amongst established community members, the term ‘Oralman’ has taken on a
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who are ‘paperless persons’ (dokumentter žoqtar)—that is, people referred to as
Oralmandar, but who actually lack the legally recognised status as an Oralman.
From a juridical point of view, the category of ‘paperless Oralmandar’ is a paradox.
The term ‘Oralman’ in the strict sense of the law signifies an individual’s ownership
of a special status (and, thereby, in possession of official papers). However, the
same category used in everyday language and in connection with the attribute of
‘paperless’ denotes an understanding that the person’s residence is illegal. 
As Diener (2005: 334) observed, partly due to migration laws fraught with
inconsistencies, the term ‘Oralman’ has taken on a range of different meanings
since it was devised in 1994. It is, thus, analytically important to distinguish
between different domains in which the term is used today. From the range of
different domains, we only single out two here. Firstly, there is the juridical domain,
defined in the aforementioned law ‘On the Migration of the Population’. Secondly,
there are situations during which people speak of the Oralman in everyday life,
using ordinary language, in which they mostly do not orient towards the juridical
definition of the term. In contrast to the juridical definition, in the domain of
everyday life, the term carries a broad range of dimensions, such that in each
individual situation its meaning may remain highly ambivalent. Unlike the official,
or juridical, designation, community members use the term to refer to a number
of different categories of people. Consequently, people referred to as Oralmandar
are not necessarily Oralmandar in the juridical sense. For example, there are cases
where families were granted the juridical status of Oralmandar but then failed to
obtain Kazakhstani citizenship within the restricted time frame reserved to do so. In
this case, they lost their legal status as Oralmandar. However, in everyday life, they
continue to be referred to as Oralmandar, notwithstanding their actual legal status. 
With regard to the origins of individual migrant families, the term ‘Oralman’ 
is primarily reserved for Kazakhs coming from China and Uzbekistan (especially 
from the autonomous region Karakalpakstan). Ethnic Kazakhs who migrated 
from Kyrgyzstan tend not to be referred to as Oralmandar. Furthermore, internally 
migrating Kazakhs born in Kazakhstan (i.e., Kazakhs coming to Kyzylzhar 
from another place in Kazakhstan) are not referred to as Oralmandar. In all of 
these cases, the designation of the term ‘Oralman’, as used in everyday life, can 
contradict the meaning it carries in the juridical sense. 
In short, the term ‘Oralman’ was once devised by government officials and 
introduced into the public discourse with rather precise political intentions. The 
term held a quite specific juridical denotation. Today, it has taken on a range of 
different meanings depending on the contexts and domains of its usage. Thus, the 
use of the term in ordinary language is often independent of its juridical or official 
political meaning. 
Registr prikreplennogo naseleniya and the emergence 
of new informal practices in medical treatment 
One of the problematic issues within the domain of medicine in Kazakhstan 
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salient, partly because of their existential significance for people in need of basic 
healthcare services. In an attempt to compensate for the decline in public funding 
for healthcare after 1991, many post-Soviet countries introduced a distinction 
between, on the one hand, free benefit packages of health and, on the other 
hand, health services for which a fee is charged (Rechel et al. 2013: 1151). In 
Kazakhstan, this distinction, first of all, concerns its citizens. By contrast, foreign 
citizens are guaranteed healthcare services on a pay-per-use basis (Riekkinnen 
et al. 2015). In this regard, it is important to remember that the Oralmandar are 
legally endowed with a legal status placing them on equal footing with citizens 
of Kazakhstan across several domains. Accordingly, the ‘Code of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan on the People’s Health and Healthcare System’ (O zdorov’e 
naroda i sisteme zdravoochraneniya) states that every citizen of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan as well as the Oralmandar are guaranteed the free benefits package— 
that is, the so-called state-guaranteed health benefits package (Jones et al. 2017). 
In this case, the term ‘Oralmandar’ clearly denotes those persons who fall under 
the category ‘Oralman’ by virtue of the law ‘On the Migration of the Population’. 
However, cases have been reported wherein PHC, even in emergency situations, 
was denied to non-Kazakhstani citizens and Oralmandar alike (Zakon 2013). In 
the Kyzylzhar hospital, one important reason medical professionals withhold, 
at least formally, the provision of healthcare services is connected to a recently 
introduced electronic database system. This system dates back to an attempt to 
simplify and centralise procedures in the healthcare field in 2010. At that time, the 
Ministry of Health of Kazakhstan issued a law regarding the creation of a unified 
healthcare information system (Registr prikreplennogo naseleniya or RPN). RPN 
was intended to contain data on individual patients attached to local healthcare 
organisations (Katsaga et al. 2012: 29). 
Prior to the introduction of RPN, a close connection existed between patients’ 
permanent residence and the medical organisations to which patients were 
attached. The idea behind tying the provision of healthcare to local residence 
dates back to the Soviet propiska, a system for managing internal migration and 
cutting off unregulated migration flows (Buckley 1995). With the new RPN, the 
government’s intention was to detach patients’ residence from the local medical 
organisations to which patients had been attached. This would offer citizens more 
opportunities in terms of individual choice in the provision of healthcare. From 
the perspective of lawmakers and policy experts in faraway Astana, Kazakhstan’s 
capital (renamed Nur-Sultan in 2019), this seemed like a reasonable decision for 
a country with an increasing rate of internal migration. As we argued above, since 
1990, increasing numbers of people had adopted translocal and mobile lifestyles. 
Thus, the new migratory realities conflicted with the inherited Soviet institutions 
and their specific bureaucratic practices. 
RPN stores information on each patient in a central, countrywide database. It 
enables individual medical organisations and healthcare professionals to retrieve 
information about a particular patient, regardless of whether the patient is already 
registered in that organisation or not. Moreover, the procedure of registering 
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it should have become much easier for patients and hospital administrators to 
detach patients from one hospital and attach them to another hospital in which 
they intend to undergo medical treatment. That is, registering new patients goes 
hand in hand with detaching them from the hospital to which they were previously 
attached. Thus, ideally a few clicks on a computer screen would achieve what 
previously involved much time-consuming paperwork. 
But, in reality, the transition to the electronic RPN did not proceed as smoothly as 
planned in Astana. At least for Kyzylzhar, we find substantial evidence suggesting 
that the hospital’s medical professionals experienced a range of problems with the 
new system. One of these problems resulted from a lack of technical knowledge 
and resources. Since the average age of staff members was relatively older, 
many experienced considerable problems with regard to the technical know-
how and skills associated with computer-assisted administrative work, to which 
they were not accustomed. For instance, for Olga Stanislavovna, the hospital’s 
oldest physician in her seventies and who still sees patients full-time, working 
on a computer frequently results in unpleasant experiences. We observed on one 
occasion that some intractable problems with the computer software literally 
brought her to tears. This is only partly due to her advanced age, but also due to 
the fact that the digitalisation of patient data only recently began in the village 
hospital. Previously, only a few offices and surgeries were equipped with personal 
computers. Even today, when most offices in the hospital are equipped with a 
desktop computer, the computer’s hardware is outdated. Consequently, even 
younger medical professionals frequently experience difficulties when processing 
piles of patient files from paper to the new electronic database. 
This lack of technical knowledge and modern equipment accounts for some of 
the difficulties the hospital staff experienced with the electronic RPN. But other 
problems emerged as well. Prior to the introduction of the new system, patients 
who lacked official documents, including the ‘paperless’ Oralmandar, were 
primarily treated by circumventing official regulations. With the introduction of 
RPN, some hospital patients who previously received treatment with hardly any 
bureaucratic hurdles were suddenly cut off from medical services. 
However, even before the electronic RPN was introduced, the free provision of 
medical services to non-citizens and ‘paperless persons’ had not been envisaged 
by Kazakhstan’s legislation. As the hospital director and others explained to us, 
providing care to patients not officially registered by bypassing official regulations 
had become much harder due to the centralised electronic storage of patient data. 
Prior to the introduction of RPN, patient files had not been assigned unique 
numbers directly associated with citizen ID cards (the so-called individual’niy 
identifikacioniy nomer or IIN). Since medical cards and ID cards had previously 
been independent of each other, an individual’s lack of Kazakhstani citizenship 
could not be deduced from her/his medical card. According to several medical 
professionals with whom we talked, in the period prior to the introduction of 
RPN, they had mostly tried their best to somehow provide healthcare services 
even to ‘paperless’ patients, sometimes free of charge, sometimes for a small 
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or a small amount of money. These kinds of informal practices can hardly be 
categorised as outright acts of corruption. Instead, these represent practices of gift 
giving, making it acceptable for physicians to transgress certain regulatory lines 
and for patients to reciprocate these same transgressions with an act of gratitude. 
With regard to the perception of the informal practices in question here, 
they can be understood as in line with the aforementioned social configuration 
of established community members and outsiders (see the section ‘Who are the 
Oralmandar of Kyzylzhar?’ above). On the one hand, an ethos exists amongst the 
village’s doctors, who all belong to the group of established community members, 
according to which all patients have a right to be helped, regardless of their 
official status or the documents they do or do not possess. On the other hand, those 
same doctors may think that, when helping such patients, they actually provide 
a rather generous, albeit undeserved, service to patients whom they consider as 
outsiders and often as culturally and socially inferior to themselves. This kind 
of thinking has likely stabilised the previously described social configuration of 
established community members and outsiders, since almost all patients who fall 
under the aegis of informal practices for healthcare provision are also positioned 
as outsiders within this configuration. 
Of course, apart from the Oralmandar, some other categories exist, consisting 
of patients who cannot be treated within the framework of official regulations. For 
instance, there are a handful of people in the village who still have not exchanged 
their Soviet passports for the new passport of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 
From a legal point of view, these individuals are foreigners or stateless persons. 
Furthermore, there are non-Kazakh migrants from neighbouring countries, who 
have not yet obtained permanent residence permits. Nonetheless, the bulk of the 
beneficiaries of the informal healthcare provision practices described here are the 
‘paperless’ Oralmandar. 
In view of this complex situation, it may seem surprising that the aforementioned 
informal practices have persisted following the introduction of the RPN system. 
But the new system seems to reinforce the existing differentiation between 
established community members and outsiders. In particular, this concerns those 
outsiders who have neither Kazakhstani citizenship nor the legally recognised 
status of Oralman. For the ‘paperless’ Oralmandar, it is impossible to register 
within the RPN system. As Gauhar Kayratovna, one of the doctors, explained to 
us, the network of official monitoring and budgeting in the healthcare system has 
become more closely interconnected than ever before. Furthermore, the hospital’s 
budget is now tightly linked to the number of officially registered patients. As she 
explained, 
They [the ‘paperless’ Oralmandar] are not on the list of the RPN, they are not 
our patients. Therefore, we are not allowed to provide any medical services to 
them. We don’t get paid for such people and, besides, if we will treat them, we 
will have problems with the higher ranking medical authorities afterwards. 
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Throughout our time in the hospital, we observed that, despite such assertions, 
which appear to be accounts of how things should be according to official 
regulations, the informal practices in question have indeed persisted. That is, 
the ‘paperless’ Oralmandar continue to receive medical treatment. However, 
providing healthcare to them has become much more clandestine than before, 
whereby doctors officially deny it (but not unofficially) to the beneficiaries. 
Meanwhile, the Oralmandar continue to be perceived as a problematic social 
category in the context of the village community. 
Here, we wish to provide an illustration of this perspective characteristic of
healthcare professionals using an excerpt from a discourse in one of the daily case
conferences. This case demonstrates how medical professionals from the hospital
reflect upon the question of who will be granted PHC and under what conditions.
One of the tasks of the hospital’s nurses involves monitoring certain categories
of people in the village, such as children and the elderly. But this monitoring also
includes keeping track of the number of ‘paperless persons’ in the village. Each
nurse working in the hospital is responsible for monitoring the population of one
street in the village (usually this is the street where the home of the nurse is located).
Nurses regularly brief on their monitoring duties during the daily conferences. 
Immediately prior to the following discussion transcribed below, one of the 
nurses, Nazgul (NA), reported to her colleagues—in particular, to the doctors 
Gauhar Kayratovna (GK) and Kudaybergen Curbashevic (KC)—about three 
Oralmandar living on the street she monitors. According to Nazgul’s descrip-
tion, the three Oralmandar had a residence permit but did not intend to obtain 
Kazakhstani citizenship. 
Transcript 20160414 (simplified version, translated from Kazakh and Russian) 













They have it, they have it. 
One can have a residence permit for their whole life! 
(1.2) 





OK, tell all of them, ‘Those who don’t have legal documents for 
the Republic of Kazakhstan are served on a fee basis.’ 
‘Go to the district centre, pay your fee and then come back!’ 
(0.4) 






No, if it is for children, they are innocent, we don’t mind. 








The Karakalpaks and the Turkmens. I’m talking about these people. 
Ask us decently, and we won’t reject anybody.
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In line 1 of this transcription, Gauhar Kayratovna explains the motives underpin-
ning the Oralmandar’s decision to retain their Chinese citizenship. Since they are 
unwilling to relinquish their Chinese citizenship, they cannot obtain Kazakhstani 
citizenship. However, it turns out that they have residence permits and, thus, reside 
in the village legally (lines 3–4). Hospital director Kudaybergen Curbashevic, 
then, reflects upon how to deal with these Oralmandar and instructs his subordi-
nates accordingly (lines 5–19).2 
This discourse shows how the mode of translocal mobility we described
as a characteristic feature of post-Soviet times is framed as a highly problem-
atic issue here. Kudaybergen Curbashevic refers to presumably official regu-
lations in the provision of healthcare services (lines 7–10). Simultaneously,
he specifies the conditions under which the official rules should be circum-
vented (lines 14–19). Importantly, he mentions the possibility of circumvent-
ing the official regulations not merely as a discursive statement. That is, his
discourse is consistent with ethnographic observations we repeatedly made
throughout our fieldwork: in almost all cases where, from an ‘official’ point
of view, the provision of healthcare services would not be possible, due to,
for example, the lack of citizenship or another suitable legal status, medical
professionals from the hospital actually did provide the healthcare services
deemed necessary. The excerpt above, thus, exemplifies how medical profes-
sionals create room to manoeuvre, which exists despite the official regulations
regarding providing healthcare services. In other words, there is a discrepancy
between, on the one hand, the official discourse and legal regulations and,
on the other hand, the actual provision of healthcare services under practical
circumstances. 
For people at risk of being excluded from PHC, like some of Kyzylzhar’s
‘paperless’ Oralmandar, this may turn out to be favourable. However, the infor-
mality created through this means of providing healthcare services introduces
an element of arbitrariness into medical practitioners’ decision-making when
determining who they will or will not treat. Thus, the kind of informal provi-
sion of healthcare we observed in the hospital of Kyzylzhar is likely to rein-
force existing inequalities, which can be conceptualised according to Elias and
Scotson’s (1965) social configuration of outsiders and established community
members. 
Our own observations are confined to one rural village in the east of Kazakhstan. 
Thus, we can only make educated guesses regarding the situation in other rural 
communities, let alone other regions of the country. However, the provision of 
healthcare services seems to remain an unsettled issue, especially in Kazakhstan’s 
‘remote, loosely populated countryside areas’ (Riekkinnen et al. 2015: 127). The 
precarious situations of the Oralmandar, particularly those who are ‘paperless’, 
have been described for other regions of Kazakhstan as well. We would, there-
fore, expect to find social configurations similar to that we have described in this 
chapter, with their specific problems related to practices of informality existing 
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Conclusions 
In this chapter, we evaluated a selection of data from our fieldwork in one rural hospital
in Kazakhstan. In doing so, we have attempted to contribute to the growing subfield
of informality studies in post-socialist countries. We situated the ethnographic site
of our research within the broader historical scope of biomedicine in Kazakhstan.
We argued that many of the biomedical institutions and their practitioners during
the Soviet era were characterised by a specific mode of mobility associated with
collective migratory experiences, such as that of ‘being sent’ far away. 
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, a different mode
of mobility emerged. This mode is translocal, much more dynamic than the
typical Soviet mode of mobility and is characterised by its recurrence over
individual lifespans. Kazakhstan’s Oralmandar represent one of the social cat-
egories particularly affected by this post-Soviet form of mobility. As people
whose family networks and mobile lifestyles are often spread across several
countries, healthcare systems, labour markets and jurisdictions, they are also
especially affected by the respective regulatory frameworks in each of these
contexts. 
We examined the emergence and persistence of informal practices vis-à-vis
the provision of PHC using the example of one rural hospital. Whilst from a
strictly juridical point of view the ‘paperless Oralmandar’ are not legally enti-
tled to treatment, they have actually been provided with free PHC services here.
Following the introduction of a new healthcare information system, the informal
provision of healthcare services became more difficult. However, these informal
practices have actually persisted. For the ‘paperless’ Oralmandar, this persis-
tence is favourable in a certain sense. However, in the long term, the persistence
of informal treatment practices may become a barrier to the integration of the
Oralmandar—and other vulnerable minorities—into local communities, such as
Kyzylzhar. Without the possibility of claiming their rights to PHC on a substan-
tial legal basis, these groups will depend upon the arbitrary decisions of local
healthcare providers. 
Notes 
1 We have used pseudonyms for all names of places and persons used in this chapter. 
2 He refers to the Oralmandar from Karakalpakstan and Turkmenistan as Karakalpaks 
and Turkmens, respectively. 
References 
Alekseenko, A.N. and Masanov, N.Ė. (2000) ‘Migracionnye i ėtnodemografičeskie 
processy v sovetskij period’, in N.Ė. Masanov et al. (eds.), Istorija Kazachstana: 
Narody i kultury. Almaty: Dajk-Press, pp. 367–419. 
Appadurai, A. (1996) Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
  
 
              
    
          
     
              
         
       
   
    
 
             
  
    
    
          
 
       
         
230 Bakyt Muratbayeva and Benjamin Quasinowski
Bonnenfant, I.K. (2012) ‘Constructing the Homeland: Kazakhstan’s Discourse and Policies 
Surrounding its Ethnic Return-Migration Policy’, Central Asian Survey 31 (1): 31–44. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2012.650004 
Buckley, C. (1995) ‘The Myth of Managed Migration: Migration Control and Market in 
the Soviet Period’, Slavic Review 54 (4): 896–916. https://doi.org/10.2307/2501398 
Diener, Alexander C. 2005 ‘Kazakhstan’s Kin State Diaspora: Settlement Planning and 
the Oralman Dilemma’, Europe-Asia Studies 57 (2): 327–348. https://doi.org/10.1080
/09668130500052005 
Elias, N. and Scotson, J. (1965) The Established and the Outsiders. A Sociological Enquiry 
into Community Problems. London: Frank Cass. 
Ensor, T. (2004) ‘Informal Payments for Health Care in Transition Economies’, Social 
Science & Medicine 58: 237–246. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0277-9536(03)00007-8
Footman, Katharine et al. (2014) ‘Foregoing Medicines in the Former Soviet Union: 
Changes between 2001 and 2010’, Health Policy 118: 184–192. https://doi.org/10.1016
/j.healthpol.2014.09.005 
Jones, Michael et al. (2017) ‘Specifying a State Guaranteed Health Benefits Package 
for Kazakhstan: Lessons for Emerging Economies and Middle-Income Countries’, 
International Journal of Health Planning and Management 32: 540–553. https://dx.doi
.org/10.1002%2Fhpm.2359 
Kaiser, M. et al. (2017) Sosučšestvovanie ėtničeskich grupp v Kazachstane. Almaty: 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation. 
Katsaga, A., Kulzhanov, M., Karanikolos, M. and Rechel, B. (2012) ‘Kazakhstan: Health 
System Review’, Health Systems in Transition 14 (4): 1–154. 
Kindler, R. (2014) Stalins Nomaden. Herrschaft und Hunger in Kasachstan. Hamburg: 
HIS Verlag. 
Lane, R. (2018) ‘Yelzhan Birtanov: Leading Kazakhstan to Universal Health
COVERAGE’, Lancet 392 (October): 1388. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(
18)32542-x
Lock, M. and Nguyen, V. (2018) An Anthropology of Biomedicine. Oxford: Wiley 
Blackwell. 
Martin, T. (2001) The Affirmative Action Empire. Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet 
Union, 1923–1939. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Michaels, P. (2003) Curative Powers: Medicine and Empire in Stalin’s Central Asia. 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Natsuko, Oka (2013) A Note on Ethnic Return Migration Policy in Kazakhstan: Changing 
Priorities and a Growing Dilemma. IDE Discussion Papers No. 394, Institute of 
Developing Economies, http://hdl.handle.net/2344/1218. 
Obermann, Konrad et al. (2016) ‘Data for Development in Health: A Case Study and 
Monitoring Framework from Kazakhstan’, BMJ Global Health 1(1): 1–14. http://dx.
doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2015-000003 
Olcott, M.B. (1995) The Kazakhs. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. 
Packard, R.M. (2016) A History of Global Health. Intervention into the Lives of Other 
Peoples. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Pohl, M. (2007) ‘The “Planet of One Hundred Languages”. Ethnic Relations and Soviet 
Identity in the Virgin Lands’, in N. Breyfigle., A. Schrader and W. Sunderland, W. 
(eds.), Peopling the Russian Periphery, Borderland Colonization in Eurasian History. 
London: Routledge. 
Polese, A, Morris, J. and Kovacs, B. (2015) ‘Introduction: The Failure and Future of the 
Welfare State in Post-socialism’, Journal of Eurasian Studies 6: 1–5. https://doi.org/10
.1016/j.euras.2014.11.001 
  
             
  
              
       
 
          
                    
           
     
                    
             
          
          
     
‘Ask us decently and then we will not reject anyone!’ 231 
Rechel, Bernd et al. (2013) ‘Health and Health Systems in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States’, Lancet 381: 1145–1155. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(
12)62084-4
Riekkinnen, Mariya et al. (2015) ‘Equal Access to Publicly Funded Health Care Services: 
The Legal Experiences of Finland and Kazakhstan’, International Comparative 
Jurisprudence 1: 121–132. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.icj.2015.12.006 
Shukshin, Andrei (2019) ‘Striving to Provide Universal Health Coverage in Kazakhstan’, 
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 97: 250–251. http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT
.19.020419 
Tengrinews (2011) ‘Kulibaev: Liderami bastuyučšich v Žanaozene neftyanikov 
yavlyayutsya pereselency’, Tengrinews.kz, 29 September, https://tengrinews.kz/kaz
akhstan_news/kulibaev-liderami-bastuyuschih-janaozene-neftyanikov-197979/ 
UN (2017) International Migration Report. Highlights. New York: United Nations. 
Werner, C.A., Emmelhainz, C. and Barcus, H. (2017) ‘Privileged Exclusion in Post-
Soviet Kazakhstan: Ethnic Return Migration, Citizenship, and the Politics of (Not) 
Belonging’, Europe-Asia Studies 69 (10): 1557–1583. https://doi.org/10.1080/096681
36.2017.1401042
Zakon (2010) ‘V Kazachstan vpervye repatriirovano men’še Oralmanov, čem ustanovleno 
kvotoj’, Zakon.kz, http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=30547735#pos=4;-240, 
accessed 16 February 2019. 
Zakon (2013) ‘Graždanam drugich stran, imeyučšim vid na žitel’stvo v Kazachstane, 
otkazyvayut v medicinskoj pomočši’, Zakon.kz, https://www.zakon.kz/4553491-grazhd
anam-drugikh-stran-imejushhim-vid.html, accessed 16 February 2019. 
Zeveleva, O. (2014) ‘Political Aspects of Repatriation: Germany, Russia, Kazakhstan. A 






12 Dual citizenship and 
twofold informality 
The interstices of state power and 
transnational lives amongst Meskhetian 
returnees in Georgia 
Jvan Yazdani 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I examine ‘informality’ in interactions amongst state institutions, 
non-governmental organisations and the Meskhetian diasporic communities/ 
returning migrants in Georgia and Azerbaijan. In doing so, I take advantage of 
the ambiguity inherent in the concept (Misztal 2000: 17), applying it to differ-
ent levels of analysis and, further, employing it as a label for the interpretive 
frames imposed by Meskhetians on immigration and citizenship regulations. In 
other words, I rely on the category of ‘informality’ when I describe my research 
participants’ practices as ‘informal’, as well as when I describe their interpreta-
tion of practices and systems that negatively impact their resettlement and civic 
membership projects. Although I consider an assessment of intent beyond the 
scope of my research here, ‘informal governance practices’ were indeed identi-
fied within the rationale of Georgian state policies during the period in which the 
citizenship regimes pertinent here took shape (Rekhviashvili and Polese 2017). 
Furthermore, devoting attention to informal practices regarding mobility in par-
ticular is, I argue, called for given the peculiarly spatial and geographical dimen-
sion of informality (Polese et al. 2016: 16). 
The specific citizenship regime developed during the post-communist transition 
in Georgia is characterised by some as purely civic (rather than ethnic), since the 
new republic granted citizenship rights to all Soviet citizens permanently residing 
in its territory—perhaps a side effect of the highly contested politics of national 
identity within Georgian society (e.g., Shevel 2009: 287). Others argue—more 
consonant with the material presented here—for continuity between the ‘ethnic 
hierarchical’ conceptions of citizenship that underpinned Soviet-era policies on 
nationalities and today’s ‘ethnic nationalist’ citizenship (e.g., Khazanov 1997: 
18–45). Furthermore, the Meskhetians’ peculiar position within Georgian society 
has resulted from the strongly felt association of Georgian national identity with 
Orthodox Christianity (Shurgaia 2008: 250–300), and given that the Georgian 
language has emerged as the main element in the formation of a national identity 
in what is described as a ‘highly language-conscious’ society (Smith et al. 1998: 
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167–196). The Meskhetians, a Turkish-speaking, Sunni Muslim population, have, 
therefore, been identified as an ‘internalised Orient’ (Cherchi and Manning 2002: 
32; Tlostanova 2012: 137). 
What I observed, and hope to describe adequately here, is a grey area, where 
informal practices of citizenship ‘from above and below’ interlace with each 
other. I characterise the interactions and endeavours within this area as informal 
practices of dual citizenship, because I am primarily concerned with a typology of 
return migration not resulting in a thorough separation from former communities 
and countries of residence. My research participants’ lives possess an indisputable 
transnational quality, exhibited perhaps most comprehensively in family formation 
processes and in their eccentric relation to canonical, geographically sanctioned 
national identities. 
Their choices, and the informal practices employed to carry them out, are 
framed—as subsequent sections make clear—by motivations and circumstances 
that have roots in a present of disempowerment and a past of deportation, 
dispossession and a loss of civic rights, a past that looms ominously over their 
present. Indeed, the failures to realise projects of diasporic return and mobility 
are ordinary. The consequences range from moving back to the country from 
whence migration originated, to spending years in the host country without the 
rights associated with membership or being forced to give up the project of return 
entirely. To put it bluntly, the majority of the Meskhetian returnees I met are 
disillusioned, embittered and weary because of the impasse in which they have 
found themselves. 
The question that informs this chapter is thus: Does the category of ‘informality’ 
help to understand Meskhetians’ interpretation and handling of the legal and 
mundane arrangements (which, in turn, rely on informality) that obstruct their 
projects of return? 
Prior to analysing more recent issues, I provide an outline of the history of the 
1944 Meskhetian deportation by Soviet authorities, the ensuing exile imposed on 
its members and the subsequent formation of its diaspora. It would be difficult, 
otherwise, to appreciate the current Meskhetians’ predicaments. Next, I focus 
on the research setting, especially the legal-institutional framework of return 
migration: the ‘Law on Repatriation’, adopted by the Georgian government 
in 2007 and the 2014 ‘Law on Georgian citizenship’. The latter was passed 
whilst I was in the field and represented a legal shift with potentially significant 
repercussions for returnees’ status. Describing my research participants’ 
narratives around these issues is meant to shed some light on how their field of 
action is partially structured by legal-institutional frameworks as well as by their 
everyday encounters with different sorts of boundaries: some unambiguously 
geographical, and some pertaining to the interplay of history, identity politics and 
group narratives. 
In order to better situate their historical and political plight, I also provide 
an argument that subsumes their experience of deportation, exile and dispersion 
under the definition of postcoloniality. Finally, I elaborate upon the hypothesis 
















repatriates’ cultural and civic horizons and already extant informal practices of 
dual citizenship. 
Soviet deportation and the formation of a diaspora 
Muslim Meskhetians lived in villages along the Georgian–Turkish border until 
November 1944, when the Soviet army deported them en masse to Central Asia. 
The rationale for this operation can be traced to the Soviet collectivist policies 
of ‘demographic engineering’ (King 2008: 186), one tenet of which was the 
belief that ‘primordial ethnos’ were so durable they would survive even after 
the eventual demise of classes and ideologies (Slezkine 1994: 449). The Muslim 
population of Meskheti, a southwestern region of the Georgian Soviet Socialist 
Republic (today, a region in the Georgian province of Samskhe-Javakheti), were 
thus targeted as an undifferentiated whole. According to official figures, 92,307 
persons were rounded up, forced into cattle train wagons and—after a journey 
which lasted more than two weeks—placed under special settlement restrictions 
in Central Asia. These individuals included Muslim Meskhetians (Turkish-
speaking Sunni Muslims), as well as Hemshins, Batumi Kurds and Terekeme.1 
Additionally, nearly 30,000 soldiers from these four nationalities, returning from 
the war, were, in turn, also deported (Trier and Khanzin 2007: 2), something 
that amongst my research participants exemplifies the blatant inequity of their 
collective treatment. 
In the eyes of the Soviet government, this likely served as a preventive 
measure, since Muslim Meskhetians were seen as potential collaborators with 
Turkey. Their removal was, thus, meant to establish a more ‘reliable’ border 
population (Nekrich 1978: 103–105). As Hasanli (2011: 3) points out, Turkey 
and Russia indeed shared a historically high-friction border, known for periodic 
conflicts dating back centuries. 
The Meskhetians’ fate was, therefore, decided on the grounds of imperial 
claims, security concerns and collective allegations. A note by the Head of the 
People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), Lavrenti Beria, stated the 
following: ‘A considerable part of this population, related to the residents of 
Turkey, was engaged in smuggling, expressed their wish to emigrate and served 
as a recruitment ground for spies and gangsters’ (cited in Hasanly 2011: 20). 
Whether or not these allegations reflected any truth, the 1944 deportation
order led to the relocation, in military fashion, of the entire population
irrespective of sex, age, individual responsibilities or political affiliation. During
the first years of displacement and exile, thousands died (Pohl 1999: 132), with
some scholars reporting mortality rates reaching 14.6% (Pohl 2008: 207). Until
1956, the deportees lived confined in ‘special settlements’—very limited zones
they were not permitted to leave without official permission. After the special
regime was abandoned, they were still barred from returning to their homeland.
Instead, starting in 1958 and throughout the 1960s, about 25,000 deportees were
permitted to move to Azerbaijan, a country they perceived as transitory towards
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following ethnic strife and the targeting of their communities in Uzbekistan,
more than 50,000 Meskhetians arrived in Azerbaijan as refugees (Yunusov 2007:
176). The (small) number of returnees who have settled in Georgia since 2007
(the focus of my ethnography) originate from these Meskhetian communities in
Azerbaijan. 
The Meskhetian diaspora can, therefore, be considered a ‘victim diaspora’ 
(Cohen 2008: 39–59), given the coercive and violent nature of its inception in 
1944 and successive instances of their discrimination or overt persecution. 
Beginning in the early 1990s, for example, thousands of returnees were forced 
from Georgia again. Since 2004, thousands have been accepted as refugees by the 
United States from the Russian province of Krasnodar. 
Their 1944 mass deportation by the Soviet government and the successive 
episodes of victimisation, forced mobility and discrimination form a core 
repository for their collective narratives, alongside their personal and familial 
stories and their diverse and often conflicting identities. The decisive factor for 
the advancement of the Meskhetian cause in Georgia would be, eventually, the 
country’s aspiration to join the Council of Europe. Throughout the 1990s, the 
fact that deportation had been perpetrated by (and within the then boundaries 
of) the USSR was still considered reason enough to exonerate the government 
of any responsibility. However, when, in April 1999, Georgia became a member 
of the Council, the Meskhetian cause was taken up as an official obligation and 
commitment (Trier et al. 2011: 39; Overland 2007: 534–540). 
A bumpy political path led to the adoption, in 2007, of the ‘Law of Georgia on the 
Repatriation of Persons Forcefully Resettled from Georgia by the Former Soviet 
Union in the 40s of the 20th Century’.2 From its inception, this law was met with 
criticism by advocacy groups and Meskhetian organisations on the grounds that it 
provided too limited time for the submission of applications, imposed cumbersome 
requirements and left too much room for interpretation by government officials; it 
also required legal provisions that many potential repatriates found economically 
insurmountable (Trier et al. 2011: 37–49). By 1 January 2010—after a two-year 
application period that included two deadline extensions—a total of 5841 families 
(8900 individuals) had applied for repatriation to Georgia, of whom only 412 were 
granted ‘conditional citizenship’.3 In the wake of the adoption of the ‘Law on 
Repatriation’ in 2007, a few hundred Meskhetians, mostly from Azerbaijan, 
settled in Samskhe-Javakheti of their own accord without following the formal 
procedures. Some took advantage of an exception to the principle against dual 
citizenship and managed to become Georgian citizens. This exception was no 
longer available already by late 2009, when the authorities’ change of attitude 
towards this parallel repatriation led to incidents at the border (Trier 2011: 676– 
677 and note 73). My research focuses on those who did not manage to obtain 
Georgian citizenship, neither through the 2007 ‘Law on Repatriation’ nor through 
the aforementioned exception. In addition to this rather tiny group in Georgia, 
my research also focuses on their communities in Azerbaijan and organisations 
related to the Meskhetian diaspora, which played a significant, albeit contentious, 





























Research and institutional setting 
The majority of my fieldwork took place over a one-year period in Caucasian
Georgia, between 2014 and 2015. It consisted of two stays, lasting eight and
four months, respectively, in the village of Nasakirali (founded by returnees in
the late 1970s) and the town of Akhaltsikhe, where the majority of Meskhetians
arrived after 2007. My research draws upon qualitative research methods
such as semi structured interviews and participation in family and community
activities (e.g., harvesting, tea plucking, seasonal work trips to Turkey, etc.)
as well as through small surveys and genealogical analysis. The vast majority
of the 59 individuals living in Akhaltsikhe (nine households) arrived from
Azerbaijan. During the time of my fieldwork, no one had yet obtained Georgian
citizenship. They had repatriated independently of the legal framework laid out
by the Georgian government and, thus, had not made use of the relevant laws.
Most held the official ‘repatriate status’, a situation they denounced as unjust in
view of their history and collective memories of deportation and dispossession,
and of the Georgian government’s unfulfilled duty of rehabilitation. Indeed, a
2015 motion of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe describes
the repatriation programme as ‘mostly focused on providing a legal repatriate
status to the eligible applicants and not on facilitating the actual repatriation
itself’.4 My analysis, therefore, takes into account that the explicit, public aims of
governance should be investigated in combination with their (un)intended effects,
brought forth through informal practices as well. As Castles (2004: 854) warns,
thinking exclusively in terms of the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of migration policies
limits our capacity to deconstruct agendas and goals that might be hidden or
inexplicit. What (if anything) lies beneath the regulatory framework of the laws,
however, is beyond the scope of this work. However, a disenchanted attitude
towards state powers is resonant with the inclinations of many Meskhetians I met
and with anthropology’s vocation. 
Within this theoretical framework, parallel to examining informality as a 
way to realise rights and achieve incorporation into the country of immigration 
by means other than institutional paths (Berenschot and van Klinken 2018: 97; 
Rigo 2011; Sassen 2002: 6), I also consider it as part of local theories regarding 
the management of mobility by states. My primary preoccupation is, thus, 
informality within local interpretative narratives, which thrive in an atmosphere 
of expectation and distrust. As such, research participants attributed informality 
to the state as a way of surreptitiously ‘getting things done’, instrumental to 
conspiratorial schemes against their collective return to what they consider their 
homeland. Often, when return migration and full membership projects failed at 
the individual or family level, these narratives posited the state’s intentionality 
and hostility. A direct consequence has been growing mistrust in institutions 
governing citizenship and immigration. What emerges as chiefly pertinent here is 
the inclination of survivors of deportation or subsequent generations to read past 
and present suffering as programmed, and to reject explanations that postulate 
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At the time of my fieldwork, the tiny community of Meskhetians in Akhaltsikhe 
consisted of nine households, with a total of about 60 to 70 people. Typically, 
each household included three, sometimes four generations: an elderly, possibly 
direct witness of the 1944 deportation; her/his daughter/son, with their spouse, 
both of working age, who provided the practical impulse to repatriation; and their 
teenage children and, often, grandchildren. 
From the strictly normative view often expressed by the government, 
Meskhetians’ predicament is, in essence, a form of deranged, reckless migration, 
since they dispensed with some of the formal requirements of the law that should 
have allowed their settlement and naturalisation in Georgia, thus leaving Azerbaijan 
‘too soon’ and finding themselves in legal limbo. Needless to say, opinions of this 
sort have generated resentment, since most Meskhetians understand their right of 
return as a form of historical compensation that cannot be circumscribed solely 
through legalistic arguments. 
To complicate things further, a new citizenship law was adopted by the 
Georgian government in April 2014 during my fieldwork. This law introduced a 
more restrictive visa regime, which abolished the pre-existent ability of foreigners 
to reside in the country for 360 days without requiring a residence permit.5 For 
my research participants, the law’s effects were potentially disruptive, since most 
were citizens of Azerbaijan. 
This sudden and largely unexpected change in the legal framework exposed 
the fragility of Meskhetians’ presence in a country to which they claimed a 
moral–historical right of collective return. At this particular juncture more than 
ever during my fieldwork, the theme of citizenship seemed charged with emotion, 
and conjured imaginative new forms of membership frameworks (Shafir 1998: 
23). This imaginative effort was, needless to say, fraught with fears, since the new 
law could potentially shift the ground under the feet of people whose citizenship 
and sense of home lacked a formal status in the country. Memories and collective 
narratives of suffering at the hands of the Soviet state were, thus, mobilised along a 
continuum of persecution culminating in today’s legal framework for repatriation. 
Arguably, an internalised sense of deportability played a role in this, since the 
relationship between their citizenship rights and the state (Peutz and De Genova 
2010: 15) was promptly structured along narratives similar to those ingrained in 
their group identity for decades. 
My fieldwork extended to their sending communities in Azerbaijan as well. 
Here, the failure of the repatriation programme has generated frustration and 
inspired the spread of conspiratorial interpretations of the procedures adopted by 
the Georgian and Azerbaijani governments in handling repatriation. 
From a broader perspective, the circumstances of these communities—both 
in Georgia and Azerbaijan—fall within the peculiarities of contemporary human 
mobility and the restructuring of nation-states in globalisation. Indeed, the latter 
has led to an increase in modes of governing borders and populaces, which favour 
discipline over repressive state control (Geiger 2013: 34; Zolberg 2006: 443). 
In this sense, Meskhetians’ relationship with borders and citizenship systems 







forms of graduated or partial membership that withholds the rights accorded 
to full citizens (Ong 2006: 82; Krujit 2002: 37; Schonburgh 2007: 17). These 
regulatory grey areas, in this case at least, seem to be perpetuated by a variety 
of mechanisms—at the interstices of two or more citizenship regimes—which 
include the mere disregard for repatriates’ conundrums as well as informal, yet 
seemingly institutionalised practices. It is against such a theoretical background, 
and the experiences of my research participants, that I advance the idea of dual 
citizenship as an imaginative horizon, and, possibly, a practical solution. Holding 
two citizenships (their country of origin’s as well as Georgia’s, their elective 
homeland) would accommodate the actual life circumstances and aspirations of 
those (very few) in the Meskhetian transnational diaspora who opted to repatriate. 
New laws and informal practices 
The total number of Muslim Meskhetians in Georgia today is thought to range 
from 600 to 1000 (Aydıngün et al. 2006: 13). They are a politically marginalised 
group, whose plight, like that of other Georgian minorities, has often been per-
ceived through the lens of ethno-political categories and national security con-
cerns (Sabanadze 2014: 120–132; Tournon 2007: 101, 203), to the detriment of 
their pleas for rehabilitation and return. Meskhetians are also part of what has 
become a transnational diaspora dispersed throughout the former Soviet Union, 
Turkey and the United States. The majority of those who live in Georgia began 
arriving in the late 1970s, and most have become naturalised citizens. In this 
chapter, however, I provide examples from a small number of Meskhetians who 
only recently repatriated and whose status in Georgian society remains tenuous 
both socially and legally. I use the term ‘returnees’ despite the fact that most were 
born after the 1944 deportation. Returnee (‘repatriant’) is a term used by my 
respondents themselves. A repatriant, according to an ‘emic reading of return’, 
is someone whose family socialisation was characterised by ethnic capital and a 
strong ideology of return to the homeland, regardless of their place and date of 
birth (Christou and King 2010: 639). 
Unsurprisingly, Soviet deportation was such a foundational experience that 
it is ingrained in today’s repatriates’ ethos, and is still of importance when we 
consider the problems they face with contemporary institutional regimes of 
mobility and citizenship. Mann (2005: 8) actually argues that amongst surviving 
victims the idea of accidental suffering is commonly unacceptable. Thus, amongst 
Meskhetians in Akhaltsikhe, intentionality is projected onto occurrences that lie 
beyond an individual’s control and fall within the scope of governments. 
On one particular occasion, I witnessed a bitter argument about the high 
mortality rates amongst the deported, which involved the son of a deportee born 
in the 1950s and an acquaintance of his. The Meskhetian man contended that the 
high mortality rates had been caused by a specific plan implemented by the Soviet 
authorities. His acquaintance’s opinion, instead, was consistent with the theory of 
‘abandonment in deportation’, which attributes the deaths to an unintentional lack 
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227). Similarly, Uehling (2004: 94–95) describes how Crimean Tatar deportees 
challenge the deportation accounts suggesting that the operation was carried out 
in a ‘human’ way or that, at least, there was a sincere effort to do so on the part of 
the Soviet leadership. 
These collective narratives give testimony to Meskhetians’ history of abuse 
by the state, deployed as interpretive frameworks on today’s predicaments. They 
offer meaning whenever the workings of the state or other political entities resist 
interpretation or appear to function through ‘informal’ mechanisms of exclusion 
and control. 
The majority of Meskhetians who recently resettled in Georgia originate 
from Azerbaijan, as outlined above. Here, Meskhetian organisations, especially 
Vatan, strove to assist potential repatriates with application procedures. Vatan 
(‘Homeland’) was established in 1990, with the aim of promoting the return to 
Meskheti (currently situated roughly within the province of Samskhe-Javakheti). 
Testimonies from Vatan’s leaders and members of local branches of the 
organisation, in this sense, reflect the perception of the repatriation programme 
and emerging notions attempting to grapple with its ambiguities. At the heart 
of these narratives lie the criteria utilised by the Georgian government to vet 
applications, and the alleged arbitrary exclusion of Vatan’s members. 
This is clearly exemplified by the following excerpts from interviews with 
Rehman and Yusuf6: 
Rehman: To this day, no one who works for Vatan has obtained the status 
of repatriate, not even one status have they given us! This law … this law of 
2007, has only damaged us, it has been adopted in order to create obstacles 
for our return to Georgia. … Look at this guy, to his mother and his father 
they haven’t given it, neither to this brother and sister, in his family they 
only gave it to him. What is he supposed to do? To those who work for the 
fatherland, they don’t give the status; they give it to those who don’t really 
care! 
Another member of Vatan went even further: 
Yusuf: When I speak about a filter, I mean this, for example: they learn that 
someone’s dead, and then they send him the status! 
In order to analyse these narratives, it is useful to consider the relationship 
between the modern state’s securitarian preoccupations and its technologies of 
population control. Ultimately, the system of repatriation elicits political and 
ideological support in the public arena, but also emotional responses amongst 
subjects by evoking the promise of a status, the acquisition of which presupposes 
a wilful commitment. Thus, a space of programmed informality is generated and 
sustained by means of informal practices and unspoken rules of behaviour. Within 
this civic limbo, full membership in society is suspended—that is, postponed until 

























Still, informal fields of action seem equally important, since they pertain to 
domains that escape planning, control and, sometimes, cognition. 
Informality should, thus, be understood here as the modality of behaviour
adopted by a range of actors, from individuals to state and community institutions.
A space is constituted in which citizenship can be conceptualised not only as
a practice but also as an interpretive framework. The examples above reflect
the application of such framework to bureaucratic and legal procedures which
are enigmatic or raises legitimate doubts. We can argue that the condition the
repatriates enter represents one in which the friction between their status of
incomplete citizenship and partial, informal incorporation into society takes place
within the law itself, rather than outside it (Chauvin and Garcés-Mascarenas
2012: 243). What this perspective allows us to see, I believe, is also the ongoing
relevance of the nation-state as the source of citizenship rights in this era of
globalisation (Tölölyan 1991: 5; Oommen 2006: 34). This is a crucial point
since the field of informal practices I consider is not beyond the reach of—or
necessarily in defiance of—the state(s) across whose boundaries the Meskhetians
move and live their lives. 
The work of state institutions, therefore, also depends upon informal 
instruments: in order to vet repatriation applications, the Georgian government 
instituted a Council of Elders7, composed of senior members of the Meskhetian 
community. This council’s work relies on ethnic and kinship networks, and its 
legitimacy is based on the respect elicited by its members amongst Meskhetians. 
In the words of Nino, a Georgian nongovernmental worker: 
The Council of Elders … an institution which was created … to make sure 
that the individuals are identified, those who cannot demonstrate they were 
deported. Basically, there were cases of individuals who claimed to have 
been deported, but neither them nor their ancestors had been. 
But what kind of documents can they provide? 
When these people were deported, they were given papers which stated 
when and from where they were deported, a tiny piece of paper with their 
name and date … 
A document 70 years old is difficult to come by … 
It’s true. … Since the main criterion for repatriation is that the person, or 
his ancestors, were deported, and many could not prove it with a document, 
the government had to verify that they really were deported, or their ancestors 
were. That’s why they created this Council of Elders, which is an organism 
comprising three elders who verify the requirements of each person. The 
Ministry sends them the documents when everything else is verified and they 
ask them to make sure these people are truly deportees. They have personal 
networks, personal connections with the deported communities in Azerbaijan 
and elsewhere; it’s enough to make a call, be in touch with these communities, 
they have personal contacts, they know someone, and so on. … Thanks to this 
process the government managed to give more than 1000 individuals a status. 
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are leaders within their communities, respected by other Meskhetians, and 
for this reason they were chosen. … They have contacts, know many people. 
If the defining element of ‘informal citizenship’ is the role of personal connections 
in dealing with state institutions (Berenschot and van Klinken 2018: 99), the 
institution of the Council of Elders reflects the very embodiment of this principle. 
Informality compensates, in this case, for the lack of proper documentation, and, 
as clearly explained in the interview excerpt above, made it possible for a much 
larger number of people to access the application procedure. Nonetheless, it is 
also a source of conjecture and distrust, often directed at the very members of the 
Council, who are sometimes negatively associated with the Georgian government 
and accused of personally benefiting from their role. 
Postcoloniality: nationality, naturalisation 
and transnational horizons 
The question of whether the experiences of Meskhetian deportation, exile and 
dispersion, as well as their current relationship with their homeland, could be 
subsumed under the definition of postcoloniality is tied to the wider debate on 
whether the post-Soviet space itself should be included in postcolonial studies. 
Although the second question lies beyond our scope here, a number of elements 
speak in favour of answering the first question affirmatively, at the very least 
from the point of view of the Meskhetians’ experiences. For one thing, mass 
and arbitrary relocations of entire collectives and Soviet nationality policies and 
practices qualify as postcoloniality (Chioni Moore 2001: 123). Given the defining 
character of deportation for Meskhetians’ collective identity, the category of 
postcoloniality seems appropriate. Possessing an equally colonial tint are those 
‘cultural technologies of rule’ (Hirsch 2005: 307), such as the census and passport 
systems, integral to the project and implementation of collective relocation, as a 
colonial means of constituting subject positions through representation (Slemon 
2003: 46). Seen in the analytical context of a postcolonial relationship, the status 
of the Meskehtians who recently migrated to Georgia could be explained as a form 
of a disaggregated right containing partial recognition and elements of nationality 
(Cohen 2014: 147–148). The spectre looming in Meskhetians’ imagination may 
represent the ‘infinite danger’ of statelessness (Walzer 1983: 32), a condition in 
the postcolonial perspective that must refer to migration as much as to the ‘game of 
citizenship’ (Samaddar 2020). To complete this picture, the Arendtian reflection 
of statelessness highlights avoiding the dilemma of the irrational, stateless 
nonperson, such that statelessness is avoided from the perspective of the state as 
well, conferring partial bundles of rights as a means of expressing a difference in 
an institutional capacity whilst maintaining its control over the population (Cohen 
2014: 132–134). The Meskhetian repatriates, particularly those left in legal limbo 
through the shortcomings of the repatriation programme, appear trapped in a 
postcolonial space that lacks a proper centre–periphery structure: their direction is 





taken on the task of repatriation. Moreover, the very proliferation of international 
boundaries resulting from the birth of post-Soviet republics complicates, at least 
symbolically, their return (Martin 2001: 333), leaving a bittersweet taste to their 
appraisal of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the post-Soviet transitions to 
democracy. 
It comes as no surprise then, given the (at least perceived) threat of statelessness 
and the possibility of ushering in a liminal state, that giving up their Azerbaijani 
citizenship (an official requirement to naturalise as Georgian) becomes a 
nonviable, seemingly irrational option. 
The arbitrariness of informal bureaucratic practices manifests in the uncertainty 
surrounding the very amount of money to be paid to the Azerbaijani authorities in 
order to give up one’s citizenship (ranging ‘from USD 250 to 170’8). In addition, 
other uncertainties surround one’s rights including, for instance, the inability to 
inherit and possess property in the country of origin—an unreasonable prospect 
for people whose lives have become practically transnational. All these factors 
contribute to the failure of most to naturalise, a problem that could potentially 
be addressed by allowing for dual nationality (Hammar 1985: 442). This would 
represent a gesture of practical as well as symbolic compensation for people who 
have been historically disempowered and victimised through policies around 
nationality. 
One conclusion I draw, then, is that informality should be seen as an idiom 
and a code of conduct not necessarily relegated to the margins of state practices, 
but rather implicated as a part of the very rationale for state power. Navigating 
around the obstacles it poses involves a capacity to act along a transnational 
horizon of mobility and lifestyles. Several Meskhetian men, for example, engage 
in seasonal work in Turkey, new families frequently create a bridge originating 
from a Meskhetian community abroad, remittances are sent from kin abroad and 
participation in the informal economy is also common through, for example, the 
sale of products from small plots of land or dairy products. These and a myriad of 
other practices that exceed the formal expectations of national communities coexist 
within groups that continue representing themselves as culturally bounded and 
self-sustaining. Yet, these practices are pragmatically enmeshed in relationships 
of economic and political interdependency necessary for reshaping notions 
of citizenship (Thunder 2014: 79–80). In this sense, the pursuit of naturalised 
citizenship is but one facet of a more complex strategy, wide-reaching in a literal, 
geographical sense and involving unique understandings of transnational contexts 
(Gutiérrez 2008: 196). What the subjects substantiate here is a procedural, civic 
idea of citizenship, rather than a holistic, romantic, cultural one (Rapport 2005: 
205), which subjectively dilutes the nationalist, formal core of conventional 
citizenship (Zolberg 2000: 517). Where repatriates’ and state practices interact, 
overlap and enter into conflict, informality plays out publicly in the ‘game of 
citizenship’. Still, it retains its shadowy qualities as a cognitive lens through 
which hegemonic manifestations of regulatory powers are interpreted. 
A shrewd look at these migratory policies might blur the boundaries between 
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to a grey area wherein citizenship is negotiated. Such a relativisation of citizenship 
entails a circumspect assessment of the naturalisation path afforded by the ‘Law 
on Repatriation’. The perceived trade-off they are offered, between renouncing 
their citizenship of origin and the promise of a new one, becomes disempowering 
for people living a de facto transnational life (Iordachi 2004: 135). In a sense, the 
moral and spiritual implications, as well as the practical impact, of the ‘national 
order of things’ (Malkki 1992: 26) are at odds with aspirations that still retain an 
echo of the Soviet cosmopolitanism of ordinary life (Humphrey 2004: 151), albeit 
embodied in its Caucasian variant as a continually ‘deferred project’ (Grant 2010: 
124). Personal and collective memories of violence and dispossession instilled 
a sense of vulnerability within the Meskhetian diaspora’s sense of self, possibly 
explaining their unwillingness to accommodate return and mobility projects. Thus, 
naturalisation is impossible lest one severs citizenship ties with their nationality 
of origin. 
Dual citizenship, however, would recognise the inscription of the repatriates’ 
existence within a transnational order, granting it legitimacy. As Spiro (2010: 127) 
points out, a regime that suppresses plural citizenship incentivises individuals to 
select the one with the greatest personal salience, based on a number of practical 
as well as symbolic and emotional factors. Such choice seems to represent an 
insurmountable obstacle to realising the repatriates’ rights. Mobilising this 
concept functions, in my opinion, as more than a mere speculative exercise. 
Repatriates’ informal practices of citizenship are, in fact, informal practices 
of dual citizenship. It is in this direction that reluctance to strip themselves of 
their nationality of origin, rather than mere economic considerations, becomes 
intelligible. Naturalised citizenship in both countries would, thus, recognise their 
transnational lives (Kivisto and Faith 2015: 139), and perhaps achieve a form of 
historical compensation. 
Conclusions 
This chapter reflected on the informal practices of (dual) citizenship (Sassen 2002: 
6) amongst disenfranchised individuals. At the same time, it utilised the category 
of informality vis-à-vis local interpretations of legal frameworks, notably of 
the (un)intended effects—or implicit aims—of norms regulating mobility and 
membership in the national polity (which, in turn, often rely on informal practices 
of exclusion). Informality has, thus, been understood as a principle of action, 
thought and perhaps governance, used to describe the actions of disempowered, 
marginal individuals and communities as well as policies. On the first level, it 
works as a way of ‘getting things done’, of gaining something by compensating 
for the restraints imparted by laws and regulations, by one’s status in society, such 
as what I have described in this chapter as ‘informal practices of dual citizenship’. 
For the Meskhetian repatriates in Georgia, this means cultivating a fractured sense 
of home, bifocal at least and perpetually incomplete. 
In this chapter, I investigated Meskhetians’ perceptions of state powers in
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betrayal of established norms of citizenship (Levin 2017: 4)) drawing from
the impact of the 2014 ‘Law on Citizenship’. On the second level, informality
serves as a means of achieving particular goals through ambiguous forms of
governance that generate grey areas. Meskhetians’ informal citizenship practices,
therefore, arise through a dialogue with the informality of the institutional and
legal framework of the repatriation programme. Undoubtedly, this represents an
unequal relationship, within which their life projects and the accomplishments
of everyday work appear open to revision and possibly stripped from them at
any time. It is a state of things in which people perceive—and are affected by— 
structures of inequality inscribed in their imperfect membership status, rendering
them vulnerable to social and embodied forms of suffering. The question of purpose
is relevant here, chiefly as part and parcel of local interpretative frameworks,
arising from histories of victimisation and a quest for reparation. In this light,
the principle of informality qualifies one dimension through which the returnees
experience the state(s): time and money-wasting bureaucratic hurdles, loopholes
in the legal framework and so on. These everyday complications force one to
conduct their lives in grey areas and through informal practices of citizenship.
The idea of ‘dual citizenship’ is, therefore, advanced again in this chapter.
But here it represents a formal embrace of the contradictions of the returnees’
transnational lives. Through dual citizenship, multiple memberships and histories
would be brought to light and legitimised. The informal principle could, thus,
offer analytical tools via which to address immigration and citizenship law,
primarily—as we have seen—by bringing local interpretative models into our
analysis. Furthermore, looking through the lens of ‘informality’ sheds light on
certain modes of governance, especially in the fields of migration and citizenship,
which generate uncertainty and vulnerability. 
Notes 
1 A shared history of deportation, resettlement and exile has blurred the boundaries of 








6 I use fictional names to protect my interlocutors’ privacy. 
7 https://ge.boell.org/en/2011/11/02/repatriation-issues-muslim-meskhetians. 
8 From my field notes. 
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